Section 17
Go to Chapter 7 – The Indispensibility of Reason and Logic in Biblical Interpretation
C. A. Campbell was professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow when he gave his Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews from 1953 to 1955. These lectures were subsequently collected in a work entitled On Selfhood and Godhood.[104] I concur with Campbell’s assessment of the role of reason presented in these lectures when he defended reason as the philosopher’s “instrument” for discerning truth even in matters of religion and faith. With qualifications made against rationalism, which I discussed earlier and a distinction Campbell will also make, we would be correct to maintain that it is also the theologian’s “instrument” for discerning truth even in matters of religion and faith.
Campbell observed that religious critics of philosophy claim that the philosopher’s use of reason is offensive to religious faith.[105] This claim is also made in this controversy between Calvinists and non-Calvinists. Calvinists object that sinful human reason cannot possibly fully comprehend the depths of God’s will and ways. As such, it is offensive to Christian faith. Calvinists, therefore, use this limitation of human reason to justify the problematic interpretive and doctrinal conclusions of Calvinism. These interpretations and doctrines create logical and moral incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions that Calvinists claim are only “apparent” contradictions. Therefore, according to Calvinists, due to certain presuppositions about the nature of human reason being flawed and faulty, the Calvinist interpretations only “appear” to be contradictory and should therefore be accepted as mysteries of the faith. According to Calvinists, the Bible clearly sets out their doctrines as they have interpreted them.
But is this really the case with reason and revelation? Whether the Calvinist interpretations are actually real contradictions and not “apparent contradictions” is the question before us. What is an “apparent contradiction?” Can we know a real contradiction when we see one? Does an “apparent contradiction” presuppose that we must know a real contradiction when we see one?
Calvinists acknowledge logical difficulties and contradictions in their theology, but then claim they are only “apparent” or a “high mystery” because implicitly they know that one’s interpretations of the divinely inspired text cannot and therefore should not contain real contradictions or incoherencies. But are these assertions about “apparent contradiction” and “high mystery” biblically and intellectually plausible, or can it be discerned whether the Calvinist interpretations are real contradictions and incoherencies and therefore misinterpretations of the text?
Calvinists and non-Calvinists agree that God needs to reveal himself to us in order for us to have a true understanding of who he is and what he is like. It is not within the ability of human reason to discover and know what only God can reveal. But once he does reveal himself, especially as recorded in written form, how are we to come to a true understanding of this written revelation? What role does reason play in the interpretation of written texts?
Due to the applicability of Campbell’s insights to our concerns here, I quote him at length. Note that we can rightly substitute “theology” for “philosophy” and “thinking person” or “theologian” for the word “philosopher” in Campbell’s discussion. He states,
“I think there is great need, therefore, that the claim for reason inherent in philosophy itself be set out with care. When that is done, objection will, without doubt, still be taken to the claim in some religious quarters. But it will no longer seem plausible, I think, to dismiss the claim as preposterous.
We need not linger over a definition of reason sufficient for the purpose in hand. Within the framework of the dispute about the competence of reason in religion, reason can, I think, be taken with fair safety as denoting for all parties the kind of thinking which is directed to the attainment of truth under the sole guidance and control of thought’s own internal standards. That is ‘reason’ in the sense in which reason is the characteristic instrument in philosophy. And obviously the philosopher qua philosopher must make some claim for the competence of his instrument. Our immediate question is, just how much must the philosopher claim for it, if he is not to stultify his very choice of it as his instrument?”[106]
It seems to me that this same question is at the heart of the differences between the Calvinist and non-Calvinist handling of the biblical text and the acceptance or rejection of the respective theological conclusions. The examples given above introduced us to the role of reason in interpretation. Given rationally perplexing theological conclusions, can we simply defy reason’s presence and role by labeling interpretive conclusions as only “apparent” or “high mystery,” or ought rational coherence be an essential element in our interpretive methodology and a check upon our theological conclusions when they prove contradictory or incoherent? What is reason’s proper role, potential, and limitations in producing and determining valid interpretations? Campbell continues,
“Now it is clear at once that the competence claimed for it is not omni-competence; that is to say, it is certainly not the ability of reason to develop from its own internal resources the whole system of truths about the universe…Now I have little doubt that a good deal of the animus towards philosophy which one remarks in so many religious circles today rests on the erroneous assumption that the philosopher does, qua philosopher, conceive of his instrument reason as an organ competent to apprehend God, if any God there be: and I should agree that against such a claim for reason it is possible to bring very formidable arguments indeed. On the other hand, it is certain that some of the religious critics of philosophy…know perfectly well that this is not a claim intrinsic to philosophy, and that there are many philosophers who would not make it. Presumably, therefore, these critics must have in mind some other claim for reason which, rightly or wrongly, they ascribe to the philosopher, and which they feel to be offensive to religious faith. What is this claim?
I think it is as follows. And I think the critics are right in believing that it belongs to philosophy as such, but wrong in believing that it is an invalid claim, and wrong also in believing it to be somehow derogatory to religion.
The philosopher must claim, I think, that wherever the question of objective truth arises, whether it be the truth of religion or of anything else, it is for reason, and for reason alone, to carry out the assessment of the evidence, and to make the final adjudication upon it. The evidence may come from many quarters, including, unquestionably, what is called ‘religious experience’. But how far, e.g. (if at all) a putative instance of religious experience can be regarded as an authentic instance of religious experience, involving the actual revelation of Deity that it is taken by the experiencing subject to involve; and how far, accordingly, (if at all) weight is to be attached to it in the construction of a theory about the ultimate nature of things – these are surely not matters that settle themselves. They are matters to be reflectively determined in the light of a variety of relevant considerations. And what is there save reason, the philosopher asks, to perform this office?
Is this then the claim for reason inherent in philosophy which induces so many religious thinkers to repudiate and disparage philosophy? I believe that it is. To exalt philosophy, or its organ reason, to the status of supreme judge in matters even of religious truth seems to them shocking; an irreligious assault upon the supremacy of faith. ‘If philosophy must make this claim or perish’, they would say, ‘then so much the worse for philosophy.’
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the validity of this ‘philosophic’ claim for reason is, in the end, inescapable. And I think we can best see that it is so by directing our attention to a simple, but surely very significant, fact. No one, so far as I am aware, is prepared to admit that his own religious beliefs are unreasonable. If that were imputed against him, on the ground, perhaps, that he is putting his trust in some non-rational mode of apprehension, he is ready to argue in defence of his so doing. He will say, perhaps, that ‘mere reason’ is out of its depth in the realm of religion, and that a God who is truly God can be apprehended only through His own Self-revelation, not by any processes initiated and controlled by the human reason. But then, notice well, he is arguing. He is contending that it is reasonable, in view of certain relevant considerations, to put one’s trust in a non-rational (or supra-rational) mode of apprehension. And what can this appeal to reason mean save the acceptance of reason as the ultimate court of appeal, even in matters of religion, which is just what the philosopher claims it to be?”[107]
We should note here that even though we gladly acknowledge that God takes the initiative to reveal himself to us, a revelation he has preserved for us in the Scriptures, and without which we would know less than we need to about him and ourselves, we also must acknowledge that we must process this revelatory evidence in a certain manner. Campbell’s point is that even those who claim “faith” over understanding do so by employing sound reason to argue and defend their position. Likewise, the interpretive process should be in accord with sound reasoning. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility of true mysteries and miracles, for both of these are coherent given a supernatural being of the type presented in Scripture. Yet reason will also inform us of these possibilities. We are not embracing rationalism. But neither should we excuse interpretive incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction as mystery or miracle. Rather, we are defending the use of reason for discerning validity in interpretation.
Campbell also states,
“Whatever more specific criteria the intellect may from time to time accept in its endeavors to know the real, there is one general and over-riding criterion from which its allegiance can at no point be withheld, viz. ‘non-contradiction’. An ‘object’ that is self-contradictory, in the sense that the characters we ascribe to it in our conception of it contradict one another, cannot as so conceived be accepted by thought as the reality it is seeking to know…I shall try to persuade you that when the nature of the contradictory is correctly elucidated, certain conclusions of the utmost importance follow about the nature of a reality which, whatever else it may be, must be assumed to be at least such that it does not contradict itself. ”[108]
Most Calvinists will agree with this in theory. Yet I submit that they are inconsistent, for they do not feel non-contradiction is a principle binding upon them for determining the validity of their interpretations and doctrines. Many Calvinists will dismiss the contradictions and incoherencies in their theology by claiming that they are engaged in ‘faith seeking understanding.’ But how does ‘faith’ seek anything, let alone ‘understanding,’ except through reason? And once we acknowledge the proper role of reason, how can we ignore contradiction and incoherence in our interpretive conclusions? Can the content of ‘faith’ violate the law of non-contradiction? In this sense, even ‘faith’ is “thought through” – resting upon something more fundamental than itself. ‘Faith’ cannot exist in an intellectual vacuum. “Faith or reason” is not a biblical viewpoint. Yet, might not the tenant, “faith seeking understanding,” be an excuse for maintaining a position regardless of its rational incoherence? May “faith” be an excuse for maintaining a theological tradition that refuses to admit its incoherence and therefore the possibility of an erroneous apprehension of Scripture? In these cases, perhaps “faith” does not want to seek any further “understanding,” indeed, “faith” wants no part of “understanding” when that “understanding” challenges that “faith.”
Campbell adds the following insights, which clarify the confusion many Calvinists express when they seek to justify the contradiction generated by their view of sovereignty and human freedom by labeling it “apparent” or “high mystery.” They assert that the human mind is inadequate to fully comprehend the will, plans, and ways of God. As true as this certainly is, the real issue pertains to the human mind’s adequacy to arbitrate what is being asserted about the will, plans, and ways of God. Calvinists either fail to recognize this distinction or simply “rationalize” or “spiritualize” it away to justify maintaining their theology despite its contradictions and incoherencies.
Campbell continues,
“Incidentally, it should be observed that the believer’s argument is not self-contradictory in thus tacitly appealing to reason to show that it is not by reason that we can apprehend God. For his appeal is to reason as ultimate arbiter, not to show that reason is not the ultimate arbiter, but to show that reason is not an appropriate organ for the apprehension of God.
On the other hand, it is self-contradictory to appeal to reason as ultimate arbiter to show that reason is not the ultimate arbiter. And that I am suggesting, is precisely what the religious critic of philosophy’s claim for reason is committed to doing, if he is going to try to justify his attitude at all. He may, of course, simply assert that not reason but Authority, or Inner Light, or what you will, is the ultimate arbiter: but as soon as he commits himself to defending the proposition, to arguing in its support, he presupposes the truth of the very proposition he is aiming to disprove. ‘Argument’ has no meaning if it does not invite decision in accordance with the evidence as it approves itself to reason. I cannot persuade myself, therefore, that there is any real alternative to acknowledging reason as the ultimate arbiter in the field of truth – religious truth or any other sort of truth – except silence, a dogged refusal even to begin to argue in defence of one’s beliefs.”[109]
Note first that if the Calvinist wishes to claim that reason is not the ultimate arbiter regarding their interpretations of the text, which is different than the claim that the human mind is capable of fully comprehending God apart from his revelation of himself to us, then Calvinism is surely presenting itself as genuinely irrational with respect to its hermeneutic. It is not unreasonable to believe God must reveal himself to us for us to apprehend him to the degree he desires that we do so, but it is unreasonable to maintain that our statements about that revelation need not be consistent, coherent, and non-contradictory. Besides opting for simple assertion or silence, which, according to my own experience, most Calvinists in the end resort to, we cannot escape this basic law of rational communication. Indeed, Campbell states that trying to escape rational coherence must lead to silence or mere assertion. Remember, we are grappling with what resources we possess in the matter of discerning the validity of an interpretation of the written text. Therefore, exegesis is insufficient in itself if it does not properly consider the role of reason as the ultimate arbiter in matters of conflicting interpretations. Without this consideration, we have too narrow and technical a definition of exegesis to do us much good in resolving these important differences. Exegetes can even manipulate their exegesis to their own advantage, as we saw the Calvinist doing in the above section, David Allen, Leighton Flowers, Exegesis, and Contradiction: 1 Timothy 2:1-6. Something more needs to be included in the interpretive process. That something is a determination as to the rational and moral coherence of the proposed interpretations and the theological constructs built upon them.[110] Neglect of rational and moral coherence as an indispensable hermeneutical principle is what the non-Calvinist objects to in Calvinist interpretation. The Calvinist / non-Calvinist divide is a hermeneutical divide.
Observe, therefore, that if the Calvinist is not willing to have the discussion at this level, then there is really nothing to discuss that will be of any theological benefit. To what end would theological discourse lead when there is no agreement as to the rational ground rules of interpretation? It is this phenomenon that allows the interaction between Calvinists and non-Calvinists to continue perpetually without progressing towards uncovering the truth in these matters. Hence, many Calvinists reach the point of silence and exhibit what Campbell describes as a “dogged refusal even to begin to argue in defence of one’s beliefs.” Indeed, silence or mere assertion becomes the only option where rational coherence has been dismissed. Many Calvinists simply ignore non-Calvinist attempts to engage on this matter. The law of non-contradiction is the prerequisite for all rational discourse. The basis of any meaningful discussion requires that it be rationally coherent. If rational coherence is summarily dismissed, then there is nothing to ground our interpretive claims as true and accurate. There is nothing by which we can establish their validity. Being inherently incoherent, they would be rationally indefensible. Hence, we have the Calvinists’ flight to “mystery.” If the two parties do speak, they speak from different contexts regarding what constitutes a sound hermeneutic with respect to logical and moral reasoning, and therefore, they cannot agree. But why shouldn’t we be able to discern the true meaning of a revelatory text if we can agree that authorial intent is a sound hermeneutical principle? Can’t we agree that authors intend to think and write with coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction? If the Calvinist disagrees with this, then it is incumbent upon them to explain and justify the incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction that mark their interpretations. Are they arguing that interpretive relativism is an option? And if they present an argument for their position, are they not affirming, as Campbell pointed out, that coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction are essential for proper interpretation, let alone rational thought and discourse?
Note that silence on the part of the Calvinist is an effective “response” to avoid a rational critique that might expose the irrationality of one’s position. It is also an expected response from one who believes that people hold the positions that they do because God predetermined and causes them to do so. Who is the Calvinist to argue with God as to what he has ordained each of us to think and believe! If the non-Calvinist has been ordained by God to be a non-Calvinist, what else is there to say? Since there is no such thing as meaningful persuasion within the Calvinists’ theistic determinism, the Calvinist would not feel obliged to engage in persuasive dialogue that presupposes libertarian freedom. Moreover, there is nothing to say because there is nothing further to think upon in a meaningful way, in that the Calvinist does not include coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction in their hermeneutic.[111] We cannot dismiss the necessity for rational coherence and hope to come to a resolution. How can two sides in a controversy reach a resolution when one party operates based on interpretative coherence (i.e., the non-Calvinist) and the other allows for interpretive incoherence (i.e., the Calvinist)? It simply cannot be done because allowing for interpretive incoherence cuts the rational and moral ground out from under us by which we discern what is true and false.
It therefore appears to me that what non-Calvinist textual interpretations have in their favor is a higher degree of rational coherence and intellectual honesty across the whole scope of Scripture. The non-Calvinist theology and soteriology can be coherently incorporated into the full biblical witness to the contingency of reality and the God/man relationship, and maintain honesty and integrity in the spoken word. There is truth correspondence between thought, word, and reality in non-Calvinist theology that we are hard-pressed to find in Calvinism. The culprit of the acute problems within Calvinism is its theistic determinism. This is a substantial matter that goes a long way to convince many of us that non-Calvinist theology and soteriology are closer to the biblical truth. With ‘common sense’ on the side of the non-Calvinist, the burden of proof therefore lies with the Calvinist. They have a doubly hard task. They not only need to exegete the text and propose an interpretation, but then, if it be determined that their interpretations are logically incoherent with other texts and biblical doctrines (as Calvinists themselves admit), and they refuse to allow this to challenge and correct their interpretations and theology, they need to either attempt to convince us and themselves that such interpretations are not rationally incoherent, or, convince us why we should believe their interpretations are true despite their rational incoherence. Regarding the latter, the Calvinist would be admitting to the irrationality of their theology. And as Campbell observed, “No one, so far as I am aware, is prepared to admit that his own religious beliefs are unreasonable.”[112] Concerning the Calvinists convincing people that their interpretations are not rationally incoherent, Calvinists have not fared well. Many Calvinists attempt to provide rational coherence for their theology.[113] But these attempts, having been fully vetted and countered by non-Calvinists, have not contained any advance in the coherence that is needed to convince those who are neutral or even their honest, truth-seeking opponents that Calvinism is credible. Calvinism, due to its determinism, remains incoherent and contradictory. I submit that incoherence and contradiction are inherent within the Calvinist system. But again, it is worth reiterating that Calvinists themselves admit as much either explicitly or implicitly in their asserting “apparent contradiction” or their “flight to mystery.” They, therefore, are in the awkward spot of attempting to convince non-Calvinists why we should believe their interpretations are true regardless of their rational incoherence. These attempts seem to me to boil down to giving reasons why we shouldn’t attend to our reason in these matters. As I will demonstrate, the suppression of reason is integral to propagating and sustaining Calvinism. (See Chapter 10 – The Calvinist Suppression of Logical Reasoning, Moral Intuition and Common Sense)
Non-Calvinist theologian Clark Pinnock makes the following observations,
“There is a theological theory widely maintained in evangelical circles that Scripture teaches on the one hand that God has divinely decreed all that comes to pass, and on the other that man is a responsible moral agent. Although these two concepts sound like a contradiction, we are told not to object because the Bible teaches them both, and we have no right to protest. The word “antinomy” is used in this connection to describe what appears to be a logical contradiction…It seems so neat to be able to say that a given act is both the product of the divine first cause, and also be the product of the human second cause. Could not second causes be completely subordinate to God as first cause, but nevertheless remain genuine and actual causes? After all, what proof is there, Gerstner asks, that if God predestinates something to happen that he has to force someone to do it? Surely it is possible for God to predestinate an act to come to pass by means of the deliberate choices of individuals.
We do not need to pause over the philosophical merits of this theory as a general cosmological rule (who is to say where God’s possibilities end?), because it breaks down so badly on the theological and moral front. Is sin also wholly a product of the divine first cause as well as the human second cause? Surely not! It is simply blasphemous to maintain, as this theory does, that man’s rebellion against God is in any sense the product of God’s sovereign will or primary causation.”[114]
For Pinnock, these Calvinist rationalizations of “predestinating by personal means” and attempting to distinguish between comprehensive primary causality and secondary “causes” along with maintaining divine causality while avoiding divine “force” or coercion are hardly convincing.[115] For Pinnock, they fail theologically and morally. For even if God doesn’t “force” any one to do anything, when Pinnock compares the Calvinist claim “that God has divinely decreed all that comes to pass” with what he knows is an accepted biblical/theological truth – that God cannot be the source and cause of sin and evil – he deems the claim rationally and morally incoherent and therefore false. Because the Calvinist states that the Bible teaches God causes whatsoever comes to pass, and therefore God causes evil, yet the Bible also teaches that God is holy, just, good, and cannot do evil, Pinnock needs go no further theologically or morally to determine that the Calvinists’ beliefs are biblically false. Pinnock must rationally and morally conclude that the doctrine that God decreed whatsoever comes to pass, because it makes God the author of sin and evil, is “simply blasphemous.”
The point to observe is that if Gerstner agrees that God cannot be the source and cause of sin, yet he maintains that God ordained “whatever comes to pass,” then we can conclude that Gerstner is unconcerned about the rational, moral, and theological coherence of his position and doctrinal statements. This is typical of Calvinism. In contrast, Pinnock is very concerned about the rational, moral, and theological coherence of his position and doctrinal statements. Pinnock seeks to define sovereignty, explain sin, and understand the nature and character of God, etc., as a coherent whole based on Scripture. Coherence is essential to his hermeneutic and theological constructs, and those constructs must be grounded in an authoritative Scripture. In contrast, for Gerstner, it is not essential to define sovereignty, explain sin, and understand the nature and character of God, etc., as a coherent whole; although Gerstner would say his incoherent and contradictory interpretations and theological constructs are based on Scripture. But how is that true? Does Scripture contradict itself? The Calvinist has a serious problem here, of which, I submit, there is no escape while he remains a Calvinist. The point is that the two sides have completely different hermeneutics when it comes to the matter of coherence in interpretation.
C. A. Campbell comments upon the role of reason in understanding revelation. He speaks of logic as one of the criteria by which to determine the truth of revelational claims. The focus here is upon the consistency of the doctrines or revelational propositions.
“By the ‘logical’ criteria I understand criteria relating directly to the content of the ostensible revelation; to the actual doctrines it incorporates or implies concerning God’s nature and His relation to the world and to the human soul. Reason requires that the propositions affirmed explicitly or implicitly in the ‘revelation’ be propositions which reason can accept as true. This does not mean, be it noted, that they must be propositions which reason can see to be logically self-evident, or to be necessary implications of propositions that are logically self-evident. To require that would be to insist that reason is, after all, not merely the arbiter but also the organ of religious truth. What it does mean is that the propositions in question must, at the very least, not violate the principle of self-consistency. So understood, the logical criterion takes two forms. We require that the propositions inherent in the revelation be consistent with one another. And we require also – although this is a condition which must be elaborated and in some degree qualified – that they be consistent with well-accredited propositions about reality got through other channels.”[116]
I contend that Campbell’s interpretive criteria are sound and essential, but I also maintain that Calvinists reject these criteria in practice. They are not a part of a Calvinist hermeneutic. Hence, it is with the Calvinist hermeneutic that the problem lies.
Read the next section – C. A. Campbell: Defining a Contradiction and J. I. Packer’s Bad Advice
Footnotes
[104] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957).
[105] This situation mirrors the approach of many Christians to the nature and role of reason in understanding God, the Bible, and their faith. Anti-intellectualism is the default Christian mindset, and a negative view of reason is epidemic in evangelical churches today. This anti-intellectual, anti-objective, and anti-content mindset has sacrificed the life of the mind on the altar of the subjective, inner feelings of the believer. The absence of doctrine, theology, and hymns of content in the church is symptomatic of this abandonment of the life of the mind. The inability of local churches to discuss and debate substantive issues like the Calvinist / Arminian divide is a mark of the lack of concern for biblical and theological truth and attaining truth through sustained philosophical, hermeneutical, apologetic, and theological reflection. Sadly, most evangelical churches are not places that welcome and cherish substantive questions and in-depth thinking on important theological topics and their practical applications. For a fine explanation of why our minds matter and the role of reason in the Christian life and church, see J. P. Moreland, Love Your God With All Your Mind: The Role of Reason in the Life of the Soul, (Colorado Springs: NavPress), 1997.
[106] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 12.
[107] Ibid. 15.
[108] Ibid. 383, 384.
[109] Ibid. 16.
[110] Evangelicals speak of proper interpretation as both a “science” and an “art.” Perhaps a sensitivity to the obvious meaning of the text, which requires a high degree of theological objectivity, and a proper concern for the immediate and broader coherence of one’s interpretation, is the “art” element that is being neglected. Be that as it may, coherence cannot be ignored without profoundly negative implications.
[111] It has often been my experience that many Calvinists simply become silent, that is, ignore further questions or discussion at the point when one’s critique touches upon the logical and moral incoherence of their theology. They choose the second alternative Campbell pointed out above because they cannot respond to an honest inquiry that requires a rational explanation of propositions that have gone beyond rationality. It simply cannot be done. The only alternatives are silence or further rationalizations that, as far as I can tell, only compound the Calvinist’s difficulties.
[112] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 15.
[113] See, for instance, Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, eds., Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000). Norman L. Geisler, Chosen But Free, (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1999). Millard J. Erickson, chapter 16, “God Plan” in Christian Theology, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985), 345 – 363. Robert A. Peterson and Michael D. Williams, Why I Am Not An Arminian, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004). Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
[114] Clark H. Pinnock, “Responsible Freedom and the Flow of Biblical History” in Grace Unlimited, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1975), 101-102.
[115] See Kevin Vanhoozer’s Remythologizing Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) for a recent, thorough treatment of this perspective in which he employs speech-act and literary theory to argue a compatibilism between theistic determinism and human freedom. In my Vanhoozer Essays, I critique his attempt to hold to what amounts to Reformed Calvinist theology while arguing for human freedom.
[116] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 24.
The Truth of the Gospel 