Vanhoozer writes,
“Triune dialogical consummation is a matter of God’s acting not on persons but within and through them in such a way that, precisely by so acting, God brings them to their senses and makes them into the creatures they were always meant to be.” (RT, 370)
“It is in such dialogical interaction that we best see the way in which God exercises his sovereignty and humans their freedom.” (RT, 367)
First, this “acting not on persons but within and through them” seems to me from within Vanhoozer’s deterministic context to be a distinction without a difference. Vanhoozer wants to preserve his determinism – God’s unconditional election certain people, and yet he seeks to soften this determinism by God working “within and through them.” But this approach does nothing to alleviate the problem of theistic determinism in Vanhoozer’s Calvinist position. He has also clearly stated that humans remain free. This is what theologians call Calvinist compatibilism – that determinism and human freedom are compatible. Bruce R. Reichenbach asks the hard question of Vanhoozer’s Calvinist compatibilism.
“But is Calvin’s compatibilist doctrine true? According to him, God not only foreordains every event but also is the active cause behind each event. This applies not only to events in the external world, but also to events in what might be termed our internal world. God operates on the human mind, controlling desires and beliefs,[1] hardening and renewing as he wills. And he operates on our acts of choosing, so that our very choices (acts of will) are caused by God himself.[2] He is thus the author (cause) of both our willing and our doing. Since our choosing, believing, and desiring are caused by one who exists and foreordains all things prior to our existence, we cannot will, choose, believe, or desire other than we are caused to do.
But then the freedom asserted by Calvin and the compatibilist is an illusion, for the coercion that controls our acts when we are not free here extends to our desires and choices. When our actions are coerced, we are prevented from doing what we want, i.e., from doing anything other than it is determined that we do. When our will is coerced, we are prevented from making any choices other than it is determined that we make. We will what we must will and cannot choose otherwise (unless the causal conditions be different). But the causal conditions cannot be different from what they are, for their nature and order is part of God’s predetermined plan.
Thus, there is no instance in which we can desire other than decreed by God. Should we will, believe, or desire other than decreed by God, that very will, belief or desire is itself decreed by God. Freedom as voluntary action becomes an empty notion, for divine coercion extends into the depths of our choosing.
To put it another way, it is true that a free act is one that is done by a free agent not acting under constraint or restraint. But what the compatibilist fails to recognize is that constraints can be causal as well as restrictive of action. That is, the constraints can act on agents,, determining their beliefs, desires, and intentions, so that they cannot will at all or are unable to will in any fashion other than they do.” [3]
Now Vanhoozer will object to characterizing this operation of God upon our “internal world” which changes our desires, wills and actions to do his divine will as “coercion” or “constraint.” This is what Vanhoozer seeks to avoid with his “communicative” theology. But this misses Reichenbach’s main contention. It is the shutting down of the person as an individuated self who is able to originate an action from their own will that Reichenbach is objecting to. Again, to speak about God’s acting not on persons but within and through them, is a distinction without a difference with respect to the determinism that is at issue here. With respect to his problem of determinism, Vanhoozer’s “communicative” theology has not been convincing. Even though he attempts to maintain compatibilism by softening the harsh characterizations of his theological determinism as a God of “force” and “coercion” by arguing for a God of “communicative agency,” his more fundamental problem lies in the fact of his determinism. Even though God works through his Word and Spirit to move man to do his will, Reichenbach states that two problems are generated by determinism in and of itself. One is that “we are prevented from doing what we desire to do” in the plain sense that the willing that issues forth in the doing is ours. It is we who will to do it. This is to affirm the nature of man as the sole author of his actions, a view affirmed throughout Scripture. For someone else to determine those actions is for the person themselves not to be the author of those actions. And a second problem Reichenbach raises is that “we are prevented from making any choices other than those that are determined for us to make.” This is affirming the necessity of the ability of contrary choice to any credible claim that humans are free creatures. “Freedom as voluntary action becomes an empty notion, for divine coercion extends to the depth of our choosing.” Whether this is “divine coercion” or “divine communication” is not the point. “Divine communication” cannot be of the nature of an absolute divine determinism and it also be said that there is such a thing as human freedom. Human freedom, for it to be genuinely meaningful, must consist of more than the absence of external constraints or the presence of internal divine activity that is absolutely determinative. Human freedom cannot be fully explained simply by claiming that as long as one remains unfettered to do what they desire while those desires are irresistibly effected “within and through” us by God. It cannot be said that the person is acting freely. This is to ignore the more essential issue of what it is to be a human person. Human freedom is more than “authorial consummation” via “communicative speech-acts” that transform our desires, wills and beliefs to those that God has predetermined for us. That is Reichenbach’s point. Freedom is not simply the ability and opportunity to do what you presently desire to do with the added dimension that it is God who determines those desires. Free will, for it to be coherent, must mean that one’s desires are not irresistibly effected by another’s will. Freedom involves the acknowledgment of a distinct and unique self that has the God-given capacity to think, desire, and will of their own accord. Human freedom involves the person’s self and will which give them the ability to form their own desires and actions. So, as much as Vanhoozer has tried to avoid the connotation of “coercion,” it seems that compatibilism has coercion built-in by virtue of its determinism. Compatibilism is a rationalization about human freedom that allows the Calvinist to maintain his theistic determinism. It does not accurately reflect the elements of human freedom or divine activity that are plainly testified to in Scripture. Again, human freedom is more than simply the absence of external constraint upon one’s physical actions, but also involves the freedom to determine those actions from one’s self and to perform actions contrary to influences that may be affecting one’s desires. Human freedom involves the inner workings of the mind and desires that have their source in the self, that is, within the person themselves. Human freedom is not the divine determination of the self merely described as God not acting on a person but “within and through” a person. Necessary causality (determinism) must be viewed as a constraint upon the will when the causality that springs from one’s self is completely taken away. This is the teaching of Reformed Calvinism. An absolute divine causality presses the concept of communication beyond a proper definition of persuasion to that of coercion. As Reichenbach has stated, “Constraints can be causal as well as restrictive of action.”
Also, the exclusivity problem that makes God out to be arbitrary surfaces once more. Again Vanhoozer says,
“Triune dialogical consummation is a matter of God’s acting not on persons but within and through them in such a way that, precisely by so acting, God brings them to their senses and makes them into the creatures they were always meant to be.” (RT, 370)
Who does “them” refer to? The elect. As far as we can tell, God has been arbitrary in his choosing whom to save. Yes, the Calvinist will say that God has his reasons which he has not made known to us, so they trust him to be doing what is right. We agree that God always does what is right, but it seems that regarding the God offered to us on Calvinism – the Calvinist God – we can surely know is not the God of the Bible because that God is impartial, just, fair, equitable, compassionate, gracious, merciful and loving to all his creatures (Acts 11:17-18, 15:1-10; Rom. 3:21-26, 10:12; Gal. 2:6; Eph. 6:9; James 2:1-13). If God can “communicatively” effect his saving grace in a sinner’s heart so that they become “what they were always meant to be,” then why doesn’t God have all sinners become whatever it is that “they were always meant to be?” What is it that the non-elect were “meant to be?” A condemned person? Surely, the non-elect as persons made in the image of God and also sinners just like everyone else, were meant to be what the elect will become, for there is no distinction. Or at least there are none we can discern. The non-elect are persons too. If a flourishing, saved person is what the non-elect “were always meant to be” and they do not ever become that, has God failed in his creative intent for those persons? Is he powerless to “effect” saving grace in them? Why doesn’t he? According to Vanhoozer’s theology God does not “effect” such grace in them and we are left wondering why and what this might mean for the character of God. Why then is it that many of these people never come to God through Christ to be saved? Vanhoozer has no answer to this critical theological problem except that God has not chosen them. But why would God’s creative intent be any different for one person than for another person all things being equal? The answer must lie within God himself, but again that has profound implications for the character of God. It is hard not to conclude that he is being arbitrary. So this has serious implications for gaining any assurance as to the actual character of God, the immutability of that character and therefore whether God has a kind or malevolent intent towards you and me personally and individually. This is the epistemic problem in Calvinist soteriology. Equally important is that this has profound implications for the gospel; as to whether it remains “good news” or just becomes news about how salvation is defined and brought about according to the Calvinist’s “doctrines of grace.” Vanhoozer has no answer to this problem. He can only say, “As to why some people do not respond to God, it is a deep mystery; as to why some do, it is a deep grace.” (RT, 384, footnote 154) This flight to “deep mystery” is required by the Calvinist doctrines that cannot account for all the biblical data and is a premature, superficial dismissal of the problem. Vanhoozer presents a very one-sided view of the troubling implications of his own theology by resorting to “deep mystery” to explain the fate of the non-elect. But doesn’t Vanhoozer know his own Calvinist soteriology? According to his own theology it is not a “deep mystery” as to “why some people do not respond to God.” They do not respond because they are not chosen and “effectually called” by God. On Calvinism there is no “deep mystery” here. If there is any “deep mystery” it is why the Calvinist insists on believing as he does in light of the negative implications for the gospel, the character of God, and our relationship with God. What this “deep mystery” really amounts to a “deep diversion” from the theological and moral incoherence Vanhoozer’s theistic determinism has created for the nature and character of God. The corollary of his “triune dialogical consummation” is that a multitude of non-elect persons were “always meant to be” those who would spend eternity in hell. Again, this is hardly “good news” from a “communicative” God who desires “communion” with his “human creatures.”
There appears to be only two options open to us as to why what was “always meant to be” is never realized in a person’s life. It is either a result of God’s decisions and actions or man’s decisions and actions. The biblical testimony is clear on three relevant points. The first is that God desires that all persons become what “they were always meant to be,” that is, saved. 1 Tim. 2:1-6 makes this clear. Paul writes,
“First of all, then, I urge that petitions, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for everyone, for kings and all those who are in authority, so that we may lead a tranquil and quiet life in all godliness and dignity. This is good, and it pleases God our Savior, who wants everyone to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.
For there is one God and one mediator between God and mankind, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all, a testimony at the proper time.” (1 Tim. 2:1-6, CSB, emphasis. mine)
We read of this desire also in Jn. 5:34, 20:31; 2 Pet. 3:9; Titus 2:11; 1 Jn. 4:8-19. Vanhoozer’s Calvinist doctrines contradict these clear biblical affirmations. Also, therefore, we would expect that God’s determinations and actions are consistent with his revealed desires. Vanhoozer must think that what some people “were meant to be” by God is that they were created for the very purpose of being unbelieving, wicked, and to populate hell. But contrary to this, Paul says that God means that everyone should be reconciled to Him in both time and for eternity. But the doctrine of an “effectual call,” which logically implies an unconditional election, indicates that Vanhoozer believes that some men were “meant to be,” by God’s unalterable decree and design, the personifications of evil, made expressly for suffering and death.
Note that Vanhoozer never mentions this dark side of his theology. He speaks only about those particular persons who are brought to their senses and consummated by God’s “triune dialogical” action who become what they “were always meant to be,” which is saved. All other persons “were meant to be” unalterably predetermined never to be brought to their senses and are “consummated” unto eternal damnation. Note that Vanhoozer’s statements are not representative of the full implications of his theology. Vanhoozer does not consider that his proposition that God wants us all to become what we “were always meant to be” is incoherent with his Calvinist doctrines of an “effectual call” and unconditional election which state that this same God determines that a multitude of persons were decreed by God himself never to be saved.
Therefore, the second relevant point is that God has provided the way for all men to become what “they were always meant to be” in Christ through faith. Hence we have the coherent answer as to why some people become what God always meant them to be and others do not. The answer lies in God’s initiative to make this reconciliation, regeneration, and sanctification a possibility where before there was no possibility, which implies the genuine dynamic of God’s grace, justice, justification in Christ, and within those spiritual boundaries we find man’s free decisions and actions of faith or unbelief. God has made the way for salvation by faith in Christ.
This leads to a third point. The reason why a person does not become all that “they were meant to be” is not to be found in any uncompassionate, impersonal, monological, non-communicative, causal, eternal decree of God that predetermined them to be something they were not meant to be. God is a loving, gracious God. Neither does he lack the power to provide the way for them to become all that they were meant to be. That is his desire (1 Tim. 2:1-6). Rather, if a person does not become all “they were meant to be,” the cause lies in the person’s unwillingness to come to a knowledge of the truth and receive by faith the salvation God offers in Christ. The biblical reason given for this failure to become what God meant all of us to be is the person’s willful rejection of the salvation provided and offered to them in Jesus Christ (Jn. 5:39-40; 8:24: 2 Thess. 2:9-12). Person’s either believe to the saving of their souls or reject in unbelief this “good news” to the condemnation of their souls. Thus, the Bible speaks of a libertarian freedom that does not threaten the sovereignty of God, diminish the seriousness of man’s sinful nature and condition, or lessen the efficacy of the Spirit’s work, but rather testifies to a sovereignty that is coherent with these various aspects of related biblical theology. Libertarian freedom can better account for God as sovereign Creator and man as a differentiated creature, who although fallen in sin, is made in God’s image with the capacity of making free will decisions. This better accounts for the love God has for man, the initiative of God’s sovereign work in purposing and providing salvation in Christ, the precise content of God’s message of “good news” as an invitation, offer, “gift,” summons, ultimatum, etc. to be saved, the work of the Spirit who accompanies the proclamation of the gospel and effects salvation conditioned upon the response of faith, a coherent explanation for the presence of evil in the world, man’s moral responsibility, God’s present and final judgment, future condemnation and the final conquering of all his enemies along with the reconciliation of all things in Christ. In short, libertarian freedom makes the most sense of all the biblical material. It has the most explanatory power and scope.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] “Whatever conceptions we form in our minds, they are directed by the secret inspiration of God” (1.23.2). From the context, it is clear that “directed” is not to be understood in any passive or permissive sense, but in an active and causal sense.
[2] God “moves the will…by an efficacious influence” (2.3.10). “The hand of God no less rules the internal affections than it precedes the external acts, and that God does not perform by the hand of men those things which he had decreed without first working in their hearts the very will which precedes their acts.” John Calvin, The Eternal Predestination of God, quoted in John Murray, Calvin on Scripture and Divine Sovereignty (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1960), 56.
[3] Bruce R. Reichenbach, “Freedom, Justice, and Moral Responsibility” in The Grace of God, The Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989), 283.
The Truth of the Gospel 