Vanhoozer writes,
“A Christian doctrine of God will not be content with conceiving God as one who unilaterally moves people about like so many otherwise inert chess pieces. That way fatalism lies. But neither does God let the pieces take control of the board. Rather, God convincingly persuades some of the pieces freely to play of their own accord in a way that so corresponds to God’s will that we can speak (albeit hesitantly) in terms of dual agency. It is in such dialogical interaction that we best see the way in which God exercises his sovereignty and humans their freedom.” (RT, 367)
We have little problem with the way Vanhoozer expresses God’s work in the world here. But it is certainly not logically or morally coherent with Calvinist theology. It is not coherent with his universal divine causal determinism and the requisite soteriological doctrines of unconditional election and an effectual call. Can it coherently be said that one is acting “freely of their own accord” to do another’s will when it is the other’s will that has made it such that there is no possibility of doing otherwise? Human beings may not be analogous to “inert chess pieces” but according to Vanhoozer’s soteriology God is certainly “one who unilaterally moves people” for that is precisely the bottom-line of these essential Reformed Calvinist doctrines.
Vanhoozer is attempting to distance himself from the fatalism of a theology that depicts “God as one who unilaterally moves people about like so many otherwise inert chess pieces” by suggesting the idea that “God convincingly persuades some of the pieces freely to play of their own accord in a way that so corresponds to God’s will that we can speak (albeit hesitantly) in terms of dual agency.” He states that the way in which God determines all things (e.g., each person’s eternal destiny), despite the fact that he determines them, is what can provide sufficient resolution to the theistic determinism that is otherwise incoherent with genuine human freedom. “The way in which God exercises his sovereignty and humans their freedom” is by God convincingly persuading some of the pieces freely to play of their own accord in a way that so corresponds to God’s will. Even though stated “hesitantly,” Vanhoozer concludes that as God operates in this manner it can be called “dual agency.” But does such an approach really avoid fatalism? And isn’t Vanhoozer back-pedaling to the degree that we no longer have the monergism that is required of his Calvinist theology and soteriology? Here is the situation according to Vanhoozer as a Calvinist. The God who has predetermined “whatsoever comes to pass” does so by convincingly persuading people to do what he has determined. But how does this avoid monergism, causality, or fatalism? By “convincingly persuades” Vanhoozer must mean “always convincing” which is just to make the term “persuading” have no meaning, because the very nature of “persuasion” implies the possibility of not being convinced. But we have just seen that God must always convince everyone in every way. Only that would remain consistent with his Calvinist universal divine causal determinism. In other words, “convincingly persuades,” in this context of divine willing and acting in which God cannot fail to bring about his will and his determined result, just means cause to act. God causes people to think and act according to his will. Therefore, first of all, his statement that “God convincingly persuades some of the pieces freely to play of their own accord in a way that so corresponds to God’s will” is not Calvinism. Calvinism maintains that God ordains “whatsoever comes to pass.” That means everything! Note that non-Calvinists confess God’s prerogative to effectually move upon particular persons (“some of the pieces”) so as to do his will. But on Calvinism, which is a universal divine causal determinism, God does unilaterally move people about, and not just some of them but all of them. Secondly, when Vanhoozer says that “the pieces freely to play of their own accord in a way that so corresponds to God’s will” he is stating a contradiction. The fact is that it is God alone who causes “the pieces” to act out his will. Now, if God determines all things, no matter how he does it (i.e., “convincingly persuades”) then “the pieces” do not act “freely…of their own accord.” This is not dual agency, it is divine instrumentality of the human person. Even if, for the sake of argument, admit that the method of divine “persuasion” which cannot fail to “convince” avoids fatalism, certainly “that way instrumentality lies.”
Now, if Vanhoozer is going to insist that persuasion is personal and an appropriate way for God to work within human persons to do his will, then he will have to admit that “persuasion” implies the fact that a person may not be convinced even by God and therefore God’s will may not be accomplished. But that simply cannot be on the Calvinist definition of God’s sovereignty. Vanhoozer is using language that is only appropriate with the worldview of libertarian freedom. It is not coherent within the worldview of theistic determinism. He is using terms to loosely with respect to his own deterministic theology when he says, “God convincingly persuades” when he means to say, “God effectually calls” or “God acts determinately.” To “persuade” implies the freedom and ability of contrary choice. And such freedom is inconsistent with Calvinism. And “convincingly persuades” as Vanhoozer wants to use it in this context to mean God determines and causes people to act according to his will is just a conjunction of words that cancel each other out. In the context of trying to explain how theistic determinism works the word “persuades” simply will not give you that result. And we still have the problem of how God “persuades” someone to do his will? To persuade involves reasoning, argument, experiences, and the like. Persuade is not a synonym for determine. Persuasion, which involves the presentation of evidence to convince, ultimately implies genuine authorship of one’s actions and the ability of contrary choice. In addition, how does God “effect” “the call” to receive salvation; a “call” which cannot fail? I have pointed out that the speech act of the gospel call itself presupposes libertarian freedom for that call is of the nature of an invitation, an offer, a pleading, a warning and even a command. But these all presuppose a context of libertarian freedom rather than the limited, predestinarian, effectual, theistic determinism. Indeed, it is only in a context of sole authorship of one’s actions and the ability of contrary choice that “to convince” and “to persuade” have any meaningful applications. Moreover, moral responsibility is a coherent concept only within a reality of libertarian free will and only in this reality can it be genuinely said that people freely act of their own accord; that they are authentic agents and determine their own eternal destinies. Furthermore, meaningful talk of “communication,” “dialogue,” “communion,” “personhood,” and “persuasion” can only exist in this context of libertarian freedom, not deterministic sovereignty. Does that mean there is a danger that God has let the chess pieces take control of the board? Impossible! For instance, God communicates to people the way they should go and yet they choose otherwise. Obviously, God has not gotten “his way,” that is, his desire to do them good has been rejected by them. Has God forfeited his sovereignty? Nonsense! They must now travel in the way God has ordained for those who persist in unbelief and disobedience. So, libertarian free will is a reality. And as Vanhoozer finds that he must confess, the God / man relationship is one of “dual agency.” And yet, with the parenthetical remark – “albeit it hesitantly” – Vanhoozer strains at this concept. But alas, he must admit to dual agency because the fact of human agency is undeniable by any rational person. But this qualification reveals the strong force of his determinism despite the evidence to libertarian human freedom all around him. He bends over backwards trying not to admit to “dual agency,” but once he does admit to it, he has abandoned his Calvinism for some version of non-Calvinist theology. It is only in the context of genuine human freedom that the words “convincingly persuades” have authentic meaning. If we are talking about genuine persuasion, then the attempt to alter a person’s thinking and behavior may be successful or it may not. Therefore, the possibility that even God will not “convincingly persuade” in the sense that he has endowed human beings with substantial freedom to make their own choices, even about their eternal destiny, is not coherent with Calvinism. Persuade is the wrong word. We are back to determine. A further word about God’s sovereignty. We should reflect upon the fact that the Bible indicates that God will bring an end to all things and that the implementation of his final determined purpose for the world will occur not only by “communicative action” but causal coercion, the direct conquering force of a battle against evil. We need not totally avoid such action by God, and it is a libertarian freedom that coherently allows for this strong divine reaction to evil while maintaining God’s sovereignty. A theistic determinism cannot coherently incorporate this strong divine reaction of God against his evil enemies for it is God himself who predetermined them to be his enemies. God is “fighting” a war of his own making. Vanhoozer is right. We should avoid philosophical speculations that lead us to conceive of God in ways that are not reflected in Scripture. One of the most egregious of these philosophical speculations is that in order for God to be God in his universe we must conclude that he eternally ordained “whatsoever comes to pass.” Vanhoozer is correct, “That way lies fatalism.” (RT, 367) But that is the way Vanhoozer has chosen to go lest God lose control of the otherwise free “chess pieces” and they “take control of the board.” But to err in this other extreme of an exhaustive predetermination of all things is biblically unsustainable because it is logically, morally, and biblically incoherent. According to the biblical record we find a God who can differentiate his will from the will of the creature without threat to his sovereignty. God’s sovereignty cannot be coherently defined as him having predetermined “whatsoever comes to pass.” God’s sovereignty, as much as it at times must include strong, coercive, forceful action, is also marked by the mercy and compassion to save helpless mankind “in Christ” by faith. In sovereign love God chose that Christ would be the touchstone of destiny for each person according to their response of faith in him. Those who reject this circumscription of their human freedom will perish in the final judgment by God’s forceful overcoming of all evil. He remains sovereign throughout.
The Truth of the Gospel 