Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware: The Calvinists’ False Dichotomy

            Calvinists Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware edited a book in which prominent Calvinists contributed chapters on the various difficulties that plague their Calvinism. The book is titled Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace.¹  Schreiner and Ware wrote the preface and introduction. In the introduction, they write,

“…we are convinced that the central reason that the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis, although we grant that those who disagree with us would interpret many Scriptures differently.  But their fundamental objections are certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology we affirm.  It should be granted that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.  The objections go something like this: If God chooses only some, then how can he be loving?  If God’s grace is irresistible, then what happens to human free will?  If God saves those he has chosen, why pray or get involved in missions?  If God is in control of the world, then why do anything at all?  If God is sovereign, then why is there suffering in the world?  If God governs all events, then why is evil our responsibility, not his?

               Calvinists would not answer all of these questions in the same way.  In fact, as careful readers will surely observe, there are differing opinions even among the contributors to this work as to the most satisfying answers to these questions.  Nonetheless, there would be agreement among Calvinists that God is sovereign, and that his free election of individuals to receive his efficacious grace alone accounts for personal salvation.  God’s unconditional election and irresistible grace cause all who believe to put their faith in Christ to be saved.  We suggest that the answers to the preceding questions are often complex because the reality of life as portrayed by the Scriptures is complex.  God is completely sovereign, and yet human choices and responsibility are not a charade.  God ordains all that comes to pass and is good; and yet evil exists, and it is really evil.  God chooses only some to be saved, and yet there is also a true sense in which he desires the salvation of all.  Those who are elect will never lose their salvation, and yet those who do not persevere to the end will not inherit the kingdom of God.  All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.  People do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems.  Rather, the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.  Our attempt to solve the problems posed by our theology, then, is an example of “faith seeking understanding.”²

            This statement, among other things, provides us with the definition of the Calvinists’ hermeneutic.  I have thoroughly examined this statement in Chapters 9 and 10. Yet I want to repeat here that it essentially dismisses any bearing the “logical problems” that “raise legitimate and difficult questions” might have upon determining the biblical validity of the Calvinist interpretations of God’s sovereignty defined deterministically and election as unconditional.  I call this the Calvinists’ false dichotomy. As such, Schreiner and Ware’s approach lacks credibility at too fundamental a philosophical level to be plausible.  The cannons of reason, which are the foundation of thought, cannot be ignored, and Calvinists still claim their interpretation is valid.  Rather, given the nature of the Calvinist interpretations as incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory, they are thereby known to be nonsense, and therefore, cannot be accurate interpretations of the biblical texts.  How are these “doctrines of grace” to be deemed “what Scripture teaches” when, as Luther confessed, they give “the greatest possible offence to common sense or natural reason?”  So we see that for the Reformed thinker, “common sense and natural reason” are not allowed to play their proper role in determining the validity of an interpretation.

            According to Schreiner and Ware, “the reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”  But upon what basis can we discern whether these doctrines are really the teaching of Scripture?  What would cause a person to doubt that these Calvinist doctrines may not be an accurate reflection of biblical teaching, except for the logical, moral, epistemological, and biblical problems the Calvinist definitions of sovereignty and election generate?  Without the deliberations of logic and the use of our moral intuition being applied in the interpretative task, one’s conclusions simply cannot be verified as to their validity.  All we are left with are bald assertions being made about the meaning of the text.  But almost anything can be proposed as the teaching of Scripture simply from the ink on the page.  What then should convince us that one or the other interpretation is the more accurate interpretation, except that it gives due consideration to rational, moral, and theological coherence with the full biblical witness?  In view of the whole of biblical teaching about the nature of God and man, faith, and the gospel, etc., the theological position on sovereignty and election that best provides resolution to the Calvinists’ “logical problems,” which are “legitimate,” is the non-Calvinist position that does not place Scripture in a dichotomous, conflicted, and incoherent relationship with the deliverances of philosophical reflection and moral intuition.

            Calvinists insulate their theology from these logical, moral, epistemological, and theological concerns.  They boast that their exegesis leads to their doctrinal conclusions, but it is an exegesis that allows for conclusions that are logically and morally incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory.  They do not allow logical and moral coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction to enter into the exegetical process, nor do they allow them to scrutinize the accuracy of their exegesis and their theological and doctrinal conclusions. The very logic and detailed evidences, exegetical and otherwise, that would inform us that these doctrines are biblically suspect is put “out of court” by the unsubstantiated claim that the contradictions, incoherencies, and inconsistencies are only “apparent,” “beyond human reason,” a “high mystery,” the result of the “complex reality of life,” etc.  This amounts to the claim that the Calvinists’ interpretations are correct even though they generate logical, moral, and theological difficulties and despite any contention that these are indispensable to a sound hermeneutic. The Calvinists’ traditional interpretations hold sway over these concerns.  Ultimately, their interpretations are not subject to such concerns.

            Does Scripture teach a contradiction or not?  Can it contain contradictory propositions? Does the Calvinist have carte blanche to claim that their preferred contradiction (i.e., deterministic sovereignty and human free will) is only “apparent” and not real?  Do we have the prerogative to dismiss contradictory interpretations just because the Bible is about God and spiritual things, which it is suggested are, of course, “beyond reason?”  The answer, if we are to remain rationally coherent, must be, “No.”  Schreiner and Ware state that Calvinists have already concluded “that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.”  This is what they believe is taught in Scripture about God’s sovereignty, regardless of its final logical and moral difficulties or incoherence with other biblical teachings.  Rational coherence gives way to certain fixed textual interpretations, and the problematic results are declared a “mystery.”  Given this approach, any suggestion that Calvinists are genuinely involved in an “attempt to solve the problems posed by our theology” seems hollow and predestined (in the truest sense of the word) to go nowhere. It has already been decided that the problem is “a mystery.”  If this “mystery” theology takes precedence over rational considerations based upon alternative exegetical examination of the pertinent texts, then no logical or moral considerations hold any weight in the discussion.  They are not allowed to enter and perform their proper role.  We ask, therefore, what is left by which the Calvinist himself can attempt to solve the problems posed by their theology?

            If the exegesis which the non-Calvinist places before the Calvinist better accounts for (which can only mean “provides coherent thought to”) more of the biblical data is summarily dismissed by the Calvinist simply because it disagrees with his traditionally held interpretation, then the Calvinist interpretation will stand, just as any other interpretation based upon the simple assertion “we believe the Bible teaches that…” has a right to stand.  But I don’t think that “we believe the Bible teaches that…” is enough to give that belief the right to stand as biblical truth that all Christians should believe. The point is that there must be something that arbitrates between two or more exegetical processes that yield mutually exclusive results.  That “something” is the integration of those conclusions with other exegetical conclusions such that coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction are achieved.  These are the indicators that verify and validate accurate interpretations.  I deal with this in detail in Chapter 12.

            Therefore, based on the Calvinist hermeneutic stated here by Schreiner and Ware, we cannot engage in a rational and moral discourse concerning the Calvinist doctrines.  Without acknowledging that reason is the only arbiter available to us to discern true propositions or interpretations from false ones, all the Calvinists will have to do is state or affirm their theological propositions and interpretations, and when they prove contradictory, they may simply claim “mystery.”  We non-Calvinists can inquire into and invalidate their truth value, but the Calvinists will not.  Moreover, the non-Calvinist could never convince the Calvinist that they have misinterpreted the text and that their interpretations are not valid because the Calvinist ultimately considers logical and moral coherence hermeneutically irrelevant.  In essence, the Calvinist has informed us he will not, regardless of reasons, be convinced otherwise regarding his theological position.  Calvinism is, therefore, in the true sense of the word, irrational.  It is a theology that ultimately rejects the faculty of reason. It is not governed by nor does it operate in accordance with reason. This is why “discussion” on these matters, if the Calvinist is inclined to be engaged at all, can lead nowhere.  Non-Calvinists and Calvinists exegete the biblical data based on very different rational presuppositions; the Calvinist embraces a hermeneutic of incoherence, while the non-Calvinist embraces a hermeneutic of coherence.

Furthermore, if, as Schreiner and Ware state, “mystery” is “the full and final resolution” to the logical and moral problems of Calvinism, then this controversy should be declared futile as a failure in Christian hermeneutics and interpretation.  If Calvinists refuse to acknowledge and put into practice the hermeneutic of coherence, then this controversy will continue without reaching a consensus on the biblical truth in these matters.  It will not be resolved precisely because the very rational and moral grounds needed to arbitrate what constitutes a valid exegesis have been jettisoned. This also means that the evangelical church cannot even discern the truth of its most precious message – the “good news” of the gospel. The Calvinists’ TULIP soteriological doctrines stand in direct contradiction with the non-Calvinists’ message of truly “good news” to sinners. So, which contains the truth of the gospel?

  John Hendryx Exemplifies the False Dichotomy

            Calvinist John Hendryx, on the website Monergism.com, provides another example of the Calvinists’ dichotomizing of exegesis from philosophical and moral reasoning, the very reasoning that shows their doctrine of “God’s meticulous providence” is incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory to other biblical doctrines.  Hendryx states,

               “Since the Scripture is our ultimate authority and highest (sic) presuppsosition, the multitude of clear scriptural declarations on this matter outweigh all unaided human logic. We find that almost always the objections to God’s meticulous providence over all things are moral and philosophical rather than exegetical. This means we must strive to consciously affirm what the Scripture declares over all our finite understanding and sinful inner drive for independence.”³

            A number of responses are in order here.

            First, once again, we see the false dichotomy between exegesis and the deliverances of philosophical reflection and moral intuition in the interpretive task.  Hendryx echoes the position of Schreiner and Ware discussed above and in Chapter 9.

            Second, of course, one would expect to find “the objections to God’s meticulous providence” to be both moral and philosophical from those who value their presence and clarifying function in their hermeneutic. This would be in direct contrast to Calvinists, who give them no credence, as Hendryx does here.  Hence, we need to stress that, according to a responsible hermeneutic, the non-Calvinist objections are no less exegetical because they are moral and logical objections; rather, they are more fully exegetical because non-Calvinists believe moral and logical considerations are essential to the exegetical task.  In addition, Calvinists are prone to forget that sound exegetical material countering the Calvinist interpretations abounds.  Non-Calvinists can provide alternative exegetical explanations of every text Calvinists claim supports their “meticulous providence.”  Those interpretations are faithful to the text on any criterion required of the historical-grammatical methodology, with the added advantage that they better account for the full scope of the material coherently and consistently.  Any attempt to boast that Calvinism is correct based on exegesis while maintaining that philosophical and moral objections hold no weight against such exegesis seems to misunderstand the reliability, essential necessity, and role of reason in the interpretive process. So Hendryx’s statement only confirms that Calvinists view the philosophical discipline and our moral intuitions as irrelevant to the exegetical task.  Indeed, these are considered immaterial when they present a challenge to the Calvinist exegesis and interpretations. Whereas non-Calvinists include the logic of philosophy and moral considerations in their interpretive framework.            

            Third, Hendryx misconceives the moral and philosophical objections brought against Calvinism as “our finite understanding and sinful inner drive for independence.”  This mischaracterization is a red herring meant to divert us from the real problem here.  The problem here is not “our finite understanding” nor our “sinful inner drive for independence,” but the violation of the laws of logic and reasoning principles in the interpretive process – laws and principles that are necessary for us to understand anything at all.  The problem here has nothing to do with our “sinful inner drive for independence” but the Calvinists’ inner drive to be free from the logical and moral entailments of their theological system.  It seems that the confusion between rationalism and the legitimate use of reason persists in Calvinist thought. To employ one’s moral intuitions and rational faculties in the interpretive task is not to seek autonomous existence from God or any “sinful inner drive for independence.”

            Fourth, Calvinists’ attempt to reduce their problem of interpretive difficulties to mere differences in exegesis. They ignore the logical and moral objections non-Calvinists raise to the Calvinists’ exegesis. But this sword cuts both ways. Non-Calvinists also provide exegetical support for their theology and soteriology, but given that the Calvinist has jettisoned logical reflection and moral intuition from the interpretive task, how would the Calvinist be able to refute and reject the non-Calvinist exegesis as unbiblical?  How does the Calvinist know that the non-Calvinist view is not the teaching of Scripture?  Just because it disagrees with the Calvinists’ interpretation?  Well, on the Calvinists’ rationale of dismissing philosophical and moral critiques, the non-Calvinist position also holds true. The non-Calvinist claims its exegesis is biblical and accurate, so that should suffice the Calvinist. So, which exegesis is more faithful to the text?  How will we know?  This is why the matter is not merely exegetical.  It is a matter of delineating what constitutes a sound exegesis with respect to the reasoning that occurs in the process of exegesis.  Exegesis sits within a hermeneutical framework that also needs to be defined, revealed, and defended.  Our hermeneutic needs to be clarified and defined regarding whether it values coherence and the use of philosophical reasoning (i.e., clear thinking) and our moral intuitions.

            Fifthly.  Philosophy just is the discipline of clear thinking.  To raise philosophical objections to a position is to raise substantial issues that must be addressed and cannot be cavalierly dismissed.  Ultimately, Calvinists recognize this because they try to maintain a semblance of logical credibility in defense of their Calvinism, but this is impossible once you are trapped in the vortex of theistic determinism.  I would like to know how we “strive to consciously affirm what the Scripture declares” exegetically, without using our moral and philosophical reasoning?  How do you “affirm what the Scripture declares over our finite understanding” when we must employ our “finite understanding” to affirm what Scripture declares?  Thus, the Calvinist position here is circular and self-defeating.

            Sixthly, if our understanding is so marred by sin as the Calvinist claims, then what warrant does the Calvinist have to think that his exegesis is correct?

            Seventh, what is “unaided” human logic?  Is that different than “human logic” as it stands?  What would “aided human logic” amount to?  Would it be a different logic?  It is not clear what the difference is between logic, unaided human logic, or any other kind of logic.  Rather, the rules of logic are clearly defined and are always applicable and necessary for any inquiry or discussion to be meaningful and productive.  Logic is an established discipline with axiomatic rules.  It seems that the Calvinist cannot bring himself to dismiss logic wholesale, but he wants to pick and choose when it applies.  This seems a convenient way to maintain his theology when it runs afoul of logic.  The Calvinist can use logic as long as it affirms his theology, but when his theology violates logic, it becomes “finite understanding” or in need of some kind of “aid.”

            Eighth. This reveals that the place of reason in interpreting divine revelation needs to be clarified. It’s the “divine” aspect of the text that the Calvinist employs to dismiss the rules of logic and our moral intuitions from applying to their interpretations.  But, by virtue of its also being a written text, certain rules of interpretation established by reason apply (e.g., coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction).  And if there are first principles of logic and morality, by virtue of their being first principles, they must apply.

I, like all evangelicals, grant the indispensable and foundational role of exegesis and the historical-critical method to biblical interpretation.  But disparate theological and soteriological positions are, in essence, arguments about whether one’s proposed meaning of a literary text, which is based on their exegesis, is valid.  And as they are arguments, both the laws of logic and sound hermeneutical principles governing the interpretation of a written text apply to biblical exegesis.  Hermeneutics, or the principles of interpretation, are grounded in the canons of reason.  Therefore, exegesis is also grounded in the canons of reason or the laws of logic.  Why?  Because to jettison the laws of logic in exegesis is to allow our exegesis to be untethered from reason and the inevitable result must be that any proposed exegesis of a text becomes “valid” because it cannot be critiqued with respect to its coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction and as such it cannot be known to be in accord with the author’s intended meaning.

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Footnotes

1. Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000). ↩︎
2. Ibid. 18, 19. ↩︎
3. John Hendryx, Section 44, 1^st paragraph.  Last accessed 11/23/2025.
   www.monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/onsite/qna/sovereignfree.html ↩︎