Section 18
Go to Chapter 7 – The Indispensibility of Reason and Logic in Biblical Interpretation
We now turn to a critical question in this debate that the Calvinist attempts to avoid and the non-Calvinist claims is the Achilles heel of Calvinism. That is, the issue of contradiction. The Calvinist recognizes that there is a logical problem among their several doctrinal beliefs or claims about what Scripture teaches. For instance, the resultant contradiction between their definition of divine sovereignty as a theistic determinism in relation to their claims about contingency, human freedom, and responsibility. This plays itself out with respect to our salvation and eternal destinies, in the Calvinist doctrine of unconditional election. This doctrine maintains that God alone has unconditionally chosen before he created the world who will be saved and who will be condemned to eternal punishment in hell (“the reprobate”). Yet Calvinists also maintain that God holds the non-elect or reprobate responsible for their rejection of God’s offer of salvation in Christ. God will judge them for their rejection of salvation.
Now Calvinists attempt to relieve such contradictions by labeling them only “apparent.” They call these “apparent contradictions.” But this raises questions like, what is a contradiction and can we know one when we see it? Philosopher C. A. Campbell provides fundamental insight into the logical problem of contradiction that plagues the Calvinist reasoning and theological position.
“Now in actual practice (whatever a man may be driven to say in defending a theory) everyone agrees in rejecting as false a proposition which he believes to involve self-contradiction. The ‘Law’ of contradiction is one whose authority is accepted in all thinking, and in that sense is an ultimate for human thought.”[117]
Campbell goes on to argue that the Law of contradiction is indeed a ‘Law’ and that,
“…a man cannot not accept the principle of contradiction if he is to think at all. But where we have a principle which we have literally no choice but to accept, to talk of that principle as a ‘convention’ is nonsense. Acceptance of it is a matter of necessity, not convention. As Aristotle pointed out a long time ago, ‘a principle which everyone must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis’.”[118]
From this point of view, Calvinists need to come to grips with whether or not in labeling their logical difficulty an “apparent contradiction” they are treating the Law of Contradiction more as a ‘convention’ that can be employed or discarded as one finds it more or less theologically convenient.
Campbell also argues that it is not only a law of thought but also a “law of things, holding good of ‘reality.’”[119] As such, this runs contrary to the Calvinist justifications that dismiss contradiction and rational incoherence on the basis that God is incomprehensible to our fallen, sinful human minds. The Calvinist position seems to require that we not think in accordance with the reality of the matter. God may be incomprehensible to our fallen, sinful human minds, but whatever that means, it does not entail ignoring or violating the law of contradiction. It does not entail the acceptance of logical inconsistencies and contradictions. This is especially true if logic is grounded in the very nature of God as a rational being who is also immutable and does not establish or alter reality merely by an act of his will, that is, for instance, suspending or violating the law of non-contradiction. Such acts of his will could only be understood as arbitrary, and claims of “apparent contradiction” are vacuous, being divorced from considerations of what is and is not possible for God to be and do given his divine nature.
We must acknowledge, therefore, that although our understanding of God is limited, it is not self-contradictory. We should not talk about the incomprehensibility of God or things being ‘spiritual’ in ways that require us to dismiss the canons of reason or laws of logic, especially the law of non-contradiction. It is a principle that cannot be reversed lest we make any true and sure knowledge of God’s nature, as well as what we can know of what is true from what is false, null, and void.
Few Calvinists would disagree with this in theory. One cannot reasonably argue against the use of the Law of Contradiction. For any argument as such presupposes the Law’s status and necessity as a Law of reasoning. Try arguing anything with a blatant disregard for whether or not your argument is coherent and non-contradictory. One might as well argue that 2 plus 2 equals 4 and 2 plus 2 does not equal 4 in the same manner and at the same time, and hold that the contradiction is only apparent. Calvinist J. I. Packer advises we do just that concerning his definition of the sovereignty of God and the biblical witness to human freedom and responsibility. He says we ought to,
“…put down the semblance of contradiction to the deficiency of your own understanding; think of the two principles as, not rival alternatives, but in some way that at present you do not grasp, complimentary to each other…teach yourself to think of reality in a way that provides for their peaceful coexistence, remembering that reality itself has proved actually to contain them both.”[120]
The implications of such advice in mathematics would be disastrous. And in the same way that we know this reasoning is faulty for mathematics, we know that it is faulty for interpretation and theology, for the canons of reason are the ground of all reasoning as such. As Campbell observed, “The proof of the principle of non-contradiction is that it is a principle which we cannot help accepting if we are to think at all.” What Packer is doing is attempting to rationalize this problem in his theology to maintain the credibility of his theology. What he ends up doing is giving the Calvinist permission to go about speaking nonsense. We should not and cannot take J. I. Packer’s “advice” if the laws of logic are indispensable to rational thinking and discussion. Hence, Packer imposes upon us a suppression of reason while reorienting how we ought to think about what we initially find troubling about Calvinism – its contradiction. This is bad advice.
Now, the Calvinist has claimed that the basic contradiction we find in Calvinism (theistic determinism vs. human freedom and responsibility) that troubles most of us is not a contradiction at all. It is only an “apparent contradiction.” But for many of us, this is a bald assertion because we trust our reason to identify a contradiction when we see one. Therefore, the Calvinist’s assertion raises the question as to whether Calvinism contains a real contradiction, as was established above in this chapter and in other chapters on this site. If so, then Calvinism is in error concerning one or many of its interpretations and doctrinal beliefs. Recall Campbell’s words,
“…everyone agrees in rejecting as false a proposition which he believes to involve self-contradiction. The ‘Law’ of contradiction is one whose authority is accepted in all thinking, and in that sense is an ultimate for human thought.”
And also,
“…a man cannot not accept the principle of contradiction if he is to think at all. But where we have a principle which we have literally no choice but to accept, to talk of that principle as a ‘convention’ is nonsense. Acceptance of it is a matter of necessity, not convention.”
Therefore, if Calvinism presents to us a real contradiction, then it must be false with relation to the causes, that is, the interpretations or doctrines, of that contradiction. Contradiction is decisive that Calvinism is unbiblical. It is not a valid interpretation of Scripture. For if it is true that the Law of Contradiction is an inviolable Law of all legitimate thought and reality, and Calvinism is found to be marked by true or real contradiction, then that would be the death knell for Calvinism regarding the doctrines that cause that contradiction. Yet Campbell recognizes,
“It is one thing, however, to see that the Law of Contradiction is a genuine ‘law’, is an ultimate law, and is a law both of thought and things. It is quite another thing to see what precisely it is that constitutes contradiction…”
So, what precisely constitutes a contradiction? Is there a real contradiction within Calvinist thought and doctrine, or is this problem something other than a contradiction that only “appears” to be one? (Although Calvinists seem to recognize it as a contradiction because they describe it as an “apparent contradiction.”)
Anyway, Campbell references a work by F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, to explain the definition of contradiction.
“Beyond a doubt,…thought requires the uniting of differences for its very life. But it does not follow that thought is prepared to accept a union of differents irrespective of the manner of their union. ‘Thought demands’ Bradley reminds us, ‘to go proprio motu, or, what is the same thing, with ground or reason.’ A merely external union of differences…is not in the end acceptable to thought. It is of the very essence of thought to seek some ground for their union; and so long as no adequate ground is discoverable, intellectual dissatisfaction persists. A bare conjunction of differents, unmediated by any ground, thought rejects as alien to its nature, as ‘irrational.’…Here…we find our answer to the question of what constitutes contradiction. Contradiction consists in uniting differences simply, in and as a bare conjunction. What the concrete nature of the differences happens to be is not of the essence of the matter. The crucial point is that thought cannot, qua thought, accept their union unless it conceives some actual or possible ground for their union.”[121]
Here, Campbell tries to get at the essential definition of a contradiction. Applied to our topic we may ask, “What is the ground or reason for the union of the differents of divine sovereignty as theistic determinism and human responsibility and freedom as expressed by Calvinist theology? Is it a “bare conjunction of differents, unmediated by any ground?” I believe so. This, as I see it, is precisely what the Calvinist doctrines produce. We are required to accept the “bare conjunction of differents” upon which there is no adequate ground for thought to rest. This is precisely the way Packer exhorts us to think, or more appropriately, not to think. Indeed, Packer states, “…teach yourself to think of reality in a way that provides for their peaceful coexistence.” This is nothing short of the suppression and reorientation of one’s thinking. Packer is telling us to teach ourselves to ignore what our reason and common sense tell us so that we may blindly accept his contradiction. Packer never seriously investigates the nature of the contradiction that his doctrine of deterministic sovereignty generates with human freedom and responsibility. He offers no grounds for explaining what certainly presents itself to our thinking as a contradiction other than simply to assert that it is not real but only “apparent.” He does not justify his assertion except to say “reality itself has proved actually to contain them both.” But has it? How so? How does reality prove to us that universal divine causal determinism is true? I would think that reality and practical experience tell us it is not true. He presumes that we all “see that each must be true on its own” without questioning whether the incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions his doctrine of sovereignty as theistic determinism generates are sure indicators that it is a misinterpretation of Scripture. For Packer to say “each is true on its own” is to presuppose that his universal divine causal determinism is the teaching of Scripture. That is question-begging. We are saying his universal divine causal determinism is not true because of the incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions it produces. We hold to the Law of Contradiction. Packer does not. Reality has not proved to contain them both as Packer asserts. The human freedom and responsibility that is mutually exclusive of theistic determinism certainly seems to have the force of practical reality behind it, by the Law of Contradiction that eliminates Packer’s deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty. So Packer has a vested interest in jettisoning the Law of Contradiction, because without it, we cannot tell whether Packer’s interpretation is correct or not. How do we know Packer’s theology contains a real contradiction? We know this because, even given his theological propositions, intellectual dissatisfaction continues to exist. That is why this controversy continues ad infinitum. Packer is “uniting differences simply, in and as bare conjunction.” Packer puts determinism alongside freedom and responsibility without the ability for us to conceive how they can be unified upon “some actual or possible ground.” So this is precisely what constitutes contradiction. There is a lack of “some actual or possible ground for conceiving their union.” We know we are dealing with a contradiction when given certain propositions, our mind can find no rational grounds for their union; no resting place for the mind’s ability to conceive the logical compatibility of those propositions when present.
Therefore, it certainly seems to me that Packer declares his doctrinal difficulties only “apparent” because he is confronted by what can only be understood as a real contradiction. By labeling the contradiction only “apparent,” Packer is unwittingly telling us that his interpretation of deterministic sovereignty and human freedom and responsibility violates the Law of Contradiction. But note the problem here with respect to the nature of a contradiction as “uniting differences simply, in and as a bare conjunction.” Campbell has pointed out that, “It is of the very essence of thought to seek some ground for their union; and so long as no adequate ground is discoverable, intellectual dissatisfaction persists.” This lack of grounding and the resultant “intellectual dissatisfaction” is precisely the nature and definition of a contradiction, and it is precisely what we have here with Packer for the following reasons.
First, Packer cannot provide us adequate ground for the union of his interpretive propositions. To simply assert that what certainly presents itself to us as a contradiction is to be considered merely “apparent” fails to ground the differences and still leaves us in intellectual dissatisfaction. Packer cannot ground or justify that which for all practical purposes and our reasoning faculties tell us is a real contradiction.
Secondly, Packer knows that the nature of the difficulty with his interpretations and theological assertions amounts to real contradiction. If he didn’t know this, it would not require that he identify it as such when he instructs us to “put down the semblance of contradiction to the deficiency of your own understanding.” If it were not a real contradiction, it would not even present itself to him as a contradiction. The contradiction is front and center. It shows itself as real. Implicitly acknowledging the truth of the law of non-contradiction and the irrationality of violating it, Packer must attempt to avoid it as the reality about his interpretations and doctrinal conclusions.
Thirdly, it is a real contradiction; otherwise, it would never have presented itself so tenaciously to his thought process as such. This problem stubbornly persists in Calvinism and this debate, which is evidence that we cannot conceive of “some actual or possible ground for their union.” The two propositions float about as the Calvinist attempts a “merely external union of differents…which is not in the end acceptable to thought.” Campbell states that, “A bare conjunction of differents, unmediated by any ground, thought rejects as alien to its nature, as ‘irrational.’”
Fourthly, it is a real contradiction because if Packer’s Calvinist interpretations were biblically accurate, we would have been left with some other linguistic dilemma or puzzle of reasoning that could eventually be grounded and provide intellectual satisfaction – perhaps an actual paradox or genuine antinomy. When Calvinists do claim these are the nature of their doctrinal difficulties, they should then be able to show us the resolution of the paradox or antinomy because these can be resolved to reach intellectual satisfaction. But this the Calvinist has not done, which confirms that the problem is one of real contradiction. And if the Calvinist cannot resolve their problem as a paradox or antinomy, then they have a real contradiction on their hands. Paradox and antinomy can, sooner or later, be intellectually grounded and find resolution, but a contradiction cannot. As discussed above, that is the nature and definition of a contradiction. If Packer’s Calvinist interpretations were biblically accurate, he would be able to demonstrate how they are what he claims them to be – an antinomy – and therefore not a contradiction.
Fifthly, given the law of non-contradiction, a real contradiction must be written off as real nonsense. That is what we have here – a real contradiction. In other words, we do not see, upon further reflection, how to make sense out of the Calvinist’s deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty and human freedom. The Calvinist himself does not claim to be able to do so. We are left with “a bare conjunction of differents.” As Campbell stated, “A merely external union of differences…is not in the end acceptable to thought. It is of the very essence of thought to seek some ground for their union; and so long as no adequate ground is discoverable, intellectual dissatisfaction persists. A bare conjunction of differents, unmediated by any ground, thought rejects as alien to its nature, as ‘irrational.’”
Packer cannot provide any substantial evidence that his doctrines aren’t a real contradiction. His course of action was not convincing or helpful. He is not interested in determining whether or not this is a real contradiction. He is more interested in declaring it not to be so. He therefore must ignore what he also knows is true, that is, that both his own logical reasoning and the tenacity with which this debate persists suggest that there is a real contradiction here. To simply declare the contradiction “apparent” or describe it as a “semblance” does not make it less of a contradiction. We must therefore conclude that the Calvinist doctrines Packer suggests we define and understand as an “antinomy” or as a “semblance of contradiction” or an “apparent contradiction” remain really self-contradictory and therefore real nonsense. As such, they are misinterpretations of Scripture. Therefore, the Calvinist approach to this matter violates a fundamental law of rational thought – the law of non-contradiction. When in play, as it is here, the law determines valid from invalid interpretations. Therefore, Calvinism, in this respect, does not provide the rational grounds needed to support belief in the Calvinist interpretations of Scripture. We lack the intellectual warrant to think the Calvinist’s interpretations of God’s sovereignty in conjunction with human freedom and responsibility are correct. Hence, Calvinism does not warrant our belief.
I conclude from Packer’s approach that his traditional theological paradigm is non-negotiable and will not even be subject to the Law of Contradiction, let alone open to review from the Scriptures in light of the arguments from opposing interpretations of the pertinent texts that avoid contradictions and produce textual and theological coherence and harmony throughout the whole scope of biblical teaching.
This, therefore, is the source of the perplexity and frustration many people experience when attempting to discern exactly what it is that is so disturbing yet elusive about Calvinism. It lies in the fact that we know a contradiction when we see one, yet the Calvinist requires that we suppress and ignore what we know to be contradictory. Those who question the logical and moral coherence of these doctrines must be diverted from pursuing this line of reasoning to its final conclusion. If one does pursue this line of reasoning, Calvinism comes up short as incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory, and therefore it cannot be the teaching of Scripture.
Read the next section – J. I. Packer: Paradox, Antinomy and Real Contradiction
Footnotes
[117] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 384.
[118] Ibid. 386.
[119] Ibid. 386-387.
[120] J. I. Packer, Evangelism & The Sovereignty of God, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1961), 21.
[121] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 387-389.
The Truth of the Gospel 