Vanhoozer writes,
“God authors human creatures in his image to be willing covenantal agents…Though God is the Author of all that is, human beings nevertheless exercise a secondary authorship, and hence genuine freedom.” (RT, 303)
Once again, one would think that on the basis of these words that “genuine freedom” would include sole authorship of one’s actions and the ability of contrary choice; that God does not “effect” in all ways and at all times all the thoughts, desires, and actions of all people for the purpose of having them do his will. Yet, Vanhoozer is sure to clarify that God’s speech and action are on a different level than human speech and action, and that “God’s authorial speech both constitutes and consummates human characters, and this is not the contradiction but the basis of the human creature’s freedom and answerability.” (RT, 303, footnote 26) How so? This is the fallacy of naming. Just because Vanhoozer says that “God’s authorial speech both constitutes and consummates human characters,” by which he means to say that God predetermines every person’s thoughts, words, deeds, and eternal destiny, and then says that this is “the basis of the human creature’s freedom and answerability” does not make it so, if by these words he means true freedom and if by “answerability” he means responsibility and culpability for one’s thoughts, actions, and life. For what does Vanhoozer mean by “freedom” and “answerability” except that given his theological determinism these are fancy expressions for the perfunctory performance of human beings simply acting out the will of God. This is precisely what we have here. It is the use of words to suggest that a kind of real human freedom exists when it does not because given his other deterministic theological statements it cannot (e.g., “God is the Author of all that is”). What we have here is a case of literary legerdemain. It is an unsubstantiated declaration that because human beings instrumentally act out what God has predetermined, that human beings “nevertheless exercise a secondary authorship” and are therefore said to have “genuine freedom.” How so? Note that the “nevertheless” gives away the fact that Vanhoozer is referring to Calvinist theistic determinism when he states, “God is the Author of all that is.” Vanhoozer also writes,
“Those who refuse to harken to the divine voice or enter into communicative relationship with God forfeit the privilege of communicative agency, thereby consigning themselves to the role of instruments rather than communicants.” (RT, 379)
Given Vanhoozer’s universal divine causal determinism, and all that Vanhoozer has said regarding the “effectual” call, the above statement is completely contradictory. Obviously those privileged to be “effectually” called cannot refuse to “harken” to the divine voice, rather they are made to want to “harken” to the divine voice. And those not so privileged to receive an “effectual” call never could “harken” to the divine voice. Those who “refuse to harken to the divine voice and enter into communicative relationship with God” have been predetermined by God to refuse to harken to his voice or enter into relationship with him. Furthermore, they do not “consign themselves to the role of instruments,” they are consigned to that role by God himself. Furthermore, Vanhoozer’s claims about God as an “authorial communicative agent” who when he speaks his word it accomplishes its intended purpose (“effectual call”) is rendered incoherent here. People hear the divine voice that obviously calls them into relationship with him, but obviously that “speech-act” does not accomplish its intent in the case of these “refusers.” Unless the “divine voice” had a secret purpose contrary to its content which communicates God’s desire for the hearer to engage in communion with God (i.e., become a “communicant”), then this statement conflicts with the theological proposition of an “effectual call.”
This statement is coherent only on the basis of libertarian free will, not compatibilist “free will.” It is incoherent with the determinism inherent in compatibilism. This kind of statement also reveals the deeper problem that plagues theological discussions on these important issues. Reformed Calvinist scholars feel “free” to employ either their determinism, compatibilist “free will” or a libertarian form of human freedom as they see fit without regard for remaining rationally coherent and consistent with their deterministic theological doctrines. Even though we still wonder what happens to be the precise content of the “divine voice” which is communicated to these two groups who are inevitably determined by God to “respond” in diametrically opposite ways (i.e., the “effectual call” and “refuse to harken”), the issue of moral responsibility and divine justice also appears here and the incoherence is astonishing. Those who “refuse to harken” to the divine voice “forfeit” a privilege they could never have. They could never have this privilege because they obviously did not receive an “effectual call” otherwise they would have harkened to the divine voice.
Furthermore, we do not see how the one who has been so privileged to be “effectually” called (the “communicant”), is any less an “instrument” in the hand of God to do his will than the one who is predetermined to refuse to “harken” to the divine voice. This “communicant” is just a predetermined as the refuser. Both cannot do otherwise. Therefore, both merely serve the role of instruments of God’s will. The point to note here is that the description above is incoherent with Vanhoozer’s Calvinism. The words can only be interpreted and understood as meaning that people may and should desire of their own will to do God’s will. The statement is not coherent with the deterministic position Vanhoozer proposes elsewhere. Those described above have a personal self that interacts with God as a personal being and as such, as Vanhoozer himself says, can “refuse to harken to the divine voice or enter into communicative relationship with God.” They have real options open to them. God has not determined their responses. According to Vanhoozer there are two real possibilities in play, hence a real contingency that is incompatible with Calvinist determinism, that is, the real ability of doing otherwise than what God would have them do and be. They may also “forfeit the privilege” and end up “consigning themselves to the role of instruments.” These persons obviously have a self that can act according to its own will and “refuse” to do the will of God. But then we have no such thing as an ‘effectual call” or, if we do Vanhoozer’s statements makes no sense. According to Vanhoozer’s Calvinism the only possible way to become a “communicant” rather than an “instrument” is by being predestined to salvation and receive an ‘effectual call,” but Vanhoozer speaks as though these people are of themselves rejecting an “effectual” call and consigning themselves to the role of an “instrument.” I conclude that a libertarian free will dynamic is the only one that makes sense of human freedom and the biblical witness to the God/man relationship. It’s the only dynamic that makes sense of Vanhoozer’s words.
The Truth of the Gospel 