The vocabulary of “persuasion,” “understanding,” “freely,” “willingly,” “enable” and “answer” are all key elements in Vanhoozer’s theology. But we should note that there is a conglomerate of ideas in the Westminster Confession’s doctrine of an effectual call (and hence Vanhoozer’s theology) that if taken to the touchstone of Scripture cause theological conflict and the plain sense of these words send an incoherent message. The Spirit “effectually draws” all those “predestinated to life,” making them “willing” to come to Christ and yet all this works so as “they come most freely.” Many hesitate to argue against the divine action described here precisely because it is viewed as a gracious act of God. And it is likely that this form and definition of God’s “grace” has continued to be propagated within Evangelicalism out of the distinctly Christian desire not to diminish whatever can been perceived as an act of undeserved favor on God’s part towards helpless sinners. But our religious sentiments are not the deciding factor of spiritual truth. The deciding factor is whether this idea of “grace” and an “effectual call” can survive a biblical examination in which rational coherence plays a role in determining valid interpretation.
It is also said that the Spirit “enables” the hearer to “answer” the call to salvation which is also said to be an “offer” of grace, yet the hearer remains “altogether passive therein.” Here is where these words become contradictory. An “offer” is defined by the possibility of accepting or rejecting what is offered. An offer that is “irresistible” because it has been determined to be “effectual” by the one “offering” it is incoherent. And how is it that the one “answers” the call and yet “is altogether passive therein,” except that we view a person as merely an instrument through whom God works his will. And how are we to perceive being “made willing,” when having “a will” entails a person being the sole author of an action and having the ability of contrary choice? For a person to have a “will” which then is totally determined by another’s will seems to defeat the very meaning and purpose of having a “will” of one’s own. How is “doing what one desires” sufficient for a proper definition of “they come most freely” when what the person desires is predetermined by God and thereby the resultant action is also predetermined? The linguistic and practical dynamics between God and man are more than can be accounted for from within compatibilism. For instance, the use of the word “enabled” is problematic. Vanhoozer, writing about “that Benjamin among theological doctrines: the effectual call” quotes Anthony Hoekema who defines it as follows:
“that sovereign action of God through his Holy Spirit whereby he enables the hearer of the gospel call to respond to his summons.” (RT, 371)
The use of the word “enables” is not accurate in the context of the theistic determinism of the Confession or Vanhoozer’s theistic determinism. The concept of “enablement” is compatible with a non-Calvinist soteriology, but on Calvinism the quote should read,
“that sovereign action of God through his Holy Spirit whereby he causes the hearer of the gospel call to respond to his summons.”
Again, Vanhoozer attempts to soften the impersonal causality of Calvinism’s soteriology, but the use of “enables” or “enabled” introduces a concept that is incoherent with their determinism. To “enable” retains the possibility of contrary choice. One may be enabled to do something that they were not able to do before, but that does not entail that they will or must do what they have been enabled to do. “Enabled” implies both the need for active participation and the freedom to reject what is now a possibility for them – the thing which they have been enabled to do. In this case of the “effectual call,” it is an enabling “to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it.” Yet it is clearly stated that, “man is altogether passive therein.” So, what does it mean “to answer” and “to embrace?” And what is the implication of “offer?” It is these Calvinist doctrines of absolute passivity based in an absolute determinism that cannot endure language that, by definition, involves interactive relationship and contingency. And as the overwhelming biblical testimony is to both a worldview and the divine/human relationship that is marked by contingency, conditionality, possibility, and potentiality, this Calvinist compatibilism (i.e., that theistic determinism and human freedom are compatible) will not endure a biblical scrutiny that seeks to maintain logical, moral, and epistemic coherence. By maintaining a theistic determinism compatibilism renders itself incoherent. And this contingent, conditional, possible or potential activity should not be defined as simply perfunctory, that is, free will defined as performing the divine will, as if when I type on my computer I can claim that the computer is acting “most freely” simply because it is engaged in something it is capable as a machine of doing. The same goes for the “effectual call.” A person is not acting “most freely” simply because the person is engaged in what they are capable as a person of doing, that is, having dealings with God. Persons are not acting “most freely” when their actions are exhaustively determined by the will of God. It is incoherent to talk of making, that is, causing, someone freely do something. This is true when Calvinist’s claim God is making them willing to come to Christ. But this is merely an instrumental use of a human “agent.” Rather, biblical “activity” involves the activity of person’s which implies the ability of sole authorship of action and the ability of contrary choice. Therefore, from a deterministic context it certainly is very difficult to understand the irresistible, effectual activity of God upon person’s as not perfunctory, instrumental, impersonal, strategic, causal, etc. Just to assert that,
“…divine converse converts – brings about decisive changes in human beings in ways that do not violate but consummate their nature as persons.” (RT, 370)
or to write,
“And God can insinuate the end in our deliberations…” (italics mine)
are the use of clever language, but this does nothing to address the more fundamental problems of Calvinist soteriology, let alone the problem of the contradiction between Calvinism’s theistic determinism and human freedom and responsibility.
In Vanhoozer’s Calvinist compatibilist theology, being “made willing” (determined) is incoherent with the sense of the word “enabled” which implies libertarian freedom of the will. Referring to section X of the Westminster Confession, Jerry Walls and Joseph Dongell observe,
“Immediately striking is the different language used here to describe the effectual call…Those who receive this call are said to be altogether passive until they are renewed by the Holy Spirit. Then they are said to be enabled to do something they could not before, namely to actively embrace the grace that is offered.
Now the notion of being enabled is quite different from that of being made willing. The one who is made willing to do something will surely do that thing. His will is controlled in such a way that he wills just what he has been determined to will. But to be enabled to do something is another matter altogether. It implies that one has been given the ability to do it but that how the ability will be exercised is undetermined.”[1]
Walls and Dongell rightly emphasize that to speak in terms of “enablement” while claiming that God determines one’s desires in such a way that the person cannot and will not do otherwise is incoherent. Calvinist compatibilism is an incoherent conflation of propositions. In contrast, libertarian freedom is consistent with “enabling,” for God remains sovereign as he genuinely interacts in divine freedom to either allow human freedom or curtail, circumvent, or remove that freedom in certain circumstances and for certain purposes as he providentially rules and reigns over the affairs of persons with substantial freedom of the will. The human libertarian freedom we find in Scripture and experience daily is inconsistent with an absolute theistic determinism and the necessary causality required to make persons willing to do certain things determined by God. In addition, “free will” does not simply refer to “doing what one desires,” to which the Calvinist adds “but God determines your desires, therefore you have free will and God is sovereign.”
Walls and Dongell make further observations on the problems of “being made willing” and “enablement” in the Confession.
“…ability is not the same thing as willingness. One may be enabled to do something without being willing to do it. This distinction is important because the notion of being enabled, unlike that of being made willing, is compatible with libertarian freedom. Indeed, it implies such freedom. To enable someone to do something is to make it possible for her to do it but not to determine her choice. It is up to her whether she will do what she has been enabled to do. This means that effectual calling is described in two ways: one implies a compatibilist view of freedom and the other implies libertarian freedom. These appear to be inconsistent accounts.
Now a defender of the Westminster Confession might contend…that fallen sinners lack both the will and the ability to obey God. It’s not enough for God to make us willing to do right; he must also enable us to act rightly…The question, however, is whether the notion of being made willing that is found in the Westminster Confession implies that the ability is still lacking and must be added once willingness is established. The answer to this can be easily ascertained by examining the passage in question. Those who are described as having been made willing are clearly not lacking in the ability to do what they are made willing to do, namely, to come to Christ. Rather, they have been determined to the good in such a way that they actually do come to Christ, and do so “most freely.” So the concept of being made willing here entails being determined to willingly perform the action requested.
This is very much at odds with the notion of being enabled to do something and being free in the libertarian sense to choose whether or not to do it. That is the ordinary meaning of the term enabled and the natural way to read it in the passage cited above…
At best then, the use of enablement language is highly misleading in light of the deterministic language that precedes it; at worst, it is inconsistent.”[2]
The main point here is that the Westminster Confession is confused. It promotes the two incompatible concepts of “they come most freely, being made willing” and “enabled to answer this call.” The meaning of the word “enable” implies libertarian freedom which is in contradiction with the determinism of “being made willing.” “Enablement” language presupposes non-determinism. To speak of enabling in the ordinary sense of the word, and the sense used by compatibilists, leaves open the possibility of contrary choice. To “enable” presupposes no determination of the desires, will or actions. Thus, talk of “enabling” while also claiming “they come most freely, being made willing” is incoherent. To speak of God making a person desire, and therefore will a certain course of action, is to maintain a determinism that is inconsistent with speaking about enabling the person to freely come to Christ. Simply by causing one to have the desire and the will to come to Christ, the coming would be inevitable. Talk of enabling has quite different implications. Calvinists know this yet they refuse to adjust their theology accordingly.
The determinism of compatibilism is completely different than the Spirit communicating the gospel content that challenges, calls and summons the hearer to respond to the gospel message. Through the proclamation of the content of the Word of God, and by virtue of what the gospel is in and of itself (i.e., “good news), the Spirit is personally involved in the delivering of the message to the hearers. Non-Calvinists debate whether the sinner needs to be enabled respond to the message or whether the message the sinner needs any special enabling because the message itself is perfectly comprehensible and fitted for sinners with the presence of the Spirit driving the message home to the hearer. The Spirit is at work in the mind and heart of the hearer, not necessarily enabling them to believe, which by virtue of the message they can do, but adding power and divine presence to the proclamation of the message so the hearer is without excuse for remaining in unbelief. Because of the content of the gospel which informs the sinner of their sin, the “good news” of their salvation, and the presence of the Spirit, the hearer is left with no excuse for not believing in Christ. They make reject the message and squelch the Spirit, but they will have no excuse before God. It is they, not God, who has determined their eternal destiny in hell. Nevertheless, any non-deterministic approach would be consistent with being enabled to come to Christ. By being enabled by the Spirit through the Word, that is, according to the content of the gospel message, the person’s desires and will, and therefore their response, is not determined. The call is not “effectual” in the sense that it has a predetermined result depending upon one’s election by God to salvation. Rather, the content of the gospel as “good news” indicates that the hearer retains the free will to determine their eternal destiny with respect to Christ.
Although Vanhoozer makes the claim of compatibility between the clear determinism of predestination and human freedom, it appears that the definition of human freedom has been constructed to fit the deterministic occasion. If the definition of human freedom is reduced to the unencumbered performance of one’s strongest desires, then if God effects those desires, willingness, and ability to do what He wants done, the claim can be made that such actions of God are compatible with human “freedom.” But here freedom is reduced to simply the performance of what one desires to do and that without constraint or impediment as God determines one’s desires and therefore does not sufficiently or coherently incorporate the realities of biblical faith, moral responsibility, justice, and judgment.
Jeremy A. Evans, assistant professor of Christian Philosophy at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary states that according to the compatibilist there are two conditions for the establishment of human freedom. The first is that one has the power or ability to choose something should one want or decide to do so. The second condition is that there exist no constraints or impediments that prevent a person from doing what they want to do. He also notes that,
“…I am still considered to be free in compatibilism even if the past determines what I will or desire. So, even though this construal of human freedom affirms that determinism is true, it finds no problem in saying that human freedom is compatible with determinism. As it were, although my desires are beyond my direct control (in fact, they control me), they are still my desires. Often this kind of freedom is called freedom of inclination, where I can do whatever I want but have no power over my wants. I am free insofar as I am unhindered in exercising these desires through choices…persons may be morally praised or blamed as long as they act freely, where freedom is to be understood as choosing according to one’s greatest desire.”[3]
But notice, although compatibilist language seems to include all the dynamics of human freedom, it is only saying that the elements are in place whereby I inevitably take a certain course of action. A person is “freed up” so to speak, both internally (willingness) and externally (no impediments), to act. The theistic determinism is maintained by stating that it is God who enables and effects the desires.
But the problem lies in the implausible and insufficient construction of a definition of “free” that has the “will” determined by God. When examined more closely, there is an obvious sense in which the concepts of being “predestined,” “made willing” and “enabled” to come to Christ “most freely” being “altogether passive therein” are confusing and contradictory. The determinism of compatibilism inserts incoherence in what it is attempting to do. Is human willing that is meaningfully free something that is determined by God through ones desires as an “altogether passive” phenomenon? As already discussed above, “enablement” entails the real possibility of an active choice of one thing or another. To be “enabled” and also “determined” as to what one can will and must will or “choose” is hardly a convincing or realistic account of human freedom no matter how much Vanhoozer tries to alter God’s deterministic sovereignty with a vocabulary of non-causal, non-coercive, personal, “communicative,” “speech-act” theory.
Evans goes on to point out the essential differences between this compatibilist view and a libertarian view of free will.
“How does this view of freedom differ from the libertarian account of freedom?…First, neither of these two conditions stipulates that genuine alternatives are required for the agent to be free.”[4]
Evans raises the point that contrary choice is absent in compatibilism. Human freedom cannot simply be reduced to the ability to do what one desires without constraint or impediment. From a biblical perspective this view comes up short. For even though the compatibilist will point out the affects of sin upon the human will and understanding, the Bible still testifies to the realities of active sole authorship and contrary choice as foundational for faith, moral responsibility, justice, and judgment. These biblical themes cannot be coherently incorporated into an ultimately deterministic theology. In Scripture, human decision and moral responsibility become meaningful issues with respect to hearing and responding to the gospel, its biblical definition as “good news” for all sinners, the nature of faith, the call and possibility of responding to God in faith, the fact of morally culpable action, the judgment and justice of God, the knowledge and assurance of one’s salvation, and the presence of evil in the world. These are profoundly significant issues, and the way they are perceived and promoted rests upon one’s view of how God relates to man and vice versa. I submit that the compatibilist view cannot coherently incorporate these biblical truths into its inevitably deterministic theological scheme. Therefore, compatibilism is an unbiblical explanation of the God/man relationship.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] Jerry L. Walls and Joseph R. Dongell, Why I Am Not A Calvinist, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 166.
[2] Ibid. 166-168.
[3] Jeremy A. Evans, “Reflections on Determinism and Human Freedom” in David L. Allen & Steve W. Lemke, eds., Whosoever Will: A Biblical-Theological Critique of Five-Point Calvinism, (Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2010), 255, 259.
[4] Jeremy A. Evans, “Reflections on Determinism and Human Freedom” in David L. Allen & Steve W. Lemke, eds., Whosoever Will: A Biblical-Theological Critique of Five-Point Calvinism, (Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2010), 254-255.
The Truth of the Gospel 