Vanhoozer writes,
“A picture of God as causal agent holds classical theism captive. When God’s willing is viewed in terms of causality, it is difficult to reconcile divine love with the notion of personal relation…One way beyond the classical theism-panentheism impasse is, I suggest, to see God as communicative agent. God’s lordly loving of human persons largely takes the form, I believe, of communicative action.” (FT. 90)
I completely agree with this assessment. There is a way beyond an unbiblical classical Reformed universal divine causal determinism and the unbiblical, extreme relationality of panentheism. It is to “see God as a communicative agent” defined biblically and not deterministically or panentheistically. God’s “lordly loving of human persons takes the form, I believe, of communicative action.” Again, I agree. But “lordly loving” should not be made synonymous with “divinely determining.” But that is precisely what Vanhoozer means by “lordly.” On Calvinism, “lordly” is a synonym for God’s sovereignty defined as theistic determinism. If Vanhoozer feels that the problem with “classical theism” (which includes Reformed Calvinism) is “its picture of God as a causal agent” then Vanhoozer’s doctrines of divine sovereignty and “effectual call” are not coherent with “loving human persons.” For Vanhoozer’s God, although a “communicative agent,” is also an overwhelming causal agent by virtue of his sovereign eternal decree, unconditional election, and effectual call. This effectual call, even though “communicative,” is causal by its very nature as effectual. Therefore, it is still difficult, at least for the Reformed Calvinist, to “reconcile divine love with the notion of personal relation” when God determines to effect relations with some and not others, that is, he does not love the non-elect, and the relations he determines are irresistible. But if the problem with “classical theism” is “its picture of God as an impersonal causal agent” then we can see how Vanhoozer provides some relief by stressing God’s “communicative agency.” Better for God to “persuade” than to “force” or “coerce,” although we are not sure what to “force” or “coerce” would amount to with respect to one’s salvation.[1] This personal causality is what Vanhoozer wishes to establish.
Many non-Calvinists could agree with this personal, causal understanding of God’s activity among men. Of course we do not seek to avoid divine causality, even impersonal causality (although even these “impersonal” instances would need to be carefully examined for what constitutes their impersonal or personal nature), for God himself acts in the world, often forcefully, and he of course also acts through people. Non-Calvinists do not seek to avoid causality altogether but do maintain that God is not an impersonal or personal effective cause of one’s salvation as unconditional. What does allow for coherence here is the incorporation into one’s theology of the appropriate degree of conditionality that the Bible testifies to in the divine/human relation.
So where does Vanhoozer’s real problem lie? If the problem with “classical theism” (i.e., Reformed Calvinism) is “its picture of God as a comprehensively causal impersonal agent” then we fail to see how God as a “communicative agent” provides relief for what we sense as contradictory with human freedom. For we sense, and our experience confirms, that human freedom must include sole authorship of one’s actions and the possibility of contrary choice. The realities of moral responsibility, along with moral effort and duty require these. In contrast, Vanhoozer’s compatibilism maintains a comprehensive causality. For when we expand even a personal causality to cover all things, and with regard to salvation all eternal destinies, it is this comprehensive effectual causality that generates insurmountable biblical, logical, moral, and epistemological difficulties. God may be more personal by being communicative, but it is the comprehensive effective causality that is at the core of Calvinism that creates its problems and makes it unbiblical. This is precisely what is incoherent with the human freedom and responsibility everywhere testified to in Scripture. By extending God’s causal activity to “whatsoever comes to pass” in accord with his will alone, and making it irresistibly effectual, the “communication” reverts to the impersonal, monological causality it tries to avoid. It is to land back at the exhaustive theistic determinism which is incoherent with human freedom and “communicative” or “dialogical” actions. Because the causality is rooted in a fixed, divine decree ordaining “whatsoever comes to pass,” this necessarily reduces “human free will” to a determined human activity of the will effected by God solely in accord with his will. The human will is confiscated to do his will, and even if this works via “communication,” and to the end of the elect one’s eternal happiness, this still renders the person’s willing meaningless. The will of a person cannot, by definition, be irresistibly effected by the will of another who has the power to intentionally cause that person to do their will without annihilating the free exercise of the will of the other person. The mistake the unbiblical relational theologies make is to conclude that God can never do this. Whereas the mistake of Reformed Calvinism is that God always does this. In the former theologies, all the elements of the annihilation of any meaningful sense of divine freedom are in place. In the latter theology all the elements of the annihilation of any meaningful sense of human freedom (granted by and patterned after the divine freedom) are in place.
Moreover, given Calvinist determinism, attempts at compatibilism are incoherent. By virtue of extending the casual nature of God’s activities to all things, especially to everyone’s eternal destiny, the problem of the loss of human freedom arises. Comprehensive divine causality establishes the irresistibility of the human creature to that divine causality, and comprehensive irresistibility of the human creature the doctrine of the “effectual call.” An “effectual call” revives the impersonal nature of this causal event in that the human will is overwhelmed by the divine will to do what the divine will has predetermined. That is impersonal because what it means to be a person, that is, to retain one’s fully functioning will, is engulfed by the will and activity of God. The “effectual call” is rooted in theological presuppositions that prevent the incorporation of sole authorship and contrary choice which are the necessary elements for being a person as reflected in Scripture. It is from this Scriptural testimony to the nature of God’s relationship with man, and vice versa, that we get our information about what it means to be a person and therefore be in personal relation with God and others. And it seems that what it means to be a person and in personal relation with God is set against an absolute, irresistible, effectual, divine causality. The claim that divine causality is “communicative” cannot justify an absolute determinism, for an absolute determinism cannot be justified on a biblical basis. Whatever “God-in-communicative-act” may mean, it certainly cannot be absolutely equated with “God-in-deterministic-act.” For God to be communicative is mutually exclusive with him actively, irresistibly and effectually working his will in all things – for what then would there be to “communicate?” The degree of divine causality and the situational nature of God’s communicative and determinative actions have to be carefully discerned in the scriptures. Reformed Calvinist sovereignty runs roughshod over the theme of libertarian freedom found throughout Scripture. God acts sovereignly over his human creatures in that he will achieve what he has planned and purposed in the world and for mankind. This may include causal action upon persons, but this is more times than not a dynamic interaction with his human creatures involving libertarian freedom. It is a genuine interaction – a true dialogue or “back and forth” communication. This “back and forth” is what a communicative act entails. God interacts communicatively with human beings given the libertarian freedom he endowed them with. Only libertarian freedom makes sense of both God’s causal activity in grace or judgment. God’s causal or conditional interactions with persons imply and respect human decision in that God will act determinately and causally when God needs to realize his gracious purposes for man’s salvation or when man rejects God’s communicative, conditional actions towards him in the gospel. God acts in a number of ways accordingly, which is to imply that God vested human’s with substantial freedom to which God genuinely responds. God has predetermined good things for mankind in Christ and he offers these good things to them which implies their libertarian freedom. On the other hand he can only judge with justice and equity any rejection of his determined goodness and grace because his human creatures have libertarian freedom. Each scenario involves both his sovereign activity and libertarian freedom. Hence, it is the comprehensively causal nature of the Reformed divine activity that runs against the biblical testimony to the measure of freedom in the God/man relation. As such it crosses a line into the “impersonal.” The Bible does not testify to the proposition that God is the cause of all that happens. Therefore the “communicative” nature of God’s relation with man is only one aspect of the problem with a “communicative” determinism. It would not be accurate to portray the “communicative” nature of God’s actions as testified to in Scripture as an irresistible, effectual, divine causation of “whatsoever comes to pass.” This is especially true with regard to the salvation of individuals mainly due to it incoherence with the biblical portrayal of the nature of faith. The determinism in Calvinist theology, no matter how it it presented, still remains logically, morally, epistemologically, and biblically problematic.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] In this both the non-Calvinist and Calvinist are “barking up the wrong tree.” The Calvinist sets “force” and “coercion” up as a kind of “straw man” that is easy to dismiss. That is, as long as God doesn’t “force” or “coerce” people (not knowing what that would amount to), he still may therefore “communicatively” predetermine them to belief and salvation. And as far as the non-Calvinist is concerned, what he really objects to is not God “forcing” people or using “coercion,” for the non-Calvinist has a place for such divine acts in Scripture, but the objection is to the biblical inadequacy of a comprehensive and particularly soteriological determinism. That is what is incoherent with the larger scope of biblical teaching. It is the logical, moral, epistemological, and biblical incoherence that is the essential issue. Hence, it sounds convincing when the Calvinist claims that since God “communicatively” determines events and every person’s eternal destiny therefore the problem of “force” and “coercion” is solved. The idea is that as long as God does not “force” or “coerce” he may determine whatsoever comes to pass. But this is biblically inadequate and diverts our attention from the real issue. That is, has God revealed himself and his ways with man as comprehensively deterministic? He has revealed himself as sovereign, but should that be defined in terms of theistic determinism? The non-Calvinist maintains that to “communicatively” determine persons is a contradiction in terms. It is to miss the fact that theistic determinism itself, no matter the form it takes, injects a host of incoherencies into the biblical witness to God’s works and ways and man’s place and relation to God.
The Truth of the Gospel 