Chapter 7 – The Role of Philosophical Reflection and Moral Intuition in Exegesis and Hermeneutics

Section 8


Go to Chapter 7 – The Indepensibility of Reason and Logic in Biblical Interpretation


The Calvinist will immediately protest that if we challenge their interpretation of sovereignty and election because it is logically, morally, and theologically inconsistent and incoherent, then we are trying to comprehend the ways of God via our fallen, sinful human reason, and we cannot do that.  God’s knowledge and ways are completely “other” than ours, they say.  But Dr. Gordon R. Lewis writes,

“The frequent claim that God’s knowledge is totally other than ours implies that God’s truth may be contradictory of our truth.  That is, what may be true for us is false for God or what is false for us may be true for God…From a biblical perspective, however, the human mind has been created in the divine image to think God’s thoughts after him, or to receive through both general and special revelation truth from God.  Although the fall has affected the human mind, this has not been eradicated.

…Although God’s mind is unlimited and knows everything, it is not totally different in every respect from human minds made in his image. As omniscient then, God’s judgments are formed in the awareness of all the relevant data.  God knows everything that bears upon the truth concerning any person or event.  Our judgments are true insofar as they conform to God’s by being coherent or faithful to all the relevant data.”[39]

David K. Clark affirms,

“Human knowledge also suffers the serious negative effects of sin (Rom. 1:24-28).  But these limits do not entail that all human knowing is illegitimate, untrue, irrational, or unwarranted.  Using a variety of strategies, humans test for truth, gradually sorting out better ideas and eliminating false ones.  Think of the way science has radically improved our understanding of the world.  Thus, human knowing is genuine to the degree it approximates God’s knowledge of truth.”[40]

Philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig upholds the rules of logic in assessing religious claims and coming to the truth in a matter.  Speaking about the particularism of the Christian gospel verses the acceptance of the idea of religious pluralism he states,

“…religious pluralism, that is to say the view that there are many roads to God, many equally valid ways of apprehending God, has today…become the conventional wisdom…”[41]

He goes on to point out that.

“There are two forms that this religious pluralism might take. First, a kind of unsophisticated religious pluralism, and then secondly a more sophisticated religious pluralism.

Unsophisticated religious pluralism is typically advocated by college sophomores who say that all religions are equally true and therefore whatever you believe is true and all religions lead to God. This, I say, is unsophisticated pluralism because the law of contradiction requires that contradictory claims cannot all be true, and the world’s religions make contradictory claims about things like the existence of God, the nature of the soul, sin, how salvation is to be achieved, life after death, and so forth. They cannot all be true because they are mutually contradictory.”[42]

This same “law of contradiction” directly applies to the Calvinist/non-Calvinist soteriological controversy.  Note that Craig invokes “the law of contradiction” to state what must be true or what must be false when people make claims about religion that are “mutually contradictory.”  He states that, “the law of contradiction requires that contradictory claims cannot all be true… They cannot all be true because they are mutually contradictory.”  I submit that Calvinists and non-Calvinists are presenting contradictory claims, especially about “how salvation is to be achieved.”  Thus, the gospel is at stake in this controversy.

The irony is that the Reformed Calvinist tradition is generally noted for its emphasis on the intellect.  It is characterized as theologically and doctrinally “deep.”  But it can be argued that whatever emphasis there is in Calvinism on the “intellectual” in the Christian faith, or whatever reputation it has for emphasizing the life of the mind, this mostly refers to their thinking about their own theological teachings and doctrines. It refers to their own Calvinist theology. But to be “deep” theologically should also reflect a depth in logical and moral reasoning. Calvinists boast about the “depth” of their doctrines of divine sovereignty and unconditional election because it is impossible for us to ultimately fathom how they can be reconciled with human freedom and responsibility. But this is not anything theologically “deep.” Rather, it is rationally contradictory. It is a misinterpretation of the text. The reason this is the case is that their definitions of sovereignty and election are deterministic. So Calvinists would have us believe that because their doctrines are incoherent and contradictory, they are biblically and theologically “deep.” Not so. Don’t be confused by this.

So Calvinists abandon logical and moral reasoning when it comes to integrating their theistic determinism with the majority witness of Scripture to contingency and human freedom and responsibility. But this cannot be done. Interpretatively, this is just the Calvinist ignoring the necessity of incorporating logical and moral coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction into their hermeneutic.     

Hence, human reason is reliable and therefore essential to the interpretive task.  The logical, moral, and theological coherence must be brought to bear in discerning the validity of biblical interpretations, propositions, and theological constructs.  Each side in the Calvinist/non-Calvinist debate can produce its “proof texts.”  Each claims that the proper exegesis of these texts supports their doctrinal conclusions.  Yet, they also result in contradictory views. Which is correct?  Calvinists claim that exegesis takes priority over philosophical and moral objections brought against their theology and soteriology.  For the Calvinist, since the non-Calvinists’ critique of the Calvinists’ exegesis is philosophical and moral, this only confirms for the Calvinist that their position is based on Scripture, and the non-Calvinist view is based merely on those philosophical and moral objections to Calvinism.  But this is not accurate. This Calvinist perspective not only begs the question as to the validity of their exegesis but also establishes a false dichotomy between exegesis and reason. It is a flawed hermeneutic to dichotomize exegesis from philosophical and moral reasoning.  All of these make for a proper hermeneutic.  This false dichotomy also ignores the fact that the non-Calvinist position rests on sound exegetical support and therefore has the interpretive advantage of being both exegetically grounded and coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory.

Simply having an exegesis of a text is no guarantee that that exegesis is correct.  And the fact that we can be assured that the Calvinists’ interpretations result in a real contradiction is not only a tell-tale sign that Calvinism is false, but also a tell-tale sign to the church that the controversy can and must be resolved.  The contradictory nature of Calvinism clarifies where the problem lies and how it can be resolved.  The matter of whether interpretations that exhibit incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction can still be considered valid or accurate interpretations, as we find is the case within Calvinism, is the issue that must be addressed.

The evangelical church cannot be indifferent to the serious problem in their midst of two soteriologies and gospels at odds with each other. The evangelical church cannot abandon the fundamental rules of thought and think that it can arrive at truth.  Evangelicals cannot allow a logical contradiction at the core of their Christianity, that is, the message of the gospel, and think it will remain a message of “good news” or be credible to thoughtful unbelievers. If the Calvinist TULIP doctrines are not exposed for the unbiblical teachings that they are and expunged from the evangelical church, then the church will become ineffective in evangelism. It will also discourage believers from cherishing intellectual integrity, theological learning, and growth in the life of the mind as essential to Christian living.

Therefore, the solution to the problem must be found in a fuller consideration of what makes for a proper hermeneutic.  What will adjudicate between conflicting, contradictory exegetical conclusions?  Baggett and Walls submit that we must incorporate what we have been given in general revelation, what they call “philosophy,” which simply is the use of reason to the end of thinking clearly about interpretive claims.  They write,

“We think of our argument as unapologetically appealing to general revelation, which means we reject the claim that philosophy can or should be ignored in the process of figuring out the answers to such questions.  The Protestant principle of sola scriptura is sometimes today misunderstood to imply that clear thinking and good reason play no part in figuring out God’s revealed truths.  The primacy of the Bible in terms of its theological truth is taken to imply that exegesis, biblical interpretation, carefully isolated from any other sources of insight, ought to be able to answer any and all theological disputes that may arise.

Skepticism toward philosophy often reaches fever pitch in the Calvinism / Arminianism debate, where disputants on both sides of the divide often eschew the deliverances of philosophy and insist that the question must be settled on biblical and exegetical grounds alone.  Any hint of even bringing philosophical analysis into the conversation is thought to be anathema, abandoning the authority of scripture to provide reliable revelation.

Here we need to draw an important distinction.  Whereas biblical authority trumps in the realm of theological norms, there are more basic philosophical processes at play that hold logical priority in the realm of basic epistemology….take the choice of the Bible as authoritative rather than, say, the Koran; this selection, to be rational, requires that we have good reasons for believing the Bible to be God’s real revelation.  Appeal to those considerations involves trust in reason, which involves trust in our ability to think philosophically.  The Bible is to be taken as authoritative in the realm of theological truth.  But before we can rationally believe such a thing, as human beings privy to general revelation and endowed with the ability to think we must weigh arguments and draw conclusions, that is, do philosophy.  Proper trust in the Bible altogether involves the process of thinking rationally.  It’s a fundamental mistake to think otherwise.

…When someone suggests that we “don’t need philosophy, either in this debate or more generally, their words at best reflect a huge misunderstanding.  The sentiment wrongly assumes that we are even able to understand the Bible, let alone discern that it is the ultimate revelation from God, without the capacity to think.  Philosophy is, to put it most succinctly, clear thought.  Perhaps it sounds pious to say that all we need is the Bible, and Protestants do in fact believe there’s a sense in which it’s true that Christians are to be a people of one book, but it’s at worst a sentiment predicated on a laughably shallow, simplistic, naïve epistemology and hermeneutic.  It’s just not that simple.  We can’t open the Bible and begin to understand it without engaging our reason, and using our critical faculties in this fashion as an interpretive tool is not to exalt the deliverances of reason above the deliverances of scripture.  If, in addition to building a strong biblical and historical case against Calvinism…we can also build a strong philosophical case, that’s significant.  Indeed, it’s essential to the very process of biblical interpretation…Philosophy can and ought to help adjudicate this intractable debate among Christians.”[43]

My point here is that when reason or “philosophical analysis” (i.e., more popularly expressed as using our “common sense”) is applied to the controversy, Calvinism is found wanting.  In response, the Calvinist too prematurely, and somewhat cavalierly, dismisses the fact that their soteriology is marked by the contradictions and incoherencies brought forth against it.  Therefore, they fail to incorporate the “more basic philosophical processes at play.”  They fail to incorporate what reason is telling them.  And even when such incoherencies are acknowledged, the Calvinist does not question the accuracy of their interpretation.  Yet, Baggett and Walls argue that these incoherencies should be weighty indicators that something is amiss in Calvinist textual interpretations.  They cannot simply be rationalized away.

Obviously, the Calvinist implicitly admits to some significant degree of human freedom being taught in Scripture, otherwise they would not have to strive to reconcile their deterministic doctrines via their compatibilism. Yet the Calvinist also offers explanations like “mystery,” “antinomy,” or “apparent contradiction,” or “the Bible teaches both.” But these explanations are inconsistent with compatibilism. These explanations are telling us there is no answer to the problems Calvinism has produced. But either compatibilism does the job, or it doesn’t!  And this last “explanation” that the “Bible teaches both” is, of course, question-begging; it merely presupposes the truth of their deterministic interpretations, and that is not an argument in defense of those interpretations.  If the biblical teaching were as clearly Calvinistic as Calvinists make it out to be, there would be no problem here to reconcile.  But “mystery,” “antinomy,” “apparent contradiction,” or “the Bible teaches both” have no explanatory power. They amount to mere assertions and beg the question.  Are these explanations convincing concerning the Calvinist problems of interpretive incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction? I don’t think so. Do you?

Calvinists are defending the accuracy of their interpretations while claiming that human reason cannot comprehend the deliverances of those interpretations, even though they lead to logical, moral, epistemological, practical, and theological incoherence and contradictions.  The point is that rather than question the accuracy of their interpretations because they are incoherent, they find refuge in “mystery,” “incomprehensibility,” “biblical tension,” and “God’s greater glory.”  They even go so far as to assign a lack of humility and stubborn pride to non-Calvinists who don’t embrace their “doctrines of grace,” even though these non-Calvinists can provide sound interpretive explanations of these troubling yet enduring theological problems.  This certainly seems to suggest that to embrace and/or remain a Calvinist, there needs to be significant suppression and/or an abandonment of one’s logical and moral reasoning.

So all that the Calvinist has done is to merely assert that we cannot comprehend divine sovereignty, human freedom, and election as they have interpreted them.  But that is not a convincing defense of the hermeneutic involved that brought them to that position.  What they are making very clear is that their hermeneutic does not include the light shed upon the difficulties of their interpretations by philosophical deliberations and our moral intuitions.  What the Calvinist has done is actually incorporate incoherence and contradiction into his hermeneutic and interpretive/theological method.

There is no disagreement from the non-Calvinist that exegesis is foundational for gleaning the meaning from a text.  What we are insisting upon is that the validity of one’s exegesis needs to be established and that there are other considerations by which that is achieved.  And although philosophy is not a sufficient discipline for doing theology, it is a necessary discipline.  Biblical exegesis, although foundational to biblical interpretation and the task of biblical and systematic theology, is not done in an intellectual vacuum.  Philosophical reasoning provides a check on interpretive propositions and conclusions to ensure they are coherent and non-contradictory.  Hence, biblical exegesis is also not a sufficient condition for proper interpretation.  It is a necessary condition, but we cannot think of engaging in any discipline without being sure we are reasoning correctly, and that is the purview of philosophy.

When we insist on coherence and non-contradiction as indispensable to a proper hermeneutic, and we let their light shine upon the Calvinist doctrines and the reasonings offered in defense of those doctrines, we can better see the full scope of their logical, moral, theological, and practical incoherence and contradiction.  Only when this is done does Calvinism’s theistic determinism show itself as an extremely problematic theology.

Baggett and Walls think these additional God-given “philosophical” considerations (i.e., the use of our logical faculties and moral intuitions) are essential to a sound hermeneutic.  Although a thorough exegesis is surely fundamental and essential to any sound interpretation and subsequent theology, the question of whether that exegesis is proper and requires other considerations that involve the use of our logical faculties and moral reasoning is also part of good interpretation.  Note again what Walls and Baggett conclude,

“If, in addition to building a strong biblical and historical case against Calvinism…we can also build a strong philosophical case, that’s significant.  Indeed, it’s essential to the very process of biblical interpretation.”[44]

What Calvinist’s make clear is that ultimately their hermeneutic does not include the light shed upon the issues by philosophical reflection and moral intuitions.  Again, there is no disagreement from non-Calvinists that exegesis is foundational.  We affirm our commitment to biblical authority.  But we do so by insisting that there are rational and philosophical considerations by which the validity of one’s exegesis is to be evaluated.

A high view of biblical authority cannot be taken to mean we must believe interpretations regardless of how incoherent or contradictory they show themselves to be.  This again only begs the question whether those interpretations gleaned from our authoritative Scripture are correct.  If we have dispensed with coherence as an essential part of distinguishing accurate from inaccurate interpretations of the text, how would we ever know whether an interpretation reflects the author’s intended meaning, which just is the authoritative meaning of the text?  Baggett and Walls think these extended “philosophical” considerations are essential.  Indeed, they are God-given.  They state,

“Using rationality and logic and our best philosophical tools and moral insights isn’t contrary to God’s plan for Christians.  It’s all part of our God-given nature and his general revelation to us, by which we can determine in the first place that the Bible is God’s special revelation to us and by which we can best interpret it in a way that accords with God’s morally perfect and recognizably good nature.

There are aspects of God that transcend our reason to be sure, but God doesn’t call us to believe anything opposed to reason.  This distinction is one that some popular postmodern Christian writers often fail to grasp, and they thereby tend to make a virtue of incoherence.”[45]

The basics of logical and moral reasoning are part of God’s general revelation to us, and therefore, they cannot be put out of court in discerning the validity of the proposed interpretations of his special revelation and our subsequent theological constructs built upon them.  A sound hermeneutic concerns itself with where certain interpretations lead us with respect to their logical and moral implications. A sound hermeneutic must consider whether one’s exegesis leads us into logical, moral, practical, and theological coherence or incoherence.  I submit that incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction are reliable indicators of inaccurate and invalid interpretations of particular texts.

So herein lies the frustration a non-Calvinist experiences while listening to Calvinists preach and teach, reading their literature, or discussing theology with them.  The Calvinists and non-Calvinists are operating on two very different hermeneutical criteria.  The non-Calvinist believes that logical, moral, theological, and practical coherence and non-contradiction are essential to any claim that one has properly interpreted the text.  They are indispensable to biblical hermeneutics just as they are indispensable to rational thought and communication.  In contrast, this interpretive coherence is discounted by the Calvinist.  Rather than use rational and moral incoherence as interpretive “red flags” indicating that their interpretations may be incorrect, Calvinists dismiss this incoherence through the various conceptual and rhetorical devices mentioned above.  Rather than using logical, moral, theological, and practical coherence and consistency as interpretive tools that would either affirm one’s interpretive conclusions or cause one to re-evaluate them anew, they are explained away by the “reasonings” given above.  As far as I can see, this is not a biblically adequate hermeneutic.  It is a hermeneutic of incoherence.  In contrast, the non-Calvinist position accepts elements of critical reasoning that cannot be, and need not be, ignored. Our human reason must be active to come to sound textual and theological conclusions.  It is not more spiritual or glorifying to God to ignore logical, moral, theological, and practical incoherence, inconsistency, and contradictions.  This is the reason why Calvinists and non-Calvinists just cannot communicate effectively and reach a consensus on the meaning of the controversial texts. They have very different criteria by which they read and interpret Scripture. They work under two very different, irreconcilable hermeneutics. In summary, the non-Calvinist perceives that the Calvinists’ interpretations do not make sense.  I am convinced that this is the case. The next section is an example of the incoherence of Calvinism in relation to God’s character as good and what we know to be good.


Read the next section – Baggett, Walls and Lewis on Whether God is Good as We know Goodness


Back to Chapter 7


Table of Contents


Footnotes

[39] Gordon R. Lewis, “God, Attributes of” Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed., Walter Elwell, ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 494-495.

[40] David K. Clark, “Truth”, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed., Walter Elwell, ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 1220.

[41] William Lane Craig, Defenders 3 Podcast, The Doctrine of Christ, part 47.  https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/s3-doctrine-of-christ/doctrine-of-christ-part-47/   Last accessed Dec. 10, 2025.

[42] Ibid.

[43] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 67-68. 

[44] Ibid. 68.

[45] Ibid. 80.

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