Section 19
Go to Chapter 7 – The Indispensibility of Reason and Logic in Biblical Interpretation
Packer defends his doctrines from the charge that they are a real contradiction by arguing that they constitute an “antinomy” which is very different from a “paradox.” But in making the point that antinomy is not the same as paradox, Packer affirms that his antinomy is really self-contradictory and therefore really meaningless. Packer states that in a paradox,
“…what creates the appearance of contradiction is not the facts, but the words. The contradiction is verbal, but not real, and a little thought shows how it can be eliminated and the same idea expressed in non-paradoxical form.”[122]
Note that the paradox is a linguistic or verbal puzzle, and “a little thought shows how it can be eliminated.” It is not “the facts” that “create the appearance of contradiction,” implying that if it were the facts, then there would be a real contradiction, for Packer goes on to say that,
“…it should be noted that a paradox is always comprehensible…the person at the receiving end must be able, on reflection, to see how to unravel the paradox, otherwise it will seem to him to be really self-contradictory, and therefore really meaningless.”[123]
Note first that Packer accepts the “fact” that real self-contradiction is real meaninglessness. But also note that Packer has just given us the ‘definition’ of real contradiction, and that definition coincides with his notion of ‘antinomy.’ Packer’s own assessment of a paradox accords with the very essence of how to detect real contradiction, and this applies to the theological proposition that creates Packer’s “antinomy.” Just as in a biblical paradox, “the person at the receiving end must be able, on reflection, to see how to unravel the paradox, otherwise it will seem to him to be really self-contradictory, and therefore really meaningless,” so it is with theological propositions.[124] Those of us reading Scripture, that is, we who are on “the receiving end,” must be able, upon reflection, to see how to make sense of the words of the texts, their proposed interpretation and doctrinal conclusions, otherwise they will seem to us to be “really self-contradictory, and therefore really meaningless.” The fact is that we do not “see how to unravel” the Calvinists’ doctrines of determinism and human freedom. Therefore, the Calvinist’s interpretation here is “really self-contradictory, and therefore really meaningless.”
Whereas “an incomprehensible paradox could not be distinguished from a mere contradiction in terms,” and a “sheer paradox would have to be written off as sheer nonsense,” Packer states,
“…an antinomy is neither dispensable nor comprehensible…it is insoluble…we cannot explain it. Nor is there any way to get rid of it, save by falsifying the very facts that led us to it.”[125] (Italics mine)
Note first that Packer is admitting that his ‘antinomy’ has the characteristic of the “incomprehensible.” This is a characteristic of a “mere contradiction in terms” or a “sheer paradox which would have to be written off as sheer nonsense.” Not only that, but Packer’s “antinomy” is incomprehensible, insoluble, and inexplicable. Yet regarding a paradox, he states, “…the person at the receiving end must be able, on reflection, to see how to unravel the paradox, otherwise it will seem to him to be really self-contradictory, and therefore really meaningless.” So words that we are not able, on reflection, to see how to unravel, are to us “really self-contradictory, and therefore really meaningless.” And yet, there is this same inability, on reflection, to see how to unravel Packer’s “antinomy,” that is, his Calvinist doctrinal propositions. Hence, they certainly seem to us to be “really self-contradictory, and therefore really meaningless.” Packer’s “antinomy” is incomprehensible, insoluble, and inexplicable. So what’s the difference between this “antinomy” and a real contradiction besides Packer’s question-begging pronouncement that his doctrine of universal divine causal determinism is a “fact” of Scripture that cannot be gotten rid of and that, to avoid the conclusion of contradiction, we ought to place it into Packer’s creatively altered and tailor-made category of an “antinomy.” As C. A. Campbell has pointed out in the previous section (18), what Packer is describing here is just the case with a real contradiction.
Secondly, if Packer is going to introduce incomprehensibility, insolubility, and inexplicability as characteristics of the nature of his interpretations and the theology built upon them, then the logical and rational criteria we need to discern whether or not his interpretations are valid have been put out of court by Packer. Upon what grounds should we accept the presumption that “the very facts” of his interpretations of Scripture are correct? Suppose Packer’s interpretations are incorrect and, therefore, the source of a real contradiction? Even if they are of the nature of an “antinomy” as Packer redefines it, if we change “the fact” of universal divine causal determinism, wouldn’t the “antinomy” disappear? Upon what grounds does Packer demonstrate that his “antinomy” is not a “mere contradiction in terms” and a “sheer paradox” that is to be written off as “nonsense?” In presupposing the truth of his theistic determinism, which is the cause of Packer’s difficulties here, he can provide no grounds for convincing us that his position is not nonsense. As such, he is creating his own definition of “antinomy” to justify his doctrine of universal divine causal determinism, which he considers true a priori, while also begging the question.
“…the law of noncontradiction is a tool that must be used to identify Biblical truth in the first place.”
David Basinger
Thirdly, Packer presumes that his interpretations that create the antinomy are correct, making the antinomy “neither dispensable nor comprehensible.” But again, this begs the question of whether his interpretation is correct. Are “the very facts” that led us to the antinomy really valid biblical interpretations? Can the “very facts” that we would have to falsify be falsifiable on any other grounds than a logical assessment of the propositions in question? The answer is they cannot. So what “facts” would we have to falsify to get rid of the contradiction? If we get rid of “the fact” of a deterministic sovereignty, the “antinomy” goes away. Non-Calvinists have presented sound exegesis and interpretations of the disputed texts that do falsify “the very facts,” that is, the Calvinist interpretations that have forced Packer to create his version of an “antinomy.” Packer is simply presupposing the validity of his biblical interpretations on this matter and explaining away the contradiction they generate as an “antinomy.” But the “antimony” has the same characteristics of a real contradiction. The presumption of the validity of his interpretations and their indispensability required Packer to create this category of “antinomy,” which enables him to avoid what is otherwise a real contradiction in his theology.
Packer claims that “the Bible teaches both” God’s deterministic sovereignty and human freedom and responsibility. But in presupposing the truth of his interpretations, he is therefore begging the question. And Packer’s move here, a move which all Calvinists make as the full and final answer to their incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions, is to quarantine within an “antinomy” or “mystery” the logical and moral reasoning necessary to decide the validity of those interpretations. They assert that the problems their interpretations create are incomprehensible, insoluble, and inexplicable, and by calling this an “antinomy,” they avoid acknowledging that this is precisely the nature of a contradiction. But this logical and moral reasoning, along with the assessments and conclusions it may offer, is put aside. By employing “antinomy,” Packer dismisses the capacity and function of logical reasoning for discerning the validity of interpretive claims. “Antimony” sequesters the law of non-contradiction from participating in the deliberations on the validity of the Calvinist’s interpretations of divine sovereignty, defined deterministically. Packer’s “antinomy” is a convenient device for putting out of commission the intellectual tools we need to comprehend, explain, and determine the truth or falsity of Packer’s interpretations. The problem is not as Packer presents it. It is not as he says – incomprehensible, inexplicable, and insoluble. Rather, we can comprehend the Calvinists’ problem here all too well, and that is what Packer is refusing to acknowledge. The problem is comprehensible, explicable, and soluble. The problem resides in Calvinism’s definition of God’s sovereignty as a universal divine causal determinism.[126] We can identify the source of the problems plaguing Calvinism. The source lies in its theistic determinism. We can explain, both intellectually and interpretively, the types of problems entailed by this theistic determinism. We can see how it is antithetical to the biblical worldview, and we can solve these problems by the application of logical and moral reasoning (i.e., clear thinking) to the interpretation of the text, that is, by adopting a hermeneutic of coherence.
Applying this discussion to the Calvinists’ theology of deterministic sovereignty and human freedom and responsibility, Campbell observed that, “The crucial point is that thought cannot, qua thought, accept their union unless it conceives some actual or possible ground for their union.” Packer’s “antinomy” diverts our thinking from reflecting on and facing the fact that we cannot conceive of “some actual or possible ground for their union.” Thus, lacking such grounds, we cannot accept the Calvinist doctrine of God’s deterministic sovereignty, not because the non-Calvinist is seeking human autonomy from God, but simply because it places Scripture in contradiction with itself. And that’s just an indication of bad interpretation. This is not a matter of mystery, but misinterpretation. This is not a matter of antinomy, but misinterpretation. Thus, theistic determinism cannot be a viable interpretation of Scripture because it is antithetical to the overwhelming testimony to genuine contingency that is integral to the biblical worldview. Incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory interpretations of Scripture cannot be true reflections of what the disputed texts mean to convey, given their immediate contexts and when interpreted within the broader canonical context.
Because the Calvinists’ theistic determinism creates the logical and moral incoherence in their theology, Calvinists will always reject the incoherence as interpretively insignificant. They must always ultimately dismiss the use of human reason and logic from their hermeneutic. Packer makes this clear. Listing the reasons fellow Christians reject his deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty, he states,
“The root cause is the same as in most cases of error in the Church – the intruding of rationalistic speculations, the passion for systematic consistency, a reluctance to recognize the existence of mystery and to let God be wiser than men, and a consequent subjecting of Scripture to the supposed demands of human logic.”[127]
Packer would have our hermeneutic untethered from reason and logic so he can declare his incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory doctrines an “antinomy” and a “mystery.” He hopes that the above list of “cases of error in the Church” will convince most people that his doctrines are biblical. But this list, topped off by “subjecting Scripture to the supposed demands of human logic,” amounts to the suppression of reason in exegesis and interpretation. Packer has to take this course of action because he knows what happens when his theology is subjected to the deliberations and deliverances of logical reasoning and moral intuition. His theology falls to pieces. Suffice it to say here that we cannot accept Packer’s suppression of reason if we are to discern whether there is a real contradiction here. He is requiring us to put aside our critical thinking to accept his theological propositions that, as “brute facts” and “bare conjunctions of differents” find no intellectual resting place. They cannot be accepted as true because they cannot be adequately grounded and unified, which is what it means to be a contradiction. Campbell explains,
“…critical thinking often finds itself obliged to reject what uncritical thinking accepts ‘without a qualm’…thought’s intrinsic demand for a ground is surely plain enough in those activities of thought, such as science and philosophy, in which the theoretic interest dominates; in which truth, not practical convenience, is our goal, and in which, therefore, if anywhere, we might expect to discover the authentic nature of the intellect’s demands. In science and philosophy ‘brute facts’, ‘bare conjunctions of differents’, are not just ‘accepted’. On the contrary, intellectual unrest persists so long as we see no way to deliver them from so ‘irrational’ a status. ‘Brute facts’ are for science and philosophy problems: problems not solved to our satisfaction until we have mediated the ‘bare conjunction’ through what appears to us an adequate ‘ground.’ Just as ‘Nature abhors a vacuum’, so ‘the intellect abhors a bare conjunction’”.[128]
In addition, Isaac Watts has said,
“It was a saying of the ancients, that ‘truth lies in a well’; and to carry on the metaphor, we may justly say, that logic supplies us with steps whereby we may go down to reach the water.”[129]
We must reject Packer’s advice and keep our minds in gear. We must keep our intellectual wits about us. If we do so, I submit that it becomes evident that there is a real contradiction in the Calvinists’ theology. Packer states that there is no way to get rid of an antimony “save by falsifying the very facts that led us to it.” Well, non-Calvinists have compellingly falsified “the very facts” of Calvinist theology by their alternative coherent exegeses of the relevant texts in both their immediate and broader contexts. But it is equally important to see that we can “get rid of” this “antinomy” by showing it up for what it truly is, that is, camouflage for a contradiction. If it can be shown that the Calvinist doctrines hidden by an “antinomy” are truly contradictory, then both the “antinomy” as an “explanation and the doctrines fail.
Theistic determinism and unconditional election can never be unified intellectually, or in any other way, with contingency, free will, and human responsibility. These conflicting doctrines fit Campbell’s description of a contradiction as a bare conjunction of differents, unmediated by any ground. Thought rejects this as alien to its nature. It deems such as ‘irrational.’[130] In other words, these Calvinist doctrinal propositions just don’t fit together in our thoughts, according to the nature and laws of thought itself. As the Calvinists propose them, these doctrines remain restlessly swirling back and forth, to and fro in our minds and in our discussions and debates without ground or union in logic or reason. That’s what contradictions do. That’s the way they behave. That’s how we know a real contradiction when we “see” one with our God-given eyes of reason. And there is a real one here in Packer’s Calvinist theology. Hence, Calvinism is to be rejected.
Read the next section – Concluding Thoughts on J. I. Packer’s “Antinomy” and Suppression of Reason
Footnotes
[122] J. I. Packer, Evangelism & The Sovereignty of God, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1961), 19-20.
[123] Ibid. 20.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid. 21.
[126] This is the phrase William Lane Craig uses to describe Calvinism. See William Lane Craig, Defenders 2 Class, Doctrine of Creation: Part 10. Oct. 21, 2012. You can read the transcript or listen to the lecture at this link: https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-2/s2-doctrine-of-creation/doctrine-of-creation-part-10/ Last accessed Dec. 16, 2025.
[127] J. I. Packer, Evangelism & The Sovereignty of God, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1961), 16.
[128] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 391-392.
[129] Isaac Watts (1674-1748), English divine and hymn writer.
[130] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 389.