Chapter 7 – Milton S. Terry on Reason in Interpretation

Ch. 7 – Section 1


Go to Chapter 7 – The Indispensibility of Reason and Logic in Interpretation


Biblical scholar Milton S. Terry writes,

               “But, above all things, an interpreter of Scripture needs a sound and sober judgment.  His mind must be competent to analyze, examine, and compare.  He must not allow himself to be influenced by hidden meanings, and spiritualizing processes, and plausible conjectures.  He must weigh reasons for and against a given interpretation; he must judge whether his principles are tenable and self-consistent; he must often balance probabilities, and reach conclusions with the greatest caution.  Such a discriminating judgment may be trained and strengthened, and no pains should be spared to render it a safe and reliable habit of mind.

               …The use of reason in the interpretation of Scripture is everywhere to be assumed.  The Bible comes to us in the forms of human language, and appeals to our reason and judgment; it invites investigation, and condemns a blind credulity…Even in passages which may be said to lie beyond the province of reason, in the realm of the supernatural revelation, it is still competent for the rational judgement to say whether, indeed, the revelation be supernatural.  In matters beyond its range of vision, reason may, by valid argument, explain its own incompetency, and by analogy and manifold suggestion show that there are many things beyond its province which are nevertheless true and righteous altogether, and to be accepted without dispute.  Reason itself may thus become efficient in strengthening faith in the unseen and eternal.

               But it behooves the expounder of God’s word to see that all his principles and processes of reasoning are sound and self-consistent.  He must not commit himself to false premises; he must abstain from confusing dilemmas; he must especially refrain from rushing to unwarranted conclusions.  Nor must he ever take for granted things which are doubtful, or open to serious question.  All such logical fallacies will necessarily vitiate his expositions, and make him a dangerous guide.  The right use of reason in biblical exposition is seen in the cautious procedure, the sound principles adopted, the valid and conclusive argumentation, the sober sense displayed, and the honest integrity and self-consistency everywhere maintained.  Such exercise of reason will always commend itself to the godly conscience and the pure heart.”[1]

            Terry’s instruction here on the role of reason in interpretation and what makes for sound hermeneutical principles is directly applicable to Calvinist exegesis and interpretation. It is important to ask whether Calvinism properly fits these criteria of good interpretation. It is hard to see how they do given everything that Terry points out here as to the role of reason in interpretation and his affirmation that reason “is still competent for the rational judgement to say whether, indeed, the revelation be supernatural.”  It is one thing for reason to tell us of its limitations; it is another to produce interpretations that are contrary to reason.  It is one thing for reason to identify and affirm things that are beyond reason; it is quite another thing to attempt to justify interpretations that are against reason, that is, interpretations that are incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory. Such interpretations cannot be justified on the basis that they are “supernatural,” that is, above our “natural” reasoning capacities to understand. These are not legitimate limitations of reason when reason itself is identifying these incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions.  These are not an affirmation of the supernatural but evidence of faulty interpretations. Terry states that “the use of reason in the interpretation of Scripture is everywhere to be assumed.”  Reason is always in play.  The supernatural is beyond reason, not against reason. And we know the difference.

            To apply Terry’s characteristics, principles, and processes of reasoning to the Calvinist exegetical and doctrinal conclusions certainly seems to indicate that they are not beyond reason’s capacity to know, but the use of reason, and we may add moral intuition, renders them implausible as valid interpretations.


Read the next section – The Proper Relationship between Faith and Reason: Audi, Moreland, Craig, Groothuis


Back to Chapter 7


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Footnotes

[1] Milton S. Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academie Books, 1883), 153-154.

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