Given the Calvinist doctrine of an eternal decree by which God preordains “whatsoever comes to pass,” non-Calvinists characterize Calvinism as God having “programmed” human beings to do his will. They conclude that the scope of this preordination nullifies the function of the human will in any genuine and meaningful sense. Calvinists object to this “programmed” language as well as the descriptions of people as God’s “robot” or “puppets.” But make no mistake about it, Calvinists believe God has predetermined what each person will think, desire, and do in every and all circumstances. What God has predetermined is what occurs, and that covers all things. We can see, therefore, that God must be the cause of all that happens and therefore, in effect, we do not have wills of our own. The fact that Vanhoozer will argue that God does not work his will against the wills of his human creatures because he transforms their will to willingly do his will is still highly problematic. It only kick the determinist can down the road a bit. It raises the question of what constitutes a coherent definition of human willing, what it means for human beings to have wills, and what it means for them to exercise those wills. Due to an inviolable determinism, Calvinists create for themselves the difficulty of providing a plausible explanation of human freedom, free will, and responsibility. They seek to define human freedom and free will in a way that is compatible with their absolute determinism. Calvinist’s claim that God acts in a way suitable to our nature as human persons to determine our wills so that we want to do his will. But human freedom seems, at a minimum, to consist of the person being the source (i.e., “author”) of their own desires as well as having the ability to do other than various circumstances, and even their own desires, may press upon them (i.e., temptation). Vanhoozer sees in the Calvinist doctrine of an “effectual call” the test case (FT, 98) for how God changes our wills to do his will via a a kinder, gentler method he calls “God-in-communicative-act.” Such a “communicative” theology is said to reconcile the incoherence between a deterministic definition of God’s decree and sovereignty with human freedom. In a very real sense Vanhoozer’s Remythologizing Theology is a Calvinist apologetic for the doctrine of the “effectual call.” But theologian Steve Lemke observes,
“In libertarian freedom a person does not have absolute freedom (a frequent Calvinist stereotype), but the person chooses between at least two alternatives. In every case a person could have, at least hypothetically, chosen something else. But in compatibilism, people always choose their greatest desire. They have no alternative choice but to will to do what they want to do. So when God changes their will through irresistible grace or enabling grace, they really have no choice. They will what God has programmed them to will…The problem is that Calvinists cannot have their cake and eat it, too. They cannot insist that an omnipotent God overwhelms and bends human will powerfully and unfailingly, and then transform this doctrine into something other than it is by softening it with more palatable language such as “effectual calling” and “compatibilism.” The effectual calling means precisely the same thing as irresistible grace. Effectual calling just sounds nicer. At the end of the day, people have no choice but to do what God has programmed them to do…No matter how modern-day Calvinists may attempt to gloss over the hardness of irresistible grace and project it in a softer, gentler light, the doctrine remains what it is.” [1]
As I see it, the doctrine of an “effectual call” or “irresistible grace” is simply salvific determinism by another name. It involves Vanhoozer in the whole deterministic problem of the Calvinist scheme of salvation. Vanhoozer stresses that God is a “communicative agent” to attempt to dispense with mischaracterizations and unworthy thoughts of God as a causal, strategic, impersonal manipulator, working his will by force or coercion. But this concern is generated by the more fundamental Calvinist understanding of what it means for God to be sovereign which raise issues as to the actual dynamics involved in a person’s salvation. The Calvinist view of God’s sovereignty as a universal divine causal determinism shapes the Calvinist doctrines of unconditional election and irresistible grace which is the same as the ‘effectual call’ (RT, 383). Throughout First Theology and Remythologizing Theology we sense Vanhoozer’s struggle to free his Calvinist theology from its theistic determinism. Indeed, one of his primary purposes is to preserve “classical theism” from the extremes of panentheism and kenotic-perichoretic relational ontotheology. Yet as necessary as this is, and Vanhoozer does a fine job here, he cannot extricate himself from the opposite extreme of “God as causal agent” that he also seems to want to avoid. He writes,
“A picture of God as causal agent holds classical theism captive. When God’s willing is viewed in terms of causality, it is difficult to reconcile divine love with the notion of personal relation…One way beyond the classical theism-panentheism impasse is, I suggest, to see God as communicative agent. God’s lordly loving of human persons largely takes the form, I believe, of communicative action.” (FT, 90)
Can Vanhoozer, via an “effectual call,” free himself from “God as casual agent” that “holds classical theism captive?” I don’t think so. It seems obvious that Vanhoozer’s “effectual call” is, by definition, causal. It causes the person that God has predestined to salvation to desire spiritual things and respond to God in the way God has willed for them. Granted, we dare not embrace the errors in the “new kenotic-perichoretic relational ontotheology,” but Vanhoozer obviously also believes that the “God as a causal agent” of Calvinism is equally as bad because he rightly sees that it equates to theistic determinism. It is this determinism that holds classical theism “captive.” So as long as Vanhoozer holds to his Calvinist doctrines, the “effectual call” cannot help him. He will always run up against the problems generated by his determinism. Incorporating the personal, relational nature of God that we do find in Scripture is a uniquely Calvinist theological problem because of its requirement that for God to be sovereign he had to preordain “whatsoever comes to pass,” which includes every person’s eternal destiny. Hence, God’s sovereignty as comprehensively deterministic is the central and guiding principle of Calvinist biblical theology and is, as far as I can see, is an insurmountable problem. I contend that Vanhoozer’s salvific determinism, which is inherent in a doctrine of an “effectual call,” is fatal to his attempt to understand God as the Bible depicts him in genuine, responsible relationship with human beings. Vanhoozer’s embrace of an “effectual call” involves him in the whole gamut of Calvinist interpretive incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions. William G. MacDonald offers this astute comparison and warning,
“In the non-Christian religious world Islam (lit., “surrender”) is a most pronounced exemplification of deterministic theology. Islamic theology makes the supreme will of Allah the all-important determinant of the affairs of men, and the Spirit of God seems at best aloof and remote. Christians should be alerted by this to the fact that a transbiblical view of the will of God can be propounded at the expense of the love of God, that making sovereignty the center and circumference of a theological system is no guarantee in itself that the system will be biblical and reveal the God who rules in love, as opposed to a god who merely loves to rule.”[2]
Of course, in Vanhoozer’s remythologizing the Spirit of God is anything but aloof and remote. Vanhoozer brings him quite intimately close as involved in the “effectual call” which is realized through the Word and the Spirit. But can Vanhoozer coherently and credibly speak about a “communicative,” “dialogical,” “relational” or personal work of God by his Spirit who desires “communion” with his human creatures from within a theology that maintains that God sovereignly, unconditionally, and unalterably predetermined the limitation and exclusion of a multitude of persons from salvation and eternal life? This is precisely what the “effectual call” entails. Thus, Vanhoozer seeks theological relief through a doctrine that presupposes the very impersonal, exclusivist determinism he is attempting to mitigate. The “effectual call” is theologically deficient as an explanation as to how God works as a “communicative agent” whose desire is to be in “communion” with human persons he created in his image. Furthermore, a call that is unconditional and irresistible (effectual) is, by definition, causal. Hence, Vanhoozer is going around in circles.
Many non-Calvinist Christians who have not had exposure to Calvinist teachings would never have encountered or understood God as anything other than a “communicative agent” in a properly personal sense. But neither would this require that they shy away from him as a “causal agent,” for they understand that although he is a “communicative agent” he is at the same time a “divine agent” who causes things to happen when and where he sees fit for the accomplishing of his plans and purposes. To be God is to be a “causal agent.” But given a straightforward reading of Scripture that seeks interpretive harmony throughout the whole scope of the biblical witness, the non-Calvinist is compelled to reject the notion that God has preordained “whatsoever comes to pass.” He is a “causal agent” but not “the sole causal agent” of all that occurs. Non-Calvinists can see that the universality of this causality would negate the very personal relationship between God and man that Vanhoozer is seeking to find. Non-Calvinists believe in God’s sovereign rule and reign over his creation and affirm his prerogative to act in the affairs of mankind in various ways including in, through and upon persons. But they do not find in the Bible a premundane, comprehensive determinism along with the predestination of every person’s eternal destiny. Now the reason why they do not find this salvific determinism in Scripture is precisely because they feel compelled to adhere to rational coherence within their theological construct. It is imperative for the non-Calvinist that a sound, biblical hermeneutic include striving to harmonize one’s interpretations of the biblical texts and not leave them in logical, moral, epistemological, and theological incoherence or abeyance. According to the non-Calvinist, a theistic determinism is not required for God to be sovereign. Indeed, some of his actions are quite forceful and coercive, but these are not those that can be described as “communicative” in the general sense required of the definition of “communication” and as understood and portrayed in Scripture. In general, a non-Calvinist understanding of the “communicative” aspect of God’s dealings with man leads them to very different theological conclusions than those reached by Calvinists. The difference is especially acute in the area of soteriology. Because God is genuinely “communicative” and enters into a “dialogical” relation with us, a relation that finds its fullest expression “in Christ” and his death as the demonstration of God’s love for us(Rom. 5:8), they never perceived God as having predetermined anyone’s eternal destiny, let alone the minutest details of every event that has ever and will ever occur throughout history. Due to his love and grace God has determined or purposed to act for the good of sinners in providing for their salvation. He does so as sovereign in his world, and therefore accomplishes what he has purposed to do. And God has also determined the nature of that salvation with respect to its accomplishment and appropriation. It is to be by God’s grace, defined as God’s accomplishment of salvation “in Christ” for undeserving sinners, and through faith, understood as the way God has determined this salvation to be appropriated so that it might be a possibility for all to obtain. (Rom. 5:12-21) The positive or negative response to the gospel is not to be sought in a distinction in “the call” between “general” and “effectual.” It is persons who believe or remain in unbelief. It is persons who obey or disobey God’s salvific communication through his Word. The deterministic view creates theological incoherence when attempting to explain the dynamics of willing disobedience and consenting faith as something persons do in and of themselves and are held culpable for as testified to throughout Scripture. I submit that a view of libertarian human freedom within the context of God’s non-deterministic, yet all-wise and powerful sovereignty, better accounts for the biblical “theodrama” because it can coherently incorporate the presence of evil, the content of the gospel as “good news,” moral responsibility, moral duty and effort, individual culpability and God’s justice, judgment, and final conquering of evil.
Rather than clarifying how it is that man retains genuine freedom in relation to a sovereign God, the “effectual call,” which presupposes a definition of sovereignty as a theistic determinism, only involves Vanhoozer in the insurmountable incoherence of the Calvinist position. A “God-in-communicative-act,” a “dialogical” God, can only be one who is not comprehensively deterministic in his sovereignty. Non-Calvinists maintain that God’s sovereignty is comprehensive in that it extends over all things, but it is not comprehensive in the sense that it determines all things. Absolute sovereignty need not mean “absolute determination.” A God who comprehensively determines our choices, especially those pertaining to our eternal destiny, operating internally “in” or “through” us to desire to do his will, no matter how “communicatively” he does so, is a God who causes us to do his will. Thus we are not the sole author of our action in this regard and God prevents us from making a contrary choice. It is not the exaltation of man over God that we are seeking here. It is the accurate interpretation of the Scriptures. Thus, the full scope of the dynamic between God and man as attested to in Scripture is not sufficiently represented in the Reformed Calvinist understanding of sovereignty. To presume that a biblical divine sovereignty can be made a better divine sovereignty by extrapolating God’s rule and reign into an absolute determinism of all things is to go beyond the biblical witness to God’s sovereignty. We know this because throughout Scripture people are presented as the sole authors of their desires and actions, along with their ability to make contrary choices. These are everywhere presupposed and taught in the Bible. These two elements are required for a coherent definition of human freedom, for without them we cannot coherently account for moral responsibility or culpability. I contend that these are two necessary elements for meaningful human freedom but can find no place in Calvinist compatibilism. Sole authorship and contrary choice are both missing in the Calvinist compatibilist definition of human “free will” because they are incompatible with theistic determinism. But theistic determinism is the ultimate dynamic in an “effectual call.” And theologian Bruce R. Reichenbach concludes this regarding compatibilism.
“Freedom as voluntary action becomes an empty notion, for divine coercion extends into the depths of our choosing.”[3]
And even if Vanhoozer successfully softens the characterization of his Calvinism as coercive by his “God-in-communicative-act” theology, he cannot avoid the fact of it comprehensive causation due to its universal divine causal determinism. That is where the deeper textual, theological, and relational problems reside.
So how does the “effectual call” become the paradigm of God’s determinative yet personal relationship with people? It seems to me that Vanhoozer is dealing with only half of the implications of his determinism, that is, he refers only to the elect and ignores the matter of the non-elect. I’ve tried to reflect on how Vanhoozer thinks about this matter. His emphasis is probably something like this.
“Since God is doing something good in the elect, we take this as him not operating in any way that can be deemed impersonal. Since he is effectually calling the elect to salvation, that is to be appreciated as gracious, relational, and personal. So we can conclude that he has not violated our freedom. We feel good about what he has done, therefore what he has done must be considered communicative and therefore fitting for us as persons.”
Again, one of Vanhoozer’s main concerns is to grapple with the problem of determinism in the Calvinist concept of God’s sovereignty, what he calls “monologic divine authorship” (RT, 306-309), in light of the biblical witness to human freedom. Vanhoozer perceives the problematic implications of his determinism and is seeking a remedy for them. But can he do so without a complete change his theological position? Of course he ought not to change his position if he is convinced it is true to Scripture. But determining what is true to Scripture is precisely what is at issue here. We are ultimately grappling with proper interpretive method. How do we know Vanhoozer’s view of sovereignty and his doctrine of an effectual call are biblical? Vanhoozer contends that his “remythologized” theology based upon “speech-act” theory gives us a proper biblical interpretive method to follow. Yet again, his introduction of an “effectual call” seems to be an intrusion of Calvin’s theological proposition into the biblical text rather than a theological truth that comes from the text. I say this because if we follow the ramifications of an “effectual call,” it only generates logical, moral, epistemic, and biblical incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction. And precisely because it does this it fails as a sound hermeneutic and therefore cannot be an accurate interpretation of Scripture. And in his texts, Vanhoozer simply presupposes the fact of an “effectual call” rather than demonstrating that it is a biblical truth. It appears from nowhere as a doctrine that is supposed to exemplify God’s communicative rather than his causal and coercive ways among men. But is a “communicative” God coherent with a God who “effectually” calls some and not others?
Vanhoozer rightly points out the problem of what he calls “classical theism” (i.e., Calvinism) when he writes,
“…the main problem with this view of monologic divine authorship, more serious even than the complaints about deterministic interventions, is that it fails to account for the dialogical interaction of God and human beings depicted in the Bible, or, for that matter, the Bible’s diverse human authorial voices themselves.” (RT, 309)
Accounting for “the dialogical interaction of God and human beings depicted in the Bible” in a coherent, credible, and ultimately biblical fashion is what Vanhoozer cannot do, for he retains the theological headwaters from which “monologic divine authorship” flow. “Monologic divine authorship” is just another phrase for universal divine causal determinism. As a Calvinist theologian, Vanhoozer has a serious, and I believe insurmountable, problem to solve. It is the rational incoherence generated by his inevitable theological determinism. He obviously feels this acutely. For although he views “speech-act” theory as consonant with the biblical view of God’s revelation – God revealing himself by speaking and acting – the purpose of his use of “speech-act theory” to process the biblical revelation is an attempt to reconcile his non-negotiable deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty with the inescapable biblical witness to genuine human freedom. It is his theological presuppositions that present these hermeneutical difficulties that he attempts to alleviate with his “God-in-communicative-act” ontology. (RT, xv) Can Vanhoozer coherently and credibly harmonize a deterministic sovereignty with human freedom without embracing a different definition of God’s sovereignty? Is his redefinition of human freedom plausible?
I don’t think so. In fact, for Vanhoozer, as a theological determinist, to make the claim that God is a “communicative agent” seems only to exacerbate the incoherence in his position. We fail to see how a relation can be described as “communicative,” “persuasive,” “free,” “willing,” “consenting,” “dialogical,” etc. when God invariably and inevitably effects his will in every person without “leaving room” for a response that is not invariably and inevitably predetermined according to God’s will and therefore caused by God alone. Vanhoozer feels he must maintain this view of God’s sovereignty – what he admits is an ultimate “causality.” Vanhoozer contends that his “remythologizing conceives the God-world relation in primarily communicative rather than causal terms” and then in a footnote states, “…the concern is not to do away with the concept of causality so much as to avoid de-personalizing it.” (RT, 28) But this raises the question as to whether causality by its very nature as expressed in Calvinist theology can avoid “depersonalization.” Are “causality” and “personal” compatible realities if the causality is irresistible in effect and comprehensive in scope? Many non-Calvinist theologians conclude that because of its absolute, comprehensive, inevitable determinism, Calvinism is inescapably marked by a causality that if it avoids raw manipulation, is certainly instrumental, strategic, and impersonal. And I contend that even if it could avoid all these difficulties of “impersonality,” it would fail on other biblical doctrinal grounds. Calvinist theology has a hard time taking into account the full scope of biblical teachings that are rooted in the fact that God is in a non-deterministic, genuinely responsive, and therefore responsible relationship with human beings. Why does Calvinist theology have such difficulty incorporating the God/man relationship as found in Scripture? The fundamental problem lies in their doctrine of an eternal decree whereby “God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.”[4] A theology based upon this proposition is inevitably on a collision course with the overwhelming witness of Scripture to human free will, contingency, possibility, sin, warning, command, responsibility, culpability, justice, judgment, evil, etc. This theological determinism presents God not only as the Creator and ruler of his world, but the sole cause of every minute detail that ever occurs, including evil, sin and each person’s eternal destiny. I contend that this is simply not what we find in the Bible if our hermeneutic includes rational coherence as a discernible and essential criterion of valid interpretation.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] Steve W. Lemke, “A Biblical and Theological Critique of Irresistible Grace” in Whosoever Will: A Biblical-Theological Critique of Five-Point Calvinism, eds. David L. Allen and Steve W. Lemke, (Nashville: B&H Pub., 2010), 114-116.
What Vanhoozer objects to here is the use of the word “programmed” in reference to how God accomplishes his will in human beings. But in pointing out that God’s way of determining (“programming”) the actions of others is “communicative,” this does not substantially alter the problem of God determining the actions of others as persons. A determinism by any other name is still determinism, and if determinism is incompatible with the testimony of the scriptures, then the problems remain. Indeed, while the determinism remains, the problems cannot be gotten rid of. This just seems to be the nature of determinism. Non-Calvinists use “programmed” to reference the result of the God/man “communication” when that “communication” results in the divine determination of man’s actions. Indeed, I would say that to claim God is “communicative” as he determines the thoughts, desires, and actions of persons is only another example of Calvinism’s linguistic and conceptual incoherence.
[2] William G. MacDonald, “The Spirit of Grace” in Grace Unlimited, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1975), 75.
[3] Bruce R. Reichenbach, “Freedom, Justice, and Moral Responsibility” in The Grace of God, The Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989), 286.
[4] G.I Williamson, The Westminster Confession of Faith for Study Classes, (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1978), 31.
The Truth of the Gospel 