Section 16
Go to Chapter 7 – The Indispensibility of Reason and Logic in Biblical Interpretation
Regarding logical and moral entailments, can a Calvinist accept the doctrine of unconditional election and reject the doctrine of reprobation and remain logically consistent? All Calvinists accept unconditional election. It is essential to what it means to be a Calvinist. Without it, you do not have Calvinism. But some more “moderate” Calvinists reject what seems to be the logical entailment of unconditional election, which is reprobation.
Interestingly, Calvinist Vincent Cheung takes his moderate Calvinist brothers and sisters to task for not holding to what he sees as the logical entailment of their doctrine of unconditional election. Cheung maintains that the Calvinist cannot dismiss the logical entailments of his doctrines. Logical necessity cannot be jettisoned if the Calvinist theological system is to remain credible. As to whether or not the reprobation of certain individuals as a positive divine act is a “logical necessity” of God’s unconditional election of others, Cheung writes,
“The corollary of election is reprobation. Just as God has chosen those individuals who would be saved, he has also deliberately and individually (that is, “by name”) decreed the damnation of all others. Many of those who affirm the doctrine of election nevertheless reject the doctrine of reprobation. However, just as election is a necessary conclusion from the sovereignty of God, reprobation is also true if by nothing else other than logical necessity, although it is also supported by direct biblical teaching. Those who reject the doctrine do so on the basis of their irrational prejudice instead of on biblical argument or logical inference.”[99]
Note that Cheung affirms the point I am making. The truth or falsity of a theological conclusion can be reliably determined “if by nothing else than logical necessity.” So as much as one may claim exegetical support for a position or doctrine, the matter of a violation of “logical necessity” or a “necessary conclusion” is in and of itself sufficient to declare one’s thinking or their interpretation to be in error. One cannot simply ignore what logically follows from one’s interpretive claims. If the interpreter dismisses the logical and moral entailments of their position, then that is sufficient to deem their position an “irrational prejudice” at some point. The point is that the rationality or irrationality, truth or falsity of a proposition or interpretation can be determined based on “logical inference” regardless of claims about it being rooted in the exegesis of the text. If it doesn’t make sense, it is not a correct interpretation of Scripture. In fact, according to Cheung, if one’s doctrinal position violates logical inference or entailment, then that doctrinal position or interpretation would be incorrect.
Now, note what is happening here. Cheung will not follow his own admonitions to his fellow Calvinists given above. Cheung’s Calvinist definition of divine sovereignty as a theistic determinism creates logical and moral incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction throughout the Scriptures. For instance, Cheung’s definition of God’s sovereignty as theistic determinism contradicts the overwhelming testimony in Scripture to human free will and moral responsibility. These incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions are entailments of his deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty. But these do not cause Cheung any concern. Therefore, as such, he is inconsistent in the application of his own principle of entailment or “logical inference.” What he tells his fellow Calvinists about entialments he does not apply to himself or them regarding their deterministic doctrine of divine sovereignty. And this reveals the a priori status of his definition of God’s sovereignty as a universal divine causal determinism. The Calvinist holds to this theistic determinism, no matter how much incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction it causes.
So, according to Cheung, if the Calvinist is going to be rational in this matter, they must accept the doctrine of reprobation as a logical entailment or logical necessity of the doctrine of unconditional election. This certainly seems correct. But the pertinent question is whether the Calvinist doctrine of unconditional election is the teaching of Scripture. How can we find out? Well, let’s use Cheung’s own criterion. Within his own interpretive system, Cheung requires logical consistency. Hence, we can apply the same criteria of “logical necessity” or “necessary conclusion” to determine whether unconditional election is a biblical doctrine. We can inquire into whether there are logical entailments of the doctrine of unconditional election that would require us to reject unconditional election as the teaching of Scripture. We must ask whether there are logical entailments to the doctrine that end up pitting scriptural truths against each other, or against reality as we know it. Interestingly, the Calvinists’ flight to mystery, which confirms their doctrinal incoherence and contradictions and is also their ultimate response to these difficulties. The Calvinist has to dismiss or ignore the logical entailments of certain of their theological doctrines by hiding behind a curtain of mystery or incomprehensibility. This speaks to Cheung’s and the Calvinists’ use of the principles of logic and moral intuitions as applying to certain doctrinal conclusions but not others. The point is that, as much as the high-Calvinist might consider such entailments as significant within their systematic theology, Calvinists in general do not consider such entailments to be imperative and indispensable for determining the validity of their own exegetical conclusions and subsequent soteriological interpretations, given the whole scope of Scripture and other external experiential considerations. In contrast, the non-Calvinist is more inclined to include the full scope of logical and moral considerations as a determining factor in the validity of their interpretations. And there lies the hermeneutical difference. That is the hermeneutical divide. So let’s inquire into whether there are logical entailments of the doctrine of unconditional election that would require us to reject unconditional election as the teaching of Scripture.
Cheung has stated above that “election is a necessary conclusion from the sovereignty of God.” Obviously, he is referring to his Calvinist doctrines of election as unconditional and the sovereignty of God defined deterministically. Now, unconditional election certainly seems to be “a necessary conclusion” or follows logically from the sovereignty of God defined as a universal divine causal determinism. Since God predetermines all things, this includes who will and will not be saved. So we might press this point and ask what else is logically entailed in divine sovereignty defined as theistic determinism? It certainly seems that the loss of human freedom and responsibility is a logically necessary conclusion or entailment of Calvinism’s universal divine causal determinism. That is, it seems that for human freedom and moral responsibility to be meaningful, both logical reflection and moral intuition require some other non-deterministic definition of divine sovereignty. Now, if this non-deterministic definition is the result of sound biblical exegesis, then that definition would be the more biblically accurate understanding of divine sovereignty. Why? Because there would be no negative logical and moral entailments as there are in the Calvinists’ deterministic interpretation of divine sovereignty. There would be none of the incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction that plagues the Calvinists’ interpretations. As such, any negative logical entailments would not be ignored, as in the case of Calvinism. Note that for the non-Calvinist, logical and moral entailments constitute an indispensable element in their hermeneutic. If something is logically or morally incoherent in their interpretations, then their interpretation is considered to be in error. When the logical and moral entailments of a proposition or doctrine land us in incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction, then we must go back to the Bible to see what we did wrong. We must find the interpretation that does not cause this incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction. But this means that our hermeneutic must include logical and moral coherence.
So Cheung has applied logical entailment internally within his Calvinist system. I believe he is correct in doing so. Given unconditional election, “if by nothing else other than logical necessity,” he concludes that reprobation is to be accepted and believed. But if this is correct, then “if by nothing else other than logical necessity,” we ought to reject Cheung’s definition of sovereignty as universal divine causal determinism and election as unconditional. Why? Because both of these doctrines produce logical and moral incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions. Therefore, logical necessity demands we reject them. If logical necessity requires us to accept what is logically entailed by a doctrine, then logical necessity also requires us to reject a doctrine when what is logically entailed by that doctrine are incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions. Hence, not only must the negative doctrine of reprobation, which is a logical entailment of unconditional election and theistic determinism, be accepted, but the many other negative logical and moral entailments of these doctrines must be accepted. But surely we cannot countenance interpretations of the various texts in this controversy that lead to incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction. That means the Calvinist must join the non-Calvinist in deeming these problems of incoherence as interpretively significant. This is only to follow Cheung’s own advice. But can Cheung and his fellow Calvinists follow through on this when their doctrines prove to be logically inconsistent and contrary to other texts and theological truths that are clearly taught in Scripture? For instance, the loss of meaningful human freedom and responsibility is a logical and moral entailment of Cheung’s definition of sovereignty as theistic determinism. So why doesn’t Cheung abandon his Calvinist determinism? He anticipates this problem, but his answer leaves non-Calvinists baffled. He writes,
“One common objection is that this biblical doctrine of divine sovereignty removes or contradicts the moral responsibility of man. That is, if God controls everything, including human beliefs, thoughts, decisions, and actions, then it seems to some people that man would not be morally responsible for anything. However, man is responsible precisely because God is sovereign, since for a person to be responsible means that he will be held accountable to his actions, that he will be rewarded or punished according to a certain standard of right and wrong. So moral responsibility has to do with whether God has decreed a final judgment, and whether he has the power to enforce this decree. It does not depend on any “free will” in man. In fact, since human responsibility depends on divine sovereignty, and since divine sovereignty indeed contradicts human freedom (not human responsibility), this means that man is responsible precisely because he is not free.”
Are you confused yet? Cheung continues,
“Man is responsible because God will reward obedience and punish rebellion, but this does not mean that man is free to obey or rebel. Autonomy is an illusion. Romans 8:7 explains, “The sinful mind is hostile to God. It does not submit to God’s law, nor can it do so.” The Bible never teaches that man is responsible for his sins because he is free. That is, man is responsible for his sins not because he is free to do otherwise – this verse says that he is not free, but he is still counted as sinful. Whether man is responsible has nothing to do with whether he is free, but whether God decides to hold him accountable. And man is responsible because God has decided to judge him for his sins. Therefore, the doctrine of human responsibility does not depend on the unbiblical teaching of free will, but on the absolute sovereignty of God.”[100]
Cheung states, “…man is responsible precisely because he is not free.” He also states, “Man is responsible because God will reward obedience and punish rebellion, but this does not mean that man is free to obey or rebel. Autonomy is an illusion.” What is the “rationale” for these statements? A misinterpretation and misapplication of Romans 8:7? Are these statements in accord with Cheung’s own standards of “logical necessity” and “logical inference” that he demanded of his fellow Calvinists on the issue of reprobation? It seems that because Cheung holds to a deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty as non-negotiable, he must therefore reject human freedom. To his credit, he is being consistent and sees this conclusion to be a logical inference or entailed by his theistic determinism. Theistic determinism and human freedom are mutually exclusive. But this ‘consistency’ also distorts the biblical text and worldview. Recall that Cheung insists on logical consistency and chided his fellow Calvinists for not accepting reprobation as the logical entailment of unconditional election. But look how here he has just thrown it away. He asserts that there is no such thing as free will. Yet, even though he believes there is no such thing as free will, Cheung insists that there is such a thing as “the moral responsibility of man.” But ask yourself whether a person can be held morally responsible for their actions without having some degree of free will and the ability to have done otherwise? Now, Cheung claims that man is morally responsible “precisely because he is not free.” How so? Cheung states that “…for a person to be responsible means that he will be held accountable to[101] his actions, that he will be rewarded or punished according to a certain standard of right and wrong.” But does this really help us in defining “responsibility” or understanding his position? What does it mean for a person to be “held accountable for his actions?” If all this strikes you as confused and bizarre, you are not alone! Let’s examine Cheung’s statements more closely.
First, given universal divine causal determinism, whose actions will a person be held responsible for if, as Cheung makes clear, “God controls everything, including human beliefs, thoughts, decisions, and actions?” This certainly seems to be incoherent and therefore requires either a different view of the nature of God’s sovereignty or clarification as to what is meant by “responsibility.” As for “responsibility,” for Cheung, it seems that this is something God simply bestows or imposes upon people, even though God causes them to do what they do. God seems to be saying, “I know that people are not free to do right or wrong of their own accord because I control their every thought and action. Yet, because I am also sovereign in the sense that what I say goes, I will decree that by virtue of my decision to judge people by a standard of right and wrong, they will therefore become morally responsible for what I have caused them to do, whether right or wrong, good or evil.” Therefore, Cheung says, “Whether man is responsible has nothing to do with whether he is free, but whether God decides to hold him accountable. And man is responsible because God has decided to judge him for his sins.” But is this really the way God thinks about his judgment of persons for their sins? Don’t those sins have to be their sins? And for that to be the case, doesn’t there need to be some degree of human freedom or autonomy, which certainly seems to be in contradiction with theistic determinism, as even Cheung admits? Given theistic determinism, what is the purpose or meaning of a “standard of right and wrong?” And if this “standard” reveals that God is a moral being, can he hold a person responsible for things He has caused them to perform? Is that not wrong in and of itself, and therefore something God cannot do? So rather than alter his deterministic definition of sovereignty, Cheung abolishes human freedom. Cheung states, “Whether man is responsible has nothing to do with whether he is free, but whether God decides to hold him accountable.” But again, how does the mere fact that God has decided to judge people and “hold them accountable” for their sins get at what it means to be morally responsible for one’s actions? I do not see the relationship. Is moral responsibility established merely on the basis that there will be a judgment according to standards of right and wrong? Is “responsibility” created out of “thin air” by virtue of a divine fiat that states, “I, God, have decided that I will judge human beings. Therefore, that fact makes them morally responsible.” How so? And what purpose do standards of right and wrong serve if people are predetermined by God to do right or do wrong? The mere fact that there will be a judgment seems to entail that there is at least some degree of human autonomy and freedom of the will; otherwise, how can any judgment be assigned to the person and not be merely a declaration about the rightness or wrongness of an act? Indeed, the fact that there is going to be a judgment implies that persons are culpable for the right or wrong they have done as substantially free moral agents; otherwise, what is God judging but his own predeterminations? Some degree of real freedom of the will in which the source of an action is of a person who is “response-able” as an autonomous, free moral agent with an ability to do otherwise, seems to be entailed in the word responsibility and in the concept of judgment itself. But Cheung’s definition of sovereignty as theistic determinism does not allow for any degree of human autonomy or moral responsibility that results in a genuine judgment, not a ‘judgment’ merely established on the fact that God will make ‘judgments’ about the rightness or wrongness of what he preordained and caused people to do. That seems to be what is logically entailed by Cheung’s theistic determinism. So, according to Cheung, “moral responsibility,” that is, holding people “responsible” for what they do, is grounded in the divine will to simply do so. Note that there is no reference here to the characteristics or attributes of God and how we would expect Him to think and act in accord with his nature and character. Cheung’s only perspective is myopically focused on the will of God as absolute. According to Cheung, people are neither free nor autonomous, and yet, God has decreed to hold people morally responsible for what they do in complete disregard for how God’s fuller character (i.e., love, compassion, etc.) enters into these issues, or how other theological truths should form our thinking and direct the discussion (e.g., that we are created in the image of God). The bottom line here is that God causes all people to do what they do because Cheung, as a Calvinist, which takes precedence here not only over the text of Scripture, but also logical and moral necessity, must preserve his definition of “sovereignty” as a universal divine causal determinism.
So is Cheung following the logical and moral entailments of what he believes, where they actually lead? I don’t think so. He believes the fact of divine judgment, or the mere divine decree that “I will hold persons responsible for their actions,” is enough to ground the claim that they are responsible for their actions without having any human autonomy, freedom, or other type of “responsibility.” The only type of responsibility we have is “moral responsibility,” and we have that because God will judge us for the right or wrong he himself, who is also the judge, predetermined and caused us to do. That being the case, how can Cheung speak coherently about the “right and wrong we have done” in anything more than merely an instrumental sense? The incoherence between his theistic determinism and the common sense necessity that there be some degree of human freedom to justly and coherently hold people responsible for their actions is completely ignored. It is completely ignored due to the force that his theistic determinism has in distorting his thinking in these matters. But logical reflection and our moral intuition tell us that something more is necessary in the context of theistic determinism than merely a courtroom and a judge to constitute a just judgment in holding persons morally responsible for their actions. You need a viable concept of human freedom, as it is human persons made in the image of God who are going to be judged.
So if Cheung uses “logical necessity” concerning the implications of his determinism on human freedom, he should arrive at a different conclusion about human freedom or his definition of God’s sovereignty. The loss of meaningful human freedom and responsibility is logically entailed, or is a “necessary conclusion” of universal divine causal determinism. But that flies in the face of Scripture on both divine sovereignty and human freedom.
So does “sovereignty” in Scripture entail universal divine causal determinism? Not if this concept of sovereignty wreaks havoc throughout the Scriptures, which overwhelmingly testify to human freedom, responsibility, and a contingent reality. Hence, the Calvinists’ deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty is incorrect. And that would be true using Cheung’s own standards for the need for coherence and logical consistency among our interpretive conclusions and doctrinal beliefs.
Recall that Cheung has stated that “God controls everything, including human beliefs, thoughts, decisions, and actions.” It is hard to see how human responsibility is coherent with Cheung’s Calvinist theistic determinism. The logical entailment of such determinism is that there is no such thing as moral responsibility. The logical entailment of moral responsibility seems to be human free agency, which is incoherent with theistic determinism, as Cheung does admit when he says, “divine sovereignty indeed contradicts human freedom.”
Furthermore, we can raise the issue as to how this definition of sovereignty does not make God the source and cause of all evil. That seems to be a logical entailment of this theistic determinism. But also entailed in the moral perfection, goodness, and love of God is the fact that God is not evil and cannot do evil. Therefore, we are logically and morally compelled to conclude that theistic determinism is a misinterpretation of Scripture on the matter of God’s sovereignty. Recall Cheung’s criteria that something can be declared true or false “if by nothing else other than logical necessity.” Hence, it seems incumbent upon the Calvinist, on pain of irrationality, to perform his textual exegesis according to a hermeneutic that requires coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction in handling and interpreting the text. Cheung and Calvinists have to go back to the text armed with a hermeneutic of coherence, not incoherence. If they do so, subsequently, the theological system that will be constructed on such interpretations will also exhibit rational and moral coherence.
So we see that Cheung, as a Calvinist, does not remain consistent as to the logical and moral entailments and logical and moral necessity of his doctrines. Neither will he allow his doctrinal incoherence to probe the validity of his exegetical interpretations of the relevant text. For as much as Cheung has rightly observed that we can discern something to be true or false “if by nothing else other than logical necessity,” he does not apply this to his own interpretations. He does not consider the incoherence in his own theology to be hermeneutically significant.
Entailments are stubborn things because logic is tenacious and inescapable. Entailments are a matter of logical implication. As such, they are based in and bound by the laws of logical reasoning. What a belief entails is not a relative matter or open to subjective acceptance or rejection. Entailments themselves are not open to “interpretation,” rather, they act as a check on interpretive relativism. That is the point. Sound interpretation must be guided by its logical and moral entailments. If this were not the case, the text could mean anything the interpreter wants it to mean or thinks it means. Something is either a logical or moral entailment of a position, or it is not. We are all bound to accept or reject our interpretations and beliefs according to the logical and moral entailments of those interpretations and beliefs precisely because all sound reasoning rests upon logical reasoning and moral intuition. Christian beliefs are not irrational or immoral beliefs. Mystery is not an excuse for irrationality and immorality in interpretation and belief. By definition, logical and moral entailments are essential, reliable, and definitive in discerning the validity of a biblical interpretation. These entailments indicate to us the validity of those interpretations and beliefs. The only way to avoid the negative entailments in a position is to obscure the matter by asserting mystery, or in attempting to convince others that they should think differently about the position to avoid its negative logical and moral entailments, e.g., it’s an antinomy, paradox, ‘apparent’ contradiction, incomprehensible, etc. This is the tack that Calvinists take. Therefore, they must resort to the suppression of reason.
We are not talking here about what someone believes and what someone else thinks the other person believes. That would merely be to understand or misunderstand, as the case may be, the other’s beliefs. Dr. Allen’s warnings from the previous sections are correct. For instance, we should not say that because Calvinists believe in total inability, irresistible grace, and unconditional election, they do not believe in evangelism. We should not say that because Calvinists believe in unconditional election, they do not believe God loves everybody. What the Calvinist says he believes, the non-Calvinist should clearly accept as their beliefs and represent them accurately and fairly. But that is a separate issue. What we are emphasizing here is what is entailed by a person’s beliefs and propositions, that is, whether or not what follows from their interpretations and beliefs is logically or morally coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory. The Calvinist may say he believes in evangelism and that God loves everybody, but are these claims logically and morally consistent with his other Calvinist doctrinal beliefs? If they are not, that needs to be pointed out. This is what Allen and Leighton are concerned with. It is a matter of the logical and moral consistency between one Calvinist belief and another Calvinist belief. This is the matter of entailment.
It is incumbent upon both sides to acknowledge that entailments, as the conclusions derived from logical reasoning and moral intuitions, are essential for discerning whether or not one has correctly interpreted a text. Once one’s beliefs are clearly stated and understood, there are certain entailments that logically flow from those beliefs. One’s exegesis and beliefs don’t exist in a logical or moral vacuum. These entailments are either logically coherent or incoherent. They are either logically consistent or inconsistent. They are either non-contradictory or contradictory. If they are the latter or these, then we may confidently declare those beliefs to be the results of a mistaken reading and exegesis of the biblical text. They have shown themselves to be false. This is essential to good exegesis precisely because we cannot abandon reason in the interpretive process and claim we are properly representing the intent of the author. Think about it. If reason is dismissed, not only does that possibly impugn a biblical author’s thought process and skill to clearly communicate, but also makes it such that it is never incumbent for anyone to accept another’s interpretation as biblical truth. The text means whatever the interpreter thinks and says it means, and the interpreter must proceed to assert that any negative entailments cannot be genuine entailments. When logical reasoning and moral intuition have been forfeited, other rationalizations must be foisted upon people. If the non-Calvinist offers a logical and moral assessment of the Calvinists’ position, showing it to be incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory, and the Calvinist can simply avoid that critique by asserting mystery, then no progress can be made in reaching a consensus on the author’s intended meaning. Neither the Calvinists’ nor the non-Calvinists’ exegesis can stand as the only consideration in determining the validity of one’s exegesis. A proposed exegesis, as it stands, and the question of whether or not it accurately represents the meaning of the text, are two different matters. If the Calvinist position ultimately maintains that the Bible teaches that God’s sovereignty is a universal divine causal determinism and that requires us to ignore or rationalize away the logical and moral difficulties of such a teaching, then any meaningful thought and discourse becomes impossible. Yet, we should still hold to the conclusion that, on the basis that logical reasoning and moral intuitions are indispensable elements in biblical interpretation (i.e., hermeneutics), declare that definition of divine sovereignty to be unbiblical.
While Dr. Allen and Dr. Flowers identify “conflicts” and “inconsistencies” in a position and deem these hermeneutically significant, and the Calvinist refuses to acknowledge those “conflicts” and “inconsistencies” as hermeneutically significant, then there can be no reconciliation of the disparate interpretations of the text or consensus omnium reached regarding biblical soteriology. The Calvinist can just ignore the logical and moral entailments of their exegesis and continue to hold their position. The present state of the controversy has it that these “conflicts” and “inconsistencies” are real and indicate that the Calvinist interpretations are in error (the non-Calvinist) or they are only “apparent” (the Calvinist) without acknowledging that the “conflicts” and “inconsistencies” are interpretively significant as to the validity of those Calvinist interpretations. You must make an intentional decision as to the actual state of affairs. Intentional sustained thought must be given for you to decide which of these approaches is the intellectually responsible and rationally acceptable hermeneutical stance.
I submit that if the laws of logic hold in biblical interpretation, these “conflicts” and “inconsistencies” must be real, and if they are real, then where the Calvinist interpretations generate these “conflicts” and “inconsistencies,” they must be declared to be in error if we are to be intellectually responsible. This is the only way forward towards a resolution to this controversy. To claim that real incoherence, inconsistency, or contradictions are only “apparent” is an intellectual dodge, a mere assertion, and continues to beg the interpretive question. It is one of the things that keeps the controversy alive. But it should not be satisfactory for the thinking Christian.
If this hermeneutical divide is not reckoned with, this controversy will never be resolved. It will never cease. But let us be clear why it will never cease. It is not because of any mystery inherent in the text or lack of comprehension or because the Bible teaches both a theistic determinism and human freedom and responsibility in “apparent contradiction,” but because the most foundational of hermeneutical principles – coherence – has been put out of court. The laws of logic and our moral intuitions are indispensable for determining the validity of an interpretation and must be brought to bear upon the exegetical and interpretative process.
For instance, speaking about a fifth point that distinguishes someone as a “hyper-Calvinist,” that is, one who denies God’s universal saving will, Dr. Allen states,
“Most Calvinists believe that God desires the salvation of all people – 1 Timothy 2:4-6; 2 Peter 3:9, passage in Ezekiel, some other passages. Most Calvinists affirm that. However, they argue that he has sovereignly chosen to save only some people. So he desires to save all. He sovereignly chosen to only save some. Now you and I would argue there’s a real problem there. But now Calvinists say well no it’s not a real problem because most Calvinists today – moderate Calvinists – will affirm what is called God’s two wills. God’s decretal will, his hidden will…verses God’s revealed will. And they will say now in God’s revealed will in Scripture God clearly says he desires everybody to be saved. But nevertheless in the decretal will he has decreed that only the elect will be saved.
Now, Calvinists don’t see a contradiction there. You and I do. But that’s a debate for another time.”[102]
Here, the difference between the non-Calvinist and the Calvinist with respect to the weight given to the negative logical entailment of the Calvinists’ interpretation becomes clear. Dr. Allen states, “Now you and I would argue that there’s a real problem there.” The Calvinist also sees the problem here, but he attempts to rationalize his way out of it with the “two wills in God” solution. Regarding this Calvinist solution, Dr. Allen states that this does not help because we still have a contradiction in that solution as much as we did in the original theological propositions. In fact, the solution only deepens the incoherence because it involves God in a duplicitous confusion of will, thus misunderstanding the nature of God and impugning character. The non-Calvinist sees the “two wills” solution as no solution at all. It only exacerbates the incoherence of Calvinism.
It certainly seems that the Calvinist is struggling to escape the vortex of his theistic determinism, but it cannot be done. Observe that even in their supposed solutions to the logical problems in their original soteriology, the Calvinist only compounds the logical problems in those solutions. The logic of the solution is as bad as the logical problems of the original soteriology. I contend that the Calvinist will never be able to extricate himself from the logical problem of his original soteriology precisely because it is a real contradiction. Real contradictions cannot be logically resolved unless you alter some belief or premise that is causing the contradiction. You cannot reason around a contradiction. That’s what makes it a contradiction in the true sense of the word. Hence, the Calvinists’ attempts to reason around their inconsistencies and contradictions without altering the propositions in their theology will only continue to confirm that their theology contains a real contradiction. The non-Calvinist views the problematic Calvinist theology as well as the Calvinists’ “solutions” to those problems as exegetical red flags. Something is wrong in the interpretation of the text. The Calvinist has learned to ‘think’ about them differently. He has learned to suppress his logical and moral reasoning so he can “live” with these problems. But according to the non-Calvinist, the Calvinist pays too high an intellectual and moral price to do so.[103]
Now, exegesis is first and foremost the means by which we determine the meaning of the biblical text. But the point to be grasped is that the particulars of one’s exegesis and the determination of the validity of that exegesis are intricately bound to its resulting entailments. Recall above that entailment has to do with the logical implications of one’s interpretations and subsequent beliefs. Dr. Allen and Dr. Flowers perceive the Calvinist position to entail a “contradiction.” God reveals to us that he desires everyone to be saved, but also reveals to us that he has secretly predetermined that only some persons he has chosen will be saved. It seems obvious, then, that God did not desire everyone to be saved. So, in light of the Calvinists’ deterministic doctrines of divine sovereignty and unconditional election, the Calvinist is in effect saying “God desires everyone to be saved” and “God does not desire everyone to be saved.” This is what is logically entailed in the Calvinist doctrines. But this is a blatant contradiction. As to who these particular elect ones are, that is hidden from us. But the fact that there is a limited number predestined to salvation is revealed to us.
This presents a logical and moral problem for Dr. Allen and Dr. Flowers regarding the mind and character of God, but not so for the Calvinist, at least in the sense that it has bearing upon the validity of their textual interpretations and causes them to go back to the text in search of a more logically and morally consistent interpretation of the text. The Calvinist inconsistencies and contradictions are grounded in what they are convinced it must mean for God to be sovereign, defined deterministically, and what it must mean for man to be a sinner, defined as his total inability to respond in faith to God. As long as these “musts” remain, the Calvinist will never allow for a more coherent interpretation of how God relates to man and how man relates to God. The Calvinist will never allow God to dictate the terms upon which he relates to man and man relates to God by virtue of a more coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory reading of Scripture. If the Calvinist says that is what the Scripture teaches, that is question begging. That is the matter we are dealing with, and the non-Calvinist contends that for the Calvinist to say their hermeneutic of incoherence can establish the validity of an interpretation is not good a hermeneutic and is not credible.
Does Scripture witness to a universal divine causal determinism? Not when you take logical and moral coherence on board in your hermeneutic. Scripture certainly does allow for an exegetically sound view of God’s sovereignty that is not deterministic. Furthermore, the Calvinists’ claim that non-Calvinists’ objections to their theology are mainly philosophical and moral, but not exegetical, is simply false. Non-Calvinists produce exegetically sound interpretations for all the relevant texts in this controversy. The “Soteriology 101” podcast cited and discussed above, along with the writings of David Allen and Leighton Flowers, are prime examples. Not any exegesis will do for the non-Calvinist. It has to be a faithful representation of the author’s intent based on all the factors that make for good hermeneutics and exegesis, especially that of coherence, which is synonymous with the principle of the immediate and broader contexts. As I demonstrated elsewhere, the principle of interpretive coherence just is the fundamental interpretive principle of context. Context is coherence and coherence context.
Let’s go back to Dr. Allen’s point when he says, “Calvinists don’t see a contradiction there. You and I do. But that’s a debate for another time.” Well, the time has come for that debate because the gospel message is at stake. Presently, two incompatible gospels are being accepted in the Christian evangelical church. Since there are two mutually exclusive soteriologies, the Calvinist and non-Calvinist soteriologies, both cannot be true. One’s soteriology is one’s gospel message. And I will remind you that the Calvinist TULIP doctrines are the full and final word on why and how a person becomes saved. This has ‘gospel’ implications. But a moment’s thought will reveal that there is no “good news” in these doctrines, and as such, they cannot, and usually are not, placed in the service of a truly evangelistic ministry. There is no “good news” that can be proclaimed based on these doctrines. Hence, the very central message of the Bible – the gospel message – is at stake in this controversy.
At the heart of the controversy is the hermeneutical divide. This hermeneutical divide must be dismantled, or there will never be a resolution to this matter. The essential problem of the difference between the two hermeneutical frameworks will always remain. I submit that rational and moral coherence are essential factors in a proper hermeneutic. It is only by virtue of a hermeneutic that includes these that we can know the meaning of a text as the author intended. But the Calvinists will not accept a hermeneutic of coherence. We have seen above that the Calvinists’ interpretations lead to logical and moral inconsistencies and contradictions; that is, they violate the first principles of logic upon which all reasoned thought rests. As such, we can know that the Calvinists’ interpretations are flawed. Even if we do not know what a particular text surely means, if our interpretation violates the canons of reason, we therefore know what it cannot mean. One may even come to an accurate understanding of a text “by accident,” so to speak. An interpretation may be poorly reasoned yet just happen to be correct, but why it is correct would be unbeknownst to us. But even when an interpretation is coincidentally correct, because it is correct, such an interpretation would ultimately show itself to be coherent with other biblical data and doctrines and, on those grounds, be more plausible than interpretations that demonstrate incoherence. Coherence is not a sufficient ground for declaring an interpretation to be what the author intended, but it is a necessary evidence for claims to have accurately interpreted the text. Accurate understandings of a text must evidence concurrence with the principles of reason. If an interpretation is incorrect, the application of a hermeneutic of coherence would ultimately expose it as incorrect. An interpretation, no matter what exegesis is brought forth to support it, if it is found to generate incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction, shows itself to be an incorrect understanding of the text. Such interpretations are ultimately indefensible. One must resort to ad hoc or question-begging explanations to maintain such interpretations and beliefs. But that will not do for the thinking Christian.
So, can we discern a contradiction when we see one? Does it matter if we do? Are we bound by the first principles of logic to take logic’s dictates as reliable for discerning the validity of a biblical interpretation? These are questions that must be faced for this controversy to advance towards the truth. What do you think?
Read the next section – C. A. Campbell and the Role of Reason in Religion and Faith
Footnotes
[99] Vincent Cheung, “Election and Reprobation.” http://www.vincentcheung.com/2008/12/18/election-and-reprobation/ Last accessed on Dec. 26, 2025.
[100] Vincent Cheung, “Election and Reprobation.” http://www.vincentcheung.com/2008/12/18/election-and-reprobation/ Last accessed on Dec. 26, 2025.
[101] Is Cheung’s use of the word “to” here just a sloppy usage of the preposition, or is it intentional? Is Cheung slipping in a concept here with the word “to” that he does not go on to clearly explain? Why wouldn’t he say “…for a person to be responsible means that he will be held accountable for his actions?” This makes the actions more personal and less deterministic. When one is held accountable “for his actions,” it connotes that it is the person themselves as a distinct individual moral agent who has done the act. The phrase “held accountable to his actions” is strange and ambiguous, and perhaps better serves Cheung’s “static” point about people being “rewarded or punished according to a certain standard of right and wrong” and moral responsibility having to do with “whether God has decreed a final judgment, and whether he has the power to enforce this decree.” How this is a sufficient definition of moral responsibility is not at all clear.
[102] Atonement for All, 34:20 – 35:23.
The Truth of the Gospel 