Chapter 9 – Reason as Problematic for Calvinist Interpretation

This clickable Table of Contents will take you to the sections in this lengthy chapter.

Introduction
Schreiner and Ware on Exegesis or Logic: The False Dichotomy
1. Schreiner and Ware Admit Their Logical Difficulties Pose Legitimate and Difficult Questions for Calvinists
2. Schreiner and Ware Declare Their Hermeneutic
3. Schreiner and Ware: Their False Dichotomy and Their Faulty Hermeneutic
4. Exegesis: An Excuse to Avoid the Probative Force of Logical and Moral Reflection
5. Matthew 28:18-20: Pastor Ronnie Rogers Critiques John Piper on ‘The Great Commission’
John Lennox Refutes Total Inability, Pre-Faith Regeneration, and Faith as Meritorious
1. John Lennox on Ephesians 2:8-9
2. John Lennox Critiques E. H. Palmer
Non-Calvinists Critique Calvinism on Philosophical, Moral, and Exegetical Grounds
1. Competent and Incompetent Exegesis: The Hermeneutical Divide
2. The Heremenutical Divide: The Calvinist Tactic of Dismissing Essential Principles of Interpretation
3. Faith Seeking Understanding or An A Priori Doctrine Seeking Justification?
4. Schreiner and Ware: Why Their Calvinism is False
5. Schreiner and Ware Ignore Their Logical and Moral Interpretive Incoherence
6. Schreiner and Ware: The Excuse of ‘Complexity’
7. Schreiner and Ware: The Excuse of ‘Mystery’
An Incoherent Claim: Determinism Motivates the Calvinist to Pray
An Incoherent Claim: Determinism is a Bulwark for Suffering
1. Schreiner and Ware on the Book of Job: Incoherence, Disengenuousness, and Obfuscation
What Is the Purpose of Schreiner and Ware’s Book?
1. Non-Calvinists Can’t Tolerate Mystery, or Are They Refusing to Tolerate Calvinist Incoherence?
2. Schreiner and Ware Ignore That Their Interpretations Create the Problems
3. Schreiner and Ware Know They Have Insurmountable Problems
Schreiner, Ware, Baggett, Walls, and Koukl: Philosophy and the Authority of Scripture
The Popular Reactions to Calvinism
Schreiner and Ware, Logic or Exegesis: The False Dichotomy Continued
Piper on James 4: How Exegesis Devoid of Coherence Distorts the Meaning of a Text
1. The Immediate Context: James 4:13-17
2. The Broader Context of 4:13-17: The Whole Epistle of James
3. Piper’s God Causes Sin and Death
4. The Most Horrific Entailments of Calvinism
5. James Affirms Genuine Free Will
6. More Examples of Calvinist Incoherence
7. Two Concluding Points Regarding Piper on James 4:13-17
Piper’s Four “Practical Glimpses” Into The Difference Theistic Determinism Makes
#1 – Piper on ‘Gospel Joy’
1. Piper Presupposes He Is Among the Unconditional Elect
2. Piper’s Ignorance and Pretention on ‘Gospel Joy’
3. Calvinism’s TULIP: The Anti-Gospel Doctrines
4. “Am I Included?”: Piper’s Calvinism Can’t Produce Assurance
5. Piper’s False Dichotomy: All Things Random or All Things Determined
6. Acts 4:27-28: Piper’s Grandiose Presumption, His Loss of Assurance, and The Non-Sequitur
7. What’s So Special About John Piper?
#2 – ‘Sacrificial Love’
#3 – ‘Fearless Witness’
#4 – Confident Planning
What Piper Failed to Address: The Dark Side of Calvinism and God Authors Confusion
The Calvinists’ Best Bet: Ultimately Ignore Their Incoherence
John Lennox on Exegesis, Theistic Determinism and Interpretive Consistency
1. John Lennox: Human Freedom Fundamental to the Biblical Narrative, Logic, and Experience
2. John Lennox: Determinism, The Gospel, and The God of the Bible
3. John Lennox: Is Calvinism Even Remotely Christian
4. John Lennox on Tim Keller’s Doctrine of Unconditional Election
5. John Lennox: Martyn Lloyd-Jones Exegetes Nonsense From Romans 9
6. Lennox and Chesterton: Calvinism’s Demonization of God
7. John Lennox: Calvinism is ‘Grotesque’ and ‘Completely Unacceptable to the Morally Sensitive Person’
8. Lennox v. Carson: What Calvinists Fear Most – The Scrutiny of Logical Reflection and Moral Intuition
Reason is Problematic for Calvinist Interpretation
Sola Scriptura or Interpretive Relativism
Schreiner and Ware: Accept Our Incoherence
Why People Are and Remain Non-Calvinists
A Brief Challenge to the Evangelical Church
The Calvinist Hermeneutic of Incoherence Results in Interpretive and Theological Relativism
Why Should We Even Have to Talk About This?
A Sad State of Affairs for the Evangelical Church
Philosophy as the Handmaid of Exegesis and Theology
1. J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig on the Importance of Philosophical Reflection
2. The Utility of Philosophy
Where is the Evangelical Philosophical Society?
Can Calvinism Survive?: Essential Issues and Questions for Calvinists

Introduction

Calvinists believe in Calvinism for various reasons, but reason isn’t one of them. They may see their Calvinism as the best explanation of their own conversion experience. They may find it comforts them in times of trouble or distress. They appreciate the internal logical connections of its soteriological doctrines (TULIP), which make Calvinism easier to grasp and express. Even non-Calvinists can appreciate Calvinism’s emphasis on the study and exposition of theology, God’s sovereignty, and the glory of God. But I submit that the words of C. S. Lewis, albeit spoken in a different context, are nevertheless applicable here when he said, “It [Calvinism] appeals to every part of me except my reason.”^[1]

Ironically, it is in this protest that the Calvinist finds satisfaction and comfort for retaining his Calvinism. When it comes to defending their theology, a hallmark of Calvinism is to put as little credence in human reason as possible. Indeed, to boast that they don’t trust fallen human reason in theological matters seems, to their way of thinking, to equal the supreme exaltation of God above all things – especially human pride and autonomy. I have already argued for the indispensability of logic and reason in the interpretative task in Chapter 7. I also demonstrated that logical reflection and moral intuitions hold no weight for the Calvinist with respect to discerning the validity of their interpretations of Scripture.

In this chapter, I intend to provide further evidence on how Calvinists view the role of human reason in hermeneutics. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how the use of reason is problematic for the Calvinist. The Calvinist simply refuses to reason and reason properly when it comes to their interpretations of the biblical text and theological conclusions. And this becomes an insurmountable problem for Calvinism itself. It is insurmountable because when our interpretations violate the canons of reason along with our moral intuitions, they must be declared to be misinterpretations of the text lest we introduce all manner of subjective relativism into our hermeneutics, in which case we will no longer have an objective way to discern the author’s intent. I submit that for a hermeneutic to be sound, that is, provide us with the principles by which we can get at the objective meaning of a text, it must be characterized by logical and moral coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. I also contend that these rational and moral characteristics are what the Calvinist feels free to forfeit in their hermeneutic to preserve as a priori biblical truth their deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty and soteriological “doctrines of grace.” This a priori belief in theistic determinism forces the Calvinist to do two things.

First, they must divorce exegesis from the deliberations and deliverances of philosophical reflection and moral intuitions. Certainly, the Calvinist must have an exegesis of the text, as we all must, to establish our doctrinal claims as credible. But ultimately, for the Calvinist, they insist their exegesis stands regardless of the logical and moral incoherence it generates. Therefore, the Calvinist must dichotomize exegesis from the truth-searching functions of philosophical or logical examination and intuitive moral reasoning.

Secondly, the Calvinist must engage in the suppression of reason. If philosophical and moral reasoning expose the contradictions in the Calvinists’ interpretations, and most of us trust our logical and moral sense in determining what is true from what is false, the Calvinist must therefore suppress a person’s logical and moral reasoning to get them to accept their interpretations of the disputed texts. And if a person has embraced Calvinism, the same suppression of logical and moral reasoning is necessary for them to remain a Calvinist. Logical and moral coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction must no longer be allowed to be a concern in exegesis and interpretation. And there are ways Calvinists attempt to get people to look past the difficulties in their theology. I dealt with these strategies in Chapter 8. The four most common tactics used to explain their interpretive incoherence are: ‘the Bible teaches both,’ ‘mystery,‘ ‘apparent contradiction,‘ and ‘compatibilism.’ Calvinists also play upon people’s other religious sentiments, such as the person’s failure to gain a tolerance for mystery, God’s ways are above our ways, and the person’s refusal to humble themselves before ‘the sovereignty of God,’ or give him all “the glory due his name.”

Now, to provide evidence as to how Calvinists ultimately reject the necessity of human reason in hermeneutics, and how reason is problematic for the Calvinist, let’s carefully investigate their approach by examining a quote by Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware in their book Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives of Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace.^{^[2]} I will be using parts of the longer quote below in various sections of this chapter.

Schreiner and Ware on Exegesis or Logic: The False Dichotomy

Prominent Calvinists Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware write the following in their book Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives of Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace.^[3]

“…we are convinced that the central reason that the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis, although we grant that those who disagree with us would interpret many Scriptures differently. But their fundamental objections are certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology we affirm. It should be granted that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism. The objections go something like this: If God chooses only some, then how can he be loving? If God’s grace is irresistible, then what happens to human free will? If God saves those he has chosen, why pray or get involved in missions? If God is in control of the world, then why do anything at all? If God is sovereign, then why is there suffering in the world? If God governs all events, then why is evil our responsibility, not his?

Calvinists would not answer all of these questions in the same way. In fact, as careful readers will surely observe, there are differing opinions even among the contributors to this work as to the most satisfying answers to these questions. Nonetheless, there would be agreement among Calvinists that God is sovereign, and that his free election of individuals to receive his efficacious grace alone accounts for personal salvation. God’s unconditional election and irresistible grace cause all who believe to put their faith in Christ to be saved. We suggest that the answers to the preceding questions are often complex because the reality of life as portrayed by the Scriptures is complex. God is completely sovereign, and yet human choices and responsibility are not a charade. God ordains all that comes to pass and is good; and yet evil exists, and it is really evil. God chooses only some to be saved, and yet there is also a true sense in which he desires the salvation of all. Those who are elect will never lose their salvation, and yet those who do not persevere to the end will not inherit the kingdom of God. All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery. People do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems. Rather, the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture. Our attempt to solve the problems posed by our theology, then, is an example of “faith seeking understanding.”^[4]

Several things are noteworthy here. First, we must respect and carefully consider the idea expressed by Schreiner and Ware when they state, “the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.” I think this is correct. The fundamental reason anyone should believe any doctrine presented to them is that they are convinced it is taught in Scripture. So I take Schreiner and Ware to be saying that one should not believe these “Calvinist doctrines of grace” unthinkingly, perhaps merely based on family heritage or ecclesial tradition. With that, I also agree. But this presents us with two related questions to answer. One question is whether these doctrines are actually taught in Scripture, and the other question is how we would know that.

I take Schreiner and Ware to be pointing out that a Calvinist should be a Calvinist because he or she has wrestled with the biblical data and come out convinced that the Bible teaches the “Calvinist doctrines of grace.” But what does it take to be convinced that the Bible teaches a certain doctrine? What does it involve to come to believe certain doctrines are the teaching of Scripture? We are talking here about how we go about interpreting Scripture, and that seems to involve presenting a principled, reasoned argument as to why we should adopt one method of interpretation over another. Now, these matters are the purview of hermeneutics, which is the discipline of delineating the principles that constitute good interpretation and by which we accurately discern the intent of the author from the text.

So, immediately, Schreiner and Ware have confronted us with some hermeneutical questions. Do sound principles of interpretation applied to the relevant texts leave us no other option than to conclude that the Calvinist “doctrines of grace” are taught in Scripture? What principles and processes of interpretation are in play such that one would confidently conclude this? In other words, we are asking whether a responsible biblical hermeneutic compels us to conclude that the Calvinist “doctrines of grace,” or any other doctrines for that matter, are the teaching of Scripture.

Schreiner and Ware Admit Their Logical Difficulties Pose Legitimate and Difficult Questions for Calvinists

Schreiner and Ware have obviously wrestled with the relevant texts at a high scholarly level and have come out believing that Calvinism best represents the teaching of Scripture. But other scholars disagree with that claim based on certain “fundamental objections” they raise against those interpretations and doctrines due to the logical and moral difficulties they generate. Those who claim that the “doctrines of grace” are not taught in Scripture do so, as Schreiner and Ware point out, because their “fundamental objections are certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology we [Calvinists] affirm.” The doctrines Calvinists claim “are taught in Scripture” raise serious “logical problems,” and Calvinists grant “that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.” Schreiner and Ware proceed to mention those difficulties in the above quote, and we can see that, in addition to the logical difficulties, they also include problems of a moral and theological nature.

Hence, we are confronted with a more precise and fundamental hermeneutical question. Is it in accord with proper interpretive principles and methods to affirm an exegesis as the accurate teaching of Scripture when that exegesis produces logical, moral, and theological incoherence, inconsistency, and contradictions? The answer will involve whether or not one believes that these logical and moral problems “provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology” are objections of such a substantial nature that they cannot be responsibly ignored or dismissed. Are they of such a substantial nature that they demand intellectual justification and, as such, bear upon the validity of the Calvinist interpretations? In short, the answer to the question will involve declaring one’s hermeneutic. That is, whether it is a hermeneutic of coherence (non-Calvinist) or a hermeneutic of incoherence (Calvinist).

The difference would be that in a hermeneutic of coherence, one believes that these logical and moral objections are reliable indications that the text has been misinterpreted, and therefore, one should not be convinced that the Calvinists’ doctrines are taught in Scripture. In contrast, in a hermeneutic of incoherence, one does not believe these logical and moral objections have interpretive significance or speak to the accuracy and validity of the Calvinists’ interpretations. If “the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture,” then we have to ask by what reasoning and by what methods we come to know what is taught in Scripture, which is just to ask what are the principles of a sound hermeneutic? And if a sound or reliable hermeneutic requires logical and moral coherence, then the logical and moral incoherence in Calvinism has direct bearing upon determining its interpretations to be invalid, and therefore they should be rejected. Precisely because of their logical and moral problems, these doctrines may not be what is taught in Scripture, and hence they should not be believed. The point here is that the logical and moral problems of Calvinism should at least give us pause in accepting their claim that their “doctrines of grace” are what is “taught in Scripture.” The non-Calvinists’ “logical difficulties” and “objections” cannot be cavalierly dismissed by Calvinists.

I submit that for most readers of a text, including the biblical text, it hardly seems necessary to defend the position that interpretations that generate incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction cannot be accurate interpretations of the text. That seems to go without saying. That is to say, it is hardly possible to defend the position that incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory interpretations of the biblical text are accurate interpretations. Consider what we would be left with in discerning an author’s intent when coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction are thrown to the interpretive wind. I don’t see how we could confidently say what a text means, let alone come to a consensus about that meaning. Logical coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction, along with our moral intuitions, are essential to any form of thought or communication that could be considered rational. Surely, therefore, they must be essential to our hermeneutics. We want our interpretations of Scripture to be rational, not irrational.

Therefore, how can the Calvinist overcome their hermeneutical obstacles of interpretive incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction? To convince people that the Calvinist “doctrines of grace” are “taught in Scripture,” the Calvinist will either have to resolve these logical and moral difficulties or argue that such difficulties ultimately do not carry hermeneutical weight. Regarding the former, Schreiner and Ware’s book Still Sovereign attempts to resolve these difficulties to clear the way for believing in the “doctrines of grace.” In Part 1, the contributors analyze biblical passages in defense of Calvinism. In Part 2, they defend particular Calvinist doctrines. In Part 3, they offer pastoral reflections. It is important to note that these very attempts imply that logical and moral coherence are important for belief, and yet, by their own admission, such a defense of their doctrines is not essential. In fact, they admit that such defenses fail in the end, for they themselves have concluded that “All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.” I say that their attempts to resolve their difficulties fail in the end because if they had proved successful in eliminating the incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions in their doctrines, they would not be required to resort to “mystery.” It wouldn’t be the case that “the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.” The arguments in their book would be convincing, and they would not have to resort to “mystery.” There would be a full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility that would be based on a responsible exegesis of the biblical text that would show itself to be coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory. But that is not the case with Calvinism. When all is said and done, the Calvinists’ logical and moral difficulties remain. And if we take these on board in our hermeneutic, then the Calvinists’ doctrines are not biblical mysteries. Rather, their exegetical conclusions remain characterized by incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction.

Hence, the Calvinist must ultimately avoid the issue of reason in interpretation. In direct contrast, it is the non-Calvinist that can show that coherent, consistent and non-contradictory exegeses of the relevant texts do exist, and as such, these are the more accurate interpretations of the biblical witness regarding divine sovereignty and human responsibility. As the result of a hermeneutic that includes coherence, consistency and non-contradiction along with responsibly implementing all that is involved in the grammatical/historical exegetical methodology, the non-Calvinist interpretations establish themselves as the more plausible renderings of the text. Therefore it is those interpretations that warrant our belief.

Schreiner and Ware Declare Their Hermeneutic

Hence, Calvinists conclude that their exegeses of Scripture should be believed regardless of any logical and moral difficulties that their exegeses create, and the doctrines derived from them exhibit. This has serious implications for those of us who accept the Scripture as our sole authority in matters of faith and practice, as it should for the Calvinist who also affirms the same about Scripture. It raises the question as to whether Scripture is inherently inconsistent or contradictory. If it is not inherently inconsistent or contradictory, as non-Calvinists and Calvinists rightly affirm, yet Calvinists interpret it as inconsistent or contradictory, then it is reasonable to think their interpretations have gone astray. This brings us again to the more immediate issue of whether the logical and moral difficulties of the Calvinists’ exegesis have hermeneutical implications for determining the validity of the Calvinists’ interpretations. Since Calvinists ultimately claim “mystery” as “the full and final resolution” of their doctrinal difficulties, they are in effect stating that interpretations of Scripture should not be subject to human logical reflection and moral intuitions. They say this on the basis that, because Scripture is divinely inspired and because of its lofty subject matter, we should expect there to be logical and moral difficulties that we cannot resolve. But should the Calvinists’ logical and moral incoherence be defined and included as a genuine biblical mystery? Furthermore, Calvinists state that due to our fall into sin, our intellectual faculties simply fail in fully understanding God and his ways. I have refuted these assertions in Chapter 8. What the Calvinist is telling us is that their exegesis of the relevant texts plainly and clearly teaches their understanding of divine sovereignty as theistic determinism and their “doctrines of grace” such that it is sufficient for us to believe these interpretations regardless of the “logical difficulties” and “difficult questions” they engender. But by doing this, the Calvinist is declaring they hold to a certain type of hermeneutic, that is, a hermeneutic of incoherence. Again, they must ultimately avoid the issue of reason in interpretation. But there are serious problems with this approach.

Schreiner and Ware: Their False Dichotomy and Their Faulty Hermeneutic

The first problem is that it is misconceived to place “scriptural exegesis” in a dichotomous relationship with “logical problems” or “logical difficulties.” But this is precisely what Schreiner and Ware are doing here. To pit “scriptural exegesis” against “certain logical problems” as if good interpretation can simply separate these “logical problems” and ignore these “fundamental objections” is to embrace a false dichotomy and construct a faulty hermeneutic. One cannot dichotomize reasoning logically about the text from “scriptural exegesis.” To do so is to jettison the necessity for one’s interpretations to make sense. That luxury is not available to the responsible interpreter. But this luxury of claiming that one’s interpretations are what the Bible teaches, despite being logically contradictory and morally incoherent, is precisely a luxury that the Calvinist safeguards for himself by establishing a dichotomy between exegesis and reason. They are giving themselves permission for their interpretations to be nonsense, while claiming that the practice of exegesis has led them to their interpretive conclusions. And who can argue with exegesis? But when the Calvinists’ exegesis leads to certain logical and moral incoherencies and contradictions, and the Calvinist does not value logical and moral reasoning in his hermeneutic, then logical and moral coherence must take a back seat to his exegetical conclusions. But then we are confronted with whether a sound hermeneutic and responsible exegetical practice can ignore logical reasoning and moral intuition in the interpretive process. Can all logical and moral incoherence be chalked up to the fact that we are dealing with matters that stem from the mind of God and that his ways are higher than our ways? Can all logical and moral incoherence be chalked up as incomprehensible mysteries? Should we expect in the practice of interpreting God’s written revelation that our interpretations not be subject to the laws of logic or our moral intuitions, but rather we should expect to arrive at interpretations that are actually incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory? Is such the norm for good biblical exegesis according to a sound hermeneutic? Granted, there are true mysteries in Scripture, but interpretations that are incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory should not be classified as among them.

Therefore, this false dichotomy needs to be pointed out for the confusion it creates, and we should challenge the claim that once one has provided an exegesis of the text, that exegesis stands despite its problematic logical and moral implications and entailments. We should consider the possibility that one can offer an exegesis of a text and yet err in that task, evidenced by their interpretations resulting in incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction. These are indications that the Calvinist has misinterpreted the text.

I think it is incumbent upon us to ask how an exegete can claim to have correctly interpreted the text when his interpretive conclusions turn out to be incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory. We should be concerned when Calvinists claim their theology is the teaching of Scripture despite these logical and moral difficulties. We need to ask whether resorting to mystery and incomprehensibility to “explain” and justify such interpretations, which serve to draw our attention away from the “logical difficulties” inherent in their “doctrines of grace,” is convincing. We should be concerned when this happens precisely because our exegesis and interpretations become untethered from the canons of reason, which are the foundation of any rational communication – whether written or verbal.

We must ask ourselves whether the examples of incoherence in Calvinist thought and interpretation I will provide below demonstrate that the Calvinists’ exegesis of the various relevant texts and their derived doctrines are seriously flawed. And we must also ask ourselves whether it is hermeneutically essential that our interpretations exhibit logical and moral coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction.

Exegesis: An Excuse to Avoid the Probative Force of Logical and Moral Reflection

I have argued that Schreiner and Ware erroneously understand exegesis to be in a dichotomous relation to the philosophical and moral reflections that can be raised against their exegetical conclusions. They have distanced philosophical reflection and moral reasoning from exegesis, thereby neutralizing the probative force these two factors bring in critiquing Calvinism and exposing it as a flawed interpretation of Scripture.

We now have to deal with Schreiner and Ware’s contention that “the central reason that the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis.” Recall that Schreiner and Ware state,

What I submit is happening here is that Schreiner and Ware are attempting to use exegesis as a basis for bolstering the scriptural credibility of their position by suggesting that non-Calvinists do not object to “the doctrines of grace” on any convincing exegetical basis. If the Calvinist can get people to think that their objectors simply don’t do “scriptural exegesis” as responsibly and thoroughly as they do, and show that the objections to their “doctrines of grace” rest on some other basis than exegesis – like pointing out the “logical difficulties” of the Calvinist doctrines – then Schreiner and Ware can claim the exegetical high-ground. After all, who could argue against the fact that if the Calvinist can show that the non-Calvinist position is not primarily based in an exegetical treatment of the text when “the doctrines of grace” are exegetically supported, and “the central reason the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis” but because of “certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology [Schreiner and Ware] affirm,” then the non-Calvinist position must not be as exegetically strong as the Calvinist position and therefore Calvinism is what Scripture teaches. When Schreiner and Ware suggest that because they do exegesis, as if the non-Calvinist doesn’t, but rather relies on “logical difficulties” or “certain logical problems” with Calvinism, they want us to believe, therefore, that “the doctrines of grace” are closer to the truth of Scripture in these matters. But given this type of controversy, which involves the interpretation of Scripture, the Calvinist may claim the non-Calvinist is weak on exegesis to distract us from a due consideration of the interpretive and hermeneutical implications of the substantive philosophical and moral critiques the non-Calvinist can level against Calvinism.

It should first be emphatically stated that given that the non-Calvinist can level philosophical and moral critiques against Calvinism does not mean that the non-Calvinist position is weak on exegetical grounds. That is simply false. It is incorrect to state “that the central reason the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis.” Schreiner and Ware may be convinced of that, but not on the basis of the evidence. The obvious must be clearly stated. Non-Calvinists do provide sound, scriptural exegesis of the various texts relevant to this controversy. I do not need to give examples of that here. I will do so in subsequent chapters, and the annotated bibliography on this website provides overwhelming evidence that what Schreiner and Ware are suggesting here is false. All one has to do is go to the scholarly literature to see that non-Calvinists provide in-depth exegesis of the texts in their peer-reviewed articles and published works.

So it seems to me that when Schreiner and Ware state, “we are convinced that the central reason that the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis,” they are suggesting that the non-Calvinist doesn’t refute them on the exegetical level, and that smacks of an excuse to avoid the philosophical and moral indictments that non-Calvinists can level against Calvinism. As integral to a sound, scriptural exegesis and hermeneutic, these philosophical and moral critiques are devastating to Calvinism. In that Schreiner and Ware dichotomize exegesis from the deliberations of philosophy and our moral sensibilities, the Calvinist would like to leave us with “exegesis” as the only consideration by which we accept an interpretation. And therefore, of course, the Calvinist can safely claim their “exegesis” is correct or at least as valid as any other. The Calvinist would have “exegesis” and “exegetical conclusions” to be the only criteria by which to evaluate the validity of one’s interpretations of a text. And I would agree with that, but only if “exegesis” is not defined in a way that dismisses philosophical reasoning and moral reflection as integral to good exegesis. It would seem that what Schreiner and Ware are doing here is eliminating from the discussion the devastating logical and moral critiques that can be brought against the Calvinists’ exegesis and their “doctrines of grace.” But adherence to the laws of logic and consideration of moral standards and intuitions are surely essential to doing good exegesis.

So if Calvinists stress the centrality of “exegesis” while characterizing the non-Calvinist as deficient in such “exegesis,” that will strengthen the credibility of Calvinism as exegetically grounded, while also putting some distance between Calvinism and the non-Calvinist’s philosophical and moral objections to Calvinism. Furthermore, when Schreiner and Ware claim the exegetical high-ground they are presupposing that their Reformed Calvinist exegesis is correct. But exegesis is a slippery matter at times. Although one might claim that a technical exegesis supports one’s theological predilections, it can fail to definitively do so.

Matthew 28:18-20: Pastor Ronnie Rogers Critiques John Piper on ‘The Great Commission’

For instance, as to the meaning of the words “world” and “all” in certain key texts, including ‘The Great Commission’ in Matt. 28:18-20, author and pastor Ronnie Rogers writes,

“Calvinists are continually reminding everyone that words like “world” and “all” actually mean groups of people or the elect, rather than meaning all individuals, both elect and non-elect, in the world. …words like “world” and “all” sometimes have a limited meaning based upon context, but it is also true that at times they mean everyone everywhere.”

Rogers, assessing John Piper’s book “Let the Nations Be Glad,” writes,

“When Piper explains Matthew 28:18-20,^[6] he gives ten reasons why nations, ethnē, should be understood as “people group” rather than meaning “to win as many individuals as they could.” He believes that salvation will happen to some throughout the world, but does not believe that everyone throughout the world can receive salvation by faith. However, in his arguments, he admits that the very form of the world used in Matthew 28:18-20, which is ethnē, “can mean either Gentile individuals or people groups.”^[7]

Further, concerning how the exact phrase used in this passage appears throughout Scripture, “all the nations” he says, “Only once must it mean Gentile individuals. Nine times it must mean people groups.”^[8] “The other eight usages could go either way.”^[9] Consequently, by his own admission, the Scripture uses both the word and the phrase in both ways, which fits fine with what I am presenting but does not work for a Calvinist. Referring to usages in the Old Testament, he says, “Virtually all,”^[10] there again demonstrating that grammar does not prove the Calvinist point.”^[11]

Rogers continues,

“…whether one understands the phrase as “people groups”, “nations” of ethnicities,” etc., that does not address the real question, which is does the missionary endeavor and preaching of the gospel offer a real chance of everyone to be saved or is the offer only for those God selectively regenerates? To wit, do only some in every people group have a chance or does everyone? If God is concerned about all people groups, maybe he is concerned about everyone in all of the people groups (John 3:16), Piper’s views notwithstanding. Piper’s answer is clearly only the elect, a point that he did not prove to be supported by Scripture, but rather he read his conclusion into Scripture.”^[12]

The point is that not all exegesis is created equal. Calvinists do exegesis, but that does not mean it is good, sound exegesis. I have already argued that when exegesis is divorced from logical and moral deliberations, it is irresponsible exegesis. Indeed, it cannot be sound exegesis if it is not philosophically and morally coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory. That is to say that one’s interpretation must adhere to the principle of context. Incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction in one’s interpretations are, in essence, violations of the principle of context. Essentially, the principle of context demands that our interpretation of a text be coherent with those texts immediately surrounding it, given the reasonable supposition that the author wrote coherently and therefore wanted his readers to interpret him coherently. This concern for contextual coherence includes the broader context of the whole canon of Scripture. Simply put, when the Calvinist claims “our exegesis shows that…”, what the non-Calvinist will insist is that these exegetical claims must make sense. That is, when anyone claims they are doing “biblical exegesis,” it must be a process that makes sense of the text. Exegesis is literally a “no-nonsense” task.

John Lennox Refutes Total Inability, Pre-Faith Regeneration, and Faith as Meritorious

For example, John Lennox provides an exegetical treatment of verses in Romans, Hebrews, Ephesians, and the Gospel of John to counter the Calvinists’ errors of total inability with respect to faith and faith as merit, and the need for pre-faith regeneration. As to all sinners having the capacity to believe, and that believing not being a meritorious work or contribution to their salvation, Lennox makes three points.

The first is that the Calvinist is confused on the nature of faith and that,

“Some of the confusion arises from overlooking a simple logical point: meriting something, and having to do something to obtain that thing, are not the same. For instance, a distant relative may leave me a considerable sum in her will. I have done nothing to deserve it. She has gifted it to me as set out in a document held by her solicitor. He sends me a letter informing me of the fact. Now I have to decide whether I trust him and, indeed, her. I have to respond or I will not receive it. I could reject it. Clearly, the fact that I have to do something to make it my own does not mean that I have merited it or contributed to it in any way.

It is surely for that reason that our Lord can say to a woman on one occasion: Your faith has saved you; go in peace (Luke 7:50).

Consistent with this, when Paul is asked by a jailer at Philippi, who has just been terrified by an earthquake that freed the prisoners, Sirs, what must I do to be saved? Paul does not understand the jailer to be asking how he can merit salvation. He does not respond by suggesting that the jailer can do nothing in view of the fact that his salvation depends entirely on the sovereign choice of God. On the contrary, he tells the jailer exactly what he is able to do – and should do: Believe on the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved – you and your household (see Acts 16:25-34).”^[13]

Lennox’s second point is that,

“In response to the jailer Paul was not denying that salvation was wholly by grace and unmerited. On the contrary, he was affirming it. For – and this is the critically important thing – Paul regarded faith, the act of believing, as the opposite of merit. This means that the personal act of believing in our trusting in Christ for salvation is not a meritorious action that contributes to salvation.”^[14]

Lennox goes on to talk about the faith of Abraham from Romans 4 noting that,

“…the faith was Abraham’s – his faith. The text does not say here that God “gave him the faith”…nor does it say that Abraham’s faith was a meritorious contribution to his justification…No, Scripture says that it was Abraham’s faith that was credited to him as righteousness.

Listen to Paul defining the essence of faith in God in verses 4-5 (ESV):

Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift by as his due. And to the one who does not work but trusts him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted as righteousness…”^[15]

Lennox then makes his third point.

“We notice also that a person’s faith in God is described as their own faith; the faith of an ungodly person is counted as righteousness.

Paul, then, is contrasting two possible actions or attitudes – working and trusting – on the basis of the tacit assumption that everyone is capable of performing both.”^[16]

Lennox quotes Hebrews 11:1-2,

“Now faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see. This is what the ancients were commended for.”

And then he states,

“To commend someone for doing something that is not within their power to do is meaningless.”^[17]

John Lennox on Ephesians 2:8-9

Lennox examines Ephesians 2:8-9, a key text for Calvinists. Calvinists exegete this text to mean that, due to man’s total inability, and because election is unconditional, faith too must be given by God to the elect as a gift for them to be saved. Lennox writes,

“…it will be objected that Paul explicitly says elsewhere that faith is a gift of God. The relevant passage is Ephesians 2:8-9 where Paul writes:

For by grace you have been saved, through faith – and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God – not by works, so that no-one can boast.

It is then argued that this verse is consistent with the view that the unregenerate person is incapable of believing, and unless God gives them the faith that person will never believe. However, in the Greek text the word for faith is feminine in gender, whereas the word for it (in the phrase it is the gift of God) is neuter. From a grammatical point of view it is therefore not faith that is the gift – the gift is salvation by grace. Paul is in fact here making the same point as in Romans 4, contrasting salvation by merit with salvation by grace through faith.”^[18]

What is to be observed in all these examples is that for Lennox, the integrating of technical exegetical or textual information with logical and moral reflection on this data and these texts is essential to the interpretive process. Using both spheres of interpretive concern, Lennox arrives at interpretations that correct the Calvinist’s conception of faith as merit and counter the doctrines of total inability, unconditional election, and pre-faith regeneration. The point is that interpretation cannot be done in a logical and moral vacuum. The text being studied must be understood to be in a coherent relationship with other texts being studied or have already had their meaning confidently disclosed. Proposed meanings of texts cannot be set in logical and moral contradiction with each other and left in abeyance as a biblical mystery.

John Lennox Critiques E. H. Palmer

Lennox makes this clear when commenting on the logical difficulty of human moral responsibility in light of the Calvinist doctrines of an eternal divine decree, unconditional election, and reprobation. Lennox writes,

“…there are theologians like E. H. Palmer who hold that:

Reprobation as condemnation is conditional in the sense that once someone is passed by, then he is condemned by God for his sins and unbelief. Although all things – unbelief and sin included – proceed from God’s eternal decree, man is still to blame for his sins. He is guilty; it is his fault and not God’s.^[19]

It is sad to read of Palmer’s own reaction to this. Elsewhere in the same work he freely – and rather oddly – admits that his view is “illogical, ridiculous, nonsensical and foolish.”^[20] He then takes refuge in saying, “This secret matter belongs to the Lord our God and we should leave it there.”^[21]

To ascribe views that are illogical, ridiculous, nonsensical, and foolish to God and his world sounds like the language of unbalanced extremism. After all, if an argument – and Palmer uses his reason all through – leads to illogical, ridiculous, nonsensical, and foolish conclusions, then the first thing to look for are flaws in the argument – either in its logic or its premises. Yet Palmer, astonishingly, encourages us blindly, and purely on the basis of his own personal authority, to “leave it there.” But God does not leave it there. The New Testament does not leave it there. As we have seen, and will further explore, a long and detailed argument in John’s Gospel is geared precisely to establish the very opposite of Palmer’s contention. God justifies his ways to us and repeatedly asks us, as his creatures, to use our moral judgment to grasp that his will and actions are the exact opposite of illogical, ridiculous, nonsensical and foolish. Simply to “leave it there” risks undermining the credibility of Scripture.

Using our God-given moral judgment is very important. For instance, the most elementary moral logic surely tells us that, if someone is going to be condemned because they personally failed to so something (in this case believe), then they must have been capable of doing it in the first place. Otherwise no guilt could be attached to their action, and their condemnation would be unjust. Attempts like Palmer’s to dismiss this point by saying that this belongs to the secret counsel of God are singularly unimpressive and cannot be correct, as the Lord himself makes it clear that guilt implies responsibility and moral capacity.

In his discussion with the religious leaders about his healing of the blind man, Jesus makes the point:

If you were blind, you would not be guilty of sin; but not that you claim you can see, your guilt remains.

(John 9:41)

According to Christ, then, people will never be condemned for not seeing what they cannot see. Therefore, if they are to be judged for not believing, they must have been capable of believing. To suggest otherwise is to run the risk of representing God as a moral monster, and that is unthinkable.”^[22]

The point here is that the Calvinist cannot simply claim that once they have performed a technical exegesis upon a text, the truth of the text has been disclosed. It is always a danger that one is imposing a presupposed theological grid upon the text. How do we know Palmer has erred in his theological conclusions? Because Palmer’s interpretations lead to what he himself admits is “illogical, ridiculous, nonsensical, and foolish.”

Don’t miss the hermeneutical divide here. When we contrast the interpretive perspectives and conclusions of Palmer and Lennox, it becomes very obvious that Palmer does not value the logical and moral considerations that are so hermeneutically essential for Lennox.

Non-Calvinists Critique Calvinism on Philosophical, Moral, and Exegetical Grounds

I am not claiming that logical and moral coherence are sufficient for discerning the meaning of a text, but they are necessary. A technical exegesis is necessary for us to come to the author’s intent, but it is not necessarily sufficient for attaining the precise meaning of the text. That is, it is not sufficient if it does not inherently include the deliberations and checks of logical and moral reasoning. These cannot be dissociated from what it means to do exegesis. The Calvinists’ hermeneutical error lies in their refusal to join philosophical and moral reasoning to exegesis in the interpretive task. And that being the case, we are cavalierly told that “we should leave it there.” A perfect example of the Calvinists’ flight to mystery. It cannot be overstated that surely this is a faulty hermeneutic. It certainly seems that the Calvinist, because he accepts a hermeneutic of incoherence, is not interested in what the text actually means, but is more intent on preserving his traditional Calvinist doctrines, no matter the intellectual and moral price tag. Lennox states the truth when he says that the Calvinist “encourages us blindly, and purely on the basis of his own personal authority, to ‘leave it there.'”

In contrast to this Calvinist confusion, what is necessary and sufficient for coming to the true meaning of the text is the exegetical process defined as a process that results in exegetical claims and conclusions that exhibit coherence, consistency and non-contradiction.

The Calvinist cannot boast of the accuracy of their exegesis if their exegesis leads them and us into these intractable logical and moral difficulties. Neither can the Calvinist hide behind an exegesis that is divorced from clear thinking about the text and claim that the non-Calvinist merely objects to Calvinism because of its logical and moral difficulties. Non-Calvinists object to Calvinism on the basis that the Calvinist exegesis leads to thinking and speaking nonsense. But non-Calvinists also object to Calvinism because they certainly do provide sound exegesis of the relevant texts, and these exegeses have the advantage of being free from the acute logical and moral difficulties found in the Calvinist interpretations. This means that the non-Calvinist interpretations better explain the author’s intent than the Calvinist interpretations.

So those who disagree with Schreiner and Ware do interpret many scriptures differently. These scholars exegete the text, but their exegesis leads to different conclusions precisely because it incorporates the clear thinking that comes from logical, or philosophical reflection, and moral intuition.

Competent and Incompetent Exegesis: The Hermeneutical Divide

Therefore, for the non-Calvinist, what makes an exegesis “sound” or weak, in addition to its faithfulness to the grammatical-historical method, is precisely the degree to which it is marked by explanatory power and scope, freedom from ad hoc ‘explanations’, and the inclusion of logical, moral, theological, and practical coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. Non-Calvinists view rational and moral coherence as integral to their “scriptural exegesis.” Certainly, the non-Calvinist must offer an exegesis of the relevant texts if they are going to establish their position as biblical. Of course, non-Calvinists must apply the same standard of coherence to their exegesis. They must provide competent and convincing exegetical interpretations that exhibit grammatical accuracy, a depth of explanation regarding historical, social, and religious context, consideration of literary genre, rational consistency with the immediate literary and broader canonical context, and logical and moral coherence with other established theological themes and doctrines. I contend that the responsible non-Calvinist theologies and soteriologies do just that. Non-Calvinists insist on providing an exegesis that does not result in nonsense. And they do just that, too. But not so for the Calvinist. Hence the hermeneutical divide.

Therefore, the “certain logical problems” non-Calvinists raise regarding Calvinism are relieved, given the non-Calvinists’ exegesis. This is the way the non-Calvinist maintains his exegetical position. His exegesis is based on the historical-critical methodology marked by coherence. This is also the way non-Calvinists refute Calvinism. They employ a coherent exegesis. This is in contrast to the Calvinist who seeks to maintain his Calvinism by an incoherent exegesis. The Calvinist insists his exegesis is valid, but it shows itself to lack clear thinking and moral sensibility; that is, it cannot stand up to philosophical and ethical scrutiny. So it is an incoherent exegesis, which surely must be deemed an irresponsible exegesis. Combine the thorough and coherent non-Calvinist exegesis of the relevant texts with the logical and moral critiques of the Calvinist exegesis and interpretations, and you have a formidable case for the non-Calvinist interpretations and against Calvinism. Therefore, objections that reveal the logical problems with Calvinism would be an integral part of the non-Calvinists’ critique of Calvinism. That’s just the way the non-Calvinist thinks hermeneutically.

Schreiner and Ware admit that there are “logical difficulties” in their theology, but this seems to have no significance for their hermeneutic or implications for their interpretations. In their hermeneutic, the logical problems in their position are not sufficient reason for the Calvinist to revisit their textual exegesis. So ask yourself, can the logical and moral implications of one’s exegesis be excluded as a necessary criterion by which we determine whether that exegesis accurately reflects the meaning of the text? For the Calvinist, the answer is “yes.” For the non-Calvinist, the answer is “no.” This is the hermeneutical divide.

The Heremenutical Divide: The Calvinist Tactic of Dismissing Essential Principles of Interpretation

This hermeneutical divide is the reason why this controversy continues. If I were to claim that my exegesis of the text, although it exhibits incoherence and contradiction, is the correct meaning of the text, how would you be able to discern the truth of my claim? Would it be by offering an alternative exegesis of the text that is equally incoherent and contradictory? I don’t think so. If that were the case, we wouldn’t get any closer to the true meaning of the text. My interpretation would be just as good as yours. This only points out the necessity that our interpretation exhibit logical and moral coherence. It certainly seems that the way we could get at the true meaning of the text is by countering an incoherent exegesis with an alternative exegesis that does not suffer from incoherence and contradiction.

Now, suppose your exegesis threatened some key doctrines I hold dear, and let’s say my exegesis was shown to result in incoherent conclusions, and you point that out to me. In defense of my exegesis and doctrine, I respond that any logical or moral problems you identify in my doctrines that are a result of my exegesis are due to the inability of our finite minds to grasp how those doctrines cohere; hence, we have a mystery on our hands that we cannot fathom. Now, I think you would be justified in asking, “Then how could any exegesis ever be verified or refuted?” Good question. It could not be verified. And this is just what the Calvinist is doing hermeneutically. They are dismissing the very tools of thought necessary to validate an exegesis and the doctrines derived from that exegesis. Therefore, if logical and moral objections can be dismissed as if they were not meaningful critiques of one’s position, and they can be divorced from playing an indispensable role in validating one’s exegesis, that exegesis can never be validated. Key doctrines, despite their being incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory, would remain intact and could not be altered. That exegesis and theology would just exist and remain in existence for whatever reasons, but those reasons would never include a philosophical or moral assessment of that exegesis and theology.

So the crucial question is, “Do the Calvinists’ incoherent interpretations remain in existence for reasons that are less than exegetically and hermeneutically satisfactory?” In other words, can you have an exegesis that leads to logical and moral incoherence and yet claim that this is also a satisfactory hermeneutic that produces accurate interpretations of the Scriptures? If you believe you can, you would simply boast that you have exegeted the text and discredit your objectors as merely getting hung up on the “logical difficulties” in your position. You will assert that these logical difficulties hold no weight with respect to evaluating the validity of your exegesis. If this is the extent of your hermeneutic, then there will never be a consensus as to the meaning of Scripture with someone whose hermeneutic takes logical and moral coherence to be indispensable. I submit that we cannot divorce philosophical and moral reflection from our hermeneutic, our exegetical process, or our interpretive claims. Once we do this, then anything goes. Any interpretation can be deemed valid. This is precisely what Schriener and Ware state at the beginning of their book and what the contributors confirm.

Therefore, I submit that the negative logical and moral ramifications of the Calvinist exegesis cannot be dismissed by fleeing to “mystery.” And I submit that intellectual integrity warrants our rejection of this non-explanation. These logical, and I would add, moral objections must be acknowledged and satisfactorily resolved by Calvinists. But that would require a serious reconsideration of their hermeneutics, exegesis, and doctrines. They would have to alter their theological system appropriately, especially given that there exist exegetically, philosophically, and morally sound alternative interpretations. Intellectual and exegetical integrity demand it. The problems identified in Calvinism must be addressed in light of an interpretive method that emphasizes an exegesis that is logically and morally coherent. Until this happens, this controversy will continue. This is the hermeneutical divide that is at the heart of the controversy.

Faith Seeking Understanding or An A Priori Doctrine Seeking Justification?

Recall that Schreiner and Ware concluded that “our attempt to solve the problems posed by our theology, then, is an example of ‘faith seeking understanding.’”^[23] But what is “understanding” except the process by which we reason through the problems posed by our theology or a certain interpretation of a text? What is a “problem” except something that does not cohere with something else; something that is inconsistent or contradictory?

To “solve the problems,” you must reason, and to reason, you need to acknowledge the input of the canons of reason and moral intuition. I submit that this is what is not happening in Calvinism. How can the “reason” people ought to embrace the “doctrines of grace” be “because they are taught in Scripture” if those doctrines pose “logical problems” which raise doubt as to whether or not they are taught in Scripture? If logical and moral reasoning are essential to a sound hermeneutic, then we would have sufficient reason to reject the claim that they are what is taught in Scripture. To avoid question begging, the Calvinist will have to give us coherent exegetical reasons for believing their doctrines are biblical, but how will they do so when we find that their exegesis generates incoherence, inconsistency, and contradictions with other established biblical teachings and reality as we all experience it? If the reason people ought to embrace the “doctrines of grace” is based on exegesis, how are we going to discern the accuracy of an exegesis when logical reasoning and moral intuitions can be dismissed when that exegesis raises “logical difficulties?” How else can one discern a valid exegesis from an invalid exegesis? How does one defend their exegesis when that exegesis is found to present “logical problems,” yet logic is not allowed to lend its input?

Ironically, the Calvinist presupposes the validity of “logic” in affirming the “logical problems” non-Calvinists raise in objection to Calvinism, but then the Calvinist dismisses this logic, ignoring its legitimate function in evaluating the validity of their interpretations. It is fine to claim that this is “faith seeking understanding,” but how will faith ultimately gain this “understanding?” What is this “understanding” if not a reasoned conclusion? Faith that is Christian need not depend on or wait for complete understanding. But faith that is Christian is never to be defined as “blind faith” or faith without reasoned evidence, let alone faith that is against reason itself. “Faith seeking understanding” cannot be used as an excuse to ignore the incoherence, inconsistency or contradiction that is inherent in one’s exegesis and theology.

This Calvinist explanation of “faith seeking understanding” needs careful examination. We should first establish what the Bible says about the nature of “faith” so we can discern what is meant by “faith seeking understanding.” Is the Calvinist using the word “faith” here to mean belief in a non-negotiable established doctrine, particularly their view of divine sovereignty as a universal divine causal determinism, and therefore, “understanding” is the ongoing attempt to make sense of the logical and moral problems that this determinism creates? A tenet of Calvinist “faith” is belief in theistic determinism. Hence, the real gist of what is meant by the phrase “faith seeking understanding” is something more like, “our belief in theistic determinism seeking rational justification.” And it is no problem if the Calvinist never produces this rational justification because they can always maintain their determinism by falling back to “mystery,” which is where Schreiner and Ware stand now.

The point is that the “faith” that is “seeking understanding” cannot be doctrinal conclusions that are presupposed to be true, that generate incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction. Incoherent doctrines are not to be equated with “faith.” Moreover, “seeking understanding” cannot be equated with incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction in one’s theology. Faith, therefore, seeks understanding in accord with the rules of logic and our moral intuitions, not despite them. Understanding is the grounds for faith; otherwise, there would be nothing to believe in, or what is proposed that we should believe in may be genuinely irrational and not worthy of belief and trust. Faith must not become justification for accepting what is incoherent. Faith is one’s personal decision to trust in what can be understood and has been demonstrated to be trustworthy. Faith, therefore, rests upon and embraces understanding. Faith embraces what can be understood due to divine revelation. What is revealed could not be known or understood apart from its being revealed. There are things revealed that human reason is inadequate for discovering and comprehending on its own, and faith affirms that revelation and the truth of what is beyond comprehension. But this is very different from claiming that what is revealed can be incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory, while pinning this problem on reason’s inability to grasp, not what is revealed, but what has been wrongly interpreted. In that case, the fault lies in the interpretation of what is revealed.

Indeed, the purpose of divine revelation is to provide logical and moral grounds for faith in God. Divine revelation fosters and demands faith in all that is revealed precisely because it is not dismissive of the laws of logic and our moral intuitions. Revelation is meant to be understood and is therefore sufficient to and in accord with the workings of reason. There are things revealed that are beyond reason to comprehend, but there are no things revealed that are in contradiction to reason with other revealed things. And it must be added that all the academic disciplines have things to contribute in support of Christian faith when their information is considered in conjunction with the proper meaning of Scripture. For instance, science and theology contribute to each other in a mutually beneficial way. Each can learn from the other about the true nature of reality. This is because there is only one God who is the Creator of all things. So, faith is the trust you personally put in God according to what He has revealed. This is why a person is held culpable by God for their unbelief in light of God’s sufficient revelation of himself and his salvation (Rom. 1:18-20). Thus, saving faith is centered upon the divine revelation of the way of salvation in Christ Jesus. But let us note that all this is dependent upon, and interrelated with, the interpretation of a written text and therefore the validation of what one proposes to be the meaning of that text. Hence, an essential question we need to answer is, “What makes for a valid interpretation?” I submit that it involves coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction.

Schreiner and Ware: Why Their Calvinism is False

Back to Schreiner and Ware’s introductory quote. In contrast to the flight to “mystery” and the claim of “complexity,” along with “faith seeking understanding,” perhaps, rather, the “logical difficulties raised” are indicators that the fault lies in Schreiner and Ware’s interpretation of Scripture. In that case, “mystery,” “complexity,” and “faith seeking understanding” become scapegoats to maintain what common logic and morality identify as problematic interpretations.

Therefore, based on the indispensability of the laws of logic to any rational thought, if the non-Calvinist can identify “certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology,” then these “logical problems” constitute a decisive refutation of the Calvinist exegesis of the relevant texts and the theological system developed upon that exegesis. This is the role of the laws of logic in the interpretive task. These laws are indispensable, and they can reliably support the validity or expose the invalidity of one’s interpretive propositions. We can confidently say that what is logically incoherent or contradictory is false. If we cannot confidently say this, or we choose to ignore it, then all thought and knowledge collapses into meaninglessness. When our theology violates the laws of logic, that is, when it is found to be inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory, then we have determined that theology to be an incorrect interpretation and understanding of Scripture. If Calvinism violates these laws of logic, as I have demonstrated on this site that it does, then this is sufficient to conclude that it is false.

Therefore, the Calvinists are preserving and protecting their doctrine of deterministic sovereignty regardless of the wide range of problematic implications. Rather than take their hermeneutical cues from these problematic indicators, Calvinists feel compelled to maintain a deterministic definition of sovereignty, which in turn dictates the definitions of their soteriological doctrines such that “his free election of individuals to receive his efficacious grace alone accounts for personal salvation.” But is this true to Scripture when the Calvinist must also admit that the same Scripture testifies to genuine human freedom, personal moral responsibility and culpability, contingency, potentiality, and possibility, let alone a message of ‘good news’ of salvation for all? We read of these on almost every page of the Bible. Does “mystery” really suffice as “the full and final resolution” of divine sovereignty and human responsibility? I do not think so for the reasons given above. Rather, the problem is interpretive.

Also note that Schreiner and Ware would have no way of knowing whether they might be in error here because the logical, moral, practical, and theological difficulties, which may be reliable indications of misinterpretation, are put out of court. Hence, in this way, their definition of “sovereignty” as a theistic determinism can, for them, remain unassailable and continue to hold absolute sway over their whole theological paradigm. Who can discuss or attempt to persuade someone that a certain exegetical interpretation doesn’t make sense when the tools by which we determine sense from nonsense are rendered inapplicable and irrelevant to the discussion because “God’s ways are higher than our ways” and therefore the relationship between sovereignty and human responsibility is “incomprehensible to sinful human reason?” Who can persuade someone that their position is incoherent if, when they are confronted with the incoherence, they always flee to “mystery?”

So we are left asking what makes all these responses anything more than mere assertions, which only begs the question as to whether the Calvinist has interpreted the Scripture correctly. What makes “mystery” anything more than a bold assertion that presupposes that the Calvinist soteriological interpretations are true? Thus, as far as the Calvinist is concerned, their interpretations are insulated from substantive critique because the logical and moral frameworks for discerning the validity of an interpretation are a priori discounted as far as hermeneutics is concerned in favor of asserting “incomprehensibility” and “mystery.” It is only upon such shaky hermeneutical grounds that they can boast that God is “Still Sovereign.”

But note again, if there is an alternative interpretation that proves to be the result of a careful examination of the historical, grammatical, social and theological context, and also “makes sense,” that is, adheres to the cannons of reason and our moral intuitions, then we see no reason as to why that shouldn’t be deemed the more accurate interpretation.

Schreiner and Ware’s admission that “the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism” is highly significant. It is a step of honest self-reflection upon the problematic implications of their theology. But when all is said and done, as far as interpretive validity is concerned, these “logical difficulties” simply do not matter to them and their colleagues who contributed to this volume. I would hope that more Calvinists would take the time and effort to carefully reflect upon what they say they believe with respect to the nature of the difficulties inherent in their positions, the cause of those difficulties, and their hermeneutical implications. And yet, as they persist in choosing to ignore the logical and moral objections and critiques of their theology, Calvinists seem to become more and more hardened to them.

Schreiner and Ware Ignore Their Logical and Moral Interpretive Incoherence

Note that Schreiner and Ware have a mindset that enables them to dismiss rational and moral considerations in their interpretations and theological conclusions. As to the logical relationship of their theistic determinism to human choice and responsibility, they state,

“God is completely sovereign, and yet human choices and responsibility are not a charade. God ordains all that comes to pass and is good; and yet evil exists, and it is really evil.”

The logical and moral problems engendered by their theistic determinism are readily apparent in the “and yets.” Their determinism regarding individual salvation is also evident.

“…there would be agreement among Calvinists that God is sovereign, and that his free election of individuals to receive his efficacious grace alone accounts for personal salvation. God’s unconditional election and irresistible grace cause all who believe to put their faith in Christ to be saved.”

The terms and phrases used here vary e.g., “God chooses,” “grace is irresistible,” “he has chosen,” “God is in control,” “God governs,” “God is sovereign,” “free election,” “efficacious grace,” “unconditional election,” “irresistible grace,” “God is completely sovereign,” “God ordains all that comes to pass and is good,” “God chooses only some to be saved”, but they all express what amounts to a theistic determinism which is a bedrock understanding of divine “sovereignty” that is unalterable for the Calvinist.

It is obvious that Schreiner and Ware themselves conclude that their view of “sovereignty” raises “certain logical problems” and “logical difficulties” in relation to “human choices and responsibility.” They state that “God is completely sovereign, and yet human choices and responsibility are not a charade.” They acknowledge that what the Calvinist means by “God ordains all that comes to pass” is logically and morally problematic with respect to the character of God as good and the existence of evil. They acknowledge that unconditional election is logically problematic, given God’s desire that all be saved, and with the affirmation that those who do not persevere to the end will not inherit the kingdom of God.

It is crucial to note that Schreiner and Ware acknowledge the legitimacy of the logical and moral difficulties non-Calvinists have brought against Calvinism. They confess that “the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.” They also state that there exist “hard texts for Calvinists.”^[24] These acknowledgements are crucial for weighing the role of logic in the hermeneutical and exegetical task and the role logical coherence plays in determining the validity of one’s exegetical and interpretive conclusions. It is crucial because it certainly seems to be an admission of the legitimacy of logical and moral reasoning. We are, therefore, left baffled as to why logical and moral reasoning can be dismissed when they indict the Calvinist interpretations for incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction. We are left wondering why logical reflection and our moral sense are cavalierly ignored in doing sound biblical interpretation and in discerning the validity of exegetical and interpretive conclusions. If the complaints identify something legitimate, then the reasoning upon which the complaints are established is legitimate. Therefore, why shouldn’t that reasoning apply to the Calvinist’s interpretations? Why shouldn’t that reasoning be essential and indispensable to the Calvinists’ hermeneutic?

As already noted above, in Schreiner and Ware’s list of problems that Calvinism faces, they also admit to moral difficulties. These we detect by our moral intuitions. For instance, we know that it is morally wrong for someone to be held responsible and condemned for doing evil when they were irresistibly determined by God to do it. And we know that since God determined the evil, he must be the fundamental causal agent in the evil action, and therefore the agent responsible for the action. And I think it should be obvious to all that to place the responsibility on the human person doing the evil act as the “secondary cause” and to hold them accountable for the evil act when it is God who irresistibly determined the person to do the act, does nothing to relieve the essential problem here. Neither does it help to say the person is responsible for the evil act because they were doing what they desired to do, and therefore, they did it freely. This compatibilism fails because the Calvinist also states it is God who gave them the desire to do the evil act. Due to their theistic determinism, the Calvinists’ attempt to explain evil and evil actions lands us in moral incoherence with respect to the justice of such matters and the character of God as holy and good. In addition, God, whose very nature is loving and just, has predetermined that certain persons, even before they came into existence, would suffer eternal punishment, torment, and separation from himself. All others, even before they came into existence, were predetermined for salvation. Both occur in a way in which the persons themselves, with respect to their wills and choices, are completely passive, that is, that each one’s eternal destiny is decided, unchangeable, and irresistibly caused by God alone. Here we have acute problems involving our sense of justice and morality regarding the very character of God. So, the Calvinists’ interpretive incoherencies are of a logical and moral nature.

Schreiner and Ware: The Excuse of ‘Complexity’

Having now acknowledged the legitimacy of the logical and moral difficulties of their Calvinist interpretations and theology, how do Schreiner and Ware respond to these difficulties? First, they point out that the answers to these non-Calvinists’ objections are “complex.” This point is well taken. Anyone who has engaged this controversy knows how complex it can be. But that will not help the Calvinist extricate himself from the logical and moral problems inherent in his theology. “Complex” is different than logically and morally incoherent. Even if “the reality of life as portrayed by the Scriptures is complex, this ‘complexity’ will not support the logical and moral incoherence that is easily identified and even acknowledged by Schreiner, Ware, and the Calvinist contributors to their book. And as a rule, complexity should not be used to support obvious logical and moral incoherence in one’s theology. It is a vain attempt for Schreiner and Ware to redefine the logical and moral incoherence in their position as ‘complexity.’ It is disengenuous to obscure the logical problems of their theology by describing them as ‘complex.’ Rather, when one’s theology exhibits logical and moral incoherence, that theology ought to be revisited in light of responsible and sound alternative interpretations of Scripture that exhibit logical and moral coherence. Indeed, logical reasoning and moral intuitions, if allowed to lend their input hermeneutically, assist in clarifying and therefore simplifying these matters in our thinking, thus reducing their complexity. I submit to you that the excuse of the ‘complexity’ of these issues betrays the incoherence in the Calvinists’ theology. Therefore, Calvinists would like nothing more than the permission to remain incoherent and have it be accepted as legitimate within an evangelical hermeneutic. Calvinists do not want to be pressed on their logical and moral incoherence. They want to be allowed to have the answers to the logical and moral objections non-Calvinists raise against Calvinism to remain ‘complex,’ but this is only a euphemism for incoherent. ‘Complex’ makes incoherence sound legitimate.

Schreiner and Ware: The Excuse of ‘Mystery’

Having made this point about complexity, we can see how Schreiner and Ware ultimately deal with this complexity and solve these logical problems. They do so by fleeing to “mystery.” They explicitly state,

“All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.”^[25]

Again, Schreiner and Ware confirm the problematic nature of their definition of “sovereignty” when they admit to “certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology we affirm.” But as much as they will attempt to address these in the subsequent essays in their book, they a priori assert that those problems are a “mystery.” Schreiner and Ware clearly state that “All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.”

This tells us that any Calvinist attempts to resolve the logical or moral difficulties in their theology will ultimately fail. In effect, Schreiner and Ware are both admitting and informing us that there are no answers to these logical and moral problems inherent in their theology or their book. Their insistence on ‘mystery’ means that revisiting and interpreting the text in a way that takes logical and moral coherence on board is not an option for them. The essays in their book, even though they will attempt to alleviate these logical and moral difficulties exegetically, will ultimately not resolve them. Why? Because it is impossible to reason your way out of a fundamental incoherence or contradiction, while the interpretations producing the fundamental incoherence or contradiction remain intact. We can never resolve a logical or moral incoherence or contradiction without correcting the cause of these. To leave the incoherence or contradiction intact and attempt to reason it away will only reveal that reason will refuse to cooperate in such an endeavor because we would be requiring reason to betray itself. But the cannons of reason cannot be violated by rational argument. Sooner or later, the Calvinists’ arguments will betray themselves as also irrational, incoherent, or contradictory. You can’t reason around a contradiction. Reason won’t participate in attempts at defeating itself. Attempts to reason around incoherencies and contradictions only produce more incoherencies and contradictions in the process. And that is what happens in Schreiner and Ware’s book, as I will demonstrate below. After the many attempts at explaining why what you believe is really not nonsense fail, and only produce more nonsense, then one has to admit that they actually do have real incoherence and contradiction on their hands. They are caught in real philosophical and moral incoherence or contradiction. Mystery, antinomy, apparent contradiction, incomprehensibility, two wills in God, two kinds of divine love, etc., cannot rescue the situation. What is philosophically and morally incoherent cannot be resolved unless one deals with the problem at its source. In this case, the source is the Calvinists’ exegesis, which claims divine sovereignty is defined as universal divine causal determinism. Theological incoherence remains incoherence and theological contradictions remain contradictions until they are resolved at the level of interpretation and interpretive thought. But, for the Calvinist, processing one’s exegesis in accord with the rules of logic and reason has been put out of court. Given this Calvinist hermeneutic of incoherence, there can be no resolution to this problem.

Therefore, the critical question facing the evangelical church which demands an answer is whether or not biblical interpretations that prove to be logically and morally contradictory, inconsistent or incoherent are valid exegeses of the text.

Schreiner and Ware admit that interpretations that differ from theirs can be put forth. But that does not help us to determine which of those differing interpretations is true. Surely the disciplines of hermeneutics and exegesis are about ferreting out the true meaning of the text. Surely then, the question must be asked, “How can we know whose interpretations are an accurate reflection of the the true meaning of the text?” I submit that a crucial element in the answer to this question is logical and moral coherence. We should not divorce our biblical exegesis from the “logical problems” of that exegesis. In determining the validity of that exegesis, surely the logical and moral coherence of that exegesis must be taken into consideration. If logical and moral coherence are indispensable for determining valid from invalid interpretations, then, due to the type of difficulties Calvinism generates, the Calvinist interpretations fail as a proper exegesis of Scripture.

We all agree that due diligence in the exegetical process is fundamental and indispensable for arriving at the correct understanding of the text and for accepting one interpretation over another as what the author intended to say to us. And certainly Calvinists provide an exegesis of the controversial texts. But as I have said, there is good exegesis, not too good exegesis, and very bad exegesis, and we need a hermeneutic that can discern the difference. But we critique Calvinism not on the basis of its incoherence alone, but also by the fact that there are exegetically sound alternative interpretations of the relevant texts. There are alternative exegeses that lead to different interpretive conclusions. But again, obviously, not any exegesis will do. Each side in this controversy does not accept the other’s exegesis as the satisfactory meaning of the texts at issue (e.g., Rom. 9, Eph. 1, Jn. 6, et al.) Exegesis is a necessary condition for properly understanding the meaning of the text, but it is not a sufficient condition for that. What are we to do when positions differ and both sides claim exegetical grounding? I submit that there usually are grammatical-historical reasons that just haven’t been considered or incorporated into one or the other, or perhaps both sides of the debate that produced flawed interpretations. So, ideally, we could come to a consensus on the meaning of the text by gaining greater insights and knowledge through the use of the grammatical-historical method alone. So, there may be grammatical-historical considerations that have been overlooked. Yet, it seems to me that interpretations claiming to be based on a proper application of the grammatical-historical method, which dichotomize logical and moral coherence from that exegetical method, that is, they don’t consider the deliverances of logical reflection and moral intuition important elements in their hermeneutic, are prone to misinterpret the text and will likely do so. I contend that this is what is happening in Calvinism. And that being the case, the Calvinists’ traditional interpretations and the doctrines built upon them will stand as a priori true to Scripture. Therefore, the Calvinist would not be capable of acknowledging any critique that would persuade him to alter his perspective on and interpretation of these important texts. One cannot claim to be involved in a responsible implementation of the grammatical-historical exegetical methodology while ignoring whether their results are logically and morally incoherent or not. Philosophical reasoning and moral intuitions are vital contributors to the exegetical process. These also have to be taken into consideration. They are key arbitrators between two contrary exegetical conclusions.

So the non-Calvinist questions the Calvinist “doctrines of grace” on two grounds: exegetical and logical. But the Calvinist claims the truth of their “doctrines of grace” solely on exegetical grounds while dismissing the logical grounds by resorting to “mystery.” But to dismiss the logical grounds is to dismiss the means to determine the accuracy of the exegetical grounds.

An Incoherent Claim: Determinism Motivates the Calvinist to Pray

Here is an example of the incoherence of Calvinism. In their Introduction, Schreiner and Ware provide five reasons as to why they “love the doctrines of grace.”^[26] Their fourth reason is that “the doctrines of grace motivate us to pray.” They explain,

“…the doctrines of grace motivate us to pray. We do not simply pray that God will move on people so that it is possible for their wills to respond. Such prayers are characterized by hesitancy since their outcome is dependent ultimately upon the human will. We pray rather that God will invade their lives and turn the desires of their heart around so that they will be saved. We do not ask God simply to make salvation possible; we pray that God will save them, all the while knowing that God’s perfect will, from all eternity, is alone wise and right.”^[27]

Schreiner and Ware deem the non-Calvinists’ prayer to be inadequate because they “simply pray that God will move people so that it is possible for their wills to respond.” They say, “Such prayers are characterized by hesitancy since their outcome is dependent ultimately upon the human will.” But let’s now examine the Calvinist alternative.

Schreiner and Ware claim that as Calvinists, “We pray…that God will invade their lives and turn the desires of their heart around so that they will be saved.” But the content of this prayer is incoherent given the Calvinists’ deterministic worldview. First, this prayer certainly implies the expectation that God may do or will do something in answer to that prayer, that is, something that God otherwise would not have done if the prayer had not been prayed. After all, isn’t that the reason Schreiner and Ware pray at all? Isn’t the reason they pray so that things would be what they otherwise would not be? That certainly is the impression they give us here. Furthermore, they clearly state, “…we pray that God will save them.” Question. If God does “invade their lives and turn the desires of their heart around” and “save them,” does that have any relation to the prayer, or does all that happen solely on the basis that the person is among the unconditionally elect who were chosen by God for salvation before he created the world? In Calvinism, it is precisely the case that God’s “saving them” happens only in the person who has been unconditionally elected to salvation. Unconditional means it has nothing to do with a prayer or the person being prayed for. Unconditional election, or predestination, is the only explanation of why a person is saved. It is the full and final explanation as to how and why a person is saved. And their salvation or reprobation being unconditional, that is, not conditioned upon anything or anyone other than God’s will and his activity to bring about his will, the prayer has no effect with respect to the turning of the desires of their heart or their ultimately being saved. The prayer has no effect on God because salvation is unconditional. The resulting salvation of the elect has nothing to do with the Calvinist’s prayer. It occurs because God causes salvation to occur according to his premundane decision to save that individual. Period. Prayer or no prayer. So, theistic determinism is not a motivating factor for prayer, despite Schriener and Ware’s assertion that it is, which is due to their ability to dismiss coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction in their theology.

Note that the “prayer” itself is also predetermined by God. That is just a fact given the Calvinist’s universal divine causal determinism. Therefore, if the Calvinist attempts to claim the prayer was a contributing factor in a person’s salvation, the Calvinist is being deceived. The Calvinist simply chooses to believe that God, by predetermining and causing the person to pray, saved the person. We can only understand what is going on as God inducing the prayer, and as such, the prayer adds nothing with respect to cause and effect upon God or the person being prayed for. The Calvinists’ prayer does not do what Schreiner and Ware claim it does, that is, have some causal effect or move God to act in a way he may not otherwise have acted on this person’s behalf. Whether the Calvinist prays this prayer or not has no bearing upon the eternal destiny of the person they are praying for. That person’s salvation occurs or does not occur, not because of any prayer having been prayed or not having been prayed, but only based on their divinely predetermined destiny, that is, whether they are among those unconditionally elected to salvation or not.

So we can ask, as far as a person’s salvation or eternal destiny is concerned, does God act in answer to prayer, or does he unconditionally predetermine their eternal destiny and the related prayers? It cannot be both because the contingency which seems to be entailed in the former logically excludes the determinism of the latter, and vice versa. It cannot be both conditioned upon the prayer and unconditioned apart from the prayer. Therefore, if a person’s salvation is based on unconditional election, then what purpose is the prayer with respect to the prayer’s particular content – “that God will invade their lives and turn the desires of their heart around so that they will be saved?” If the person has not been unconditionally elected to salvation, the prayer cannot accomplish anything with respect to what it requests of God. God will save only those he has predestined to salvation, and he will not save those he has predestined to condemnation. If the person is among the unconditionally elect, the realization of their salvation, as unconditional, has nothing to do with the prayer.

Schreiner and Ware state that they pray that “God will invade their lives and turn the desires of their heart around so that they will be saved.” So what? You can pray for whatever you would like to pray for, but this is not a prayer that has any meaning, given their doctrine of unconditional election and their underlying universal divine causal determinism. What meaning can such a prayer have with respect to its stated goal – “that they will be saved” – for a person whose eternal destiny is already unconditionally predetermined by God? The answer is no meaning. Schreiner and Ware are praying for something that has no effect on what happens in a universe in which everything has been predetermined by that God. That Schreiner and Ware state, “We pray God will save them,” is meaningless in a deterministic reality because, again, it seems incoherent for them to be praying as if the nature of life and reality contains situations that are characterized by genuine contingency, potentiality, or possibility. Schreiner and Ware, in praying as they do, presume that God has not predetermined all things and that he will do something in genuine response to someone’s prayers. If God has predestined this person to spend eternity in hell, no prayer is going to change either the person’s mind or God’s mind on the matter. And to claim that “We pray rather that God will invade their lives and turn the desires of their heart around so that they will be saved” regarding someone who is among the elect is not a prayer; it is a recitation of what God will unfailingly do. When Schreiner and Ware say, “We do not ask God simply to make salvation possible; we pray that God will save them” that is to both presume that God will act in answer to their pray in the sense that if they had not prayed the prayer it is a real possibility that the person who could have been saved will not be saved, that is, that they know something about the person which they do not. So both the content and disposition of their prayer to God as presenting the possibility of the salvation of this person by God’s activity, presumably by his present ability and willingness to act salvifically on behalf of that person, when that salvation may not be possible because that same God has made salvation for that person impossible, is incoherent and confused. So both the presupposition of the prayer and its content are incoherent with their theistic determinism.

Note the prayer again. It is that “God will invade their lives and turn the desires of their heart around so that they will be saved.” Observe the compatibilism in the prayer. “Turn the desires of the heart around…” Compatibilism states that a person acts freely as long as they act in accord with their desires. The hitch here, as Schriener and Ware reveal, and their theistic determinism requires, is that God determines people’s desires. The incoherence remains.

Therefore, given universal divine causal determinism, God does not act in response to prayer. If you find that your prayer was ‘answered,’ it was not really answered. It was a predetermined event coincident with your predetermined desires expressed in a “prayer” to God. In Calvinism, God does not answer prayer; he predetermines prayer.

The Calvinist will object and state that God works through “secondary means” and “secondary causes” as if that resolves the problems raised by theistic determinism. I have dealt with this thoroughly in Chapter 8, where we saw that these phrases are just empty verbiage used to attempt to revive a semblance of human freedom and responsibility in a deterministic universe. In this context, these phrases would merely refer to God predetermining the Calvinists’ prayer, which to us might look as if the prayer were being “answered” by God. But that would not be the case. Both the prayer and the “answer” have been predetermined. For God also predetermines all “secondary means” or “causes” – including Schreiner and Ware’s prayer. God predetermines the prayers to be prayed and the persons who will pray them. We are left with God being the only causal agent in the universe. And he himself is not a free agent, for he is now bound to his divine, eternal decree. Again, we cannot escape the dizzying irrational effects of the vortex of determinism. Everything, including Schreiner and Ware’s prayer, is being sucked into its depths of incoherence.

On Schreiner and Ware’s determinism, “we pray God will save them,” amounts to a self-reflective or self-referencing hope or wish concerning the person being prayed for. On Calvinist determinism, this prayer only indicates the personal desire of the one praying it. They desire that the person they are praying for be saved. But again, the prayer cannot influence the person’s eternal destiny. That has been unalterably fixed from eternity past. Therefore, Schreiner and Ware’s prayer reduces to a divinely predetermined, irresistible sentiment within him, expressing a hope that God has elected the person he is praying to salvation. And we can see that’s nonsense. That’s why Calvinists don’t pray that way, although it would be consistent with their theology and soteriology. So all that a prayer like this can mean is, “I hope so,” that is, I hope this person is among the elect. Now, what if the person is not among the elect, which no one can possibly know? We would then have God predetermining Schreiner and Ware’s human sentiments and prayer that conflict with the ultimate reality of the person’s eternal destiny. God puts it into the heart and mind of Schreiner and Ware to have a compassionate desire for a person’s salvation and actually express that in prayer, when, with respect to the non-elect, God himself has predestined them to eternal damnation.

In contrast, given libertarian human freedom, the content and disposition of the prayer present the situation as an open, contingent reality, one with genuine potential and presenting the real possibility that the person may be moved from the unbelieving state that they are presently in to a state of belief and salvation. God is free to both respond to the prayer and act in the situation. Therefore, the prayer takes on meaning and purpose.

Note, therefore, if the person is among the non-elect (i.e., the reprobate), then Schreiner and Ware’s concern for that person would be more loving and compassionate than God’s love and compassion for that person. Their desire for the good of the other person may be greater than God’s compassion and desire for the good of that person. Schreiner and Ware’s concerns for that person may be dashed to pieces by their God, who may have predestined that person to eternal torment in hell. Whether prayers are made on their behalf or not has no bearing on the eternal destiny God has predestined for that person.

For Schreiner and Ware to contrast their view of prayer with prayers that “are characterized by hesitancy” is to misrepresent the non-Calvinist view and practice of prayer. What do they mean by ‘hestancy?’ To state that the non-Calvinist’s prayer has as its goal to “simply make salvation possible” is misleading and a red herring concerning the central issue here. It certainly does not bolster their position and fails to acknowledge that salvation has already been accomplished by Christ on behalf of all sinners. The Bible teaches that salvation has actually been accomplished for all sinners in the death and resurrection of Christ. The work of salvation is finished. Salvation has been made possible, but it has to be appropriated by the sinner for themselves based on their faith or believing in Jesus’ work on their behalf. Prayer for the salvation of an unbeliever, therefore, is asking God to work in the various circumstances of their life, which would include them hearing the good news of the gospel, to elicit the response of faith. God does not cause faith through pre-faith regeneration or the bestowal of irresistible grace as Calvinism teaches. In the Bible, faith, or believing, is always a responsibility placed upon the sinner. It is the God ordained response He calls for from the sinner to the good news of their salvation in Christ. It is everywhere in Scripture, contrasted to works, and therefore cannot be included in works or understood as meritorious as in Calvinism. We can see then that Schreiner and Ware’s prayer does nothing for the one they are praying for. It does not even make salvation possible for them if they are not among the elect. Now, Schreiner and Ware don’t accept a salvation that is possible for all sinners, and so they don’t even allow salvation to be possible for the elect. That is Schreiner and Ware’s point. But they fail to mention that making salvation not a possibility via unconditional election eliminates the greater part of humanity from even the possibility of salvation. And here is where the gospel message, astruly “good news,” gets truncated. The truly good news of salvation is null and void for the non-elect. It is a mockery and a lie, for it does not apply to them. In contrast, God’s ‘good news’ plan for all sinners is the biblical gospel message. God provides salvation, and sinners appropriate it by faith. Those who are saved are saved by Christ’s work on the cross. Those who are lost are lost because they reject the salvation offered to them by faith (Jn. 3:14-18). In short, there are two options on Calvinism. A person is either predestined for salvation and certainly will be saved, or they are not so predestined and cannot be saved. Hence, there is no ‘good news’ in Calvinism.

Note that Schreiner and Ware point out that the Calvinist does “not simply pray that God will move on people so that it is possible for their wills to respond.” We saw that based on unconditional election, they pray that “God will save them.” What could this possibly mean? Again, these words are vacuous. Whether the Calvinist says these words or not, “God will save them” if they are among the elect and he will not save them if they are not among the elect.

This brings us to mention the type of prayer we have here, that is, petitionary prayer. Petitionary prayer is incoherent with Calvinist determinism. The meaningful granting of a petition requires us to presuppose a non-deterministic reality. A petition has no meaning in an exhaustively predetermined reality. Given the incoherence of this type of prayer, the non-deterministic reality in which human wills are involved in matters of one’s eternal destiny seems to make much more sense.

It is, therefore, sobering to think that our prayers can influence God to act on behalf of others and ourselves. Of all the other purposes prayer serves in our lives, such potentiality and possibility are certainly of the very nature of petitionary prayer. This possibility of personal interaction with God through prayer certainly provides motivation to pray. The non-Calvinist view of reality makes sense of prayer. Prayer changes things. On Calvinism, prayers are just God ordained self-talk. Universal divine causal determinism entails that God is the sole player in the whole drama of history. Therefore, as far as what God ordains us to think and say in prayer, he causes us to think and say to him. Hence, in prayer, God talks to Himself through us. Calvinism thus logically entails a very bizarre and unscriptural view of prayer.

This point about salvation being “possible” is characteristic of each system. On the non-Calvinist view, salvation is “possible” for the person being prayed for because God desires their salvation and therefore provides everything needed for them to respond positively to the gospel. In the gospel message, God reveals to the sinner their need for salvation. God is at work by his Spirit through that message of “good news” to show and enable the sinner to respond of their own free will to that message. The gospel message, in which the Spirit is at work, tells the sinner of their need for salvation and to believe in Christ. By the very fact that they are hearing the “good news” of their salvation, God is “invading their lives.” It is correct that we do not pray for God “simply to make salvation possible.” He has already done that in the atoning work Christ accomplished on the cross on behalf of each and every sinner. The Holy Spirit is at work in the gospel message to “turn the desires of their heart around” so that the sinner hearing the good news is enabled to respond in faith and be saved. When they remain in unbelief, they are without excuse. They could have and should have believed. It is only their own willful rejection of the salvation offered to them that will cause them to spend eternity apart from God.

Schreiner and Ware add the following caveat to why “the doctrines of grace motivate [them] to pray.” They add, “all the while knowing that God’s perfect will, from all eternity, is alone wise and right.” This exposes the negative side of unconditional election, which is that God has willed certain particular persons to eternal damnation. Schreiner and Ware deem this to be God doing what is “alone wise and right.” Here, Schreiner and Ware have to suppress their logical and moral intuitions to call what they would otherwise deem, in human affairs, to be unwise and simply wrong, but when it comes to God’s will, it is “alone wise and right.” The word “alone” conveys this drastic divergence between the negative moral implications upon the character and ways of God, given the Calvinist doctrine of unconditional election, and what we would normally consider wise and right. “God’s will…alone” expresses the dissonance between God’s character that unconditional election requires and what we know of wisdom, justice, and doing what is right and fair. Schreiner and Ware can accept as “wise and right” the eternal condemnation of one person whom God could have just as easily chosen for salvation in comparison to a person who is no better or no worse (for such moral comparisons do not come into play in God’s view of sinners and their salvation), and yet for some unknown reason has chosen them for salvation. This, according to most of us, is anything but wise or right. I deal with this problem in detail elsewhere, but suffice it to say here that it is very hard for me, and probably you too, to see how the incoherence of determinism motivates them to pray.

So it is a strange kind of thinking for Schreiner and Ware to find motivation for prayer regarding a person’s salvation, given their “doctrines of grace,” when those very deterministic doctrines generate such substantial incoherence and moral difficulties. For Schreiner and Ware to claim that these doctrines are a motivation to prayer, they must dismiss the results of thinking through the logical and moral implications of their theistic determinism. If it is the case that “prayer changes things,” and we are going to think logically and coherently about what we are saying about prayer, then the Calvinists’ universal divine causal determinism cannot be the true nature of reality. We don’t live in a deterministic reality. Either prayer changes things, or it does not? Given a universal divine causal determinism, it does not. Nothing can be altered in the present or the future from the way God has willed and predetermined things to be. Given theistic determinism, by definition, there is no such thing as change in the sense of “things could have been different than what they are.”

An Incoherent Claim: Determinism is a Bulwark for Suffering

Another reason Schreiner and Ware say they love their “doctrines of grace” is because,

“…the doctrines of grace and divine providence are a bulwark for suffering. The world is a frightening place, and horrible sufferings occur.”[28]

Note that for the Calvinist, “divine providence” here means universal divine causal determinism. Logically, therefore, God is the ultimate and direct cause of this world being “a frightening place,” and he is the direct cause of all the “horrible sufferings” that occur. Let’s be clear here. On Calvinism, God is not merely the “first cause” of all things in the sense of having created all things, but he is the cause in the sense of directly bringing about these “horrible sufferings.” This being the case, the Calvinist has the problem of answering how it is that God is not indicted in doing evil and therefore being evil himself. But there is more incoherence to come as they comment on the book of Job.

Schreiner and Ware on the Book of Job: Incoherence, Disengenuousness, and Obfuscation

Schreiner and Ware state,

“The book of Job teaches us that no suffering occurs, even that which Satan brings, apart from God’s will.”

This confirms what I said above. Note that here, Schreiner and Ware are telling us that there is a being called Satan that brings about suffering. That is, Satan is a creature that can cause suffering. Now, according to the Calvinists’ definition of “the divine eternal decree,” and “divine sovereignty” and “meticulous divine providence,” it is God alone that has “ordained whatsoever comes to pass,” and by that they mean a universal divine causal determinism. God is the sole cause of all that occurs, even suffering. But here we have Satan causing suffering, which both presupposes the existence of a will that can act, not as God has predetermined, but as God allows. Clearly, this is what is affirmed in the book of Job. This is what Schreiner and Ware mean by the phrase “apart from God’s will.” And it is this “allowing” or “permitting” that is incoherent with Calvinism’s universal divine causal determinism. For God to allow Satan to act to bring about suffering is very different than the divine causal determinism of Calvinism. What the Calvinists’ theology of sovereignty teaches and logically requires is that God alone causes all things to occur. There are no other beings that can cause things to occur in and of themselves. God causes those beings to do what they do. And as such, God is the cause of the evil actions of Satan. Hence, to say, “no suffering occurs, even that which Satan brings, apart from God’s will,” is not consistent with the Calvinists’ universal divine causal determinism. It is not the same as the Calvinists’ insistence that God has predetermined and causes all things to occur as they do by his own will. That is, the Calvinist position has God directly causing Satan to bring about the suffering that God wills to occur. Indeed, Calvinist determinism has God causing Satan to be who he is and do what he does. This is the moral problem inherent in Calvinism. And for Schreiner and Ware to shift gears here from their determinism into talking of “God’s will” in the sense of God allowing is another example of the Calvinists’ disengenuousness and obfuscation.

So, if Schreiner and Ware were to be true to their theology, they would have to maintain that God causes Satan to do what he does. But they step back from their theistic determinism because the book of Job does not support it. What the book of Job does support is not theistic determinism but rather a true biblical depiction of God’s sovereignty as the exercise of his supreme authority over all his creatures and within all of his creation and over any historical events he chooses to direct in a particular way to accomplish either his universal or immediate plans and purposes. That is the nature of divine sovereignty. It is God’s capability and prerogative to rule and reign over the free creatures he himself has made. That means their freedom is not absolute, yet they are substantially free. We see God’s ruling and reigning in action here, and it is in direct conflict with the Calvinists’ definition of sovereignty as theistic determinism. The book of Job, like the rest of Scripture, testifies against determinism and for God’s sovereignty as a personal, dynamic interaction with his meaningfully free angelic and human creatures.

Obviously, Satan is not a creature who does the will of God. And Satan causes many others not to do the will of God. So God’s will is not always done. This alone falsifies Calvinism’s universal divine causal determinism. Nothing is clearer from observing the biblical history and our present experiences than that God’s will is not always done. What God wills to be done will surely be done, but obviously God does not will all things in the sense of determining and causing all things; therefore, reality and our experience affirm that God’s will is not always done.

So when we talk about God’s will being done, we need to be clear that we are talking about God bringing to pass what he plans and purposes to accomplish, not that he has willed all things to occur as they do. The former is biblical sovereignty, the latter is unbiblical theistic determinism. Obviously, Satan has a will of his own. Satan rebelled against God, and it would be absurd to think that a definition of divine sovereignty would require us to believe that God predetermined and caused Satan to do what he did in rebelling against God and that God, in Christ, and in the last judgment, is redeeming and judging his own predeterminations. But that is what Calvinism entails. Therefore, despite the way Calvinists misrepresent creaturely freedom, it is not a threat to God’s sovereignty.

In this instance, with respect to what Satan would like to do to Job, we see that Satan cannot act apart from what God decides in the matter for reasons God wants to accomplish, and the book of Job is written. It is therefore incoherent for the Calvinist to speak of God allowing Satan to do what Satan wills to do while at the same time holding to his universal divine causal determinism. Theistic determinism entails that God’s will is the only causal will in the universe. To “not be able to act apart from,” which presupposes the reality of at least one other substantially free agent, is very different from “to not be able to act at all” as a substantially free agent. The latter is entailed in theistic determinism.

Schreiner and Ware continue,

“Not a sparrow falls apart from God’s will, and God has numbered the hairs on our heads (Matt. 10:29-30).”

These are statements about God’s knowing all things within the context of God’s care for his disciples. In the same way God knows and cares about what is happening with his creatures, he knows and cares about his disciples. For Schreiner and Ware to be consistent with their determinism the verses would have say “not a sparrow falls without God having predetermined that it fall.” But the verses do not say this. Again, context is crucial here. Jesus is telling them that as to the mission he is sending his disciples on that they should not be afraid (Mt. 10:26, 28, 31) Why? Because “the Spirit of the Father” will be with them (10:20), they have Jesus’ example of being maligned with which to identify and they need to know that they are valuable to their “Father in heaven.” Just as the Father knows about such a small thing as the falling of a sparrow, he will certainly therefore know what his disciples experience. Jesus therefore comforts them by telling them “So do not be afraid; you are of more value than many sparrows.” (10:31) That is obviously very different than the thinking that these verses support theistic determinism. Schreiner and Ware affirm the above treatment of these verses when they state,

“The inference is that nothing happens to us that does not pass through God loving hands.”

But note what they are doing here. They are backing away from their determinism. The phrase “pass through” is too soft. The sense of this phrase is too weak and does not properly express their theistic determinism. It is an implicit admission that there exist other ‘wills’ that God has to deal with. So these ‘wills’ must be free in some genuine sense. Schreiner and Ware should be more forthright. They should have said, “Nothing happens to us except what has been predetermined and caused by God.” That is very different from “passes through God’s loving hands.” “Passes through” implies other causal agents that are doing things that God has to either allow or not allow to happen. That is different than God willing and causing these “agents” to do what they are doing as the Calvinists’ theistic determinism requires.

So they claim their “doctrines of grace” are a bulwark in suffering, but when they have to explain this, they step back from God determining all things to describing what happens in suffering as God “allowing” and “permitting” some things. The point is that Calvinists default to the non-Calvinists’ position when it comes to the problem of evil and suffering. There is almost nothing Schreiner and Ware say in completing this section that a non-Calvinist would disagree with.

“We are not saying that suffering will not be agonizingly painful, nor are we suggesting that there will be no process of questioning or grief. But we are saying that we can live in the confidence that no action or event – not one! – can ever occur outside of God’s all-encompassing and wise plan. Even though life is not always easy, “God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose” (Rom. 8:28). We can trust our lives to a loving Father who shelters us under his wings and works everything out so that we will be more like Jesus (Rom. 8:29). The world is not spinning out of control. He is guiding it according to his own wise plan, which is beyond our understanding.”

I said that there is almost nothing here that a non-Calvinist would disagree with. But we know Schreiner and Ware are referring to their theistic determinism when they say,

“…no action or event – not one! – can ever occur outside of God’s all-encompassing and wise plan.”

I think this can be taken by non-Calvinists to mean that God’s ‘all-encompassing and wise plan’ has to do with all of history, therefore no action or event is not ‘outside’ of that ‘wise plan.’ But this is not what Schriener and Ware mean. They mean to say that there is an ‘all-encompassing…plan’ that includes every action and event. They mean to affirm their theistic determinism. But the confidence Schreiner and Ware claim their theistic determinism does not necessarily require such determinism. Therefore, I do not see how the “doctrines of grace” are required, or even support the claim that they are a “bulwark for suffering.” Indeed, on consistent Calvinism, God is the cause of that very suffering. How does that provide a “bulwark for suffering?” God is the author of the evil that happens to people and, therefore, evil himself. So much for God being a bulwark in suffering when he is the cause of it!

What Is the Purpose of Schreiner and Ware’s Book?

So, in their more honest moments, these prominent Calvinists must admit there are “logical problems” in their theology. In their book, Schreiner and Ware attempt to address or resolve these problems by offering justifications of their doctrines in light of Scripture. But what does this attempt amount to if logical and moral coherence are still not allowed to play their necessary role in determining the validity of these further explanations? Ask yourself this key question. Do any further explanations they provide need to be logically and morally coherent? You must answer this question. It cannot be ignored. The Calvinists’ answer is, “Not necessarily.” How about your answer? Can you affirm a “hermeneutic of incoherence?” How so? So, here’s the Calvinists’ hermeneutical strategy. If attempts by Calvinists to justify their exegeses and doctrines are also found to be logically and morally incoherent, given their “hermeneutic of incoherence,” they will simply continue to fall back on claims of “human incomprehensibility” and “mystery.” They will simply ignore their “logical problems.”

That being the case, why is a book like this necessary? Are the Calvinist contributors to this book trying to further resolve their logical difficulties? If so, why? I thought we had reached “the full and final resolution” to this problem of sovereignty and human responsibility in “mystery.” They state this as a forgone conclusion. If they have already concluded that their problems are a mystery, then what more needs to be said? What more can be said? Can a genuine biblical “mystery” that is past finding out due to the limitation of fallen, finite human reason be resolved through further exegesis or attempts to explain these “logical difficulties?” It does not seem to be possible to do so once we are untethered from the interpretive anchors of the truths of logic and our common moral sense.

So Schreiner and Ware’s book seeks to justify their Calvinism through “biblical analysis,” addressing “theological issues” and “pastoral reflections.” So what would constitute a justification or resolution of their “doctrines of grace?” Any justification would seem to require accepting that logical and moral coherence are essential to a sound exegetical method and biblical hermeneutic. But that raises the question of why logical and moral coherence are not applied to the “doctrines of grace” as they are presently exegeted? If there is recognition that “logical difficulties” exist and there is an attempt to employ logical and moral coherence to further justify the “doctrines of grace,” why aren’t logic and moral coherence respected and employed in assessing the validity of the interpretations that produced those “doctrines of grace?” Why shouldn’t coherence be applied to the “doctrines of grace” themselves? Why shouldn’t coherence bear upon discerning the validity of the interpretations that produced them? Because such an assessment would require the Calvinist to abandon those doctrines? So, for the Calvinist, their exegesis is off limits to logical and moral critiques as far as these bear upon the determination of the validity of their exegesis. As such, this betrays the fact that they maintain their doctrines first and foremost, not out of sound exegetical reasoning, but from other reasons that transcend exegetical, interpretive, and hermeneutical coherence.

Therefore, I submit that the Calvinist has an a priori commitment to a deterministic definition of sovereignty regardless of whether logical and moral coherence are meaningful for determining exegetical and interpretive validity. For the Calvinist, this is the teaching of Scripture regardless of the incoherence it produces with respect to other clear passages and affirmed doctrines. Deterministic sovereignty is non-negotiable for the Calvinist. Therefore, whatever incoherencies or contradictions this concept of sovereignty causes, ultimately, these do not matter for discerning its interpretative validity. Hence, proposing divine mystery is all that is left in response to these critiques and must suffice for anyone who wants to embrace Calvinism. To convert to Calvinism, an individual is required to sacrifice their logical framework and moral intuitions in the interpretive task.

If further exegesis is all that is needed to convince us the Calvinist “doctrines of grace” are the biblical teachings, then I see no other way of doing this other than that any subsequent arguments Calvinists make be marked by completeness, clarity, coherence, and cogency, that is, they take “logical difficulties” seriously and attempt to remove them. Logical and moral reasoning are entailed in what it means to argue. This is not a quarrel. It is a call to reasoned argument with regard to the meaning of the biblical literature. I see no other way of arguing and supporting a point of view other than on the basis of logical reasoning. I see no other way of convincing someone of a point of view than on the basis of sound reasoning. That is what “convincing” means. But I contend that this is something the Calvinist has a priori eliminated from determining the validity of their own interpretations regarding their “doctrines of grace.” Schreiner and Ware have made this clear. They could never be convinced otherwise as to the validity of their “doctrines of grace” because the grounds upon which convincing occurs have ultimately been put out of court. They say their position is based in exegesis, but it is an exegesis that is not subject to logical and moral coherence, consistency, or non-contradiction. It is an exegesis that is not subject to the laws of logic and moral intuitions. I submit that if the Calvinist’s hermeneutic does not include the deliberations and deliverances of logic and moral intuition, then their exegesis that violates these cannot be defended with the rules of logic or moral intuitions that they reject. It is hopeless to try to get logical reasoning to support a position that is based on rejecting logical reasoning. That is doomed to fail because reason cannot betray itself. It can be distorted. But then it is no longer reason. One will sooner or later have to resort to mystery as Schreiner and Ware admit when they confess that “All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.”^[29]

Non-Calvinists Can’t Tolerate Mystery, or Are They Refusing to Tolerate Calvinist Incoherence?

Calvinists accuse non-Calvinists of being intolerant of mystery. They state that non-Calvinists are short on tolerance for living with biblical mystery. But when Calvinists do this, they mischaracterize the non-Calvinists’ response to what Calvinists have created by their own misinterpretations. According to the non-Calvinist, incoherent and contradictory interpretations are not to be considered a biblical mystery. What the Calvinist calls a ‘mystery,’ the non-Calvinist calls a contradiction. And therefore, what the Calvinist is attempting to do in chiding the non-Calvinist for lack of appreciation for and tolerance of biblical mystery is to get them to concede the point at the hermeneutical level. That is, the Calvinist wants the non-Calvinist to back off from challenging their interpretations and doctrines. If we all agree that the problems within the Calvinist doctrines are a biblical mystery, then the problems are solved. The claim is that the Bible teaches these doctrines, but we are just not able to reconcile them in our fallen, sinful minds. But it is the Calvinist who must convince themselves that their contradictory interpretations are a ‘mystery’ to preserve their traditional doctrinal positions. ‘Mystery’ is, of course, a powerful spiritual lever that can be used to pry non-Calvinists from insisting the Calvinist ought to adopt a hermeneutic of coherence. What the Calvinist wants and needs is for the non-Calvinist to grant them permission to be interpretively and theologically incoherent. The Calvinist needs this permission because they cannot escape their incoherence. And they refuse to let it challenge and inform their interpretations. What the Calvinist wants is to be allowed to have a theology of ‘mystery’ as a cloak for their hermeneutic of incoherence. If logical and moral coherence are going to be ignored, the nature of the difficulties their interpretations have created demands that they flee to mystery.

So, the non-Calvinists’ insistence on rejecting Calvinism as a true mystery and seeing it as it truly is – a contradiction – reveals the hermeneutical divide. The Calvinist is willing to reassign to mystery the logical difficulties that they acknowledge are in their interpretations, whereas the non-Calvinist is not willing to do this. They believe this move is intellectually irresponsible and, therefore, just poor hermeneutics. For the non-Calvinist, the Calvinist interpretations are not ‘apparent contradictions’ but real logical contradictions and moral difficulties that reliably indicate to the non-Calvinist that the Calvinists’ interpretations are incorrect. Calvinists acknowledge “that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism,” but these mean nothing to them regarding the accuracy of their interpretations. This tells us that the Calvinist does not consider such difficulties hermeneutically significant. It seems obvious to many of us that the Calvinist demonstrates again and again that they do not consider these difficulties to be hermeneutically significant. They fall back on their exegesis of the text, but as foundational and important as the grammatical-historical method of exegesis is for proper biblical interpretation, there are better and worse exegeses. Therefore, a technical exegesis is insufficient in and of itself to discern which of two conflicting exegetical interpretations of the same texts reflects the biblical truth. The more fundamental question here is hermeneutical, that is, whether logical and moral reasoning are indispensable considerations in discerning the validity of one’s exegesis. If not, the resulting exegeses may be vastly different and even contradictory. And, rather than a responsible search for the truth, “live and let live” or “why can’t we all just get along?” will be the preeminent concerns. That is the case in this controversy.

Schreiner and Ware Ignore That Their Interpretations Create the Problems

Hence, Schreiner and Ware observe that,

“All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery. People do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems. Rather, the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”

They state that “people do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems.” Of course not. But solving all such problems is not the issue. Rather, it is the fact that Calvinism creates the problems that are the issue here. And it is the fact that it creates certain types of problems – logically and morally intractable problems – that is the issue here. And to attempt to resolve these problems without addressing what it is that created them in the first place, or confess to the intractability of these problems, is bound to result in rationalizations that are as incoherent as the interpretations they attempt to defend. Once again, they can only find refuge in the flight to mystery.

Schreiner and Ware state that people embrace Calvinism “because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.” Well, what has convinced them that these doctrines are taught in Scripture? Have they thought about the scope and degree of the problems that plague the Calvinist doctrines of grace? Perhaps people should reject becoming Calvinists because of the number and nature of Calvinism’s logical and moral problems. Apart from Calvinist proof-texting, how would a person know “these doctrines are taught in Scripture,” except that the interpretations also exhibit rational and moral coherence with the other proposed teachings of Scripture? People don’t become non-Calvinists because such a theology solves all the problems a non-Calvinist view may contain, but because they believe it is the teaching of Scripture. But they are also convinced that the teaching of Scripture flows from sound exegesis, which necessarily includes logical and moral coherence. That hermeneutic, by definition, excludes Calvinism as a viable interpretation of the text. Non-Calvinists prefer their position because any difficulties that exist in the non-Calvinist position are located where there is genuine incomprehensibility regarding the ways of God, not contradictory claims and moral inconsistencies that stand in logical and moral opposition to other texts, while also impugning the character of God. They are non-Calvinists because their exegesis is sound and coherent. They are non-Calvinists, not despite the other Scriptures, but in consideration of the other Scriptures. They do not embrace a both/and hermeneutic apart from incorporating interpretive coherence, whereas the Calvinist embraces a both/and hermeneutic despite its interpretive incoherence. For the non-Calvinist, rational and moral coherence among interpretations is essential. In contrast, to diffuse the profound nature of the logical and moral difficulties inherent in Calvinism, Calvinists resort to re-categorizing the “logical difficulties” as “mystery.” But these logical and moral difficulties are not mysteries. Rather, they are all too transparent and understandable as logical and moral contradictions and incoherencies. Furthermore, Schreiner and Ware’s conclusion is perplexing. If “the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery,” then why investigate this issue at all? Why write a book like “Still Sovereign?” Who can uncover what amounts to a forever hidden divine “mystery?”

Schreiner and Ware Know They Have Insurmountable Problems

So, what is it about the Calvinists’ exegetical method that when it leads to interpretations and doctrines that are incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory, it becomes appropriate to exclude the probative force of these logical and moral assessments from their exegesis? On what hermeneutic does one have that prerogative? What exegetical method provides the luxury of claiming ‘mystery’ when one’s interpretations run afoul of logical and moral reasoning and cannot be justified intellectually? Can a biblical exegesis be justified as valid while at the same time it proves to be logically or morally incoherent? I don’t think so. Schreiner and Ware’s admission that “the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a ‘mystery‘ is confirmation that their position cannot be justified. The Calvinist would have to give us a reason why our logical and moral faculties are not suitable to arbitrate in this matter. It seems the burden of proof regarding why we cannot trust or employ our logical reasoning and moral intuitions in judging the validity of an interpretation lies with the Calvinist. And the Calvinist cannot deal with this inquiry by merely saying the Scripture teaches their doctrines, for that would be to beg the question. So it seems that we cannot cavalierly dismiss our logical reasoning and moral intuitions in the interpretive task. Fleeing to mystery is not an option here. Mystery is just not the nature of the case.

Schreiner and Ware state that “we are convinced that the central reason that the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis.” That is not true. The “doctrines of grace” are questioned by non-Calvinists based on “scriptural exegesis.” But for the non-Calvinist, “scriptural exegesis” is logical exegesis. Not so for the Calvinist. For the non-Calvinist, “scriptural exegesis” is coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory exegesis. Not so for the Calvinist. To point out the false dichotomy between exegesis and “logical problems” is a problem for the Calvinist because they want to create the impression that the “logical problems” are somehow inferior to “scriptural exegesis” – as if they are not part of an evaluation of the validity of one’s exegesis. Schreiner and Ware are suggesting that their “doctrines of grace” stand based on “scriptural exegesis” and therefore those doctrines are unassailable on that basis. But non-Calvinists do question those doctrines based on exegesis. We question those doctrines based on our own exegesis of the controverted passages and the Calvinists’ exegesis that excludes logical and moral reasoning from that exegesis. So the non-Calvinist has both positive exegetical support for their interpretations and doctrines while also objecting to the Calvinist doctrines based on their exegesis as being divorced from logical and moral reasoning, which is just poor exegesis.

The resolution of this controversy requires that the Calvinist accept as a sound hermeneutical principle the incorporation of logical and moral coherence as an integral element within the exegetical task. The inclusion of logical reasoning and our moral intuitions when reading and exegeting a biblical text, or any text, not only serves to lead us into accurate interpretations but also reliably arbitrate among incompatible interpretive conclusions. These serve as safeguards against interpretive error. Coherence is essential in a responsible hermeneutic and is reliable for discerning the validity of a proposed interpretation. It is not a sufficient factor, but it is a necessary factor.^[30] For the Calvinist to confess that he is a Calvinist because he believes his Calvinism is taught in Scripture, when his Calvinism generates logical and moral incoherence, is to leave his exegesis unjustified as a convincing exegesis. The logical and moral reasoning, which provides the grounds for any convincing that is to go on, has been put aside. Calvinists ultimately ignore this problem in their exegesis and interpretations. Calvinism must be accepted on an “exegesis” defined as indifferent to logical and moral coherence. Calvinism must be accepted apart from logical and moral grounding.

Non-Calvinists also believe their doctrines are taught in Scripture based on sound exegesis. So where does that leave us? What will determine which exegetical conclusions are more plausible? I submit that an indispensable God-given arbiter between conflicting exegetical conclusions is the logical and moral coherence of those exegetical conclusions. Logical and moral reasoning are integral to good exegesis, and therefore logical and moral coherence and non-contradiction are essential for determining the validity of one’s exegesis.

Schreiner, Ware, Baggett, Walls, and Koukl: Philosophy and the Authority of Scripture

The non-Calvinist who holds to a high view of Scripture as divinely inspired and authoritative would agree that what we teach and proclaim is to be an accurate reflection of what the Bible teaches and conveys. But the logical and moral difficulties that Schreiner and Ware acknowledge plague their Calvinist teaching are troublesome not only hermeneutically but with respect to an evangelical doctrine of Scripture. As Calvinists, Schreiner and Ware are asserting that the difficulties peculiar to their Calvinist interpretations are inherent in Scripture as properly interpreted. They believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture, that is, that the difficulties of the type generated by the Calvinist interpretations are inherent in Scripture. The clearest expression of this is when they claim ‘the Bible teaches both,’ that is, theistic determinism and human freedom. But the type of difficulties we are dealing with here has to do with the most fundamental modes of reasoning – the rules of logic and our moral intuitions. These are the very things we use to interpret the Scripture in the first place, which I have argued casts doubt on the validity of the Calvinists’ exegesis.

But now, the Calvinists’ interpretations and hermeneutic also raise the question of whether Scripture can be logically self-contradictory or morally incoherent as divinely inspired, that is, as God’s Word to us. Apparently, on Calvinism, the answer is, “Yes.”

David Baggett and Jerry Walls, in their book, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality, argue that a proper hermeneutic must incorporate what we have been given in general revelation, what they call “philosophy,” which simply is the use of our God-given reason to the end of thinking clearly about interpretive claims. They write,

“We think of our argument as unapologetically appealing to general revelation, which means we reject the claim that philosophy can or should be ignored in the process of figuring out the answers to such questions. The Protestant principle of sola scriptura is sometimes today misunderstood to imply that clear thinking and good reason play no part in figuring out God’s revealed truths. The primacy of the Bible in terms of its theological truth is taken to imply that exegesis, biblical interpretation, carefully isolated from any other sources of insight, ought to be able to answer any and all theological disputes that may arise.

Skepticism toward philosophy often reaches fever pitch in the Calvinism / Arminianism debate, where disputants on both sides of the divide often eschew the deliverances of philosophy and insist that the question must be settled on biblical and exegetical grounds alone. Any hint of even bringing philosophical analysis into the conversation is thought to be anathema, abandoning the authority of Scripture to provide reliable revelation.

Here we need to draw an important distinction. Whereas biblical authority trumps in the realm of theological norms, there are more basic philosophical processes at play that hold logical priority in the realm of basic epistemology….take the choice of the Bible as authoritative rather than, say, the Koran; this selection, to be rational, requires that we have good reasons for believing the Bible to be God’s real revelation. Appeal to those considerations involves trust in reason, which involves trust in our ability to think philosophically. The Bible is to be taken as authoritative in the realm of theological truth. But before we can rationally believe such a thing, as human beings privy to general revelation and endowed with the ability to think we must weigh arguments and draw conclusions, that is, do philosophy. Proper trust in the Bible altogether involves the process of thinking rationally. It’s a fundamental mistake to think otherwise.

…When someone suggests that we “don’t need philosophy,” either in this debate or more generally, their words at best reflect a huge misunderstanding. The sentiment wrongly assumes that we are even able to understand the Bible, let alone discern that it is the ultimate revelation from God, without the capacity to think. Philosophy is, to put it most succinctly, clear thought. Perhaps it sounds pious to say that all we need is the Bible, and Protestants do in fact believe there’s a sense in which it’s true that Christians are to be a people of one book, but it’s at worst a sentiment predicated on a laughably shallow, simplistic, naïve epistemology and hermeneutic. It’s just not that simple. We can’t open the Bible and begin to understand it without engaging our reason, and using our critical faculties in this fashion as an interpretive tool is not to exalt the deliverances of reason above the deliverances of Scripture. If, in addition to building a strong biblical and historical case against Calvinism…we can also build a strong philosophical case, that’s significant. Indeed, it’s essential to the very process of biblical interpretation…Philosophy can and ought to help adjudicate this intractable debate among Christians.”^[31]

Apologist and philosopher Greg Koukl would agree. Although writing in an apologetic context on the virtues of argument, his comments on the role of reason in biblical interpretation are applicable here. He writes,

“Imagine living in a world in which you couldn’t distinguish between truth and error… Such a world would be a dangerous place. You wouldn’t survive long.

What protects us from the hazards of such a world? If you’re a Christian, you might be tempted to say, “The Word of God protects us.” Certainly, that’s true, but the person who says that might be missing something else God has given us that is also vitally important. In fact, God’s Word would be useless without it.

A different thing is necessary before we can accurately know what God is saying through his Word. Yes, the Bible is first in terms of authority, but something else is first in terms of the order of knowing: We cannot grasp the authoritative teaching of God’s Word unless we use our minds properly. Therefore, the mind, not the Bible, is the very first line of defense God has given us against error.

For some of you this may be a controversial statement, so let’s think about it for a moment. In order to understand the truth of the Bible accurately, our mental faculties must be intact and we must use them as God intended. We demonstrate this fact every time we disagree on an interpretation of a biblical passage and then give reasons why our view is better than another’s. Simply put, we argue for our point of view, and if we argue well, we separate wheat from chaff, truth from error.

Jesus said, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength” (Mark 12:30). Loving God with the mind is not a passive process. It is not enough to have sentimental religious thoughts. Rather, it involves coming to conclusions about God and his world based on revelation, observation, and careful reflection.

What is the tool we use in our observations of the world that helps us separate fact from fiction? That tool is reason, the ability to use our minds to sort through observations and draw accurate conclusions about reality. Rationality is one of the tools God has given us to acquire knowledge.

Generally, sorting things out is not a solitary enterprise. It’s best done in the company of others who dispute our claims and offer competing ideas. In short, we argue. Sometimes we are silent partners, listening, not talking, but the process is going on in our minds just the same.

This is not rationalism, a kind of idolatry of the mind that place’s man’s thinking at the center of the universe. Rather, it’s the proper use of one of the faculties God has given us to understand him and the world he has made.”^[32]

Schreiner and Ware simply cannot ignore the deliberations and deliverances of philosophy. They need the clear thinking that it provides to rightly interpret the Scriptures. They need to adopt a hermeneutic of coherence.

What we need to realize here is that Koukl is also a Calvinist. It would be interesting to hear from him as to how what he has argued above coheres with his Calvinist doctrinal beliefs. He is another example of a Calvinist who dismisses logical and moral coherence when it comes to protecting and preserving his Calvinism. Although Koukl advocates for the proper use of the “tool of reason,” that is, our God-given “rationality” in the interpretive task (‘philosophy’ according to Baggett and Walls), he yet remains a Calvinist. What this tells us is that Koukl’s Calvinism trumps his hermeneutical principle of the use of reason in interpretation. Non-Calvinists agree with Koukl here. We agree that the use of our mental faculties is primary to come to the correct understanding of Scripture. But this makes us wonder how Koukl, as a Calvinist, can implement his own hermeneutical principle? His Calvinist interpretations and doctrines violate his own primary hermeneutical principle of the use of our mental faculty in the interpretive task. So, as a Calvinist, will Koukl first and foremost be intent on protecting and preserving his ‘doctrines of grace,’ or will he submit to his own hermeneutical principle and return to the text employing the ‘tool of reason’ and his God-given ‘rationality’ in interpreting the text? If he does not do the latter, this tells us that the Calvinist will preserve his ‘doctrines of grace,’ even at the cost of sacrificing those mental faculties in the interpretive task. I have demonstrated this Calvinist proclivity over and over again. The Calvinist doctrines take priority over a sound hermeneutic of coherence. This means that the Calvinist embraces his ‘doctrines of grace,’ not anchored in an exegesis reflective of sound hermeneutical principles, but for reasons apart from the proper interpretation of Scripture. So, despite what Koukl writes above, he adopts a hermeneutic of incoherence. He is either duplicitous or just confused.

This protecting and preserving his ‘doctrines of grace’ means that in the mind of the Calvinist, he thinks of himself as the guardian of God’s glory and sovereignty, defined as a universal divine causal determinism. But if Kuokl’s hermeneutic were applied to his own Calvinist interpretations and doctrinal conclusions, it would reveal that the Scripture could not be teaching those doctrines. For reasons in conflict with Kuokl’s own stated hermeneutic, which exposes his Calvinist doctrines as unbiblical, he continues to believe and promote his incoherent ‘doctrines of grace.’

For whatever personal or spiritual reasons Calvinists continue to embrace their TUILP doctrines, we non-Calvinists are forced to conclude that those reasons take precedence over the authority of Scripture. Once the Calvinist abandons a sound hermeneutic by adopting doctrines that betray themselves as false by incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction, they have rejected the authority of Scripture to define and compel their beliefs on these issues. The incoherence of their interpretations and doctrinal conclusions shows that Calvinists favor the tenets of their own theological tradition over the authority of Scripture. If they took the authority of Scripture seriously, they would take their hermeneutical incoherence seriously. But they do not.

Hence, because the Bible’s authority is directly linked, as far as our practical living is concerned, to our accurate understanding of it, it is also linked to our correct interpretation of it. When misinterpreted, it is misunderstood. When it is misunderstood, its authority for our practical living is weakened. Erroneous interpretations of the Bible have no authority over us. Indeed, they should not be believed.

The Popular Reactions to Calvinism

There are various reactions believers have towards the Calvinist “doctrines of grace.” Most are shocked when they first hear of them. And as I have argued, this initial common-sense response should not be ignored. Others are indifferent. They either do not realize or care about the important negative implications and entailments of these doctrines. Calvinists themselves tend to see their doctrines only from the ‘positive’ side. Ultimately, they dismiss all the negative ramifications of their doctrines. Others conclude that theistic determinism has no practical bearing upon daily life, so they just ignore Calvinism. It is a fact that all Calvinists live as if the world is characterized by contingency and indeterminacy, not theistic determinism. And how we live in the world as compared to the theology we claim is true about the world is perhaps the most powerful apologetic for or against one’s theological worldview. Our theology must provide explanatory power and explanatory scope. One’s theology, if it is true, has to be consonant with how we live and experience reality. We have every reason to think libertarian free will is the truth about reality because there is no escaping the fact that we all think, make decisions, and act on that basis. Calvinism simply lacks such explanatory power and scope. It cannot coherently bring together the factors of human behavior, reality, and how we experience these. Others are partial to Calvinism. They acquiesce to the Calvinist rationalizations (e.g., antinomy, tension, uncomprehensibility, mystery, faith seeking understanding, compatibilism). And many just think that if in the end we are left perplexed by the options presented by theologians, then surely we are better off if we err on the side of “divine sovereignty,” even if that means embracing theistic determinism. Calvinism seems attractive in that respect. We want to be on the side where it’s God “who gets all the glory.” Our Christian humility prompts us to “play it safe” and “go with God, not man.” But these are false dichotomies propagated by Calvinists. Then there are the Calvinists who suggest that one is proud or lacks faith in God if one does not embrace the “doctrines of grace.” These suggestions are particularly intimidating. But the majority of Christians who have given it some thought may quietly and confidently reject them because they are convinced “Calvinism ultimately doesn’t accord with God’s character” or “it just doesn’t make sense.” They politely seek to avoid controversy and maintain peace and harmony in the spirit of Christian love and brotherhood, but lack the conviction that truth matters. This is especially the case in our time of religious, cultural, and moral relativism. On the Calvinist side, many are “closet Calvinists” for the same reasons. Many pastors and teachers are careful not to firmly state or preach what they believe lest they jeopardize the peace and harmony of their congregations, or because they themselves realize that their Calvinist doctrines cannot be preached in the service of the gospel as “good news.” And if pressed on the issues, it has been my experience that Calvinists simply ignore those who question or challenge them.

Therefore, this chapter, and indeed this whole website, is meant to challenge all evangelical Christians to think more carefully about the negative implications of Calvinism, especially with regard to the gospel as “good news.” Those who call themselves “evangelicals” need to do so lest they let the truth of the gospel slip away. In the midst of the tolerance and love we are to extend to fellow Christians with whom we disagree, surely the gospel is not something that can compromised. Generally speaking, there is a strange silence among Christians as to these extremely problematic issues within Calvinism. I think one will find that they are not directly discussed or taught in most evangelical churches today – churches that contain both Calvinists and non-Calvinists. Even the passages in Scripture that bear upon these doctrinal differences are simply skipped over. So much for teaching the whole counsel of God’s Word! The reason for this is that most pastors and Christian laypersons do not clearly understand the issues at stake and are confused about how to get at the truth of the matter. And this is what we would expect. J. I. Packer for instance, has made it clear that Calvinism is not to be understood but simply accepted. The Calvinist will employ the tenet, “faith seeking understanding,” but then he forfeits any understanding that is readily available to inform that faith. Indeed, it is understanding that challenges their faith, that is, their Calvinism, and therefore the tenet is more like “faith selecting understanding.” The problem for Calvinism is that when it is brought to the bar of logical coherence and fundamental principles of reason and morality, both of which are essential to good interpretation, it does not fare well at all. When it runs up against these problems, the adage becomes “faith ceases seeking understanding,” or even, “Calvinism seeking justification.”

Don’t be fooled. The internal logic of the Calvinist TULIP doctrines is not what I am referring to when I say Calvinism does not take logical and moral coherence on board in its hermeneutic. Even though it has its own internal logic, Calvinism cannot be rationally fitted or explained within the immediate contexts of the disputed texts, nor the broader context of the canon of Scripture. This baffles most Christians, not because of “a reluctance to recognize the existence of mystery and to let God be wiser than men, and a consequent subjecting of Scripture to the supposed demands of human logic” as Calvinists assert, but because most Christians rightly believe faith and reason are not in conflict. They think that sound interpretation is based upon God-given logic, and true biblical mystery is not the same as doctrinal contradiction.

If the Calvinist is truly seeking ‘understanding’ at all, they will find, given their doctrines, that ‘understanding’ soon gives way to an intellectual void. And that void cannot be filled by faith because faith is not equivalent to irrationality. Rather, faith is reasoned trust in a God who can be known as trustworthy and loving. This knowledge of a trustworthy, loving God, and whether he is kindly disposed towards any one of us, Calvinism cannot provide. It undermines faith by suppressing what can and must be understood about God to even begin to have faith in him. Can you truly love a God who may have predetermined you to eternity in hell? You can love a God that you assuredly know loves each and every one of us and desires that we be saved. Again, Calvinism is a religious scheme that, due to its direct conflict with other biblical truths, our practical experience, and reality, can only be believed by persons willing to suppress their reason and moral intuitions. This is not the nature or definition of biblical faith or the “good news.” Indeed, the severity of the Calvinist doctrinal incoherencies leads to a logical, moral, and epistemological morass from which one must retreat if one is to rightly fear, love, and worship the personal God of the Bible who is worthy of a coherent faith response through a knowledge of the provision and assurance of one’s salvation.

Schreiner and Ware, Logic or Exegesis: The False Dichotomy Continued

Schreiner and Ware follow Calvin in asserting their doctrines are the teaching of Scripture despite their logical and moral difficulties. Recall that they state,

“People do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems. Rather, the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”[33]

But certainly, we ought to be asking whether such difficulties are indicative of the fact that these Calvinist doctrines are not taught in Scripture. Do such problems raise doubts about the accuracy of the Calvinist’s exegesis? Whether Calvinists can successfully solve “all such logical problems” in their theology is not the issue. The issue is the fact that Calvinist interpretations of Scripture generate them in the first place. And as far as they are real contradictions, inconsistencies, and incoherencies, I do not see how the Calvinist could ever solve them unless they depart from the interpretive method, along with the particular doctrines that are causing them.^[34]

So, Calvinists assert that Calvinism is, after all, a “mystery” which they claim is the result of a proper exegesis of the text regardless of its “logical problems.” But can interpretations that lead to incoherence and contradiction reflect the proper exegesis of those texts? Many scholars do not think so. I contend that any claim that one holds to a doctrine for “exegetical reasons” entails that they also hold it because of logical reasons and moral considerations, not regardless of these. We need to reject the false dichotomy between “scriptural exegesis” and “logical objections.” Good scriptural exegesis is logically consistent exegesis.

Non-Calvinists contend that Calvinism is false because the non-Calvinist can clearly demonstrate that the Calvinist’s exegesis of the relevant texts generates incoherence and contradiction, and that the non-Calvinist can produce and demonstrate that there are sound exegetical alternative interpretations that do not result in incoherence and contradiction. Non-Calvinists ought not to fall into accepting this dichotomy between exegesis and philosophy, or what Schreiner and Ware call “logical problems,” because it is a false dichotomy. Again, philosophy is essentially just clear thinking. Exegesis just is an examination of the text that, for all else it involves, does so with clear thinking, that is, with coherence and noncontradiction as essential to the task. The non-Calvinist believes that clear thinking is indispensable to exegesis. Lucid, cogent, consistent, coherent interpretations mark good exegesis. And these bear upon hermeneutics regarding its several principles and concerns.

For instance, there would be no advance as to authorial intent if our exegesis can dismiss coherence and non-contradiction. To dismiss these would only open the door for our biblical author to be incoherent and contradictory, thereby throwing our search for his “intent” into confusion. We would never be able to discern his true intent because once the canons of reason are considered non-essential to exegesis, then one’s exegesis or claims about the author’s intended meaning would be relative to whatever any exegete claims the text means. One interpreter could claim the author means one thing, and another interpreter could claim he means something totally different, without the exegetical tether of needing to have the author make sense. And this is just the point. If we are willing to jettison rational and moral coherence as essential to determining the validity of an interpretation, then one interpretation is as good as any other, even when an interpretation is marked by incoherence and contradiction. We land in interpretive relativism. In contrast, we must presuppose that authors write to be understood for the substance they are attempting to communicate. And understanding requires that one think, write, or speak according to the laws of logic. Divine inspiration cannot be used to excuse interpretive incoherence or relativism. Coherence, therefore, is essential to exegesis and also essential for discerning the validity of one’s exegesis.

You would think all this would go without saying. But as I have thought carefully about the Calvinist/non-Calvinist divide, I cannot escape the conclusion that the essential difference lies in the degree to which one takes rational coherence on board in their hermeneutic. It is not as though there are two mutually exclusive yet legitimate interpretations of the disputed texts, although this is how it is presented in most evangelical churches today. There is a pervasive interpretive relativism within Evangelicalism. It is somewhat surprising that what common sense otherwise tells us is essential to interpretation has to be expounded in this manner and to this degree. We would simply ask the Calvinist for a response to the following questions:

Can one claim as a credible exegesis that which violates the law of non-contradiction?
Can one claim their understanding of the text to be valid if it results in incoherencies and inconsistencies?
How can one insist that exegesis ought to be the means by which we come to understand the meaning of a text and yet be able to dismiss logical reasoning and moral intuitions in the process or in its conclusions?

I submit that “logical difficulties” are an integral part of any serious assessment of exegetical validity. This clear thinking distinguishes good exegesis from bad exegesis or eisegesis. A “logical problem” to an exegetical proposition or interpretive conclusion is a significant matter and is an integral aspect of the hermeneutical task. Non-Calvinists believe that determining the truth or falsity of one’s exegesis requires the use of logical and moral reasoning. The best theologians and biblical exegetes are also the clearest thinkers. Theology and philosophy are inseparable. Exegesis and logical reasoning go hand-in-hand.

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that “scriptural exegesis” is not the “central reason” the non-Calvinist questions “the doctrines of grace” as if “certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology” are the more “fundamental objections” brought forth by the non-Calvinist. I have argued above that for non-Calvinists, there is no dichotomy between “logic problems” and Scriptural exegesis. Therefore, “Scriptural exegesis,” in its fullest sense, is a “central reason” the non-Calvinist questions the “doctrines of grace.” Our “logical objections” to Calvinism are part and parcel of our “scriptural exegesis.” Non-Calvinists have carefully exegeted the passages in this controversy. Therefore, non-Calvinists do question the “doctrines of grace” on exegetical grounds. Hence, Schreiner and Ware’s assertion that our objections to Calvinism are fundamentally “certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology” is not quite right. The point is that the dichotomy that does exist between the Calvinists’ exegesis and philosophy is a false dichotomy and the cause of serious misinterpretations.

Piper on James 4: How Exegesis Devoid of Coherence Distorts the Meaning of a Text

I have argued that merely providing a technical exegesis of a text does not guarantee it has been accurately understood. It is also required that one’s exegesis make sense. Interpretive validity cannot be reduced to merely exegeting text after text, declaring their proposed meanings, and constructing a theology while ignoring any inconsistency and incoherence created by that exegesis and within the theology gleaned from it. A responsible and valid exegesis of Scripture requires that the full and final testimony of that Scripture be marked by coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. This is not to say there are no genuine mysteries in Scripture; rather, it is to maintain that we should not claim that incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory interpretations fall into the category of genuine biblical “mystery.” The Scriptures are not incoherent or inconsistent, nor do the Scriptures contradict themselves.

Calvinists make much of their doctrine of sovereignty, defined as theistic determinism, which they claim is supported by biblical exegesis. They claim that exegesis must hold sway over any philosophical or logical objections non-Calvinists levy against Calvinism. I have shown that this is a false dichotomy and that any exegesis that is true to the text must include logical and moral coherence.

Here is an example of an incoherent exegesis of James 4 given by Calvinist John Piper. And although he provides us with an exegesis of the text, I think it will be obvious that his exegesis cannot be what the text means to say. This goes to show that the Calvinists’ claim that Calvinism is what the Scripture teaches, just because it boasts exegetical support while dismissing the assessments and interpretive input of philosophical reflection and moral intuition, is simply a flawed hermeneutic.

Let’s examine this exegesis of James 4 that Calvinist John Piper claims supports his deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty. In an interview on John Piper’s “Ask Pastor John” podcast,^[35] the following question was posed to Piper.

“So, Pastor John, you have said many times that you believe in the absolute sovereignty of God. That he finally and decisively controls everything, from the farthest galaxy to the smallest subatomic particle, including all the actions of human beings. I think what our listeners would like to hear is not only why you believe that, but mainly, how does this truth make a difference in our daily lives?”

Piper responded,

“Well that’s right. That is precisely one of the foundational, pervasively influential convictions that I have behind everything I do and think. Let me give just one passage of Scripture as to why, and then four really practical ways this makes a difference in our lives.”

Note that Piper affirms “the absolute sovereignty of God,” by which he means that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings.”

Now we need to remove any nuanced connotations from these words and be clear about what Piper means by them, for a non-Calvinist can also affirm this description of “the absolute sovereignty of God.” If by “finally” is meant “in the end,” and by “decisively” is meant “definitively” or “authoritatively,” and that by “controls everything” is meant that there is nothing that can thwart God’s ultimate plans and purposes, then I, as a non-Calvinist, could agree. I believe God “finally and decisively controls everything” in the sense that nothing escapes him as if there were something that caught him by surprise and was beyond his ability to deal with, given the full complement of his attributes and according to his ultimate plans and purposes. Nothing or no one can frustrate God from accomplishing what he wills to accomplish. Nothing or no one can impede him in his purposes. But this definition does not entail theistic determinism. Therefore, the keyword here is “controls.” What does Piper mean by “controls?”

As a Calvinist, what Piper means by “controls” is that God has predetermined by his own will whatever occurs, down to the minutest details, and therefore he causes all things to occur as they do. That is the point of the questioner when he includes “from the farthest galaxy to the smallest subatomic particle, including all the actions of human beings.” He is getting at Piper’s theistic determinism. In Calvinist theology, the phrase “the absolute sovereignty of God” equates to what William Lane Craig has aptly labeled universal divine causal determinism. We need to be clear on this. What makes the Calvinist view so controversial is its deterministic definition of divine sovereignty that entails that God is the sole causal agent in the universe. All other “causal agents” are merely so instrumentally. They are the “secondary causes” or “means” which God has also predetermined since this divine determinism is universal.

Note also that Piper says this theistic determinism is “one of the foundational, pervasively influential convictions that I have behind everything I do and think.”^[36] Let us observe the ramifications of determinism when it becomes the foundation for everything a person does and thinks. Piper continues by providing textual support for his deterministic definition of sovereignty.

“The text that gives a glimpse into why I believe this is from the book of James:

Come now, you who say, “Today or tomorrow we will go into such and such a town and spend a year there and trade and make a profit” — yet you do not know what tomorrow will bring. What is your life? For you are a mist that appears for a little time and then vanishes. Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we will live and do this or that.” As it is, you boast in your arrogance. (James 4:13-16)”

Piper believes James 4:13-16 teaches his deterministic view of sovereignty. Here are the conclusions he draws from this passage.

“So, there it is. You ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we will live.” So I conclude that if the Lord doesn’t will for us to live, we die. If he does will, we live. The Lord is absolutely in control of everything that determines our life and our death.

We don’t live a second longer than he wills. We don’t die a second sooner than he wills. I believe this brings amazing stability and strength and courage and boldness and risk-taking into the Christian life if we believe that God is good and sovereign.”

Does this text really teach Piper’s determinism? Is that really the meaning of this text? What if this passage in James were to establish that people have wills of their own that are at odds with or lack conformity to the will of God? That certainly would undermine Piper’s deterministic definition of sovereignty. Given determinism, if this passage were to indicate that people act contrary to the will of God, then such an interpretation would have God at odds with himself, and that would be nonsense. If the passage were to either teach or presuppose that because people have their own wills and desires by which they plan and purpose what they will do in the future, in disregard of God’s will, and that this is viewed as contrary to God’s will, then that would affirm a distinction between their wills and God’s will. This would also be sufficient to show that Piper’s determinism is incorrect. This would especially be the case if James were to speak in terms of God having the prerogative to overrule the human will, along with its plans and intentions, in certain circumstances. This would logically imply that the human will is distinct from God’s will, that human beings have a will of their own for God to overrule, otherwise God would be overruling his own determinations, and that would also be nonsense. If human agency is real, that is, that humans have wills substantially free from the will of God, this would require a different definition of “sovereignty” than Piper’s theistic determinism.

In addition, what if we can show that what James says in other places in this same epistle is incoherent with Piper’s deterministic view of sovereignty? Unless we decide to ignore the principle of context, which involves the affirmation of the rational coherence among an author’s thoughts put down in writing, and presuppose that coherence didn’t matter to James and coherence isn’t essential for us to understand what James has written, that is, that coherence has interpretive significance, this would show that James’s intent in the phrase “If the Lord wills” is not what Piper contends it is.

At this point, just ask yourself whether James’s admonition “Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we will live and do this or that” logically entails universal divine causal determinism. Do you think so? Why? Why not?

Piper continues,

“Then he [James] says not just we will live, but rather, we will do this or that. That’s James’s way of saying everything. He’s referring to practical things like “tomorrow we will go into such and such a town and spend a year there and trade and make a profit.” James says, “No, you should say, ‘If the Lord wills, we will do this or that.’” I conclude that this means we won’t do this if it’s not the will of the Lord, and we won’t do that if it’s not the will of the Lord.

There’s a text, especially James 4:15, which I think tells us to practically believe and govern our lives by the conviction that God is completely sovereign over all the details of life, death, and whether we do this or that.”

Here, Piper interprets the phrase “this or that” as comprehensively referring to all the actions of all persons of all time. He also interprets the phrase “If the Lord wills” as meaning that the Lord’s will has predetermined all the actions of all persons of all time. Recall that for Piper, the phrase “God is completely sovereign” means God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings.” Here, Piper reiterates the comprehensive nature of this sovereignty by the words “over all the details of life.” It is clear that what Piper means by “God is completely sovereign” is universal divine causal determinism or theistic determinism.

The Immediate Context: James 4:13-17

Let’s examine both the content and context of James 4:13-17 more carefully to see if Piper’s interpretation is a valid exegesis of the text. Here is the full section in the RSV.

¹³“Come now, you who say, “Today or tomorrow we will go into such and such a town and spend a year there and trade and get gain”; ¹⁴whereas you do not know about tomorrow. What is your life? For you are a mist that appears for a little time and then vanishes. ¹⁵Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that.” ¹⁶As it is, you boast in your arrogance. All such boasting is evil. ¹⁷Whoever knows what is right to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin.”

Note first how Piper has truncated the pericope to exclude verses 16b and 17. Verse 17 is part of the text, and an important part at that, for our discussion. I’ll return to this later. Piper has also skipped over verses 13 and 14 and left out commenting on verse 16. But Piper has not only truncated the paragraph but also the sentence in verse 15 to focus on the phrase “If the Lord wills.” Piper shortened verse 15 to talk about life and death, and makes his comments without due consideration of the context. Note that nothing in these verses or in the words “If the Lord wills” requires the conclusion, “The Lord has predetermined absolutely everything in our lives which includes our death,” or that God “finally and decisively has preordained whatever comes to pass, including all the actions of human beings.”

Piper focuses on the matters of life and death broadly speaking. From James’s statement “Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we will live…” Piper extrapolates the opposite and adds that “if the Lord doesn’t will for us to live, we die.” Ok. That certainly may be the case. But how does that entail that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings?” It doesn’t. That is a non-sequitur.

Moreover, the fact that God wills that someone dies at a certain time might be a special act of God in response to other factors that include that person’s free will decisions or prayer to God – for instance, Ananias and Sapphira in Acts 5:1-11 and Hezekiah in 2 Kings 20:1-6. How could these historical events be coherently understood from within Piper’s theistic determinism? The nature of these incidents certainly leads us to believe that the time of death or its postponement was a contingent matter, not predetermined. Piper’s conclusion that “if the Lord doesn’t will for us to live, we die. If he does will, we live” only confirms that God can do as he pleases, not that he has predetermined all things to occur as they do. Piper’s conclusion that “We don’t live a second longer than he wills. We don’t die a second sooner than he wills” is ambiguous as to teaching determinism. And for Piper to presume the people James is addressing are thinking about their lives in terms of theistic determinism does not seem to be the point of what James has written. Nothing in the passage thus far is communicating that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings.” Piper merely asserts that this is what James means to tell us. Piper is reading his theology into the text. James says,

“…you do not know what tomorrow will bring. What is your life? For you are a mist that appears for a little time and then vanishes. Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we will live and we shall do this or that.”

Context is always important. Who is James addressing, and what is their situation and approach to life? Verse 16 tells us that these people were boasting in their arrogance and that all such boasting is evil. Therefore, “You do not know what tomorrow will bring…” means that your boastful arrogance is out of touch with reality under God’s sovereignty by which he can change your plans and even end your life. That is what it means for God to be sovereign. But James’s point is that life is unpredictable and brief and that this ought to produce in us a due reverence for God and willingness to submit to his plans and purposes for us. This does not mean that God has predetermined the time and means of our death. Note that James’s presupposition here is that these people do have a will of their own that is out of touch with the God-fearing humility that comes from a due reverence for God as our creator and sustainer. As such, this situation that requires James’s words of rebuke would be incoherent if James viewed life as comprehensively predetermined by God. Teaching these people that life is predetermined in this situation where free will is presupposed is also incoherent. You can’t be teaching people that all things are predetermined by God as a means to change their behavior, while all the time presupposing it is they who have the ability and responsibility to do so.

By taking verse 15 out of its fuller context, Piper has removed the important content that both informs and controls the meaning of this verse. So let’s read James in context with an eye for coherence to see whether Piper is reading his determinism into the text (eisegesis) or deriving it from the text (exegesis). Here is the full section in the RSV.

It is important to say at the outset that James is not rebuking these persons for their interest in trade or business, laying out future travel plans to carry on that business, or seeking to make a profit per se. Such activities are certainly legitimate in and of themselves. But believers need to approach all their endeavors with distinctively Christian attitudes and actions. A more informed contextual reading reveals that James is speaking to believers or others who exhibit a boastful arrogance (v. 16a) and presumptuous self-confidence about where they will go and what they will do in the future with their lives (v. 13). New Testament professor Donald W. Burdick observes that,

“This section gives another example of the “wisdom” that characterizes the world (cf. 4:15). James addresses businessmen, probably Christians, since v. 17 seems to suggest that the readers know that their practices are wrong.”^{^[37]}

We’ll come back to verse 17 later, but note here that James’s first words, “Go to now” (KJV) or “Come now” (RSV) or “Now listen” (NIV), forcefully address these over-confident businesspersons. Burdick notes that this is “a pointed call for attention that indicates the seriousness of what follows.”^[38]

Right from the start, we have a situation in which these people need instruction in God’s will and ways. These people need to hear and heed what James is about to say in contrast to what they “say.” Burdick points out that the phrase “you who say…” is in the present tense legontes (“say”) and “seems to indicate that this situation under consideration was not an isolated instance. It was something that occurred frequently.” They are saying, “Today or tomorrow we will go into such and such a town and spend a year there and trade and get gain.” (v. 13) The point is that “God has no place in the plans.”^[39]

This was a settled mindset that James was concerned about with regard to their spiritual lives. We all know people like this, and perhaps we need to check ourselves in this respect. Many of us, even as Christians, are proud and self-centered. We believe that it is by our own strength, prowess, education, cunning, and resources that we have achieved a measure of success, status and wealth. We make plans that are completely our own, with no humble disposition to follow God nor reference our wills to have him work his will in our lives. Some symptoms of this self-centered life are prayerlessness, ungratefulness and discontent. This kind of pride in what we are and have, along with an arrogance about what we will accomplish in the future due to our own abilities and prowess is simply to be ignorant of the reality that it is God who gives us all good things.^[40] Certainly there is no need for us to degrade ourselves in a false humility. We can exercise a healthy sense of pride in our accomplishments. But the point is that this should never be devoid of thanks to God and submission to his will. This is the outlook for the believer. We can also enjoy all the good things we have obtained. But there can be an overemphasis on the “we” by which we forget that all good things come from our Father in heaven (1:17). We often leave God out of the equation in our thinking and living. James is rebuking those who go through life oblivious to or even rejecting God’s presence and grace. James thinks they ought to know better (4:17). They should not be acting with indifference or willful neglect of God’s presence and the possibility of divine redirection of their plans and purposes for their lives. Life must be about doing the will of God. Therefore, from time to time our wills need to be corrected. Obviously, then, James observes that people do not always think and act in conformity to the will of God. It is this difference of wills that informs us that Piper’s determinism, in which all thoughts, desires, beliefs and actions are determined solely by the will of God and comprehensively caused by his activity alone, is incoherent with the text and therefore wrong.

We continue with verse 14,

“…whereas you do not know about tomorrow. What is your life? For you are a mist that appears for a little time and then vanishes.”

Burdick observes,

“No allowance is made for unforeseen circumstances. These businessmen are confident that they will be able to carry their plans to completion. And so James points out their fallacy. They “do not even know what will happen tomorrow,” to say nothing about a year from now. They have been planning as if they know exactly what the future holds or even as they have control of the future. Not only is their knowledge limited, but their very lives are uncertain. They may not be here next year…Some of James’ readers had been planning as if they were going to be here forever!”[41]

So James is rebuking these believers for their seriously flawed thinking as exhibited in their words and actions. They are the type that take for granted their future existence while planning and arranging their commerce, while neglecting consideration of God’s ways, and without due concern for and submission to his will. A modern-day example of their attitude might be, “We, ourselves, have made plans. We are going to New York City, where we will spend a year, do business, and make for ourselves a handsome profit.” Full stop. Now, that would be to view things from a purely horizontal perspective. It is completely man-centered and self-centered thinking. Now, when we add, “If the Lord wills,” as James instructs, he does not mean to tell us that we should acknowledge that all things have been predetermined by God. Rather, this is an expression of submission to what God might have by way of a change of our plans and purposes. James sees their attitude of pride. There needs to be a correction of this purely horizontal viewpoint, one in which the persons are cognizant of and willing to take into account God’s will for them.

Let’s look more carefully at the reasoning of the passage in light of theistic determinism and why the content and context defeat Piper’s interpretation.

To these people, James says, “Instead you ought to say…” The word “ought” is highly significant here. James’s rebuke presupposes human free will and implies personal responsibility. When James chides these arrogant people about what they “ought to say,” James is presupposing that they are exercising their wills in disregard of God and his will. If they “ought” to be doing something they are not doing, then they are willing and acting contrary to the will of God for them. That is what they need to do “instead” of what they are presently doing. The word “instead” is also telling. It suggests that what these people were thinking needs to be replaced with a different way of thinking. And yet, there is always the possibility that they will continue to disregard James’s instruction and refuse to be open to God’s will for them. What they need to do “instead” is change their perspective to include a due reverence, humility, and submission to God regarding what he might want to do in their lives. It is a word of contingency, potentiality, and possibility.

But all this makes no sense given Piper’s deterministic definition of the will of God, which has God determining that they do what is contrary to his will. Contrary to Piper’s determinism, James says the change of mind they need is their responsibility; he certainly does not believe that God caused them to think and act in their present waywardness. If that were so, then God would be willing and causing in these businessmen the very godless disposition that God does not want them to have. God would be simultaneously holding them accountable for their proud arrogance while having determined them to be proud and arrogant! Piper’s theistic determinism makes nonsense of the text, and we cannot seriously entertain that James is a theistic determinist and is missing or ignoring the logical incoherence of his own words.

James’s words, “Instead you ought to say,” presuppose that these people lack this humble, submissive outlook on their lives and business that God would have them embrace. They would rather disregard God and act accordingly. According to James, they need to change, but the fact that they are thinking and doing as they are means that God is not causing it, and this necessary change of attitude is an open issue. They may or they may not respond. The implication is that they can shut God out and continue in their foolish ways. In contrast, on Piper’s determinism, God has caused them to be proud, self-sufficient, and arrogant, and yet through James, God is also instructing them to be humble, submissive, and open to his will. Recall Piper’s definition of sovereignty. It is that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings.” So, according to Piper, it is God’s will that these people be arrogant and boastful, and yet according to James, it is not God’s will that they be arrogant and boastful! This makes nonsense of the passage.

The Broader Context of 4:13-17: The Whole Epistle of James

Note that if James was speaking as a “Calvinist,” we wonder what he is thinking when he warns, chides, corrects, and instructs these wayward believers, not only here but throughout his epistle. So let’s now expand our interpretive context to the whole epistle. We will see that James says in so many other places also speaks against Piper’s deterministic interpretation of the words “If the Lord wills.” Especially applicable is 1:13-18. James says,

“When tempted, no one should say, “God is tempting me.” For God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone; but each one is tempted when, by his own evil desire, he is dragged away and enticed. Then after desire has conceived, it gives birth to sin; and sin, when it is full-grown, gives birth to death.” (NIV)

Here, James absolves God from being the source or cause of temptation, evil, or sin. But in direct conflict with what James says here, Piper’s theistic determinism – that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings” – has the problem of indicting God as responsible for the presence of evil in the world, tempting people to sin, and causing their sinful actions. Again, Piper’s theistic determinism is in direct conflict with what James clearly writes here.

To deal with their contradictory position, Calvinists have developed what they call “compatibilism.” I examine this supposed “solution” in detail in Chapter 8 – Calvinist Attempts to Justify Sovereignty as Theistic Determinism. Simply put, compatibilism defines “free will” as the ability for a person to act in accord with what they desire to do. As long as they can do what they desire or want to do, they have “freedom of the will.” If they are not coerced, forced, or restricted from doing what they desire or want to do, then they have human freedom. According to the Calvinist, what makes this “compatible” with divine determinism is that it is God who determines people’s desires. Therefore, for the Calvinist, as long as people are doing what they desire or want to do, they are acting freely, but it is God who determines and causes what people desire or want to do. Hence, God accomplishes his will in all things by predetermining all the desires of all people, and since they can do what they desire, they therefore do it freely.

This, of course, does nothing to remove the determinism in the Calvinist position or establish meaningful human freedom. It only pushes it back a step and reduces the “second cause” – the human being – to a merely instrumental role in performing what has been predetermined by the will of God. Persons may remain physically unshackled or externally uncoerced by God or others, but having their inner being, from which they exercise their will, think, desire, and act, determined by God alone, makes their thoughts and actions no less shackled and no more free than if the person were physically constrained. Lack of freedom is not limited to mere physical constraint. One can be constrained in thoughts, desires, and beliefs. And that is precisely what God is doing in Calvinism. A person cannot be unilaterally and exhaustively predetermined by God, in their will, thoughts, desires, and actions, and still be considered to be acting freely. An accurate conception of acting freely involves that a person’s action is the result of their own will, not merely a divinely caused desire. The latter is incoherent and contradictory to genuine human freedom. Compatibilism, therefore, is just another expression of determinism.^[42] Piper’s theistic determinism, then, implicates God as the source of evil and the perpetrator of evil, sinful acts.

In response to compatibilism, it is crucial to observe that James clearly teaches that God does none of this. In fact, James refutes Calvinist compatibilism at its core when he states. “…but each person is tempted when, by his own evil desire, he is dragged away and enticed.” Obviously, then, people have at least some desires that are their very own. They are not predetermined and caused by God. This is a decisive defeater of Calvinism as a universal divine causal determinism. Indeed, James vindicates God from being the source and motivator of people’s evil desires. Burdick states,

“Therefore it is inconsistent to think that God could be the author of temptation.

Instead, the source of temptation lies within man himself. He is tempted “by his own evil desire.” James personifies man’s sinful desire and identifies it as the efficient cause of temptation (RHG, p. 635.) He does not blame any external person or object.”^[43]

But Piper’s position logically entails that God is the sole cause of temptation, evil desire, and enticement. Therefore, Piper’s view is in conflict with the clear teaching of Scripture.

Piper’s God Causes Sin and Death

James also clearly states, “Then after desire has conceived, it gives birth to sin; and sin, when it is full-grown, gives birth to death.” Piper’s divine determinism has God as the sole cause of this whole process, which culminates in sin and death. We must conclude that in Calvinism, God is the author of sin. If the Calvinist will protest that this is not the case, again, we would like to know how it is not other than merely asserting that it is not.

In 1:16-18, what James writes counters Calvinist compatibilism, which makes God the source of evil. James writes,

“Don’t be deceived, my dear brothers. Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows. He chose to give us birth through the word of truth, that we might be a kind of firstfruits of all that he created.”

Burdick comments,

“The warning in this passage is against being deceived into thinking that God is the author of temptation. In fact, the Greek construction used here…often implies that the addressees have been engaging in the practice being prohibited. In that case James would be saying, “Stop being deceived.”

Here follows the statement that the prohibition of the previous verse was intended to introduce. Instead of sending temptation, God is the giver of “every good and perfect gift.” The concept of goodness rules out the possibility that God would send an influence as destructive as temptation. God’s gifts are marked by kindness and helpfulness, not destructiveness. They are “perfect,” which in this context excludes any possibility of moral evil, such as tempting his people to commit sin. The point of James’s statement is that nothing but good comes from God.

…He is always the giver of good gifts, never as sadistic being who would entice his creatures to destroy themselves in sin.”^[44]

But on Calvinist compatibilism, all the desires of every person – good or evil – are caused by God to be what they are so that they will perform what God has predetermined. For Calvinists like Piper, this ensures that God remains absolutely sovereign in the affairs of men. Given Calvinist determinism, we cannot escape the conclusion that God does indeed, not merely entice, but predetermine and therefore cause his creatures to destroy themselves in sin.

The Most Horrific Entailments of Calvinism

To Piper’s credit, he attempts to be logically consistent in his theology. But in doing so, he cannot escape the illogical implications of his own determinism. When Piper was asked, “Has God predetermined every tiny detail in the universe, such as dust particles in the air and all of our besetting sins?” His answer was an unequivocal “Yes.”^[45] Also, recall that Piper quotes Calvinist Mark Talbot in agreement when Talbot states,

“God…brings about all things in accordance with His will. In other words, it isn’t just that God manages to turn the evil aspects of our world to good for those who love Him; it is rather that He himself brings about these evil aspects for His glory (see Ex. 9:13-16; John 9:3) and His people’s good (see Heb. 12:3-11: James 1:2-4). This includes – as incredible and as unacceptable as it may currently seem – God’s having even brought about the Nazi’s brutality at Birkenau and Auschwitz as well as the terrible killings of Dennis Rader and even the sexual abuse of a young child…”^[46]

Piper and Talbot have no reservations about assigning these horrible, sinful acts to God. Piper and Talbot are obviously suppressing their moral intuitions here, as evidenced in the words “as incredible and as unacceptable as it may currently seem.” One must suppress their moral intuitions and completely ignore the biblical data to come to such a detestable position that certainly impugns the character of God as a moral monster. It doesn’t “seem” to be an incredible and unacceptable thing to think about God; it is an incredible and unacceptable thing to think about God! Piper and Talbot do this to preserve their flawed definition of God’s sovereignty. We see here the distorting effects theistic determinism has on a person’s understanding and interpretation of the Bible. The vast majority of the Scriptural witness to the nature of God testifies to his holiness, purity, sinlessness, goodness, mercy, and compassion.

Here we have the hermeneutical divide in stark relief. The Calvinist can suppress his God-given moral sensibility and the clear teaching of Scripture to preserve his theistic determinism, whereas the non-Calvinist must take into account the full scope of the biblical witness to let it speak its truth about the nature of God and reality, not only when interpreting this passage in James but also any other text of Scripture. The clear thinking of philosophical reflection and moral intuition needed to avoid the blasphemy about God that Piper and Talbot are teaching here is absent in the Calvinist hermeneutic.

What James states in 4:16 provides more evidence against Calvinist compatibilism and determinism. It reads,

“As it is you boast in your arrogance; all such boasting is evil.”

James considers arrogant boasting to be evil. According to compatibilism and Piper’s determinism, God predetermined and caused the arrogant boasting of these people, and therefore, he predetermined and caused them to do evil. But God has nothing to do with evil. The text clearly says, “…you boast in your arrogance…” The arrogance is theirs. They own it. Moreover, surely James cannot be interpreted as saying, “Because God is causing your desire to act in arrogance, but it is you who are acting out that arrogance, therefore you are doing it freely and are responsible for it.” That is what Piper and Talbot believe. But surely this impugns the character of God, who, as Piper himself noted, is “good” as well as “sovereign.” Piper clearly says, “…we believe that God is good and sovereign.” But how is God “good” on Piper’s deterministic definition of “sovereign?” He is not good; rather, he has caused these people James speaks about to do evil. The Calvinist should seek a definition of sovereignty that is coherent with the broader context here and does not impugn but rather upholds the goodness of God.

James ends the pericope of 1:16-18 by saying that “He chose to give us birth through the word of truth, that we might be a kind of firstfruits of all he created.” (1:18) God is good to all in bringing us the “word of truth” whereby God gives us “birth.” (cf. 2 Thess. 2:13) This does not mean that God unconditionally chose certain people to be saved through “the word of truth.” Since nothing but good comes from God (1:13-18), we are warranted in thinking that he would not predetermine certain persons to eternal damnation, but because of his character as loving and gracious, would work on behalf of their salvation. He desires all persons to be saved. Contrary to the Calvinist doctrine of unconditional election or predestination, God chose that through “the word of truth,” new “birth” would come to those who believe. (cf. Jn. 1:12-13) No definition of sovereignty need preclude salvation being bestowed upon the sinner by God upon the condition of faith. Throughout Scripture, it is indicated that the only condition upon which salvation is appropriated by the sinner to himself is by faith. This “birth,” which is spiritual and is therefore something that God performs by the Spirit, is given only to those who believe. And the Bible is clear that all may believe and be saved. Those who refuse to believe are not saved. This arrangement is what God has sovereignly established. It cannot be altered or circumvented. God’s sovereignty will see to it. Given all that needs to be taken into consideration to arrive at an informed, coherent interpretation of these verses and the others we are considering, we can be confident that James does not mean to say this spiritual, new “birth” is given only to those God has unconditionally chosen to save. What God chose or predetermined to do is establish “the word of truth” and give new “birth” to those who believe “the word of truth.” Believers are given new birth by God through “the word of truth,” which is the gospel. The gospel is “good news.” This gospel comes with the working of the Holy Spirit, who enables the hearer to respond in faith. Those who respond humbly to the work of the Spirit and accept this “good news” God saves. Those who proudly resist the work of the Spirit and reject the “good news” remain in condemnation because they have not believed (Jn. 3:16-18).

James Affirms Genuine Free Will

Having broadened the context of our assessment to include the whole epistle of James, there are many other passages in James that are contrary to theistic determinism in that they imply personal responsibility, free moral agency, freedom to choose between possibilities, contingency, commands, prohibitions, etc. Interestingly, some of these passages directly contrast man’s desires with God’s desires which speaks against Piper’s determinism and compatibilism. James’s epistle contains a litany of situations that presuppose genuine human agency, free will and moral responsibility – boasting in riches (1:9 ff.), anger (1:19 ff.), showing partiality (2:1-13), taming the tongue (3:1-12), bitter jealousy and selfish ambition (3:13-18), fights, quarrels and evil speaking (4:1-12), fraud, luxurious living and self-indulgence, condemnation and murder (5:1-6), and saving souls from death (5:19-20). These passages are inconsistent with Calvinist determinism. Rather, they affirm a non-deterministic relation between God and man. Here are the texts of the examples above.

“If any of you lacks wisdom, you should ask God, who gives generously to all without finding fault, and it will be given to you. But when you ask, you must believe and not doubt, because the one who doubts is like a wave of the sea, blown and tossed by the wind. That person should not expect to receive anything from the Lord. Such a person is double-minded and unstable in all they do.” (1:5-8)

“Man’s anger does not bring about the righteous life that God desires. Therefore, get rid of all moral filth and the evil that is so prevalent, and humbly accept the word planted in you, which can save you.” (1:20)

“My brothers, as believers in our glorious Lord Jesus Christ, don’t show favoritism.” (2:1)

“We all stumble in many ways. If anyone is never at fault in what he says, he is a perfect man, able to keep his whole body in check.

…but no man can tame the tongue. It is a restless evil, full of deadly poison.

With the tongue we praise our Lord and Father, and with it we curse men, who have been made in God’s likeness. Out of the same mouth come praise and cursing. My brothers, this should not be.” (3:2, 8-10)

“But if you harbor bitter envy and selfish ambition in your hearts, do not boast about it or deny the truth. Such “wisdom” does not come down from heaven but is earthly, unspiritual, of the devil. For where you have envy and selfish ambition, there you find disorder and every evil practice.

But the wisdom that comes from heaven is first of all pure; then peace loving, considerate, submissive, full of mercy and good fruit, impartial and sincere.” (3:14-17)

“What causes fights and quarrels among you? Don’t they come from your desires that battle within you?” (4:1-2)

“You adulterous people, don’t you know that friendship with the world is hatred toward God? Anyone who chooses to be a friend of the world becomes and enemy of God….

God opposes the proud

But gives grace to the humble.”

Submit yourselves, then, to God. Resist the devil, and he will flee from you. Come near to God and he will come near to you…Humble yourselves before the Lord, and he will lift you up.” (4:4,6-8,10)

Previously, I raised the question as to what would decisively refute Piper’s deterministic interpretation of James 4:13-17. I said that would be accomplished if this passage spoke of persons having wills that are distinct from and at odds with what the passage informs us about the will of God for them. I think that a coherent reading of the text made this clear. Moreover, if this text, along with the many other texts in James’ epistle, is in any sense stating that people think and do things that are in conflict with what God would have them to think and do, then Piper’s deterministic view of God’s sovereignty would not be coherent with the biblical witness. I also stated that if James were to speak in terms of God having the prerogative to overrule the human will, along with its plans and intentions in certain circumstances, then that would refute Piper’s determinism. I think the phrase “If the Lord wills…”, while not necessitating determinism, certainly implies that God may intervene in human affairs to overrule the will of man. Moreover, if the broadest context of the whole biblical witness communicates that God may thwart what people have willed to do, or overrule and use for his good purposes what they have already done, then this would confirm that Piper’s view is incorrect. Given these various passages in James and the whole canonical context, Piper’s view of deterministic sovereignty is wrong and cannot be the meaning of the words “if the Lord wills” in 4:15.

More Examples of Calvinist Incoherence

Other issues come to mind given Piper’s determinism. It makes no sense for James to get bothered about these things as if they shouldn’t be, while at the same time believing that they are predetermined by God to be and therefore must be. What James would be observing in these self-sufficient, arrogant believers is just what God had predetermined. What more can Piper say about these things? Can he coherently object that they are attitudes and actions that shouldn’t be if God ordained them?

Furthermore, note that the words, “Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that” do not entail the theistic determinism that Piper wants from the passage. Rather, if James were to speak consistently with what Piper means by sovereignty, he should have said, “Instead of thinking you are in control of your lives, you need to think about reality in the following way. You should have the attitude that makes you say, “Because the Lord finally and decisively controls everything, including all the actions we will take, our future is determined. Therefore, we shall surely live while God wills, do what God has predetermined we will do, and die when God wills.” But note that James cannot even use the phrase “you should.” That implies a degree of human free will. You can see how determinism makes nonsense of language. So, given theistic determinism, James’ instructions and rebukes that presuppose personal responsibility and freedom to do otherwise become nonsense. On determinism, James’ statements become merely information that these people can do nothing with and need to do nothing about. All their thoughts, desires, and attitudes towards the future were predetermined and caused by God. And again, on theistic determinism, James’ words would be incoherent. These people are either predetermined to the spiritually indifferent, arrogant, and proud view that God has given them, or God will change their desires accordingly. But either way, it has nothing to do with them at all.

Or even more accurately and confusedly, if by saying “Instead you ought to say, If the Lord wills” James was expressing theistic determinism as Piper contends, James might have thought, “I don’t even know what to say. If God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings” then not only are these people doing what God is causing them to do, but I am thinking and writing what God has predetermined me to think and write. Again, you can see the confusion that is caused by theistic determinism. It is not a sensible or liveable view of God and the world. William Lane Craig is correct. This has a “dizzying self-defeating” effect. Piper has said that theistic determinism “…brings amazing stability and strength and courage and boldness and risk-taking into the Christian life…” How so? Everything mentioned here has a counterpart that presupposes human free will. Determinism brings stability, which presupposes we are in a world of instability. It brings strength where we need to fight against contrary forces. The same goes for courage, boldness, and risk-taking. What could risk-taking mean in a completely predetermined world?

Far from relieving anxiety, it creates anxiety about the purpose or meaning of whatever we do. We might imagine James anxiously saying to himself, “Will writing anything really matter? What should I do? What should I write? Should I write or not? Is it up to me?”

The Calvinist cannot cavalierly dismiss this as a trivial misrepresentation of their position. Again, recall Piper’s definition of sovereignty. It is that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings.” If that is the case, one wonders what the function of James’ epistle is, especially concerning its condemnations of sin, warnings against sinning, and commands to alter our thinking and living. All these presuppose a non-deterministic worldview.

The Calvinist will claim that God works his predetermined plan through certain “means.” He uses “secondary means” to accomplish what he has predetermined for everything including “all the actions of human beings.” James’ epistle is a “means” by which God accomplishes his predetermined will. But this is also problematic, for “the means” by which God accomplishes his predetermined will, that is, the means by which his deterministic reality unfolds is through personal responsibility, free moral agency, freedom to choose between possibilities, contingency, potentiality, commands, rebuking, prohibitions, instruction, etc. But all these “means” presuppose a non-deterministic reality. They have no coherent place in a deterministic reality. They are yet another incoherence that results from a deterministic divine plan. “The means,” as characterized by contingency, are incoherent with the claim that God predetermines “whatsoever comes to pass.”

If the Calvinist claims that what is written is the way the elect are brought to salvation, that is, that James and what he has written are all part of the “means” by which the elect are brought to salvation, then this too is incoherent. Again, what is being proposed is that the language and concepts of contingency, potentiality, non-determinism, personal responsibility, etc., are being employed by God to bring about what is ontologically a comprehensively predetermined reality. The descriptions and teachings don’t match the reality. How would the conclusion that reality is ultimately deterministic be gleaned from or be coherent with reading a text that speaks as if reality is contingent and non-deterministic? This, too, is a confusion. Contingent narratives, along with so many biblical teachings, are incoherent with theistic determinism. Indeed, they are antithetical to theistic determinism.

On Calvinism, all that James observes and writes is predetermined by God. For what ultimate purpose then is the epistle written? The Calvinists’ answer is that God just wanted James to write it. Was it for some “purpose?” We don’t know. What could that purpose be given universal divine causal determinism? We will never know. It surely isn’t to persuade or convince, which has no place within theistic determinism. “Persuasion” would just amount to God putting certain facts into the mind of human beings, such that they would be a conduit of God’s will being done in their sphere of existence. There is no person to persuade as if they had a will by which they could think or act contrary to God. There is only a human creature that God programs to do his will.

The Calvinist will respond that this passivity misrepresents Calvinism because we do not know what God has predetermined; therefore, we must act, and in acting, we fulfill his predetermined plan. But when the Calvinist says “we must act,” what is the nature of this acting? Is the Calvinist himself originating the act? But how does this explanation resolve the problems inherent in the Calvinists’ theistic determinism? Again, it is God who imposes his will upon our thinking and desiring, which does not cohere with how the Calvinist explains himself here, nor does it cohere with how we perceive the nature of our actions as substantially free and for which we are held responsible. This is another example of Calvinists engaging in the suppression of reason documented earlier. They are telling us to simply ignore the fact that determinism presents a logical and moral intellectual struggle that needs to be resolved. Piper’s determinism keeps cropping up in incoherent ways. Our rational and moral reasoning persistently tells us that Piper’s theistic determinism is seriously wrong, both intellectually and existentially. This is the nature of a contradiction. It is an intellectual, moral, or existential problem that searches for but cannot find a resolution that satisfies reason. It cannot find a “resting place” for the mind. It certainly may do so, but that would require the alteration or elimination of the belief or proposition causing the contradiction. Resolution can only be achieved by an alteration in the content of the mistaken beliefs or propositions.

So Piper’s determinism is not at all what James means to convey to these people. Obviously, James is not presenting theistic determinism as the corrective of their proud, arrogant, self-sufficiency.^[47] That would be self-defeating and render his rebuke nonsense. James is not chiding them for their failure to acknowledge theistic determinism, teaching them theistic determinism, or commanding them to believe it. That wouldn’t make much sense. By the words, “Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that,” James is not commanding them to accept the idea that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings,” while also chiding them for living in disregard for God and his will for them. That’s to speak nonsense. Rather, by the words “Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that” James presupposes that these people are free to choose with what mindset they will conduct their affairs, that is, whether in their own self-sufficient pride, or, in humble consideration of the will of the God who gives them life and enables them to carry on their business and make a profit. It is the will of God that they have a God-centered disposition, but the phrase “If the Lord wills” does not entail that God predetermines their present disposition and future actions. It is the will of God that they say “If the Lord wills,” but given that they do not say that, we conclude that God allows for their will to be done. Therefore, James’ words imply a non-deterministic reality in contradiction to Piper’s determinism.

Note also that the admonition “Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that” is incoherent on Piper’s theistic determinism in the sense that it introduces the contingent “if” into a predetermined divine will regarding all things. There are no “if’s” in a deterministic world. There is no meaning to “If the Lord wills we shall…” because Piper’s Lord has already predetermined all that is to happen, including the way it is to come about. There is no “if” about the Lord’s will or anything else. On determinism, whatever these businessmen are thinking, and whatever these businessmen are planning, and whatever they “will” to make happen in the future, will just be what God has predetermined. In contrast, on non-determinism, whatever these businessmen are thinking and planning, and whatever they work to make happen in the future, is an open question ultimately involving their response to James’ admonition. For James to tell these people, “Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and we shall do this or that” is an admonition to submit themselves to the will of God, which may be different than their planned course of action. God may direct them differently if they include God in their plans, and he may not direct them in that way if they do not. The future is contingent and open to possibilities. We limit the actions and will of God in our lives by neglecting James’ admonition. The alternative to being proud and self-sufficient is to think in terms of doing “the Lord’s will.” An implication of what James is saying is that we can limit the way God wills to act in our lives. God respects this free agency he has bestowed upon us as persons made in his image. This is what James wants them to acknowledge. They may or may not do so. That remains an open issue for all of us.

What the phrase “You ought to say, ‘If the Lord wills’” presupposes is the person’s willful absence of openness to the will of God. It therefore cannot mean that this willful absence of openness to the will of God is also the will of God as is required by Piper’s theistic determinism. Rather, juxtaposed to our will may be the will of God. “If the Lord wills” means that he may have something to say to us, and his sovereignty means he can do as he pleases, but obviously, the Lord also allows men to do as they please in many circumstances. James is addressing one of them. Understood in this way, the two are not mutually exclusive. The alternatives here are not either randomness vs. impersonal fate or chance vs. theistic determinism. There is an understanding of providence that allows for the free decisions of human beings in the context of a personal God who has the prerogative to intervene in response to the free actions of his human creatures. It is to be noted that there is nothing here that requires us to interpret the phrase “If the Lord wills (or ‘wishes,’ NRSV), we will live and do this or that” as universal divine causal determinism. It is a statement of humble submission to what the Lord ultimately wills for us as we say, “Today or tomorrow we will go to such and such a town and spend a year there, doing business and making money.” James’ point is clear. It has to do with one’s worldview, whether it includes or excludes the fact of God and his inevitable involvement in our lives. For James, it is astonishing that believers would hold any other view than one that includes the desire to live based on “If the Lord wills…” in their everyday affairs. But it is only in the context of their freedom to willingly and humbly respond to God that these persons ought not to neglect the God in heaven who gives them health and strength to do the work that they so intensely plan and desire to accomplish. So James addresses attitudes of arrogance and ignorance. Thinking themselves to be self-sufficient, they live deluded about their reliance upon God for all things. But this does not require the belief that reliance upon God means that all things are predetermined by God. A sovereign God could have also determined that man has substantial freedom within the context of that sovereignty. That is what the Bible testifies to. God will do all his will, even given man’s willful rebellion against him. That is what it means to be sovereign. Yet God approaches man in a personal, responsible, reciprocal love relationship because he has made man in his own image. God seeks the good of all “in Christ” and promises salvation to those who love him. Those who reject this “good news” remain in their sin and condemnation and will in the end experience the final judgment of God.

The problem here was a practical disregard for God altogether in certain areas of life for these Christians. James is redirecting them to a dependence upon God, who may direct them onto different paths than they have planned for themselves and into other situations and circumstances other than what they, in their self-centered arrogance and presumptuous confidence, have arranged for themselves. But God may also let them go their own way, as is evident to this point. James does this by raising the issues of their ignorance of what the future might bring and of the frailty, insecurity, and brevity of life.

As with all corrective instruction in Scripture, conflicting wills and actions are implied. Men and women are doing one thing while God would have them do another. So here too. Therefore, Piper’s understanding is wrong-headed at this point.

Hence, there is nothing in the text that requires Piper’s view. For one to condition their plans on the will of God does not entail determinism. What Piper has done is latched onto the words “If the Lord wills” and viewed them through the lens of his deterministic understanding of “God’s will.” Therefore he ends up interpreting them as “since the Lord wills all things, that is, predetermined all things…” or “what occurs in all things is what God has predetermined by his will…” Therefore, Piper’s view has to be read into the text to get it out of the text. He leaves no room for an interpretation of the words in which God allows certain things to occur that God does not desire or will to happen, which is consistent with James’ admonishing these people as to what they “ought to say.”

Two Concluding Points Regarding Piper on James 4:13-17

So, how does all this relate to our main thesis? Two important points must not be missed here.

1) The first is that any claims to have provided a correct exegesis of the text are inseparable from the logical and moral coherence of those exegetical claims.

2) Secondly, although on logical and moral grounds the text and context mitigate against Piper’s view, Piper disregards this as interpretively significant. Piper interprets the text in blatant disregard for the logical and moral incoherence of his interpretation with the immediate and the broader contexts of James’ epistle. The very logic of James’ statements throughout the book speaks against Piper’s determinism, yet this is not taken into account in Piper’s hermeneutic.

In conclusion, Calvinists know that they cannot escape the biblical testimony to human freedom, personal agency, and moral responsibility. So how do they maintain their determinism in the light of this clear biblical witness to human free will? When their compatibilist explanation of free will only proves to be the same theistic determinism by “secondary causes”, they ultimately must resort to “mystery.” That is, they simply must ignore the logical and moral incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction inherent in their deterministic theology. They dismiss that these difficulties have any bearing upon the validity of their interpretations of a text. But, as I have sought to demonstrate above, the Calvinist must wrest the text from its context and read his determinism into it. A careful consideration of the text in context will show that Piper’s deterministic interpretation of “If the Lord wills” is forced, inconsistent, and self-defeating.

Therefore, if it remains the case with Calvinists that their exegesis can be divorced from logical and moral coherence, then the text can mean whatever the “exegete” wants it to mean. I submit that this is a clear case of such eisegesis. It is also a clear case of the hermeneutical divide in which logical and moral coherence are essential in the non-Calvinist’s hermeneutic, but not for the Calvinist.

Piper’s Four “Practical Glimpses” Into The Difference Theistic Determinism Makes

I could end my critique here, but Piper’s four practical applications of his theistic determinism are even more enlightening. Piper gives us four areas in which his definition of sovereignty as theistic determinism, which he claims have positive practical application to our lives. They are: #1 – Gospel Joy, #2 – Sacrificial Love, #3 – Fearless Witness, and #4 – Confident Planning. Let’s assess Piper’s applications for consistency with this theistic determinism.

#1 – Piper on ‘Gospel Joy‘

The first application is what Piper calls “gospel joy.” Piper states,

“Now does that make a practical difference in our lives? Oh, it is so amazingly practical. Let me give you four glimpses of why this undergirds everything I say on Ask Pastor John. Let me just list them off for you. It has to do with gospel joy, sacrificial love, fearless witness, and confident planning. Those are my four practical glimpses into how this is so personally relevant to our lives, so let me just take them one at a time, and give one text and a brief word.”

He continues,

“First, gospel joy. Every day John Piper needs the gospel. That is, I need fresh assurances that my sins are forgiven, that God is for me and not against me, and that I’m not destined for wrath but everlasting joy. I need the gospel preached to me, with assurance, every day. I need confidence that when Jesus died on the cross, under Pontius Pilate, this was not a fluke of history. This was not random. This was God’s sovereign plan to save John Piper.”

So, Piper is telling us that he gets “gospel joy” as a practical implication of his theistic determinism. Piper’s doctrine of unconditional election comes to bear upon this soteriological application. He says that “every day John Piper needs the gospel.” What Piper means by “the gospel” is 1) “fresh assurances that my sins are forgiven”, 2) “that God is for me and not against me,” and 3) “that I’m not destined for wrath but everlasting joy.” These statements focus on the question of assurance; assurance that his sins can be forgiven, assurance that God is kindly disposed towards him and assurance that he is “not destined for wrath but everlasting joy.” But how do these concerns about assurance cohere with Piper’s theistic determinism, especially his doctrine of unconditional election?

Piper’s theistic determinism dictates Piper’s Calvinist soteriological doctrines, particularly unconditional election or predestination. On Piper’s view of divine sovereignty and salvation, God predetermines all things, including the eternal destiny of each individual. That God is “for” or “against” a person, or whether God has forgiven or not forgiven their sins, or whether they are destined to wrath or everlasting joy, has nothing at all to do with the person themselves. Each person’s eternal destiny is the result of an unconditional and unilateral decision that God made before the creation of the world, which remains unknown to us.

Now Piper says he needs these “fresh assurances” that he calls “the gospel.” But it is difficult to see how his theistic determinism and unconditional election provide him these assurances. What is it about believing that God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings” that provides Piper with “fresh assurances that [his] sins are forgiven?” According to this view of sovereignty, Piper may not have been predestined to salvation. Piper cannot take it for granted that God has elected him to salvation. Given Piper’s doctrine of unconditional election, how does Piper know for sure that God is “for” him and not “against” him? How does theistic determinism and Piper’s doctrine of predestination assure him that he is “destined” for everlasting joy and not for wrath? And how does his theistic determinism and soteriology give him warrant to define the gospel as he has and to claim those truths for himself?

Piper Presupposes He Is Among the Unconditional Elect

Given Piper’s Calvinist soteriology, it is hard to see how Piper can have these assurances unless he presupposes his own unconditional election or predestination to salvation. It seems that Piper has to convince himself that the gospel truths he delineated – forgiveness of sins, a positive, saving divine disposition, and everlasting joy and life – are his, even though such assurances do not follow from his underlying theistic determinism and predestinarian soteriology. Sure, they provide these assurances for the elect, but no one knows who these elect are. Piper correctly describes certain theological elements of “gospel joy”, but as to whether he can be assured that these apply to himself, or anyone else for that matter, is forfeited given his deterministic soteriology. Hence, Piper tells us he needs “fresh assurances” of things that his deterministic doctrine of God’s sovereignty and unconditional election cannot give him. He cannot know that these assurances are his, given his deterministic, predestinarian soteriology, unless he presupposes he is among the elect.

Piper’s Ignorance and Pretention on ‘Gospel Joy‘

Now Piper does two things so that he can claim these assurances for himself. The first is that he must ignore his deterministic soteriological doctrines. If he were to attempt to process the gospel that he says he needs “preached to [him], with assurance, every day” through his Calvinist soteriological doctrines (TULIP), these would only cast doubt as to whether these ‘gospel’ doctrines apply to him. He would have to be able to know as a fact that he has been unconditionally elected by God to salvation. But he cannot know this. If Piper were to attempt to apply his deterministic soteriology to the “assurances” he needs, they would no longer be assurances, and he would no longer have a biblical definition of “the gospel” as “good news.” He is seeking “good news” for himself, but his theology and soteriology do not provide it. So he simply ignores this inconvenient result of his deterministic theology. Secondly, if Piper responds that he is not jettisoning his soteriology here, then he must simply be presupposing that he is among those unconditionally elected to salvation. But that is to pretend that God has made a way for John Piper’s sins to be forgiven and that God is “for” him and not “against” him. It is to pretend that John Piper’s eternal destiny is “everlasting joy” when it might very well be to experience God’s “wrath.” Hence, Calvinist determinism requires Calvinists like Piper to pretend God’s relationship to them is in accord with the gospel truths Piper delineates.

Notice how the gospel, if it is going to remain the “good news” of salvation, is inseparable from the assurance that it is applicable to the hearer. It must come to the hearer without unknown, secret qualifications that jeopardize the person’s assurance that it certainly does apply to them. And that is precisely how Piper is taking this good news. He takes it as though it assuredly applies to him. But Piper is being incoherent here. Although the gospel truths he states are the “good news,” the assurance he gleans from them must be grounded in a soteriological understanding other than his own. For his soteriology is antithetical to the assurance Piper says he needs, that is, that these truths surely apply to him. On his soteriology, all he can do is either ignore his soteriology and embrace a non-Calvinist, universally applicable gospel message, or, given his Calvinist doctrine of unconditional election, he is forced to presuppose that these doctrines apply to him. As a non-Calvinist, I can surely say that the assurances Piper is seeking do apply to him, you, and me, but that is because these assurances are the consistent results of my soteriology. But we cannot say this on the grounds of Piper’s deterministic predestinarian soteriology. So Piper must either ignore his TULIP soteriology or presuppose that he is one of the unconditional elect to gain these assurances.

Calvinism’s TULIP: The Anti-Gospel Doctrines

What this tells us is that Piper’s theistic determinism has gutted the gospel of an essential aspect, that is, the assurance that it applies to you, me, and Piper. Calvinists themselves will admit that they do not know who is elect and who is not. Piper’s soteriology causes a person to doubt that salvation applies to them and, also, all the assurances he mentioned – forgiveness of sins, a positive, saving divine disposition, and everlasting joy and life. Piper’s doctrine of God’s sovereignty and his soteriology that springs from it are void of ontological assurance and, therefore, epistemological assurance. How does a person know that God has “a positive, saving…disposition” toward them on Piper’s doctrine of unconditional election? Only a view of God’s sovereignty by which He unfailingly accomplished salvation for all in Jesus, and is in good faith offered to all based on the sinner’s response of faith to that “good news,” is a God who we can know has “a positive, saving divine disposition” towards us. Only when we know that God loves each one of us and that salvation can be had by faith can we be assured that we can have “everlasting joy and life.” Only such a non-deterministic soteriology can be the grounds upon which one takes continual encouragement and “fresh assurances” from these gospel truths, for they are the message of truly “good news.” I need to know that God has made a way for my sins to be forgiven and has not left me without remedy. I need to know that God desires my salvation and has not excluded me from it. I need to know that I can have everlasting joy in God’s presence, along with eternal life, and that I need not suffer his wrath and condemnation. We all need to know these things, for they are the longing of every human heart and mind. It is essential that we have a knowledge of God’s love for us, his forgiveness of our sins, and that salvation can be received by faith, for us to be assured of these things. That is what the gospel does. But that is precisely what Calvinism does not do, for there is no “good news” in the Calvinists’ TULIP soteriology. These assurances that the true gospel provides every sinner are precisely what Calvinism takes from us. Hence, Calvinism is antithetical to the gospel as “good news.”

“Am I Included?”: Piper’s Calvinism Can’t Produce Assurance

Piper only emphasizes what I have just said above when he states, “I need confidence that when Jesus died on the cross, under Pontius Pilate, this was not a fluke of history. This was not random. This was God’s sovereign plan to save John Piper.” Note that there are two different issues here. The first reiterates what I have said above about Piper’s need. He states, “I need confidence that… This was God’s sovereign plan to save John Piper.” He is right about the importance of this need to know the gospel and salvation apply to him personally and individually. Interestingly, he says over and over that “Every day John Piper needs the gospel…I need fresh assurances…I need the gospel preached to me, with assurance, every day. I need confidence that …This was God’s sovereign plan to save John Piper.” I submit to you that deep down, Piper knows that his soteriology cannot provide him with the gospel assurances he needs. Within himself, he wants to believe the truly “good news,” but for some reason, he will not leave his Calvinism, which he knows does not provide him with the assurances he needs. And it seems that by repeating these assurances, he is striving to make them true within his Calvinist context. But stating your need for these assurances over and over will not make it so. Your soteriology has to provide it to you. Given Piper’s Calvinist soteriology, Piper is still left with the question, “Am I included?” What he seems to be doing is crying out, needing to know if he is included. His stating that his soteriology gives him “gospel joy” is unconvincing, no matter how many times and how passionately he asserts it.

Piper’s False Dichotomy: All Things Random or All Things Determined

But there is a second issue here. That of a false dichotomy. Piper presents historical events as being either random or comprehensively predetermined. Regarding God’s historical work to bring about salvation through Christ’s death on the cross, Piper wants to assure himself that this was “not a fluke of history.” He needs to know that “this was not random.” We agree with Piper here. We do need the confidence that “when Jesus died on the cross, under Pontius Pilate, this was not a fluke of history. This was not random.” It was God’s plan and he was perfectly able to carry it out. It could not be thwarted. Non-Calvinists also have this confidence because of God’s sovereignty, defined as his capability to rule and reign within a world of creatures with God-given free will. This was God’s intentional plan of salvation. Divine sovereignty means that God is the Lord of history and human affairs. He unfailingly brings about what he plans and purposes to accomplish, even given the free will of his human creatures. But to say this does not entail a contradiction. God can rule and reign in a world of free human beings. But when the Calvinist says that God cannot rule and reign in this world unless he has meticulously predetermined all things, that is a non sequitur. Theistic determinism does not necessarily follow from “God rules in the affairs of men.” And the two alternatives are not total randomness or total determinism. That is a false dichotomy. There is the possibility of divine sovereignty in the context of human freedom.

Leighton Flowers makes the point that Piper, and Calvinists in general, view God’s sovereignty as a false dichotomy between all things being random or all things being predetermined. Piper says that everything either happens randomly or must be predetermined by God. There are no other alternatives. But again, this is a false dichotomy in that God may allow certain events to occur without having predetermined them and therefore causing them to happen. This allowing or permitting presupposes that God has not predetermined all things nor is he causing all things to occur as they do. Neither is this randomness, as if there were no rational Being, i.e., God, intimately involved in the affairs of mankind. God’s sovereignty, biblically defined, is his ability to comprehensively know and effectively govern the affairs of this world, such that his plans and purposes cannot be thwarted even though he has granted human persons substantial, genuine freedom, which entails moral responsibility. This is true, biblical divine sovereignty, as opposed to Piper’s universal divine causal determinism. The non-Calvinist understands divine sovereignty as God’s ability to actively rule and overrule when the circumstances warrant it, in relation to the genuine freedom that he, as sovereign, has bestowed upon the people over which he rules. Non-Calvinists do not claim that human freedom is absolute, but it is substantial and the norm in the workings of the world. This creates an authentic, reciprocal, and personal relationship between the sovereign and the subjects, which bestows true meaning and purpose for those subjects and for historical events. Whereas the Calvinist understanding of God’s sovereignty as a meticulous divine determinism has all human action and history being merely the expression of God’s will alone, all things, therefore, including our thoughts, beliefs, desires, and actions, are nothing but the instrumental workings of God’s monolithic will, which makes him the sole cause of all that happens. We are no longer subjects of a Sovereign Lord but rather puppets on the strings of an impersonal, all-powerful entity which is not the God of the Bible. The non-Calvinist understanding of divine sovereignty is coherent with all that the Bible testifies to about the character and attributes of God, along with the moral agency and responsibility of sinful human persons. It encompasses the whole story of mankind’s creation, fall, and redemption by a personal, loving, capable God. The non-Calvinist position has the advantages of explanatory power and explanatory scope. The Calvinist definition of sovereignty does not. ^[48]

Acts 4:27-28: Piper’s Grandiose Presumption, His Loss of Assurance, and The Non-Sequitur

Piper continues,

“Here’s the text that connects the sovereignty of God down to the details of a sinner’s actions and the gospel. Acts 4:27–28 says, “For truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.”

Amazing. Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentile soldiers, the crowds crying, “Crucify him! Crucify him!” did what God had predestined to take place. Or to paraphrase using the words of James, since the Lord willed, they lived and did this or that.

Jesus’s death, down to the details of the fulfillment of prophecy (like the throwing of dice for the choosing of his clothing) was under God’s sovereign control. It was not a random event, which brings to me the strong assurance. God was totally in charge of saving John Piper’s soul. I need the gospel, and I think that text says, “No sovereignty, no gospel.”

The fact that Piper points out that God sovereignly brought about the death of Jesus for our salvation is one thing. But given his Calvinist soteriology, as far as this sovereign historical saving work being “God’s sovereign plan to save John Piper,” or that “God was totally in charge of saving John Piper’s soul,” is quite another matter altogether. On Piper’s Calvinism, he may have confidence in God’s sovereign work to accomplish salvation, but salvation for whom in particular, that is a matter that Piper’s deterministic doctrine of unconditional election does not give us any insight into. We may take confidence that nothing or no one can impede God in his determination to accomplish salvation, but given Calvinism, whether that particularly applies to John Piper, you, or me, still remains in question. That it was “God’s sovereign plan to save” we all heartily affirm. That it was “God’s sovereign plan to save John Piper”, neither we nor Piper can know for sure. Piper makes the “blind leap” or presumption that the salvation God “planned and predestined to take place” applies to him. On Piper’s doctrine of unconditional election, I don’t see how the assurance of salvation Piper claims for himself follows. If he cannot assuredly speak about salvation as applicable to every individual person, then he cannot assuredly speak about salvation for himself. And if he could assure every individual of the applicability of salvation for them, then his Calvinist soteriology comes crumbling down. In light of Calvinist unconditional election, I don’t see how just because God accomplished salvation by his sovereign workings in the lives of particular individuals, that provides Piper with any confidence to say, “This was God’s sovereign plan to save John Piper.” And the account certainly does not give Piper or Calvinists warrant to conclude their doctrine of universal divine causal determinism. That just is not in the passage. On Piper’s soteriology, for whom God has wrought salvation remains unknown to us. We are not privy to God’s premundane decision as to whom he would save. God’s sovereign workings are what they are. Piper wants to make them work on his behalf, so he has to presume he is among the elect. But on Calvinism, he does not have that prerogative. He does not have the prerogative to decide his own ontological status before God, that is, whether he has been chosen for salvation or chosen for reprobation. God alone has determined everyone’s eternal destiny, including Piper’s. Given his Calvinism, what this amounts to is a grandiose presumption. Does God’s saving work include John Piper? On Piper’s Calvinism, he could never know. On Piper’s soteriology, all that can be said is, “When Jesus died on the cross, under Pontius Pilate, this was not a fluke of history. This was not random. This was God’s sovereign plan to save his elect, that is, those he predestined to salvation.” But this can only remain a hope in the sense of “I hope I am among the elect.” Piper is engaged in wishful thinking here.

Note the non sequitur that because God worked sovereignly in the lives of certain individual’s to bring about the death of Christ on the cross he therefore has predetermined all the thoughts, desires, beliefs and actions of all people of all time. How would one come to that conclusion? Piper’s universal divine causal determinism does not follow from nor is it required for God to be able to unfailingly accomplish salvation.

What’s So Special About John Piper?

Once again, if Piper can confidently say that this sovereign plan of God “was God’s plan to save John Piper,” and say this as if it is true, which is what he is doing here, then why couldn’t every person who ever lived say this about themselves? Why couldn’t the same assurance apply to them? By claiming this assurance for himself, Piper seems to be giving every other sinner the privilege of also claiming that assurance for themselves. Now, if they too can and should claim this assurance, then there is no such doctrine as unconditional election or a deterministic predestination. The result would then be that “this was God’s sovereign plan to save everyone.” “God was totally in charge of saving everyone’s soul.” What is so special about John Piper in relation to all other sinners in need of salvation? Why can’t all sinners presuppose what Piper is presupposing here? Why can’t Piper apply to others the same assurance that he has taken to apply to himself? He should. But then, his doctrine of unconditional election would be rendered null and void. Calvinists are notorious for appropriating the blessing of God for themselves while they withhold those same blessings from others.

Finally, it’s almost as if Piper believes that since he can accept the idea of God’s deterministic sovereignty as a theological truth and therefore God’s deterministic sovereignty in salvation (i.e., unconditional election), then any such work of salvation must include him. It’s as if the acceptance of theistic determinism is an affirmation that the person is included in God’s unconditional election. “If you can believe in universal divine causal determinism, then you’re in. You are also one of the unconditionally elect.” After all, according to Calvinists, isn’t this doctrine also the litmus test for humility of the type needed to really exalt and glorify God in salvation? Isn’t it what eliminates all human autonomy that would steal glory from God and exalt man over God, allowing man to take credit for his own salvation? If it is, and you can embrace it, then this must be a “sign” of your unconditional election. But then your election wouldn’t be unconditional. It would be based on your ability to accept Calvinism’s universal divine causal determinism. But your ability to accept anything is incoherent with your determinism.

These are the logical implications of universal divine causal determinism, which is a worldview not taught in Scripture. If theistic determinism is wrong from the start, its logical out-workings will in the end prove to run roughshod over both Scripture and reason. Taking their cue from theistic determinism, the Calvinists’ albeit well-intentioned spiritual sentiments will ultimately not cohere with the full scope of biblical teaching.

#2 – ‘Sacrificial Love’

Piper’s second practical implication of his deterministic sovereignty is “sacrificial love.” He states,

“Second, I am called upon as a Christian now to love people, to love even my enemies, to do good all the time to those who don’t do good to me, to make sacrifices to my life, inconvenience myself, and not be a selfish person. Where in the world do you get the resources in your soul to do good to others when they’re not doing good to you? Even more, when it may cost you tremendously? When you might have to suffer in order to do good for other people?

The New Testament is filled with the summons to live that way. Peter argues, or counsels, or offers wisdom for how we are going to be able to do good when we are suffering. He says we must remember God’s detailed sovereignty over suffering as we do good.

Listen to these two verses:

Let those who suffer according to God’s will entrust their souls to a faithful Creator while doing good. (1 Peter 4:19)

It is better to suffer for doing good, if that should be God’s will, than for doing evil. (1 Peter 3:17)

In other words, suffering is going to come, especially to those who are committed to doing good — especially doing good to those who don’t do good to them. Peter says take heart; God is sovereign over your suffering. No suffering befalls you apart from the will of God.

First Peter 1:17 says he is your Father. First Peter 4:19 says he is your maker. He’s faithful. You can trust your soul to him and get on with the tough, hard business of doing good even to those who don’t do good to you. That’s number two. No sacrificial love without sovereignty, according to the Bible.”

The first point to note here is that with respect to loving people, and especially our enemies, given Calvinism, God himself does not do what he commands us to do (Mt. 5:43-48). Unless the Calvinist wants to argue that predestining a person to hell is loving, then God himself does not love a vast number of people, who, according to Scripture, are also his enemies (Rom. 5:6-10). If he commands us to love even our enemies, he too ought to love his enemies. A God who selectively loves only some people (i.e., the elect) and not others (i.e., the non-elect) certainly does not provide a positive example or motivation for us to love others. And the artificial distinction the Calvinist creates to justify their claiming that “God loves everyone” because he sends sun and rain upon the good and the evil, the just and the unjust, is precisely that, artificial, not to mention superficial and unconvincing. This is just another incoherence that the Calvinist simply ignores, requiring the suppression of our reason in interpreting Scripture. So, it is hard to see how deterministic sovereignty provides a rationale to love our enemies. One would think that the love God has for all people – even his enemies – would be a better reason and motivation for us to love them too, especially if this love comes by way of the Spirit’s work in our lives. If God works love in us through his Spirit, then does he not love those we are to love?

Secondly, according to Piper’s determinism and his interpretations of the verses he cites, he has God predetermining and causing the evil actions of the people that bring about our suffering, and then commands us to reciprocate with love. That makes nonsense of the situation described in these verses.

Thirdly, Piper quotes 1 Pet. 3:17 in support of his theistic determinism. But note what the verse includes – “doing evil.” The verse reads, “For it is better to suffer for doing good, if that should be God’s will, than for doing evil.” But according to Piper’s deterministic definition of sovereignty, all things are the result of “God’s will,” therefore, the suffering for “doing evil” would also be included in “if that should be God’s will.” Therefore, this has the actions of every Christian, which cause them to suffer – whether for doing good or doing evil – predetermined by God. Both would fall under the all-encompassing predetermination of God. Both would be included in “if that should be God’s will.” So here again we have God causing the situation of those who suffer for “doing evil” and therefore the cause of that “evil.”

Fourthly, we have another non sequitur. Because “God is sovereign over our suffering” does not mean that he has caused our suffering. For Peter to state, “No suffering befalls you apart from the will of God,” does not entail that God predetermined and caused the suffering. It does not require a deterministic understanding of divine sovereignty. “If that should be God’s will” certainly is not coherent with the view that claims everything that occurs is God’s will. The statement “if that should be God’s will” implies that “God’s will” cannot be defined as a universal divine causal determinism.

What Piper is doing here is an interesting case of eisegesis. At any mention of the words “sovereign” or “God’s will,” Piper imposes on those words his deterministic definitions despite the havoc his definition wreaks on the logical connection of ideas and the context of the passage. Presupposing the truth of Calvinism, for Piper, these must be talking about God’s preordination of “whatsoever comes to pass.” Here, Piper is straining to make his overarching deterministic doctrine of sovereignty applicable to “sacrificial love” because the words “God’s will” are mentioned in this context of “doing good” to those who are causing the suffering of these believers. But again, just because Peter mentions “God’s will,” Piper’s determinism is not the required interpretation of these words.

#3 – ‘Fearless Witness’

Piper’s third practical implication of deterministic sovereignty is “fearless witness.” He states,

“Third, the sovereignty of God over my fearless witness. I’m called upon to bear witness to Jesus no matter what the fearful circumstance is. How can I overcome fear and be a faithful witness? Here’s Jesus’s answer in Matthew. Watch how sovereignty figures in:

“Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell. Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? And not one of them will fall to the ground apart from your Father. But even the hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not, therefore; you are of more value than many sparrows.” (Matthew 10:28–31)

The absolute sovereignty of God over which a bird falls dead to the forest floor is the foundation of my fearless witness. And I am precious to him. More precious than all those birds whose lives are in God’s detailed, sovereign control. How much more, then, is God watching over me in all my witness — to take care of me and only let me fall dead to the forest floor precisely when it is best for me to fall dead to the forest floor?”

Again, this passage about how our heavenly Father intimately cares for us does not necessarily require a deterministic interpretation. Jesus is teaching that God cares for his followers even more than the sparrows. The beautiful delicacy of the sparrow highlights God’s care for people. A fuller biblical theology reveals that in God’s sight, each person has tremendous value. In contrast, Piper’s doctrine of predestination certainly teaches us that God neither cares for nor values a multitude of his human creatures. Piper willfully ignores this important entailment of his doctrines of deterministic sovereignty and unconditional election. He also ignores the fuller context of Mt. 10:32 ff. in which Jesus affirms libertarian free will by mutual acknowledgment, contingent denial, priority of love for Christ, dedication, division, and taking up the cross and following Jesus.

#4 – Confident Planning

Piper’s final practical implication is “confident planning.” He states,

Finally, number four, the sovereignty of God in confident planning. Not much happens of any use in this world without planning. Yet a lot of people think that planning might be pointless if God’s will is always holding sway. That’s not true.

When you make a plan, which would you rather say? Something like “If I’m lucky, I’ll live and do this or that,” or, “By chance, I may live or do this or that,” or, “As fate may have it, I’ll live or do this or that”? Or would you rather say, “If the Lord wills, I will live and do this or that”?

Luck, chance, fate — they’re nothing; they’re just words describing emptiness. But when you make a plan that says, “I plan to do this, not that, if the Lord wills,” you are building your life on an unshakeable foundation — the sovereign will of God. The wise man in the Old Testament says, “The heart of man plans his way, but the Lord establishes his steps” (Proverbs 16:9). Or Proverbs 19:21 says, “Many are the plans of the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the Lord that will stand.” So, it’s right to plan. We don’t accomplish things without a plan.

If you rest in the wise, good sovereignty of God in all your plans, you will be a confident, peaceful person. You’ll know that whatever details of your plan don’t happen, God’s will always happens. That’s part of your plan, and that’s the most important part, and therefore, you can rest in sweet peace.

So there it is, Tony. Joyful gospel dependence every day, sacrificial love every day, fearless witness every day, and confident planning every day. Those are daily, practical realities every Christian should live with and needs help with. Those texts that we just looked at, all of them point to the absolute, detailed sovereignty of God. He’s in full control, so that we can say, “If the Lord wills, I will live and do this or that.” That conviction informs everything I say and everything I do on this podcast.”

Again, we see the false dichotomy between “luck” or “chance” or “fate” and “if the Lord wills” (wrongly interpreted to mean “because the Lord has predetermined.”) None of the verses cited need be interpreted as teaching theistic determinism. For instance, note that Proverbs 19:21 says, “Many are the plans of the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the Lord that will stand.” If we view this verse in the context of theistic determinism, it makes no sense. The verse implies a difference or distinction between “the plans of the mind of a man” and “the purpose of the Lord.” The verse simply means that in the midst of all the purposes and plans we make as human beings, the ultimate purposes and plans of the Lord will be accomplished. The verse only makes sense in the context of libertarian freedom. On Piper’s theistic determinism, “the plans of the mind of a man” just would be “the purpose of the Lord.” There would be no difference. “The plans of the mind of a man” would be what the Lord predetermined and therefore purposed. On determinism, the verse should read something like this: “Many are the plans of the mind of a man that the Lord has predetermined so that his purpose will be accomplished.” But that universal divine causal determinism is not what the verse means to communicate because it is incoherent, not only with the sense of this proverb, but with so much of the testimony of Scripture to human freedom and responsibility.

Piper states, “Those texts that we just looked at, all of them point to the absolute, detailed sovereignty of God.” I disagree for the reasons given above. I am forced to conclude that Piper’s universal divine causal determinism is being imposed upon the Scriptures so Piper can employ them to confirm his own theological presuppositions. This is a classic case of eisegesis.

What Piper Failed to Address: The Dark Side of Calvinism and God Authors Confusion

Piper has attempted to show us four ways this deterministic sovereignty has practical implications for life. But he has left out the darker practical implications of his doctrine. We might think about how this works out, for instance, in a case of suicide or rape, or murder, etc. If God “finally and decisively controls everything…including all the actions of human beings,” it would have to be that God causes persons to take their own lives, causes persons to rape other persons, and causes persons to murder other persons. Piper has said that is the meaning of the phrase “If the Lord wills, I will live and do this or that.” Therefore, “If the Lord wills, I will steal that car.” “If the Lord wills, I will murder that man.” “If the Lord wills, I will rape that woman.” Hence, if the car was stolen, if the man committed murder, and the woman was raped, it is the Lord’s doing! It is God alone who predetermined and caused these evils. Recall that Piper agrees with Calvinist Mark Talbot, who states,

It seems “incredible” and “unacceptable” because it is. Piper and Talbot have God as the ultimate cause of all evil actions and therefore responsible for evil, and therefore evil himself. Despite the protests of Calvinists to the contrary, the honest and consistent Calvinist must admit this.

Not to minimize these evils, but they pale in comparison to one’s eternal damnation and separation from God and all that is good for eternity. The doctrine of deterministic sovereignty, in its corollary of predestination or unconditional election, has God predestining people to hell forever. We must ask how that makes sense of a God of love and life, and a God who sent Jesus to give us life more abundantly. God could have just as easily predetermined and caused that person he predestined to hell to live a life of joy and fullness in Christ. And why wouldn’t he if he is both “good and sovereign” as Piper claims when he states, “I believe this brings amazing stability and strength and courage and boldness and risk-taking into the Christian life if we believe that God is good and sovereign.” It seems that in this case, God’s sovereignty is at odds with his goodness. This is the dark side of Calvinism that they do not talk about.

How dizzying and confused is Piper’s universal divine causal determinist view of sovereignty? Well, according to Piper’s view of divine sovereignty, God predetermined Piper’s conclusions about the biblical text. He also predetermined that Piper should believe those conclusions are correct, and that I disagree with Piper’s conclusions for exegetical and logical reasons that God has revealed to me but withheld from Piper. So God predetermined that there be at least two incompatible views of these biblical texts. Is God really the author of such confusion? Based on a non-Calvinist understanding of Scripture, he is not. But based on Piper’s theistic determinism, he certainly is.

The Calvinists’ Best Bet: Ultimately Ignore Their Incoherence

Note the essential point here. If Piper chooses to ignore the logical and moral incoherence of his position, he can tout his Calvinism ad infinitum and without having to attend to any critique that his position is incoherent. But if he were to acknowledge that for an interpretation to be valid it must be coherent and therefore he must incorporate coherence into his hermeneutic, then he could not continue to interpret James 4 in the way he has, that is, in a deterministic manner. Once again we have identified the crux of the controversy between the Calvinist and non-Calvinist. It is this hermeneutical divide.

John Lennox on Exegesis, Theistic Determinism and Interpretive Consistency

I have argued that Schreiner and Ware do not allow the logical problems that “pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism” to shape and define their hermeneutic and interpretive methodology. It is precisely because those who disagree with Schreiner and Ware incorporate logical coherence into their hermeneutics that they “interpret many Scriptures differently.” Schreiner and Ware fail to recognize that what is fundamental for the verification and validation of one’s interpretation of Scripture is whether or not one’s exegetical assertions and subsequent theological constructs are coherent.

Mathematician, apologist, philosopher, and theologian John Lennox points this out in his book Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility. He documents what is entailed in the theistic determinism of Calvinists Paul Helm and R.C. Sproul. He begins by quoting Helm and Sproul.

“Paul Helm:

Not only is every atom and molecule, every thought and desire kept in being by God, but every twist and turn of each of these is under the direct control of God.^[50]

R. C. Sproul echoes Paul Helm:

The movement of every molecule, the actions of every planet, the falling of every star, the choices of every volitional creature, all of these are subject to his sovereign will. No maverick molecules run loose in the universe beyond the control of the Creator. If one such molecule existed, it could be the critical fly in the eternal ointment.^[51]

What Helm and Sproul seem not to appreciate is that, if God takes over and “directly controls” the molecules in my arm – for instance, as it swings to hit you – then my responsibility has gone and I cease to be fully human. Surely the remarkable thing about the creation of human minds in the image of God is that he has chosen to cede to them, to some extent at least, a real capacity to act independently of his direct control. In other words, human freedom is real.”^[52]

Why do Calvinists insist on dismissing such obvious critiques and conclusions about their determinism? The best-case scenario is that Calvinists have an admirable religious sentiment regarding God and his sovereignty. That is, that God must remain a God worthy of worship and therefore must be exalted above all things. This seems to be the heartbeat of Reformed thinking. The non-Calvinist would not disagree with this. He, too, believes in the sovereignty of God. But this sentiment can be taken to unbiblical extremes. In the mind of the Calvinist, it is as though, if the exaltation of God’s sovereignty is a good thing, even more exaltation is a better thing, until the preservation of God’s glory and the worship of God beings to transform into thinking about him as the predeterminer of all things without exception. At that point, the Calvinist has reached the epitome of what he believes it means to glorify God. His exaltation and glory become defined as universal divine causal determinism. But when God’s sovereignty is taken to this extreme, and the logical and moral implications of this determinism are ignored, we have gone biblically off course. Despite the religious motivations to exalt God above all things, God becomes more than “sovereign” in a way inconsistent with what is revealed in Scripture as to the nature of God expressed in the person and redemptive work of Jesus Christ.

John Lennox: Human Freedom Fundamental to the Biblical Narrative, Logic, and Experience

Lennox writes,

“The key question is: just what does God’s sovereignty involve?

God clearly determines the existence of the universe and humans in it. Hence the next thing to consider is what Genesis says about the status of human beings. We are informed that men and women were created in God’s image. There is, therefore, something very special about them since, although the universe declares God’s glory to us, it was not made in his image. Humans were.

Of particular relevance to our theme is the fact that the first humans were placed in a magnificent garden and told they could eat the fruit of everything except the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Far from diminishing the status of humanity, that prohibition was essential to establish the unique dignity of humans as moral beings. For the biblical story here defines the irreducible ingredients that constitute humans as moral beings and enable them to function as such. In order for morality to be real, the humans must have a certain degree of freedom, and there must be a moral boundary. So God gifted them with the freedom to eat or not to eat from all the trees that were in the garden. But God said they were not to eat of one particular tree. He told them that if they ate from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil they would be sure to die (see Genesis 2:17).

This passage is crucial for understanding what Scripture itself means by God’s sovereignty. It is clearly to be understood not in terms of absolute control over human behaviour but as a much more glorious thing: the devolving of real power to creatures made in God’s image, so that they are not mere programmed automata but moral beings with genuine freedom – creatures with the capacity to say yes or no to God, to love him or to reject him.

Of course, the word “sovereignty” (which does not, incidentally, appear in the Genesis narrative) could be understood to mean absolute control in every detail of life and, as we shall see, is taken to mean that by some theists. But this smacks of despotism and totalitarian dictatorship, rather than speaking of a God who makes a universe in which love can not only exist but is supremely characteristic of God himself.

Thus human freedom in this sense is fundamental to the biblical narrative. It chimes in with both logic and experience…”^[53]

The “fundamental objections” raised by those who disagree with the Augustinian-Calvinist theology that Schreiner and Ware affirm are rooted in the fact that “both logic and experience” testify to substantial, genuine human freedom in contrast to Schreiner and Ware’s determinism. Precisely because we can see the incoherencies and contradictions in the Calvinist’s deterministic position, these difficulties are not “mysteries” that can be cavalierly dismissed. They are not, as Calvinists say, beyond our comprehension. Non-Calvinists, like John Lennox, disagree with Calvinism precisely because they can see the incoherencies and contradictions in the Calvinist position. In addition, as Lennox has shown above, the Bible must be interpreted coherently and consistently. Incoherence and inconsistency are indications of erroneous exegesis and interpretive conclusions. Furthermore, those who disagree with Calvinists do so because there are exegetically grounded interpretations of the relevant texts that avoid the logical and moral difficulties generated by the Calvinist interpretations. Non-Calvinists preserve the sovereignty of God, the love of God, the full extent of the atonement, the nature of faith, human freedom and responsibility, contingency, predestination, election, etc., in biblical harmony. Non-Calvinists insist that all these biblical themes must be understood and held in consistent relationship with each other and must not be set at logical and moral odds with each other in an ad hoc fashion and excused by mystery. The full scope of the biblical data must be interpreted coherently. To ignore the fact that one’s exegetical conclusions result in logical and moral incoherence and contradiction is not a spiritual virtue, safeguards no biblical truth, nor does it glorify God or exalt his sovereignty. Rather, it is a sign of a faulty interpretative methodology. Lennox comments,

“God’s guidance is never purely and simply the kind of micro-management that leaves the individual no choice. The biblical narrative demonstrates this again and again…

The issue I emphasise, is not whether the Bible teaches the sovereignty of God – it does. The issue is what it means by that teaching. For there are many ways of understanding the concept of sovereignty. One is in terms of divine determinism. Another is that God is a loving Creator who has made human beings in his image with a significant capacity to choose, with all its marvelous potential of love, trust, and moral responsibility. God is not the irresistible cause of human behavior, whether good or bad – otherwise our actions and characters would be deprived of moral significance and it would make no sense to talk of us doing or being “good” or “bad.”^[54]

Note that logical reflection and moral intuition are integral to Lennox’s thinking about the relation between God and man in light of Scripture. Given theistic determinism, he concludes that “it would make no sense to talk of us doing or being “good” or “bad.” For Lennox, to “make sense” out of Scripture is just what it means to interpret Scripture correctly.

John Lennox: Determinism, The Gospel, and The God of the Bible

Lennox continues,

“It is one of God’s greatest glories that he invests us with moral significance. That fact is most clearly shown in God’s offer of salvation. That salvation is all of God, we cannot merit it; but in the preaching of the gospel we are challenged to use our God-given capacity to trust Christ to receive it. That trust is called “faith”, and it is, according to Paul, the opposite of works, as we shall see.

Divine determinism, however, holds that it is even more glorifying to God to believe that human beings do not have these capacities and that their behavior is completely determined by God. However, many, including myself, regard this view as going so far beyond the biblical teaching on God’s sovereignty that it ends up detracting from the glory of God, to such an extent that it turns people away from the message of the gospel. To put it bluntly, it raises the question as to whether the God of theistic determinism is the God of the Bible.”^[55]

We need to pause here to observe that Lennox does not understand or define “the gospel” in terms of theistic determinism, that is, in terms of the Calvinist “doctrines of grace.” Indeed, he states that such determinism “turns people away from the message of the gospel.” There is a direct relationship between soteriology and the gospel message as “good news.” The Calvinist soteriology, or their “doctrines of grace,” is a theistic determinism, and as such, they have direct bearing upon the content of the gospel as a message of “good news.” These “doctrines of grace” do not comport with a message that is truly a gospel message, that is, a message that contains “good news” for those sinners who hear it. On theistic determinism, any “good news” for the sinner is lacking. Theistic determinism turns the “good news” into bad news. Are the following soteriological beliefs consistent with “the gospel” as “good news” for sinners? Before the world was made, only certain people were chosen by God to be saved. All others cannot and will not be saved. The elect were chosen for no known reasons over others who were not chosen. The elect were predestined to salvation for reasons that lay hidden within God himself. Christ died for the elect only, not for all sinners. Christ’s death is efficacious only for the elect. There are no conditions that bring about the salvation of the elect that have anything to do with them or anyone else. Salvation, including your eternal destiny, is a unilateral and monergistic work of God. No one can exercise faith except the elect upon whom God will effectually work to bring about that faith. He does this by first regenerating them. Regeneration precedes faith. This electing grace and work of faith is irresistible in those predestined to salvation. The elect cannot reject the salvation provided for them, and all others are outside the saving plans and purposes of God. It is not God’s will that the non-elect be saved. They are the reprobate destined for eternal separation from God. So, what happened to the gospel as “good news?”

This highlights the fact that the gospel is at stake in this controversy. But note also what else is at stake – the nature of God as testified to us in Scripture. Lennox touches upon it when he says, “To put it bluntly, it raises the question as to whether the God of theistic determinism is the God of the Bible.” This is a very important point to ponder. If Calvinism so alters the biblical witness to God’s nature and character to make God out to be something contrary to the biblical witness, then Calvinism is a serious perversion of biblical Christian theology and the Christian faith. It would be enough to have perverted the gospel from the “good news” of God’s salvific love and work of atonement for all sinners to be received by faith for us to dismiss Calvinism as propagating a non-Christian and non-evangelical teaching with respect to the gospel, but add to it the Calvinist ‘god’ that is antithetical to the full Scriptural witness as to his true, merciful, compassionate, just and loving character, and we have a perversion that warrants the conclusion that Calvinism is not worthy of a Christians’ assent, let alone their belief.

Lennox continues,

“It is therefore important to test the validity of our thinking in the light of Scripture. It is, of course, Scripture that is inspired and not our interpretation of it, and it would therefore be sad if what was giving offence was not the word of God but our misreading of it.”^[56]

Again, we hold to the authority of Scripture and grant that it is beyond the capacity of the human intellect to uncover its saving truths apart from their being revealed to us by God. He has done that through the Word made flesh (Jesus) and preserved those saving truths in his inspired Word (the Bible). The Scriptural divine revelation opens windows into some truths that we cannot fully comprehend. In this sense, our thinking is subject to the light and authority of Scripture. But this is not to sanction that our reason may be sent reeling, such that we would be required to accept interpretations that are contradictory and inconsistent with other teachings of Scripture. In the exegetical and interpretive task, our logical and moral senses should be fully engaged. Given that the Calvinist interpretations are incoherent and contradictory, they must be deemed erroneous lest we endorse a hermeneutic of irrationality. Therefore, it is all the more important that we come to grips with what constitutes a sound hermeneutic. It is the crux of the controversy here. We do not want to misinterpret the text, and one reads and interprets according to the hermeneutical principles they have adopted.

Lennox believes that our thinking is primarily subject to the authority of Scripture. But he would not take this to mean that the Scripture properly interpreted would completely overturn or reverse our principles of reasoning and lead us into incoherence and contradiction. Rather, Lennox argues that the Calvinist interpretation of Scripture is clearly in error. The Scripture, interpreted with congruence, consistency, and non-contradiction, shines a light that affirms a non-Calvinist understanding of the issues at hand. To confirm that we are not misreading the text, we need to bring to bear our logical capacities and moral intuitions in our exegetical endeavors.

John Lennox: Is Calvinism Even Remotely Christian

Lennox affirms this in dealing with moral implications of theistic determinism. He writes,

“…there are Christians who hold that absolute sovereignty is one of the most glorious of divine attributes and must be protected at all costs, even if it inexorably leads some to the (to my mind, appalling) conclusion that God is the direct cause of disasters, tragedies, and even sin itself.

Others, who may be inclined to agree, nevertheless shrink at what would seem to be the logical implications of their views. It is one thing to believe, as part of essential Christianity, that we live in a world in which nothing happens without God’s permission and even foreknowledge. But it is entirely another thing to go way beyond that, and to believe that all that happens, including evil, is meticulously planned and its occurrence made certain by God, independent of any other considerations. It is hard to imagine that anyone could believe that such extreme deterministic ideas are even remotely Christian. They seem infinitely far away from describing the God of love revealed to us in Jesus Christ – or the God who condemns and says that we should avoid evil. Yet how can one condemn anything that God has predetermined ought to occur? Thus, as we have seen, this kind of determinism abolishes the very concept of evil.”^[57]

Should we “shrink at what would seem to be the logical implications of [the Calvinist’s] views?” How can we and still claim we are rational in our biblical exegesis? Calvinist determinism has logical and moral implications that need to be reckoned with. Indeed, is Calvinism, because what it entails, even a legitimately Christian theology? Lennox bluntly states, “It is hard to imagine that anyone could believe that such extreme deterministic ideas are even remotely Christian.” I agree. I do not believe that Calvinism has a legitimate place in a truly biblical theology. Each of us needs to decide whether such a problematic teaching as Calvinism is a credible, accurate teaching of Scripture.

John Lennox on Tim Keller’s Doctrine of Unconditional Election

Lennox writes on how the late popular Calvinist pastor and author Tim Keller viewed election. He states that Keller,

“…describes election as God freely choosing those who freely come… Keller mentions this in his explanation of Romans 9 in connection with the question that seems to lurk behind many expressions of theological determinism:

For the biggest question is: If God could save everyone, why doesn’t he? And here Paul seems to say that God’s chosen course (to save some and leave others) will in the end be more fit to show forth God’s glory than any other scheme we can imagine. This may seem strange to us, but that is the point – we are not God, and cannot know everything or decide what is best.”^[58]

Yes, we are not God and cannot know everything, and there are many issues that we must leave at that; but this is not one of them. For, as we have seen, Scripture tells us repeatedly and explicitly that the criterion for judgment is whether or not a person believes – a position that upholds human moral responsibility and does make sense. There is nothing strange about it. It is not, therefore, possible that in this case Keller’s sense of strangeness (meaning, I presume, unfairness) is an instinctive and justifiable reaction to actual unfairness? Surely, the answer to Keller’s question is that God has provided a salvation that is available to all, and whether a person is saved or not depends on two factors: on God’s part, on the provision of that salvation; and on our side, on our faith not on our merit – on whether or not we avail ourselves of that salvation with the capacity for exercising trust that God has given us. Otherwise, there is a major problem with theodicy, as it is but a small step to deducing that God is directly responsible for evil.”^[59]

Note that Keller describes election as “God freely choosing those who freely come.” This is likely an expression of Calvinist compatibilism, which claims theistic determinism is logically and morally compatible with human freedom and responsibility. Therefore, so says the Calvinist, God unconditionally elects people to salvation without violating their free will. If this is the case, the legitimate question posed to the Calvinist is, why then doesn’t God save everybody? If he is a good God, has accomplished and therefore desires the salvation of sinners, and engages in no violation of the human person or will in the process of unconditional election or predestination, then why not save everyone? Keller gives the ad hoc and question-begging answers above. We have argued that this compatibilism does not extricate the Calvinist from the contradiction that his theistic determinism creates with human freedom and responsibility. God cannot unconditionally predestinate and irresistibly and unfailingly cause someone to come to Christ and also claim they came freely.

With Keller’s words, “this may seem strange to us,” we have an example of the Calvinist’s suppression of his moral intuition. Yes, this seems very strange to us precisely because it is very strange to us! It is very strange because it is a flawed interpretation of Scripture! And by saying, “that is the point – we are not God, and cannot know everything or decide what is best” Keller is excusing this suppression of reason and moral intuition as if this admission that “we are not God” holds some spiritual virtue that allows us to dismiss what we certainly do know about the incoherence, inconsistency and contradiction of Keller’s doctrines. The fact that “we are not God” has nothing to do with the logical and moral assessment of Keller’s exegesis and interpretations. That is what Lennox means when he states, “Yes, we are not God and cannot know everything, and there are many issues that we must leave at that; but this is not one of them.” “We are not God” is a red herring. Keller wants us to disregard what we do know about the nature of God as both just and loving, impartial and merciful, let alone what he has done in Christ to remove his wrath from us and provide salvation by faith through the death of Christ on the cross. In light of this suppression of moral intuitions and dismissal of our knowledge of God’s nature, Keller’s statements are ad hoc and question-begging. Indeed, they diminish the gospel as “good news.” As Lennox points out, “Scripture tells us repeatedly and explicitly that the criterion for judgment is whether or not a person believes – a position that upholds human moral responsibility and does make sense.” Here we have the hermeneutical divide in play. For Lennox, the interpretation that makes the best sense of all the data to be considered is the valid interpretation. Not so for Keller. The sound interpretive principles of explanatory power and explanatory scope, avoiding the ad hoc, attending to consistency, coherence, and non-contradiction, can all be dismissed by Keller when they threaten the theistic determinism at the core of his Calvinism. Lennox preserves his moral compass intact and, contrary to Keller, can conclude “There is nothing strange about it.” Lennox then asks whether Keller’s own view strikes him and others as “strange” precisely because it does strain our moral sensibilities. Why should we ignore this “strangeness?” Lennox does not think we should. And indeed, we should not ignore this “strangeness” but rather let it compel us to an alternative interpretation of Scripture based on sound interpretive principles. They are principles that do not cause this disequilibration of our logical and moral senses. We should not interpret Scripture in such a way that entails that God is directly responsible for sin, and to embrace such an interpretation, we are required to suppress our logical and moral reasoning.

John Lennox: Martyn Lloyd-Jones Exegetes Nonsense From Romans 9

Lennox gives another example from Martyn Lloyd-Jones that clearly illustrates the Calvinists’ refusal to acknowledge the incoherence in their exegesis. It is a prime example of the hermeneutical divide. Lennox writes,

“Some interpreters – those who hold that Romans 9:6-29 has to do with the sovereignty of God in individual election to salvation – do indeed affirm that Paul turns at the end of the chapter to human responsibility, but some of these come to a highly asymmetrical conclusion, sometimes called, single predestination. For instance Martyn Lloyd-Jones writes:

In verses 6 to 29, [Paul] explains why anybody is saved – it is the sovereign election of God. In these verses he is showing us why anybody is lost, and the explanation of that is their own responsibility… It is God’s action alone that saves a man. So why is anybody lost? It is because they are not elected? No. What accounts for the lost is their rejection of the gospel… We are responsible for our rejection of the gospel, but we are not responsible for our acceptance of it.^[60]

With all due respect to Lloyd-Jones, from whom I have learned a great deal, this makes no sense whatsoever. Moral logic and common sense demand that, if no one is responsible for accepting the gospel, then no one is responsible for rejecting it. Furthermore, we have repeatedly seen that there is no asymmetry in the biblical presentation of the gospel – a person will be saved or lost according to whether they believe or reject, and the responsibility is equal in both cases, since the person has the ability to accept or reject. The major defect in Lloyd-Jones’ argument is his taking the earlier part of Romans 9 as having to do with election to salvation.”

Given unconditional election, it is not only the reason a person is saved but also why all others are lost. If it is said that they are lost because they rejected the gospel and also that they are responsible for their rejection, this implies that these individuals could have accepted the gospel and been saved. But that is not the case with unconditional election. It is completely contrary to unconditional election. A predetermined reprobation of all persons who are not among those unconditionally elected is the logical corollary of unconditional election.^[61]

Therefore, the fact that many non-Calvinists interpret Scripture differently than Schreiner and Ware, Tim Keller, Martyn Lloyd-Jones, et al. is because reason, common sense, and their moral intuitions are brought to bear in their interpretive methodology. When non-Calvinists read and interpret Scripture with coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction in mind, the Scripture can be clearly understood. Hence, their hermeneutic does not allow them to embrace the logical and moral inconsistencies, incoherencies, and contradictions generated by the Calvinist interpretations of Scripture, which only cloud their meaning and message. Reason and moral intuition tell them they cannot interpret Scripture in logically and morally incoherent ways. For the non-Calvinist, to ultimately ignore incoherence is not a legitimate hermeneutical option. For how would we know to question any exegesis except by “certain logical problems that are provoked” by that exegesis? And for all the other reasons there may be for questioning the validity of an interpretation, logical and moral problems are certainly among them. Schreiner and Ware state that people become Calvinists because they believe their doctrines are taught in Scripture. How are we to determine that this is true when logical and moral coherence can be summarily dismissed? How are we to verify that assertion in light of other interpretations of the same texts? What we learn from Lennox’s examination of the interpretive conclusions of all these Calvinists is that exegesis can be wrong. To claim to have exegeted the text is not enough. One’s exegesis must be subject to the principles of a responsible hermeneutic of coherence. It would seem that human reasoning must function as the arbitrator between true and false exegesis.

Lennox and Chesterton: Calvinism’s Demonization of God

Indeed, Lennox as a Christian apologist informs us that,

“It is not surprising to meet people who say that have become atheists because the version of theism presented to them was deterministic and contradicted their moral sense. Furthermore, there are more and more people within the Christian community who are disturbed if not repelled by such views.”[62]

Lennox deals with other moral problems of theistic determinism, as when Calvinists claim God is the direct cause of evil actions but is not responsible for those actions. He writes,

“And what shall we say of those who try to vindicate God in such situations by suggesting that, although he causes people to do evil, they are in the end responsible for it – while, incredibly, God is not? How people can even get near to suggesting such things, without seeming to realise what a monster they are making of God, is beyond my capacity to imagine.

G. K. Chesterton was forthright in his assessment:

The Calvinists took the Catholic idea of the absolute knowledge and power of God, and treated it as a rocky irreducible truism so solid that anything could be built on it, however crushing or cruel. They were so confident in their logic, and its one first principle of predestination, that they tortured the intellect and imagination with dreadful deductions about God, that seemed to turn Him into a demon.”^[63]

A word needs to be said about Chesterton’s phrase, “They were so confident in their logic,” as a critique against Calvinism. Is Chesterton disparaging logic here? No, he is not. He is not saying that we should abandon our human logic, as if it were so fallen that it could not produce a correct result. That is the Calvinist position, as has been made clear. What Chesterton is referring to is the logical connections of the TULIP doctrines. There is a logical progression to Calvinism once one embraces what Chesterton calls “its one first principle of predestination.” The other doctrines logically build upon, or follow from, predestination or theistic determinism. Note the context. Chesterton affirms the intellect in the matter of interpretation. It is the intellect that has been “tortured” by Calvinism. From this ‘logic’ of predestination, “dreadful deductions” result. It turns God into “a demon.”

Lennox continues,

“In another attempt to avoid the obvious negative implications of their views, some theological determinists, having stated that God causes everything down to the movement of the last atom and every human thought, proceed to contradict themselves by turning round and maintaining that, even so, evil is not directly caused by God. Rather, he only permits it. But this makes no sense whatsoever. There is a vast and critical difference between causation and permission.”^[64]

Note that Lennox points out that the theological determinists “contradict themselves” when they seek refuge in the divine permission of evil when their position maintains a meticulous, comprehensive divine causation, which includes evil. Lennox concludes, “…this makes no sense whatsoever.” These quotations reveal the divergence of logical and moral thought brought to bear upon the interpretive issues in this controversy. They highlight the different criterion that exists between the Calvinist and non-Calvinist when interpreting the Bible. For Lennox, one’s doctrines cannot be in contradiction. They have to make sense. Not so for Calvinism.

John Lennox: Calvinism is ‘Grotesque’ and ‘Completely Unacceptable to the Morally Sensitive Person’

Lennox continues,

“Not surprisingly, therefore statements blurring that distinction [between causation and permission] may become misleadingly ambiguous and confusing, as for example, when R. C. Sproul writes, “What God permits, he decrees to permit.”^[65]…Such confusion may well be evidence of the internal conflict that arises when people see where the logic of their argument is leading them and they don’t really like it.

…The depth of the resulting intellectual fog is shown by the astonishing position held by some that God directly causes the human evil that he expressly forbids. No amount of special pleading or theological sophistry can make such a view anything less than grotesque and completely unacceptable to the morally sensitive person. After all, one of the key biblical concepts is repentance from sin. It means a change of mind, agreeing with God that what I have done is wrong. It carries with it the implicit recognition that I had (libertarian) freedom to do otherwise. Therefore repentance is without meaning if God caused me to sin.

In any case, as it has often been put to me very bluntly, how can we say God loves the world if he created a good portion of it to go to hell?” ”^[66]

Here Lennox employs the undisputed biblical teaching on repentance to expose the nonsense of the Calvinist position. Note that Lennox is seeking to deal with Scripture in a coherent manner. Coherence is important to him and causes him to reject the Calvinist teaching that “God directly causes the human evil that he expressly forbids.” For Lennox this cannot be the Scriptural teaching because it is incoherent with the doctrine of repentance. It is important to note that this incoherence does not trouble the Calvinist. Hence, we have again the hermeneutical divide.

Lennox v. Carson: What Calvinists Fear Most – The Scrutiny of Logical Reflection and Moral Intuition

Lennox is pressing the issue of the problematic logic of the Calvinist theology. The Calvinist explanations that attempt to relieve the difficulties in their theology turn out to be as problematic as their theology. Under the scrutiny of logical and moral reflection, Calvinism’s flaws begin to show. And this is what Calvinists fear the most, because as Lennox points out, they themselves sense their explanations contain as much confusion as their theology does. Recall Lennox’s observation that “Such confusion may well be evidence of the internal conflict that arises when people see where the logic of their argument is leading them and they don’t really like it.” The Calvinist cannot escape the vortex of incoherence and confusion that theistic determinism creates. As Lennox states,

“…we surely need to audit the validity of the interpretation of Scripture that lies behind such teaching.”^[67]

This is a very insightful statement. It reaches down below the superficial bantering of texts back and forth to the matter of validity in interpretation. The only way to audit the validity of interpretations is to subject one’s exegetical process and conclusions to the deliberations of logical reflection and moral intuition. We can begin to affirm valid interpretations and expose invalid interpretations only when we all adopt a hermeneutic of coherence.

So as far as their hermeneutic is concerned, recall that Schreiner and Ware had to distance themselves from “the logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology [they] affirm.” They must do this to insulate their “doctrines of grace” from the substantial critiques that logical reasoning and moral intuition bring to bear on those doctrines. But when we apply a “criteria of coherence” this places the doctrines in doubt as accurate interpretations of the biblical witness.^[68] Hence, the Calvinist must squelch this “criteria of coherence” as applied to their deterministic doctrines which create their logical and moral problems in the first place, that is, their doctrines of an eternal decree and divine sovereignty. Scrutiny by logical reflection and moral intuitions of Calvinist determinism is devastating to Calvinism. Again, it is what they fear most. Lennox makes a strong statement in this regard. He writes,

“The moral argument is surely entirely sufficient to invalidate theories of divine determinism.”^[69]

If what Lennox states is true, then teasing out Calvinism’s logical and moral implications would devastate Calvinism. Under such scrutiny, the key Calvinist doctrines will be exposed as untenable and therefore unbiblical. Indeed, the moral argument alone is enough to invalidate Calvinism as a viable biblically Christian theology. The Calvinist will sense here that they must preserve their theology from such attacks because they believe the glory of God is at stake. As admirable as this sentiment is, it does not address the issue of validity in interpretation. It does not help us in determining the validity of the Calvinists’ interpretations. Rather, it is driven more by the Calvinists’ own personal, subjective, spiritual proclivities, not by a proper hermeneutic. It is a learned, traditional response to any and all arguments against Calvinism, and therefore, is not based on the authority of the biblical text. If the Calvinists actually had a primary concern to be faithful to Scripture, they would not only have to acknowledge the logical and moral incoherence in their interpretations, but also admit that this incoherence is a reliable indicator that their interpretations are not valid. Therefore, Calvinists have a vested interest in posturing themselves behind various logically and morally concocted ‘explanations’ to avoid or deflect such scrutiny. Lennox detects and honestly describes this problem.

“The problem is, however, that those theories are often wrapped up in biblical quotations and Christian terminology that many of the clearly unacceptable logical implications of divine determinism are shrouded in mystery – a mystery that we are not allowed to question. It is even held by some that the solution lies in the fact that God has two wills: one is secret, and it is to save only those people he has unconditionally elected to salvation; and the other is revealed, and it is that he wills all people to be saved. Another, less charitable way of putting it is that the unacceptable implications of determinism get shrouded in intellectual fog and contradiction, in an intractable obfuscation.”^[70]

Calvinists also speak of their difficulties as if they are a “tension” inherent in the biblical text between God’s sovereignty and human responsibility. Lennox gives us insight into D. A. Carson’s view on this “tension” and what Carson, as a Calvinist, will not accept as the resolution of this “tension” in his theology. Lennox writes,

“[Carson] argues that there is no escape from that tension itself,

except by moving so far from the biblical data that either the picture of God or the picture of man bears little resemblance to their portraits as assembled in the scriptural texts themselves.

Carson concludes that, in his view,

It is no answer to tell me that my presentation of the sovereignty-responsibility tension still embraces certain unresolved tensions. Of course it does. But to correct me you must not claim to resolve all the tensions, for such delusion is easily exposed. Rather, if you wish to convince me that your theology is more essentially Christian than my own, you must show me how your shaping of the tension better conforms to the biblical data than mine does.”^[71]

Carson admits that his “presentation of the sovereignty-responsibility tension still embraces certain unresolved tensions.” What are these “certain unresolved tensions” that Carson “embraces?” They are the various incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions inherent in his Calvinist theology and soteriology, which are well known and documented, and spring from his theistic determinism. Carson does whatever he can to avoid using the words “incoherent,” “inconsistent,” and “contradiction” in reference to his theology. He would rather describe it as “my presentation of the sovereignty-responsibility tension.” The word “tension” is employed to soften the severity of his contradictory theology and make it more intellectually and interpretively palatable. Other words Calvinists use are “conundrum,” “antinomy,” “paradox,” and “mystery.” But we must ask whether these “certain unresolved tensions” are real incoherencies and contradictions, and if so, are they hermeneutically significant for determining the validity of Carson’s interpretations of Scripture. He cannot just presume his interpretation of divine sovereignty or human responsibility is correct, thus begging the question.

Carson lays down a challenge here. For him to be argued out of his Calvinism, he says, “you must show me how your shaping of the tension better conforms to the biblical data than mine does.” Well, first of all, he presumes that the non-Calvinist has a “tension” of the same nature and magnitude as his “tension.” But whatever “tension” the non-Calvinist might have, it is not of the nature and magnitude of his logical and moral incoherence and contradiction. Secondly, non-Calvinists have certainly shown that their view better conforms to the biblical data than Carson’s Calvinism. That is precisely what is being argued in this chapter, the many others on this website, and in the books in the annotated bibliography. But note again what Carson will not do. He will not allow the probative force of logical and moral scrutiny to change his mind regarding his treatment of the biblical data, in contrast to the non-Calvinists’ treatment of that data. As long as Carson ignores what it means to “conform to the biblical data,” that is, to take logical and moral coherence on board in his hermeneutic, his challenge is insulated from that devastating scrutiny. That is why he has to label his incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory interpretation of the biblical data a ‘tension.” Moreover, given his refusal to acknowledge the true nature of his difficulties and that they indicate that his interpretations are invalid, his challenge is a disengenuous mockery.

Again, I want to stress that even though Carson admits that his textual interpretations produce “certain unresolved tensions,” which again is a gross understatement of his difficulties, these are never cause for him to revisit the text in search of sound alternative exegetical interpretations that would free him from these insurmountable difficulties that haunt his interpretations. Carson could never alter his Calvinist deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty, which is the cause of these incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions. Lennox perceives this when he writes the following,

“Commenting on John 6:44 (No-one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up on the last day), Carson writes,

Yet despite the strong predestinarian strain, it must be insisted with no less vigour that John emphasizes the responsibility of people to come to Jesus, and can excoriate them for refusing to do so (e.g. 5:40).^[72]

Carson’s view is that “John is quite happy with the position that modern philosophy calls ‘compatibilism’”.^[73]

If what Carson means is that John believes in both God’s sovereignty and human responsibility, and that both must be held equally firmly, however paradoxical the resulting tension may appear to us, that would be fine. However, the term “compatibilism”, as mentioned earlier, is normally used by philosophers who hold that human freedom and responsibility is compatible with determinism – a very different matter; unless, of course, one interprets sovereignty as determinism.” ^[74]

And that is precisely how Carson interprets sovereignty – as determinism. True paradox or tension are one thing, but as Lennox warns us, determinism is “a very different matter.” Again, the point is that we either take logical and moral coherence and non-contradiction as indicative of valid interpretations or we do not. We cannot just foist upon John the contradiction that results from defining ‘sovereignty’ as theistic determinism in the context of his gospel, which is full of accounts that only make sense given libertarian human freedom. If the presence of this contradiction between theistic determinism and human responsibility does not indicate that eisegesis is going on here instead of exegesis, then I don’t know what will. What Carson and Calvinists do, and would like us to acquiesce to, is to call it a “tension” and not what it really is – a contradiction. And of equal import, is it really the case that there are no other interpretations of this passage that responsibly relieve this contradiction? Of course there are. Carson just doesn’t want to admit to them because he refuses to embrace a hermeneutic of coherence. If he did, he would have to alter his Calvinist definition of sovereignty as theistic determinism. But traditional denominational doctrines take on a life of their own and just will not be changed. And as long as Carson rejects a hermeneutic of coherence, he can abide the illogical and immoral results of his theistic determinism. This is why Lennox says, “We shall be interested in what Scripture teaches about determinism.”^[75] The Calvinists’ theistic determinism is the crux of the problems in their theology, and their rejection of a hermeneutic of coherence is the crux of the continuance of this controversy.

Therefore, to push Carson’s “certain unresolved tensions” into the light of logical reflection and moral intuition is the greatest threat to his Calvinist position. Logical reflection and moral intuition hold much weight in discerning true from false propositions, positions, and interpretations. Logical and moral difficulties in one’s interpretations cannot be shaken off or dismissed. As non-Calvinists press home this issue, the Calvinist becomes more threatened and resistant to it. Note what Carson says we must not do to “correct” him. He states, “But to correct me you must not claim to resolve all the tensions…” What he is saying is “do not put the search light of logical consistency and moral intuition on my theology because it won’t endure such scrutiny. I need you to not mess with my ‘tensions’ because I need to preserve my definition of divine sovereignty as theistic determinism. In other words, I’m not changing my theology!” Carson wants us to leave his theology alone so it can remain intact. This is disengenuous. Carson is not really interested in getting to the truth in this matter. He is only interested in maintaining his Calvinism.

And why would it be a “delusion easily exposed” if we were to “resolve all the tensions?” So Carson and the Calvinists must show us how it is that what Lennox has exposed here about the incoherencies and contradictions of Calvinism is deluded. Where is the “delusion easily exposed” in the avalanche of critiques of Calvinism that address its ‘tensions ‘? Where is “the delusion” that is “easily exposed” in the Arminian, Provisionist, or Molinist soteriologies? How are these soteriologies “deluded?” And if they are deluded, where does the delusion reside? Are they the same or worse delusions than the Calvinists’ “tensions?” It is a fact, demonstrated on this website, that these other interpretive options can “resolve all the tensions” in Carson’s theology, or at least a majority of the most troubling ones. Why then wouldn’t these alternative soteriologies be the more biblical soteriologies? And if these soteriologies do have fewer “tensions,” it seems that they would be compelled to reject Calvinism with all its incoherence and contradictions. The point is that these alternative interpretations do not suffer from the horrendous problems that Lennox and so many others have pointed out in Calvinism. Therefore, they are the more exegetically responsible interpretations. As such, they are the interpretations that more faithfully communicate the meaning of the Scriptures. Pointing out the incoherence of Carson’s theology may not move Carson to alter his position, but others must know what is at stake here. Lennox affirms,

“The issues at stake are not simply questions of abstract theology. They have to do with our concept of God’s person and character, and of ourselves as human beings, and they go to the heart of the gospel itself.”^[76]

Lennox knows what’s at stake here – the person and character of God and also the very gospel itself! And whether the Scripture teaches theistic determinism, that is, Carson’s definition of sovereignty, is the crucial question here. Lennox knows this. Recall that he says, “We shall be interested in what Scripture teaches about determinism.”^[77] He is also aware of the issue of validity in interpretation. He states, “What I shall try to do is to discuss Scripture and the validity of different interpretations…”^[78] But one of the ways by which we can evaluate the validity of an interpretation has been placed off limits by Carson. This is understandable because Calvinism’s logical and moral incoherence is its Achilles heel. To deflect this logical and moral critique of Calvinism guarantees the survival of its deterministic interpretation of divine sovereignty. But if the Scripture does not teach this Calvinist determinism, we do not have the “tension” that Carson as a Calvinist needs to preserve and would have us acquiesce to here.

But the non-Calvinist should not acquiesce to the Calvinists ‘demands.’ To do so would be intellectually and hermeneutically irresponsible. Also, non-Calvinists do not feel any necessity to acquiesce since there are responsible, alternative ways of interpreting the text, not only on divine sovereignty, but also on election and predestination. The non-Calvinist is not afflicted with the problems raised by Calvinist determinism and therefore does not need to acquiesce to embracing what the Calvinist calls a “tension” in their theology. Indeed, we cannot acquiesce, for to do so would be to compromise the gospel. Lennox is right. These matters “go to the heart of the gospel itself.”

And of course, the same willingness to entertain logical and moral critique also applies to non-Calvinists. They, too, must not shy away from Calvinists and others pressing them on the validity of their interpretations. If there is incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction, these need to be pointed out and addressed. But the non-Calvinist position does not have the “certain unresolved tensions” Carson has in his theology, which he would like us to acknowledge as legitimate so he can preserve his interpretations and his Calvinism. Carson would have all Christians accept that his “tensions” are to be expected because Scripture is divine revelation. He would also have us believe that these “tensions” should be tolerated by all other theological perspectives. On the far end of the spectrum, Carson would like his fellow Christians to believe that his deterministic definition of sovereignty is the correct teaching of Scripture, and, if they do not embrace it with its “certain unresolved tensions,” they would not be doing justice to Scripture and diminishing the majesty and glory of God. But this is question-begging. Non-Calvinists view the philosophical and moral incoherence of Carson’s theology as decisive regarding its validity. Therefore, there is no exegetical warrant for defining sovereignty as theistic determinism, let alone for embracing the philosophical and moral incoherence (i.e., Carson’s “unresolved tensions”) that this definition creates.

Recall that Carson writes, “Rather if you wish to convince me that your theology is more essentially Christian than my own, you must show me how your shaping of the tension better conforms to the biblical data than mine does.” But if Carson is not going to take logical and moral coherence on board in his hermeneutic, no one could ever convince Carson that their theology is “more essentially Christian” than his Calvinism. How can one be convinced of such a thing if they have jettisoned logical reflection and moral intuition in the interpretive task? Once he has chosen to ignore the philosophical and moral difficulties of his interpretations as reliable indications that he has misinterpreted the texts, Carson just presumes that the non-Calvinist needs to accept that these “tensions” are the norm and that there needs to be a better “shaping” of these tensions to convince Carson of the biblical validity of a non-Calvinist interpretation and theology. But this is wrong-headed from the start. Carson’s presupposition should be rejected. This is not a matter of “shaping” tensions. It is a matter of determining a proper hermeneutic by which to interpret and discern the validity of one’s interpretations. This is not a battle of “tensions.” It is a matter of discerning the true nature of these Calvinist “tensions” as the incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions that they truly are and, as such, declaring that these are not part of a responsible evangelical hermeneutic.

We do offer Carson an interpretation that better conforms to the biblical data. But it does not include a definition of divine sovereignty as divine determinism because the Bible never teaches or affirms this. We offer Carson a theology better conformed to the biblical data because we offer him interpretations that are coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory. We offer him interpretations that do not generate these “certain unresolved tensions” that plague his interpretations. So we do not need to be “shaping the tension” as Carson presumes we all need to be about doing, as if theistic determinism is an interpretive and theological given. It is not. It is his own deterministic theological grid that produces his “unresolved tensions.” Then, he attempts to impose those “tensions” on us as if we need to “shape” them in a more intellectually palatable way. By using the word “tension,” Carson is soft-selling what in reality is a contradiction. He can attempt to “shape” his contradiction all he wants, but it cannot be done. The contradiction remains a contradiction because the laws of logic will not be manipulated. The contradiction in Carson’s theology remains a contradiction until he resolves it at its source – his determinism. The non-Calvinist, rather, starting with the biblical data as Carson claims he also does, has no need to “shape” any “tension” because logical reflection and moral intuition are incorporated in our interpretive process. These act as safeguards to a proper understanding of the text. Hence, the biblical data itself does not allow for theistic determinism. It certainly speaks of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, but not in contradiction to each other. Such interpretations are to be preferred over Calvinism. In short, Scripture does not teach theistic determinism because of the incoherence it creates within Scripture. As such, intellectual and moral integrity demand we reject Calvinism.

Reason is Problematic for Calvinist Interpretation

Applying pressure on the Calvinist at this point is necessary if this controversy is to be brought to a resolution, or at least, gain clarity about the actual problems. To remove the present denial of the mutual exclusivity of these soteriologies and to face the hermeneutical divide will require each side to take a stand on whether logical and moral coherence are indispensable to proper interpretation and whether the lack of such coherence is a reliable indicator of faulty exegesis. Pointing out the incoherence of Calvinism strikes at its hermeneutical heart. But it is necessary to do this to bring us all to our senses in this controversy. The perpetuation of Calvinism requires non-Calvinists to acquiesce to the euphemism of “tension” when incoherence and contradiction are more honest in precisely defining the problems inherent in Calvinism. Calvinists would have non-Calvinists suspend logical and moral judgments about their Calvinist theology. Calvinists do not want to be assessed regarding their interpretive incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions. A passive indifference is preferred, and accommodation is expected in the name of Christian love and unity. Hence, in summary, reason is problematic for Calvinist interpretation.

Sola Scriptura or Interpretive Relativism

If we are going to affirm sola scriptura, we cannot affirm it apart from a hermeneutic that requires logical and moral coherence, because to affirm sola scripture without coherence is to affirm interpretive relativism. It is to pass onto the Scripture our own interpretive incoherencies and contradictions. This is both a deficient hermeneutic and doctrine of Scripture. If divinely inspired Scripture is our sole authority, and especially if the proclamation of the gospel as “good news” is our primary message and mission, then Calvinism becomes an untenable theology for the Christian church that bears the name evangelical. We must maintain the biblical message of “good news,” but there is no good news in Calvinism.

Schreiner and Ware: Accept Our Incoherence

Recall our discussion as to how Schreiner and Ware dichotomize exegesis from philosophy or clear thinking. We can now see that the “logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology” are integral to determining the legitimacy of the interpretive method and conclusions proposed by Augustinian-Calvinism. Such is the nature of interpretive thought. We see that Schreiner and Ware’s statement that “People do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems” is short-sighted. And when they add, “Rather, the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture,” they merely beg the question. The question has always been, how do we know which doctrines are really taught in Scripture? The question has always been, how do we know one has correctly interpreted the text if they are free to dichotomize logical reflection and moral intuition from their exegesis? Therefore, when Schreiner and Ware state, “…the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture,” this amounts to “people become Calvinists because they can accept this dichotomy of logic and morals from the exegesis we offer.” And that is precisely what the Calvinist must do for someone to become a Calvinist. They must reorient the person’s thinking to pay no attention to what rational reflection and moral intuition will sooner or later tell them about the nature of the Calvinist doctrines – that they are incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory.^[79]

Why People Are and Remain Non-Calvinists

Now it needs to be said, counter to Schreiner and Ware’s claim, that people don’t become non-Calvinists only because they observe that the Calvinist position has substantial logical difficulties. People become and remain non-Calvinists because they believe there is an integral relationship between reason, moral sensibility, and exegesis. They believe these constitute a responsible hermeneutic, which in turn leads to interpretations that have explanatory power and scope. People should be non-Calvinists because the Scripture teaches it, and they know it because they are working from a better hermeneutic. As such, they become and remain non-Calvinists because they believe the non-Calvinist soteriology is “taught in Scripture” in a fuller sense of the phrase. The non-Calvinist believes that Scripture doesn’t teach the Calvinist “doctrines of grace” because that soteriology is both exegetically weak and logically and morally incoherent. These work hand in hand. They cannot be separated. The non-Calvinist believes that Scripture does teach the non-Calvinist soteriological doctrines because that soteriology is both exegetically strong and logically and morally coherent. The fundamental reason people should embrace a non-Calvinist soteriology and gospel message is that they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture as described above, that is, in conjunction with what constitutes good interpretations of that Scripture.

A Brief Challenge to the Evangelical Church

There is a dire need in the evangelical church for hermeneutical reflection and precision in this regard. One catalyst for this reflection should be the incoherence inherent in the Calvinist position. This needs to be honestly reckoned with. The present denial or duplicity of church leaders concerning this matter has to cease, especially because the “good news” of the gospel is at stake. This is crucial for any church that claims to be evangelical. The hermeneutical concerns raised by Calvinism serve to verify that all theological models do not have the same interpretive validity. Some interpretations are closer to the truth than others, and the law of non-contradiction surely teaches us that mutually exclusive positions cannot both be true. These laws of logic will bring resolution to the question of the validity of proposed interpretations and theological paradigms. It is the same with our moral intuitions. They can be trusted as reliable guides in these matters. I challenge every evangelical church to be seriously engaged on this issue, refuse to sacrifice biblical truth for the sake of a false unity, and stand for the truth of the gospel.

The Calvinist Hermeneutic of Incoherence Results in Interpretive and Theological Relativism

Finally, let us think about this controversy in light of the doctrine of the divine inspiration of Scripture. It is safe to assume that evangelical Christians do not believe the Bible contradicts itself (philosophy at work again!). Therefore, no evangelical Christian would expect or want their theology to contradict itself. If Calvinism is what Scripture teaches, we may expect that its doctrines exhibit coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. But I think that I, and many non-Calvinist scholars, have clearly demonstrated that Calvinism is plagued by logical and moral incoherence, inconsistency, and contradictions. Calvinists admit as much but seek to avoid the cold, hard facts by obfuscation and ineffective rationalizations. So what are we to do? Are we to think that the Calvinist doctrines are correct interpretations of Scripture, but the logical and moral difficulties are problems on the human receiving end and occur due to our rational and moral inability to fathom those doctrines? Are we really to think that the problem is not in the exegesis but in the exegete’s inability to comprehend the results of the Calvinist’s exegesis? But how would we know that is the case? If it can be concluded that the non-Calvinists’ interpretations, being mutually exclusive to the Calvinists’ interpretations, must therefore be incorrect due to this mutual exclusivity, then hasn’t the Calvinist just employed the law of non-contradiction to argue that their interpretations are correct? And on the other hand, if the Calvinist eliminates logical and moral reasoning in the interpretive process and for determining interpretive validity, if the non-Calvinist interpretations suffer from logical and moral incoherence, then the Calvinist can no longer expect such incoherence to be an indication of erroneous exegesis. That avenue is no longer available to them since they deny that logical and moral reasoning has any bearing on the validity of their interpretations. We would be left only with an interpretive relativism. Whether Calvinist or non-Calvinist, each could say, “My interpretation is just as valid as yours.” Moreover, suppose non-Calvinists were to claim that, although their doctrines seem incoherent or contradictory with other biblical doctrines, they really are not, but that they would be logically and morally harmonious if we could only understand things from God’s point of view. Would the Calvinist accept that as a justification of the validity of the non-Calvinist’s interpretations? Given that “explanation” from the non-Calvinist, could the Calvinist determine that the non-Calvinist position is not what the Bible teaches? Could the Calvinist determine that the non-Calvinists’ exegesis is flawed? Could the Calvinist know that the non-Calvinists’ interpretations are false? Why wouldn’t it be a legitimate explanation for the non-Calvinist to claim that any type of logical or moral difficulties leveled against their exegesis should be considered to be the result of our failure to understand things as God does? They are biblical mysteries that we just have to learn to live with. After all, that is precisely what the Calvinist does.

We can see that the Calvinists’ theology and their defensive rationalizations lead us into interpretive and theological relativism. If we are to avoid endorsing this relativism, we would expect to have some common hermeneutical criteria by which we can determine which of the two mutually exclusive interpretations and their respective soteriologies is the more accurate reflection of the intent of the biblical author and his text. Surely harmony and consistency, lack of contradiction, and the presence of coherence must be included when seeking to justify our interpretations as accurate or show another interpretation to be erroneous. Except for purely exegetical errors that do not result in incoherence or contradiction, how else would we justify one interpretation over another? It is possible to misinterpret a passage without being incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory. That is a different matter. But, if one’s exegesis produces rational and moral incoherence, then it is not sufficient to justify that exegesis simply by stating that we cannot comprehend their exegetical conclusions or that they are a biblical mystery. And it is question begging to assert that one’s theological position should be embraced because one believes it is what the Scripture teaches. We would simply like to know on what basis, once logical and moral consistency and coherence are rejected, that one can substantiate their claim that their position is what the Scripture teaches. Rather, the canons of reason and our moral intuitions are indispensable for discerning accurate from inaccurate interpretations.

Why Should We Even Have to Talk About This?

It is surprising that all this even needs to be said. Most of the issues here are made clear to us just by using our common sense. But for reasons I’ve tried to bring to light, evangelical Christians have been duped into accepting the Calvinists’ disregard of the laws of logic and our moral intuitions in their theological constructs. As such, Schreiner and Ware’s approach smacks of the same sacrificium intellectus I identified in Packer in Chapter 7, and I identify in both Luther and Packer in Chapter 10. Can all sides on a doctrinal matter propose their interpretation as biblical, no matter how much they are marked by incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction? Is the last word always simply “we believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture, regardless of their inconsistency and contradiction?” Moreover, is the response of most evangelicals appropriate, who simply deny that anything of substance is at issue here, and believe that it is more important that “we all get along” rather than defend the truth of the gospel? Certainly, one should embrace the Calvinist “doctrines of grace” because “they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.” But surely when the very gospel is at stake, we must take a stand against Calvinism!

A Sad State of Affairs for the Evangelical Church

Think about the summary conclusions of our discussion thus far. The present attitude and practice of the evangelical church in this matter tells the world, 1) that we are not sure, or we cannot know what worldview Scripture intends to communicate – determinism or non-determinism, and 2) that we cannot achieve meaningful clarity on what is certainly the central message of the Bible, which is the gospel defined as “good news.” This is truly a sad state of affairs for believers and churches that call themselves “evangelical.”

Philosophy as the Handmaid of Exegesis and Theology

One important point I hope you see from this lengthy discussion is that “raw” exegesis or merely conducting the “technical” aspects of the grammatical-historical method, as necessary as this is to proper interpretation, does not in and of itself necessarily guarantee an accurate understanding of the text. Both Calvinists and non-Calvinists provide exegetical support for their positions, yet their positions are polar opposites on these major theological and soteriological issues. Of course a proper exegetical method must include not only the meaning of words and the grammatical relationships within the text, but also consideration of the so-called “introductory” matters along with identifying the literary genre and ferreting out the social, historical, literary and theological context. All of these are summarily referred to as the grammatical-historical method. And when done correctly this method goes a long way to getting at authorial intent and the true meaning of a text.

But interpretation is not only a “science.” It is also an “art.” And the “science” of exegesis is not always sufficient to accurately disclose the meaning of a text. It is necessary, but it is not always sufficient. The art of exegesis and interpretation involves knowledge of one’s own personal and theological predilections and biases, and most importantly, sensitivity to consistency, coherence, harmony, theological integration, and the reading of a text within its own context and the canonical context or Scripture as a whole. This is precisely what I have been demonstrating by the many examples in this chapter and other chapters on this website. The non-Calvinists include these principles in their hermeneutic. They play an essential role in their exegeses and interpretations. In contrast, I have also demonstrated that Calvinists do not include these principles in their hermeneutic. But it is these essential principles that help safeguard us from interpretive errors that might occur from a more short-sighted exegetical method as constrained by one’s theological tradition.

Even Calvinist D. A. Carson affirms this to some degree. He chides those who think they can glean their theological grain from the exegetical field to the exclusion of the input of other disciplines. For instance, he believes the discipline of historical theology plays an essential role in exegesis and the interpretive task. He writes,

“One well-known seminary insists that proper exegetical method will guarantee such a high quality of exegesis that historical theology may be safely ignored. I can think of no better way of cultivating the soil that sprouts either heresy or the shallowest sort of traditionalism.”^[80]

Here, “proper exegetical method” would seem to refer to the more technical aspects of exegesis, like the study of the definitions of words, grammatical and semantic relationships in the original languages, and even context and authorial intent. So, is “proper exegetical method” really all that is needed to safeguard us from interpretive error? Carson says no. For Carson, “proper exegetical method” would include the input of historical theology. He says historical theology cannot be ignored in doing exegesis. And rightly so.

But then what about philosophical reflection and moral intuition? I submit that these also cannot be “safely ignored” without “cultivating the soil that sprouts heresy or the shallowest of traditionalism.” And this is exactly what Calvinism does. These disciplines are ignored by Carson and other Calvinists, including Schreiner and Ware, as I have demonstrated in previous sections in this chapter. But philosophical and moral reasoning are also crucial elements in a “proper exegetical method.” The deliberations and deliverances of philosophy and morality are as essential to exegesis as is the input of historical theology. These also serve to safeguard our exegesis from “either heresy or the shallowest sort of traditionalism.” And this is what Carson’s Calvinism amounts to when he ignores philosophical reflection and moral intuition – if not heresy, which I am compelled to affirm, certainly the shallowest sort of traditionalism. What could be more heretical than the gross distortion that the TULIP doctrines inflict upon the central theme of Scripture, that is, the gospel as ‘good news’? Nevertheless, why can these criteria of sound interpretation be ignored while historical theology remains an essential element in good exegesis? It is because philosophical reflection and moral assessment expose Calvinism’s insurmountable problems, which show it to be a wrong-headed interpretation of Scripture with devastating effects on the gospel. Calvinism simply cannot endure or overcome the probative force of logic and morals that the discipline of philosophy has to offer in this matter. I would argue that “proper exegetical method” includes the deliberations and deliverances of philosophy, which also include those of ethics and morality. To “safely ignore” these, as Calvinists are wont to do, is to remove from the Calvinist hermeneutic the penetrating eye of rational and moral analysis that reveals that the Calvinist exegesis is incoherent, and as such, is not what the Scripture teaches.^[81]

J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig on the Importance of Philosophical Reflection

I am indebted to Christian philosophers J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig for what I have written above. They maintain that neglecting philosophy leads to intellectual shallowness. Commenting on the need for doing philosophy, they write,

“…philosophy departments are an endangered species in Christian colleges and seminaries, and serious philosophical reflection is virtually absent from most church fellowships. This, in turn, has contributed to intellectual shallowness and a lack of cultural discernment in the body of Christ.”^[82]

I would add “a lack of interpretive discernment” too. What each side needs to do in this controversy is to subject their exegesis to the intellectual rigor that only philosophy can offer. Moreland and Craig also stress the need for the input of philosophical reflection in living the Christian life and the proclamation of the gospel. They write,

“The history of the church reveals that philosophy has always played a crucial role in the nurture of believers and in the proclamation of a Christian worldview in general and the gospel in particular. The first universities in Europe were, of course, Christian, and the study of philosophy was considered of central importance to the health and vitality of the university and the Christian life. This is no less true today. In fact, there are at least seven reasons why philosophy is crucial to the texture, curricula and mission of the Christian university and the development of a robust Christian life.”^[83]

The third of those seven reasons is that,

“…philosophy is a central expression of the image of God in us. It is very difficult to come up with an airtight definition of the image of God, but most theologians have agreed that it includes the ability to engage in abstract reasoning, especially in areas having to do with ethical, religious and philosophical issues. God himself is a rational being, and humans are made like him in this respect. This is one reason humans are commanded to love God with all their minds (Mt. 22:37). Since philosophy, like religion, is a discipline that chiefly focuses on ultimate questions near the very heart of existence, then philosophical reflection about God’s special and general revelation can be part of loving him and thinking his thoughts after him.”^[84]

Moreland and Craig state that “…philosophical reflection about God’s special…revelation can be part of loving him and thinking his thoughts after him.” The reference to “special revelation” is a reference to Scripture, and therefore philosophy has direct application to exegesis. Philosophical reflection on our interpretations of Scripture is an aspect of what it means to love God. It allows us proper insights into God’s thoughts as he has revealed them to us in Scripture. God is a rational being who thinks and acts rationally. We would expect Scripture, as the revelation of the mind and heart of God, to reflect his logical, rational thought process.

Therefore, Carson, Schreiner, and Ware’s dichotomizing of philosophy from exegesis reveals a serious theological and exegetical shortcoming. Indeed, the Calvinist propensity to dismiss the logical and moral incoherence in their theology ignores this bedrock theological principle that God is a rational being and therefore his thought processes work according to the canons of reason. These are of his very nature as a rationally thinking being. This has profound implications for our view of what constitutes a proper exegetical method. An exegesis that marginalizes philosophical reflection in its processes and is banned from performing logical and moral assessments of its conclusions is a deficient exegesis and hermeneutic. It is to place traditionalism – the preservation of a certain theological viewpoint in willful disregard of its incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction with other Scriptures – above the authority of the Scripture for faith and practice. The fact that Calvinism is rationally incoherent, when coherence reflects our being made in the image of a God who thinks and acts coherently, indicates that the Calvinist interpretation of Scripture has gone awry and remains in the service of Calvinism per se and not in the service of the authoritative Scripture.

Moreland and Craig go on to state the fourth reason “why philosophy is crucial to the texture, curricula and mission of the Christian university and the development of a robust Christian life.”

“…philosophy permeates systematic theology and serves as its handmaid in several ways. Philosophy helps to add clarity to the concepts of systematic theology. For example, philosophers help to clarify the different attributes of God; they can show that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are not contradictory; they can shed light on the nature of human freedom, and so on.”^[85]

Exegesis needs the handmaid of philosophy because it clarifies our interpretations and theological concepts. It assures logical reasoning from theologians, presses for rational justification for interpretive conclusions, and identifies incoherence and contradictions so as to get at the true meaning of a text. The Calvinists’ refusal to subject their exegetical conclusions to the deliberations and deliverances of philosophy is the main reason this controversy persists. The Calvinist’s interpretive mind has been made up, and nothing can shake it from its deterministic moorings, not even the fact that it is logically and morally incoherent with the very same Scripture it is supposedly an accurate interpretation of. Calvinism cannot survive the scrutiny of philosophical and moral reasoning, so the Calvinist must do whatever is necessary to insulate his interpretations from such reasoning.

Good interpretation consists of doing one’s duty in the hard work of technical exegesis, but also requires a sensitivity to seeing the exegetical data as part of a whole that is rationally and morally coherent and non-contradictory. Philosophy is essential in this regard and therefore indispensable for doing proper exegesis. A “proper exegetical method” would include philosophical assessment. Moreland and Craig state that,

“Philosophy can help someone form a rationally justified, true worldview, that is, an ordered set of propositions that one believes, especially propositions about life’s most important questions.”^[86]

If a theology is more than this, it certainly is not less. As a Christian, one’s theology constitutes one’s worldview. And therefore this controversy is a prime candidate for the application of some good philosophical thinking. They also state,

“When philosophers examine another discipline to formulate a philosophy of that field, they ask normative questions about that discipline (e.g., questions about what one ought and ought not believe in that discipline and why), analyze and criticize the assumptions underlying it, clarify concepts, within it and integrate that disciple with other fields.

…Thus, by its very nature philosophy is, perhaps, the most important foundational discipline in the task of integrating Christian theology with other fields of study.”^[87]

The Utility of Philosophy

Philosophy’s analytical, critical, clarifying, and integrative functions are sorely needed in Christian theology, soteriology, and hermeneutics today. These functions of philosophy need to be applied especially to the discipline of hermeneutics to help resolve the theological and soteriological differences between Calvinists and non-Calvinists. Theologians can have a hard time seeing anything but their presupposed theologies in the text. They also mistakenly believe that exegesis alone is totally sufficient to come to the correct meaning of the text. This is to be expected, but for lack of philosophical training in clear thinking, the principles of logic, matters of objective truth and falsity, etc., one’s interpretations can suffer from a spiritualized anti-intellectualism and short-sighted traditionalism. I submit that Carson, Schreiner, and Ware’s dichotomizing of exegesis from philosophical reflection is a Calvinist case in point.

Given the issues involved, such as whether Calvinism is a theistic determinism, whether there are two mutually exclusive soteriologies at work here, whether theistic determinism can be reconciled with human freedom, what is human freedom, whether Calvinism is self-defeating, defining the meaning and content of the gospel, preaching and teaching with consistency and integrity, whether Calvinists and non-Calvinists are employing different definitions for the same words, whether there are transcendent moral values that apply to this controversy, what the implications are of all of the above for biblical hermeneutics, along with the many other substantive concerns non-Calvinists and Calvinists have about each other’s positions, a good dose of philosophical thought is in order here.

Where is the Evangelical Philosophical Society?

Theologians on both sides need to be open to what philosophical reflection offers us in this controversy. This would go a long way to unravel these problems. In that I believe the most fundamental issue is the acceptance of incoherence in biblical interpretation, not only on the part of Calvinists regarding their own interpretations but also the non-Calvinist’s tolerance of Calvinism’s incoherence, I believe that an honest look at the problem by clear thinking minds, will bring it to its resolution, or at least identify where the problems lie and what their resolution will require. It certainly seems that the application of rigorous philosophical thought would go a long way to discerning which of the differing exegeses, soteriologies, and theologies in this controversy is closer to the truth. The controversy is ripe for philosophical and moral assessment. Makes me wonder what the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) is doing these days! Isn’t this a matter that would give them something to sink their teeth into? Most importantly, don’t they care about reviving and preserving the central message of Scripture, that message which is central to the very mind and heart of God, the ‘good news’ of the gospel?!

Can Calvinism Survive?: Essential Issues and Questions for Calvinists

The intellectual untenability of Calvinism is an aspect of this controversy that is being side-lined by Calvinists and ignored by non-Calvinists. A crucial missing element that would resolve this matter is an intellectual accountability that prevents the cavalier dismissal of incoherence and contradiction when it comes to claims about the meaning of texts that are supposed to be the results of responsible exegesis. An exegesis that takes us into a cul-de-sac of inconsistency, incoherence, and contradiction is an exegesis that is flawed in some respect. Some aspect of the exegetical task has been neglected, missed, or misunderstood. When incoherence in a theological position is dismissed as mystery and generally accepted as such, then Christian theology has entered into the realm of hermeneutical subjectivity. This acceptance of mystery and hermeneutical subjectivity is probably due to two reasons.

The first is that when dealing with written literature that the interpreters maintain is ultimately inspired by God, inconsistent and incoherent interpretations can be “justified” on that basis. The rationale is that because we are dealing with a divinely inspired text, it is bound to contain things we cannot fully understand. Since we cannot fully understand God, we should not expect to fully understand God’s Word. But this is usually meant to justify or excuse the incoherence in the Calvinist’s interpretations and theology. Once one associates the “mystery” of God himself with one’s interpretive incoherencies, labeling these also a “mystery,” it is easy to marginalize the “logical difficulties” generated by one’s exegesis as less important than the exegesis itself. As God is a mystery, so are the Calvinist doctrines. The problem is that the Calvinist has just dismissed an essential hermeneutical element that would indicate to him that his exegesis is flawed.

The second factor is that theologians can become isolated in their own traditions, reading texts that constantly reiterate the doctrines and views in those traditions. Although this problem of continually exegeting, reading, and understanding particular texts only in the light of certain theological presuppositions and traditions is a strong, habitual propensity, it can be identified and addressed. This is not to presuppose that just because one holds to a position for reasons of tradition, that this must mean it is wrong. We do not want to commit the genetic fallacy. But we do want to know how to clearly interpret and understand the Scriptures so that our traditional beliefs might be checked and altered if necessary. But again, the problem becomes one of a vicious cycle if the tools available to us in philosophy are rejected as exegetically unimportant. “People ought to believe x because we believe Scripture teaches x, despite the logical and moral incoherence x produces,” is just bad interpretation. In contrast, good exegesis requires one not only to immerse oneself in the text, but also to check their exegetical findings against other exegetical findings in other texts for their rational coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. Exegesis is not carried out in an intellectual vacuum. Clear thinking about the meaning of a text and its relationship to other texts, along with established theological themes, is a requirement of good exegesis. The biblical authors deserve to be understood as communicating coherently. Exegesis and the resultant interpretive claims and conclusions cannot be brought forth in a rational and moral vacuum or remain there in abeyance. Logical difficulties cannot be ignored because they have a direct bearing on the validity of one’s interpretation. The challenges philosophy raises regarding our interpretive conclusions, especially when these are “logical difficulties,” can force us to go back to the text in search of a more coherent exegesis, leading to a more consistent theological framework. So the question needs to be put out there. Calvinists, do you agree with this? If not, why not?

Both the Calvinist and non-Calvinist exegeses and interpretations of the controverted texts have been clearly made known. The published literature on this controversy is voluminous, and yet there has been no movement toward a consensus about what the biblical authors meant in their writings on this subject. Why is this? I submit that what becomes clear from the many scholarly writings on this subject is that the decisive matter is both exegetical and whether the Calvinist interpreter will accept the fact that coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction are hermeneutical essentials and significant for determining interpretive validity. The non-Calvinist considers essential, but the Calvinist does not. Why hasn’t the exegetical task, which we all agree is the basis for discerning the truth in these matters, been successful in producing a consensus on the meaning of the texts relevant to what are arguably the most important doctrines of Scripture and the Christian faith? The answer is that in the end, there is a divide over whether rational coherence and moral intuitions play an essential role in determining the validity of one’s exegetical conclusions. The non-Calvinist believes that coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction are indispensable for determining valid exegetical conclusions, while the Calvinist does not. The non-Calvinist believes that we can determine which exegesis best explains the text by logical and moral coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. For the non-Calvinist, good exegesis requires attending to the rational and moral coherence of an interpretation with other texts and the total biblical witness. Not so for the Calvinist.

Certainly, we need to explain the meaning of a text, but “explaining” implies giving better reasons for one’s position. If Calvinists can summarily dismiss the devastating critiques that philosophical and moral reflection level against their exegesis and theology, while insisting their position is based on biblical exegesis, then such a claim is hermeneutically deficient and evasive. Logical reflection and moral intuitions are givens for discerning the meaning of a text; otherwise, the text can mean whatever the exegete says it means. Historically, Calvinism has remained untethered from the reasoning by which we discern the validity of an interpretation. This is how Calvinism survives. It is not by demonstrating a superior exegesis, but by touting an inferior hermeneutic of incoherence and rationalizations. Both of these help to insulate their exegesis from logical and moral critique.

Therefore, what must be assessed is whether the dismissal of logical and moral coherence in exegesis and interpretation constitutes a legitimate biblical hermeneutic or not. Once coherence can be done away with by the flight to “mystery” or “incomprehensibility,” then the Calvinists’ interpretations become insulated from reasoned critique. Any exegetical critique against Calvinism can always be withstood because such critiques will reiterate the logical and moral incoherencies that the Calvinist has put out of court as hermeneutically and interpretively insignificant. Hence, the dialogue becomes one-sided, like talking to the wall! Therefore, as far as exegesis is concerned, the Calvinist will always simply disagree with the non-Calvinist’s interpretation of the relevant texts. The non-Calvinist offers critiques of Calvinism by providing an alternative, detailed, responsible exegesis of the disputed texts and by demonstrating the interpretive incoherence of the Calvinist exegesis. But while the Calvinist does not consider any alternative exegesis to be correct, they just believe that the incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction in their own exegesis are simply irrelevant. As far as the Calvinist’s exegesis is concerned, any exegesis that claims it is better because it presents a more coherent and consistent interpretation of all the data that needs to be considered will not matter to the Calvinist. For the Calvinist, their exegesis will always stand as the correct meaning of the text because it is not subject to the tests of coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. Even a divinely inspired Scripture, which we would think must be coherent as the product of a rational God, is inappropriately used by Calvinists to justify Calvinism’s incoherence via the claims of “incomprehensibility,” “mystery,” and placing the contradiction squarely on the shoulders of Scripture by asserting “the Bible teaches both.” Calvinists, therefore, claim that the ultimate and final resolution to this controversy is a “mystery.” But I think we can see that when logical and moral incoherence are set aside in the name of “mystery” or “incomprehensibility,” the Calvinist has eliminated the rational means by which to confirm the invalidity of their interpretations and theology. Except for the alternative exegeses of the texts, which Calvinists simply reject in favor of their own exegeses, there is nothing left to dislodge them as the incorrect meanings of these texts. A rational vacuum has been created by the Calvinists in which their interpretations can survive. This always has been, and remains the crux of the problem in this controversy.

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Footnotes

[1] C. S. Lewis, “The Funeral of a Great Myth,” Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), 93.

[2] Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid. 18, 19.

[5] Ibid., 18.

[6] Piper, Let the Nations Be Glad, 203-204.

[7] Ibid. 203-204.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid. 180.

[10] Ibid. 203-204.

[11] Ronnie W. Rogers, Reflections of a Disenchanted Calvinist, (Bloomington, IN: WestBow Press, 2016), 71.

[12] Ibid.

[13] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 132.

[14] Ibid. 132-133.

[15] Ibid. 133.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. 134.

[18] Ibid. 135.

[19] E. H. Palmer, The Five Points of Calvinism, Grand Rapids, Baker, 2009, pp. 105-106.

[20] Ibid. p. 85.

[21] Ibid. p. 87.

[22] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 144-145.

[23] Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 19.

[24] Ibid. 20.

[25] Ibid. 19.

[26] Ibid. 16.

[27] Ibid. 18.

[28] Ibid. 18. All quotes in this section are from p. 18.

[29] Ibid. 19.

[30] Jerry Walls and Joseph Dongell rightly observe that, “While logical consistency may not be a sufficient condition to show that a theology is true, it is a necessary condition.” – Jerry L. Walls and Joseph R. Dongell, Why I Am Not A Calvinist, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 156.

[31] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 67, 68.

[32] Gregory Koukl, Tactics: A Game Plan for Discussing Your Christian Convictions, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 31-33.

[33] Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 19.

[34] Calvinist Paul Helm observed that the Calvinist’s difficulties cannot be solved, “not even with the help of the distinction between primary and secondary causation, or of the doctrine of the two wills, or of God’s willing permission.” – John Calvin, The Secret Providence of God, ed. Paul Helm, (Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 25. For more, see my post “Helm, Calvin, and Castellio: The Battle for Reason and Common Sense in Interpretation.”

[35] John Piper, “Is Knowing God’s Sovereignty Important to My Daily Life?” Ask Pastor John, Episode 1105, Oct. 11, 2017. The audio program and transcript can be found at https://www.desiringgod.org/interviews/is-knowing-gods-sovereignty-important-to-my-daily-life. Last accessed Dec. 18, 2025.

Also, listen to the critique of this podcast by Leighton Flowers. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4&v=b-p4ROXESx0&feature=emb_title Last accessed Dec. 18, 2025.

Flowers makes the point that Piper and Calvinists in general view God’s sovereignty in terms of a false dichotomy between all things being random or all things being predetermined. Either everything occurs randomly, or it must be predetermined by God. There are no other alternatives. However, this is a false dichotomy in that God may allow certain events to occur without having predetermined them, and therefore causing them to happen. God’s sovereignty can just as well be defined as his ability to rule over and govern the affairs of this world such that his plans and purposes cannot be thwarted even though he has granted persons substantial, genuine freedom and moral responsibility. This is true divine sovereignty, which is opposed to divine determinism. We cannot accept determinism on exegetical/biblical, logical, and moral grounds; therefore, we can understand sovereignty as God’s ability to actively rule and overrule when the circumstances warrant it, in relation to the genuine freedom the Sovereign God has bestowed upon his human creatures over whom he rules. This allows for a degree of authentic reciprocal and personal relationship between the Sovereign and his subjects. This then provides true meaning and purpose for their existence and historical events. This better accords with the biblical testimony. The other view of God’s sovereignty, as a meticulous divine determinism, reduces all human action and history to the expression of a monolithic divine will marked by static control. The former view is coherent with all that the Bible testifies to about the character and attributes of God, along with the moral agency and responsibility of sinful human persons; the latter is not. When we take logical and moral coherence on board in our hermeneutic, the former exceeds the latter in explanatory power and scope. Therefore, it is the better explanation.

[36] What does Piper do with the fact that if God predetermines all things, then God also predetermined that Piper should believe that God predetermines all things? Well, first, if Piper himself, as an independent thinking being, can do anything with that fact, then Piper has not been predetermined by God to think what he thinks, and therefore, all things are not predetermined by God, and Piper’s theology of sovereignty fails. Secondly, if God has predetermined Piper’s belief that God has predetermined all things, then how does Piper know that God has predetermined all things? God may have just predetermined that Piper should believe that. God might be the type of God that couldn’t care less about truth in certain situations, perhaps depending upon his mood?! Moreover, perhaps God does not predetermine all things, but only Piper’s belief that He does. The point is that on Piper’s Calvinism, Piper wouldn’t be “thinking” in any meaningful way to discover or know the truth about whether God has really predetermined all things or not. Piper’s thoughts are completely dictated by what God wants him to think. Indeed, how could it be said that Piper is reasoning at all in any meaningful sense when his every thought is predetermined by God to be what it is? How would Piper know that what he believes is true? The truth of the matter would completely elude him. If he says, “Well, God is always true. I read that in his Word.” But then how do you know that that thought about God’s sovereignty from God’s Word is true in the light that someone else claims an opposing view of God’s sovereignty – a view which God has also predetermined? According to Piper, God has determined both of the two mutually exclusive views. But then, which view is true? According to Piper, God has predetermined one person to believe one thing and Piper to believe something different. So what is God really like? What is he really doing? Maybe he isn’t good after all, but evil? After all, he has predetermined and caused all the evil in the world, too. Note that William Lane Craig has concluded that “…universal causal determinism cannot be rationally affirmed.” He states, “Determinism is literally self-defeating – it is rationally unaffirmable – because its very affirmation would undermine the rationality of that affirmation. In affirming determinism to be true, you are in effect affirming that that decision is not rationally made but simply determined to be true. So universal causal determinism, it seems to me, cannot be rationally affirmed.” — William Lane Craig, Defenders 2 Class, Doctrine of Creation: Part 10. Oct. 21, 2012. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-2/s2-doctrine-of-creation/doctrine-of-creation-part-10/ Last accessed Dec. 18, 2025.

[37] James W. Burdick, “James,” The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, Frank E. Gaebelein, ed., (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981), 197.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] James 1:17; 1 Tim. 6:17 “Command those who are rich in this present world not to be arrogant nor to put their hope in wealth, which is so uncertain, but to put their hope in God, who richly provides us with everything for our enjoyment.”

[41] James W. Burdick, “James,” The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, Frank E. Gaebelein, ed., (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981), 197.

[42] Calvinist John Hendryx, writing for the website Reformation Theology, states,

“Compatibilism is a form of determinism and it should be noted that this position is no less deterministic than hard determinism. It simply means that God’s predetermination and meticulous providence is “compatible” with voluntary choice. Our choices are not coerced …i.e. we do not choose against what we want or desire, yet we never make choices contrary to God’s sovereign decree. What God determines will always come to pass (Eph 1:11)…

In light of Scripture, (according to compatibilism), human choices are exercised voluntarily but the desires and circumstances that bring about these choices about occur through divine determinism.”

https://www.monergism.com/compatibilistic-determinism Last accessed Dec. 18, 2025.

[43] James W. Burdick, “James”, The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, Frank E. Gaebelein, ed., (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981), 172.

[44] Ibid. 172-173.

[45] https://www.desiringgod.org/interviews/has-god-predetermined-every-tiny-detail-in-the-universe-including-sin “Has God Predetermined Every Tiny Detail in the Universe, Including Sin?” April 24, 2010. Last accessed Dec. 18, 2025.

[46] Mark R. Talbot, All the Good That Is Ours in Christ: Seeing God’s Gracious Hand in the Hurts Others Do to Us, John Piper and Justin Taylor (eds.), Suffering and the Sovereignty of God (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), 31-77. As found in Leighton Flowers, The Potter’s Promise: A Biblical Defense of Traditional Soteriology (Trinity Academic Press, 2017), 77.

[47] It is worth noting that Calvinists do employ their determinism for this purpose, and in a subtly nuanced way, this may reveal a kind of pride of their own. Calvinists think that theistic determinism, stated theologically as “the absolute sovereignty of God,” is the doctrine that can crush human pride and remove all human autonomy from salvation, thereby eliminating all potential for boasting. What could accomplish this total dependence upon God for salvation more than the doctrine that “God is sovereign in salvation,” that is, informing a person that they have absolutely nothing to do with their salvation. They do not repent in the sense that it is ultimately up to them to repent or not. They do not believe in the sense that it is ultimately up to them to believe, or not. If they were called upon to do these as if they had a choice to do them or not to do them, then, according to the Calvinist, they would be contributing to their own salvation and have cause to boast. Indeed, the elimination of pride has to be absolute. Hence, the absolute sovereignty of God, defined as universal divine causal determinism, achieves just that. And it achieves more than that. None of us has anything to do with anything. God is completely “sovereign” in the sense that he has predetermined all things.

To be confronted with either accepting or rejecting this doctrine (which again is incoherent with holding it) is the sign that pride is either vanquished or remains in the heart. It is the Calvinists’ litmus test for human pride. But that is not only logically self-defeating, but possibly a self-deception, for the compulsion to completely eradicate pride in oneself or in others, when a fellow human sets about doing it, is a kind of pride in and of itself. I would also submit that the Calvinist can be proud that they have embraced the disposition to accept theistic determinism, no matter what the reality for them turns out to be – heaven or hell. But the Bible has none of this confusion regarding our salvation. And of course, the Calvinist hasn’t accepted theistic determinism; it was irresistibly worked in him by God’s predetermined plan, at least that’s what he should think about himself. To accept theistic determinism, as well as unconditional election, is like a rite of passage that indicates the utmost humility and submission to God. To the degree that the Calvinist inconsistently presents predestination as something to be accepted by others, as they have already accepted it, is the degree to which they are possibly patting themselves on the back for doing so. But how is this not unlike, “I thank you God that I am not like other men…” (cf. Lu. 18:9-14). If the Calvinist says belief in theistic determinism was granted to them by God’s grace, then he ought not to use it as a litmus test for humility regarding others, since they may not have been granted this humility because that may not be among the elect. Moreover, it seems that the Calvinist believes that when a Christian can look past rational and moral incoherence and contradiction in the cause of “giving God all the glory in salvation,” then they have reached the pinnacle of “humility.” One has indeed sacrificed all for God – even sound reasoning! For the clear witness of Scripture is to contingency, substantial human freedom, and moral responsibility. These are in contradiction with the universal divine causal determinism of Calvinism. Furthermore, Calvinists are humble enough to admit that if God were to have created them or their sons or daughters or a loved one for eternal damnation and separation from himself for no reason that accords with our sense of love or justice, they will continue to love and worship God. And that is what it will have to be, a matter of sheer willpower despite the logical incoherence with the biblical witness to the character of God and their own reason and moral intuitions. (Although this reference to “willpower” cannot be coherent within Calvinism!) The highest expression of humility is found in accepting these deterministic Calvinist doctrines regardless of the logical and moral incoherencies entailed by them. It seems Calvinists believe that God designed it that way for the very purpose of crushing pride and causing humility. This is the highest degree of humility to be attained. It is spiritually laudable. But this may well be a form of pride and arrogance in itself. It might well be spiritual pride. But all this is just what God has predetermined for them and the way things ought to be. Hence, the incoherence of Calvinism.

Hence, concerns about the Calvinists’ doctrinal incoherence and contradictions become vulgar attempts to crush human autonomy. We are told not to inquire into these things that are not for us to understand. I submit that the alternative may be true. That, due to the propensity of sinful man to deceive himself, something about which we agree with the Calvinist, to have passed the Calvinists’ litmus test for pride by embracing Calvinist determinism, certainly may be an indication of the ability of the Calvinist to deceive himself.

So how does the Bible speak about true humility? Humility is a personal disposition of gratefulness and submission freely rendered to God because of God’s love and grace demonstrated to all of us in Christ. What God is looking for is a heartfelt response to the divine love and grace as revealed to us in Christ. Because of his love and grace shown to us in our salvation in Christ, we are humbled before him for having done something for us he did not have to do, we could not do for ourselves, and we did not deserve. Given this kind of God and this kind of salvation, a person should humble themselves and believe. Many do not humble themselves. But the same God and the same salvation are theirs, but they reject these, remaining stubborn and proud. Affirming the dignity of free will, something God sovereignly bestowed upon his human creatures, allows the non-Calvinist not only to explain the biblical witness coherently, but also to have a message of “good news” for sinners. Each person may accept the love of God in the way God would have it accepted – freely by faith.

[48] See Leighton Flowers, “John Piper on Sovereignty in Daily Life,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-p4ROXESx0 Last accessed on Dec. 18, 2025.

[49] Mark R. Talbot, All the Good That Is Ours in Christ: Seeing God’s Gracious Hand in the Hurts Others Do to Us, John Piper and Justin Taylor (eds.), Suffering and the Sovereignty of God (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), 31-77. As found in Leighton Flowers, The Potter’s Promise: A Biblical Defense of Traditional Soteriology (Trinity Academic Press, 2017), 77.

[50] Paul Helm, The Providence of God, Leicester, IVP, 1993, p. 22.

[51] R. C. Sproul, What is Reformed Theology?, Grand Rapids: Baker, 2016, p.172. Sproul elsewhere says that the person who does not believe this should be an atheist. Ironically, with God replaced by Nature, it is exactly what atheistic determinism believes!

[52] The reader interested in more of my views on mind and matter is directed to my chapter in R. A. Varghese (ed.), Missing Link, Lanham, University Press of America, 2013. John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 54-55.

[53] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 45-46.

[54] Ibid. 52-53.

[55] Ibid. 53.

[56] Ibid. 53.

[57] Ibid. 61.

[58] T. Keller, Romans 8-16 For You, Epsom, Good Book Company, 2015.

[59] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 278-279.

[60] D. M. Lloyd-Jones, Romans Chapter 9, Edinburgh, Banner of Truth, 1991, p. 285.

[61] See the section titled “Hankins and Grudem: Reprobation as a Necessary Implication and Ways of Avoidance.”

[62] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 63.

[63] Ibid. 64.

[64] Ibid. 64-65.

[65] R. C. Sproul, What is Reformed Theology?, Grand Rapids: Baker, 2016, p. 173.

[66] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 65.

[67] Ibid. 70.

[68] It seems to me that a more responsible hermeneutical approach would be to incorporate concepts we all use in everyday life and other decision-making endeavors (historiography) to aid us in biblical interpretation and theology. Here are some principles for adjudicating between competing theologies and soteriologies. These principles are gleaned from Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2010). The Scriptures are, of course, historical texts – albeit of different genres. Therefore, these principles also apply to their interpretation.

The problem of presuppositions (the historian’s or interpreter’s horizon).
The nature of truth. All conflicting propositions cannot be true.
The correspondence and coherence nature of truth
A rational basis for believing the theological proposition or scheme
Argument to the best explanation
Explanatory scope
Explanatory power
Plausibility
Less ad hoc
Illumination
Accounting for and incorporating theological bedrock
Harmony
Cumulative case
Acknowledge provisionality of one’s case
Effectively address counter-arguments

[69] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 63.

[70] Ibid. 63.

[71] Ibid. 100.

[72] D. A. Carson, The Gospel According to John, Leicester, IVP, 1991, p. 293.

[73] Ibid. 291.

[74] John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe: The Sovereignty of God, Freedom, Faith and Human Responsibility, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 101.

[75] Ibid. 103.

[76] Ibid. 102.

[77] Ibid. 103.

[78] Ibid.

[79] See Chapter 10 – “The Calvinist’s Suppression of Logical Reasoning, Moral Intuition and Common Sense”

[80] D. A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984), 137.

[81] See Chapter 7 – “Craig and Moreland on the Indispensable Role of Philosophy.”

[82] J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 12.

[83] J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 14.

[84] Ibid. 15.

[85] Ibid. 15.

[86] Ibid. 13.

[87] Ibid. 13.

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