Section 11
Go to Chapter 7 – The Indispensibility of Reason and Logic in Biblical Interpretation
We have seen how Calvinism has raised questions about the rationality of its beliefs. Because of its theistic determinism and doctrine of unconditional election, I have demonstrated that it is marked by incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction, logically as well as morally. Philosopher Robert Audi reflects on the relationship between rationality and what makes for justifiable beliefs. He states,
“We might say that a justified belief is one that there is adequate reason for the believer to think true; but, as suggestive as this is, it transfers the burden of analysis to the relevant notion of adequate reason. We can say that a justified belief is one that is rationally acceptable, which in turn, might be taken to mean that one does not deserve criticism, from the point of view of rationality, for holding it.”[53]
This raises a question about the criticism that can be brought against Calvinism or non-Calvinism from the point of view of rationality. Are we more rationally justified in holding one over the other? With respect to the coherence of one’s beliefs, Audi observes that coherence alone cannot create justification for beliefs, but “incoherence can defeat justification.”[54] He states that,
“Incoherence has a definite negative character. The paradigm of it is blatant logical inconsistency.”[55]
Speaking about what justifies a person to hold certain beliefs he states,
“It has been plausibly argued…that one source, and perhaps the basic source, of justification is coherence among one’s beliefs.”[56]
Regarding incoherence and contradiction he writes,
“…incoherence is a prime defeater, as where one discovers that something one believes entails a contradiction and hence one ceases to be justified in holding that belief.”[57]
“…in any case of foundational justification, coherence can be expected as well. This is an important point; and it does much to explain the appeal of coherence as a purportedly basic element in justification.”[58]
As to our beliefs being rational and justified Audi writes,
“A justified belief or action…is also rational… If we call someone’s belief or action justified, we do not question whether it is rational: to say that it is not rational is to take away with one hand something given by the other.”[59]
“A body of evidence can be such as to make it rational to judge a matter either way. If, however, it justifies one in believing p, it does not also justify one in believing not –p.”
Audi is of course pointing out that we are never justified in believing a contradiction. He also writes about prima facie justification for a belief by pointing out “the evident truth of simple logical truths.” Audi states,
“There are intuitive impressions as well, such as the sense of the evident truth of simple logical truths, and these impressions too can ground prima facie justification…”[60]
“The capacities entailed by rationality certainly do imply that there are many logical truths which rational persons are at least disposed to believe. Take the proposition that if it is either snowing or sizzling outside, and it is not snowing, then it is sizzling. If one considers this under normal conditions, one believes it.”[61]
“…incompatible propositions cannot both be true.”[62]
“If I have good enough ground to be justified in believing a proposition, this precludes my being justified in believing an obvious contrary.”[63]
Again, the law of non-contradiction holds for our beliefs to be justified. Regarding that which might override the justification for our present beliefs, Audi gives the following principle formulation.
“…my justification for believing p is overridden if I have, equally accessible to me, a least as good (undefeated) justification for believing a proposition logically incompatible with p.”[64]
Again, Audi can confidently state,
“…mutually incompatible propositions cannot both be true…”[65]
Audi is affirming the indispensable role logic plays in determining justified propositions and beliefs. With regard to biblical interpretation and theology, this issue was stated succinctly by Jerry Walls and Joseph Dongell when they wrote,
“While logical consistency may not be a sufficient condition to show that a theology is true, it is a necessary condition.”[66]
The issue of the logical and moral coherence of one’s proposed interpretations of Scripture and doctrinal formulations must be reckoned with. They raise hermeneutical concerns that cannot be ignored. Calvinists cannot justify their doctrinal incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions produced by their theistic determinism by baptizing them as a spiritual virtue on the basis that “God’s ways are higher than our ways,” or “who are you to talk back to God,” or their incomprehensibility due to fallen human reason, or that they are an antinomy, or “high mystery.” Certainly, the Bible contains genuine mysteries, but the logical and moral inconsistencies and contradictions produced by the Calvinists’ interpretations show them to be genuine misinterpretations of the text. Simply put, our beliefs must be rational, that is, they must evidence coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. The non-Calvinists’ interpretations, theology, and soteriology exhibit these characteristics, while the Calvinists’ do not. The non-Calvinists’ interpretations exhibit explanatory power, explanatory scope, and moral clarity. The Calvinists’ interpretations do not. Hence, we are not rationally justified in believing Calvinism is a biblical theology; therefore, we are not justified in accepting Calvinism.
Read the next section – Robert Audi: Natural Theology, Natural Reason and the Resolution of Religious Disagreement
Footnotes
[53] Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19.
[54] Ibid. 24.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid. 28.
[58] Ibid. 47.
[59] Ibid. 51.
[60] Ibid. 43.
[61] Ibid. 174.
[62] Ibid. 187.
[63] Ibid. 196.
[64] Ibid. 45.
[65] Ibid. 52.
[66] Jerry L. Walls and Joseph R. Dongell, Why I Am Not A Calvinist, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 156.