Vanhoozer writes,
“The task of the Christian theologian is to demonstrate the rational superiority of the Christian way and Christian wisdom in whatever situation one finds oneself.” (FT, 349)
“The church is not immune to the conflict of interpretations. Are there any norms that may help us decide which communities reading or performance of Scripture is the most adequate? There are, I believe, two such criteria. The first is the text itself, the fixed point from which various interpretations may be challenged. As Martin Luther successfully demonstrated during the Reformation, the text can be used against the community of its interpreters. Second, some interpretations or performances of a text may be more “fruitful” than others. But what does “fruitful” mean in the context of biblical hermeneutics? It means, first, a reading that explains more of the text and displays more of its rich internal coherence. But second, an interpretation may be judged to be fruitful if it disperses the riches of the text among its readers. Augustine pointed to charity as a kind of criterion for a good reading of the Bible. Jesus said we would recognize his disciples by their love. Should we not therefore prefer the reading that gives rise to a way of living that most approximates the life of Jesus himself, the harbinger of the kingdom of God? Christian culture is not just a means to preach the gospel; it is rather the means for us to come to know the gospel and to know what it means.” (FT, 333)
“Augustine’s rule for biblical interpretation can be neatly extended to the church’s interpretive performance: when faced with a plethora of possible meanings, choose the interpretation that fosters love of God and love of neighbor.” (FT, 333)
I contend that Vanhoozer’s Calvinist interpretations and theology are in conflict with his own statements above and fail on several of the criteria mentioned here. I have argued that Calvinist speech is incoherent with its underlying theology. Here in Part 2 I will demonstrate the textual and rational incoherence of the Calvinist’s interpretations. They are less consistent and therefore are not “fruitful” in the sense of properly understanding the text or displaying “its rich internal coherence.” Secondly, the Reformed Calvinist doctrines do not “disperse the riches of the text among its readers” in that it leaves a myriad of readers without any riches at all. In fact, according to the Calvinist interpretation of the text, it assigns the many non-elect readers to an eternity in hell.
Interpretation needs to be situated. Interpretation needs to strive for coherence on all fronts. There needs to be logical, moral, epistemological and theological coherence to one’s interpretation when all is said and done. Calvinist soteriological interpretation falls short here also. For one, it does not reflect internal biblical coherence. Take Romans 9-11 for instance. The Reformed Calvinist interpretation of chapter 9 blatantly contradicts the words of Paul in chapters 10 and 11. It certainly does not “disperse the riches of the text among its readers.” Unless the “riches of the text” of Romans 9 includes the fact that many of its readers have been excluded from God’s love and grace in Christ and predestined to eternal death, or, the non-elect never read the Bible or hear the gospel, then what possible “riches” can be “dispersed” from the text for these non-elect readers predestined to hell? What is the main message any reader should glean from Romans 9-11? Is it that they may be among those God has predestined to eternal punishment and wrath, or, that there is “good news” for all sinners and they can obtain salvation by faith in Christ? I would argue that throughout Romans, and his other epistles, Paul makes the case for the latter.
Reformed Calvinism also falls short of Vanhoozer’s admonitions in the area of love. Calvinists have a hard time explaining the love of God. How does the depiction of God having unconditionally and arbitrarily predetermined certain persons to eternal damnation lend itself to loving God or give rise to “a way of living that most approximates the life of Jesus himself?” For instance can it be credibly maintained that the intent of John in the so called particularist texts in his gospel was to teach limited atonement and unconditional election when these propositions generate incoherence and contradiction with John’s universalist texts, the broader scope of Christian biblical theological truths and our experience of life in the world? Perhaps Reformed Calvinism is not a biblically accurate theology according to Vanhoozer’s own criteria. He also writes,
“Right interpretation depends not only on having the right procedures but on having the right habits of perception as well as a desire to understand the whole. We often need to be trained in order to perceive things correctly…To stake a theological truth claim ultimately demands practical reasoning…Staking theological truth claims is a product neither of instrumental nor of speculative reason but of practical reason: a type of reasoning about moral action and a type of reasoning for which one may be held morally responsible. Indeed, according to some recent virtue epistemologists, rationality just is a form of being moral – of ethics applied to the intellect…” (FT, 348)
Does Calvinism fair well here? Noteworthy is the fact that for most people Calvinism is baffling; it just doesn’t make sense. This popular sentiment should not be cavalierly dismissed as coming from sinners who have not developed the “right habits of perception.” For among these sinners are also believing sinners who were saved by hearing a message antithetical to the Reformed Calvinist soteriology. When they hear the Calvinist version of salvation they intuitively, if not also biblically, respond by saying, “That doesn’t make sense,” or “God can’t be that way” or “God would never act that way,” etc. Is there no “practical reasoning” and “common sense” in these responses to the Calvinist interpretations? Why is it necessary to suppress these observations, knowledge, and intuitions to become Calvinists? This raises the whole issue of proper reasoning and how that faculty of reasoning as an epistemological virtue has been trained differently in the Calvinist as opposed to the non-Calvinist. Vanhoozer writes,
“Is the epistemology of the cross fideistic? Yes, in the sense that faith yields knowledge of God; no, in the sense that I am not saying that one may justifiably believe irrationally or against the evidence. On my view, fideism is a matter of belief policy where one decides that accepting certain forms of evidence – apostolic testimony, to be exact – is a rational, intellectually virtuous knowledge-producing act. The epistemology of the cross I am here trying to sketch is fideistic in the sense that with regard to the evangelical truth claim it displays a certain epistemic humility as to the unaided powers of human reason and makes a reasoned case for the necessity of trust. From another angle, an epistemology of the cross does not renounce the role of evidence but expands it to include testimony.” (FT, 358)
The Calvinist / non-Calvinist (i.e., Arminian, Provisionist, etc.) debate reduces to the problem of rational coherence as a hermeneutical essential. It involves the issue of reasoning and discerning the epistemological criteria by which we determine valid interpretations from invalid interpretations. I heartily agree that “free and open conversation” along with the humility to seek truth and not simply maintain one’s position is necessary to prevent irrational fideism, yet if it is irrational fideism that we want to avoid then of course that requires the incorporation of what constitutes rational coherence into our theological hermeneutic. It is not enough simply to converse. We must converse and interpret upon a certain basis. Rational and moral coherence must everywhere be presupposed. But I have shown on this website that the Calvinist does “believe irrationally or against the evidence.” It fails to make “a reasoned case for the necessity of trust.” If it cannot even provide the assurance of the love of God, how can it provide “a reasoned case for the necessity of trust.” All it can provide is a trust in one’s own presumption that they are loved by God and that he desires that they be saved.
We should note the inescapable aspect of determining truth on the basis of evidence, which I take to require the use of human reason. Simply put, a valid interpretation involves providing evidence for one’s claims. That evidence and the reasoning behind it must reflect logical and moral coherence. A valid theological interpretation will not generate logical and moral contradictions and inconsistencies nor epistemic doubt as to God’s salvific disposition towards his human creatures. Vanhoozer quotes Paul Helm on virtue epistemology which examines whether one suffers from a “weakness of the will” or is being virtuous in how they reason and handle evidence. Helm writes,
“…An example of weakness of will, says Helm, is ‘when a person does not believe when there is good reason to believe.’ It is not enough, then to want to avoid error; one has to love the truth more than one’s own ideas. Blaise Pascal notes that everyone has an aversion for the truth in different degrees ‘because it is inseparable from self-love.’ One displays a distinct lack of virtue, for example, by ignoring the evidence. Moreover, according to Montmarquet, such ignorance results not in bliss but in blameworthiness.” (FT, 354)
The main point here is well taken – that we should be in pursuit of the truth, not maintaining our own ideas. We should believe when there is good reason to do so. But in attempting to determine what precisely is the true interpretation of a text we cannot dismiss the function of evidence presented with logical and moral coherence, that is, according to “good reason.” Logical and moral coherence are indispensable for determining valid interpretations. Interpretations that evidence logical and moral coherence should be deemed the more valid interpretations, that is, the interpretations that are closer to the intent of the author or true meaning of the text. Interpretations that evidence logical and moral incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction should be deemed less valid interpretations, that is, the interpretations that do not represent the intent of the author or the true meaning of the text. Characteristic of this latter type are the Calvinist interpretations. They suffer from incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction.
To his credit Vanhoozer has not discounted rationality for he admits that “…this desire [for truth] by itself does not suffice for rationality.” (FT, 353) He also states that “Virtue epistemology thus has the merit of admitting long-neglected factors back into the conversation about knowledge, truth and rationality.” (FT, 353) With this I agree. But all this is what the Calvinist refuses to practice when a mountain of rational, moral, and biblical evidence is brought to bear against their universal divine causal determinism (i.e., their doctrines of God’s eternal decree, sovereignty, and unconditional election). Yet, given the Calvinist’s attempts to suppress the evidences (e.g., the flight to “mystery,” “antinomy,” claims of incomprehensibility, “the Bible teaches both,” compatibilism, etc.), that indict Calvinism as irrational, we need to face the fact that we cannot know the truth apart from evidence, and that we process evidence on the basis of human reason. The pursuit of the truth happens upon some basis, and that basis, although it may include more than rationality, that is, a love for the truth as Vanhoozer correctly argues, it will not be less than rationally coherent. And we must distinguish between the two. But I submit to you that Calvinism is rationally and morally incoherent thereby putting its own ideas above a love for the truth. That truth, as far as biblical interpretation is concerned, is gleaned by a hermeneutic that incorporates logical and moral coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. This is not the hermeneutic of the Calvinist. Calvinist’s embrace a hermeneutic of incoherence. As such, their interpretations or “doctrines of grace” cannot provide epistemic assurance to the sinner of God’s saving love for them. Hence, it is not a proper gospel (i.e., “good news”) or evangelical theology.
Also, the question as to how and whether Calvinism has meaning and application to practical living is very important. Most people reject Calvinism not because it has absolutely no bearing upon practical living, for who can maintain that a deep reverence for God or emphasis upon his sovereignty will have bearing upon the way one lives. Rather, they reject the theistic determinism of Reformed Calvinist theology as implausible because everywhere and in every way life presents itself both internally and externally as non-deterministic. The weight of practical evidence is against Calvinism’s theistic determinism. Calvinism’s determinism doesn’t explain the way life is lived and the way we experience and act in it. Dorothy Sayers writes the following about creeds, which has application to statements of theology and faith.
“A creed put forward by authority deserves respect in the measure that we respect the authority’s claim to be a judge of truth. If the creed and the authority alike are conceived as being arbitrary, capricious and irrational, we shall continue in a state of terror and bewilderment, since we shall never know from one minute to the next what we are supposed to be doing, or why, or what we have to expect. But a creed that can be shown to have its basis in fact inclines us to trust the judgment of the authority; if in this case and in that it turns out to be correct, we may be disposed to think that it is, on the whole, probable that it is correct about everything. The necessary condition for assessing the value of creeds is that we should fully understand that they claim to be, not idealistic fancies, not arbitrary codes, not abstractions irrelevant to human life and thought, but statements of fact about the universe as we know it. Any witness—however small—to the rationality of a creed assists us to an intelligent apprehension of what it is intended to mean, and enables us to decide whether it is, or is not, as it sets out to be, a witness of universal truth.”[1]
We know and experience the world as one of libertarian human freedom not Calvinist determinism. Furthermore, for all practical purposes Calvinists live on the basis of non-Calvinist libertarian freedom.
In a footnote in First Theology Vanhoozer sets out criterion for a sound hermeneutical model. He writes,
“A hermeneutical model oriented to understanding and right interpretation can easily assimilate commonly cited epistemological criteria – personal disclosure value, empirical fit, logical coherence, to name a few. Rationality in hermeneutics, as in science, is a matter of submitting one’s interpretation to critical tests in a free and open conversation. It is this willingness to submit one’s interpretation to critical tests that prevents hermeneutical theology from becoming an irrational fideism.” (p. 348, footnote 30)
But does Calvinism fair well according to Vanhoozer’s own criteria? I think not. I have attempted to show that it certainly fails with respect to logical and epistemological coherence. And he himself points out that “doctrine is not a matter of what works but of what befits the way things – God, the world, oneself – are.” (RT, xiv, italics mine) Does Calvinism “befit the ways things…are?” Again, I have demonstrated it does not. Again, another of these “critical tests” of good interpretation is the theology’s coherence with practical living, and practical living in characterized by free will, not Calvinism’s universal divine causal determinism. Philosopher C. A. Campbell raised this critical point in his treatment of the self and free will in his book On Selfhood and Godhood. Campbell writes,
“I begin by drawing attention to a simple point whose significance tends, I think, to be under-estimated. If the phenomenological analysis we have offered is substantially correct, no one while functioning as a moral agent can help believing that he enjoys free will. Theoretically he may be completely convinced by Determinist arguments, but when actually confronted with a personal situation of conflict between duty and desire he is quite certain that it lies with him here and now whether or not he will rise to duty. It follows that if Determinists could produce convincing theoretical arguments against a free will of this kind, the awkward predicament would ensue that man has to deny as a theoretical being what he has to assert as a practical being. Now I think the Determinist ought to be a good deal more worried about this than he usually is. He seems to imagine that a strong case on general theoretical grounds is enough to prove that the ‘practical’ belief in free will, even if inescapable for us as practical beings, is mere illusion. But in fact it proves nothing of the sort. There is no reason whatever why a belief that we find ourselves obliged to hold qua practical beings should be required to give way before a belief which we find ourselves obliged to hold qua theoretical beings; or for that matter, vice versa. All that the theoretical arguments of Determinism can prove, unless they are reinforced by a refutation of the phenomenological analysis that supports Libertarianism, is that there is a radical conflict between the theoretical and the practical sides of man’s nature, an antinomy at the very heart of the self. And this is state of affairs with which no one can easily rest satisfied. I think therefore that the Determinist ought to concern himself a great deal more than he does with phenomenological analysis, in order to show, if he can, that the assurance of free will is not really an inexpugnable element in man’s practical consciousness. There is just as much obligation upon him, convinced though he may be of the soundness of his theoretical arguments, to expose the errors of the Libertarian’s phenomenological analysis, as there is upon us, convinced though we may be of the soundness of Libertarian’s phenomenological analysis, to expose the errors of the Determinist’s theoretical arguments.”[2]
It is my experience that Calvinists are reticent to engage in discussion and the examination of all the evidence, including the phenomenological evidence, that speak against their theological position. They do not consider the implications upon their theology of the weight of these concerns as an integrated whole. Calvinism is a fragmented and dismissive theology. Fragmented in that it ignores the hermeneutical principle of interpreting in context, and dismissive when its rational, moral, and epistemic problems are exposed. These problems are not considered important for discerning the validity or invalidity of their interpretations. These matters of rational and moral coherence, along with the epistemic assurance that is foundational to the gospel message and salvation, are dismissed in favor of their belief in a universal divine causal determinism. Calvinists are very adept at rationalizing their position in light of these evidences rather than letting these evidences provide a formative influence in their theology. Moreover, substantial challenges to the Calvinist’s rationalizations are generally met with an indifferent silence. This is because Calvinism does not fare well when subjected to cross-examination. The most formidable challenges to Calvinism involve its rational incoherence in dealing with the biblical texts and practical living. And that is to say much when one is in pursuit of the truth. For the pursuit of truth must be tethered to the framework of logical and moral coherence. And phenomenological reality is certainly a witness to “what befits the way things – God, the world, oneself – are.” (RT, xiv, italics mine) The dismissal of this framework is especially troubling as this posture of irrationality is assigned to the Word of God in their “the Bible teaches both” position. For if the Word of God is inconsistent and contradictory, and the fundamental laws of human thought are not a reliable guide to discerning the true meaning of a text, then we have placed truth beyond our knowing. Scripture no longer is the Word of God and cannot serve its revelatory or authoritative role. The Calvinists “the Bible teaches both” rationalization is nothing more than interpretive and theological relativism. Its meaning is whatever you think it means. C. A. Campbell writes,
“So far as I can judge, what a great many devout Christians really want is to say to Reason ‘Thus far and no further! By all means subject the superstitions of the benighted heathen to reason’s criticism, but not the one true religion. Hands off the word of God!’ The trouble is that there can be no case for suddenly drawing the line at the Christian religion unless it be that we already know that religion to be true; and there can be no way of knowing that religion to be true, it seems to me, unless we subject it to critical examination by reason. ‘Hands off the word of God!’ is a fine sounding slogan; but it means just nothing at all unless we know, first, that there is a ‘Word of God’, and secondly, if there is, what it has to say to us.”[3]
I submit to you that the devout Calvinist has a “thus far and no further” hermeneutic regarding the use of the canons of reason and moral intuition. It also has a “hands off the Word of God” approach which is to say that Calvinists reject biblical critiques of their interpretations and theology by asserting that it is incomprehensible to human reason and quoting Romans 9:20, “But who are you, O man, to answer back to God?” (ESV)
So, due to the influence of Calvinism, there is much confusion among Christians as to the essential function of reason and moral intuition in discerning the validity of an interpretation.
Reformed Calvinist soteriology is a prime example of how a failure to rationally and morally integrate one’s theological propositions with the whole scope of biblical interpretation and teaching places the true meaning of particular texts beyond our knowing.
And most importantly, the gospel is at stake here. An “effectual call” rooted in an “unconditional election” introduces doubt as to whether God is kindly disposed towards us as individuals and whether he has provided for and desires our salvation. The bottom line is that God may have predestined me to heaven, but he also may have predestined me to hell, and this epistemic void as to God’s love for me and desire to save me is insufficient for the necessary response of trust in him. The salvation I may be “trusting” him for may simply be an illusion of my own making and not my true ontological destiny as God has predetermined it. In other words, with respect to every sinner, the epistemology of the message of the cross and salvation must also be the ontology of the cross and salvation. God’s salvific desires, plans, and purposes must accurately reflect the message of “good news” proclaimed to sinners. How can we love God in response to a divine “love” that we cannot be sure applies to any of us? The reality of my relationship before God that he has determined for me may be very different than I presume. On Calvinism, the Calvinist is forced to presuppose his own election. But biblical trust is founded upon the sure knowledge of God’s love and salvific will and designs for me. It is not a “trust” in the sense that “I hope (trust) he has chosen me for salvation.” It is “ a reasoned case for the necessity of trust.” That trust is engendered by the surety that God loves me and has sent Jesus to die for me. It is a christologically sound trust. The Calvinist deterministic doctrines remove the reason for trust and leave us with a blind “I hope so.” Hence, Calvinism is christologically deficient.
Also, we can see how Calvinism warps the content of the gospel as “good news” and makes it inapplicable and therefore disingenuous to the multitude of the non-elect. Calvinism asks us to “trust” in a God that is presented as morally arbitrary in his decisions to save some and not others. But God must be a morally consistent being to be trustworthy. Calvinism’s unconditional election places any assurance that God is morally consistent beyond our knowing. It completely voids what we know of proper moral judgments, expecting us to accept God is morally consistent despite unconditionally electing some to salvation and all others to eternal damnation. My point is that in Calvinism there is an unfortunate disregard for the proper role of moral intuition and coherence as an indicator of valid interpretation.
I am not suggesting human reason is sufficient for the full apprehension of the nature, will and ways of God apart from the need for him to reveal himself to us. Something Vanhoozer rightly warns against is the attempt to “think of God on the basis of reason alone.” (FT, 355) We also need his revelation to us. What I am suggesting at least is this. That once God has revealed himself, the statements we make about the meaning of that revelation are subject to logical, moral, epistemological and theological coherence. Reason plays a role in determining the validity of our interpretations – a role it is not suited for in and of itself for attaining a comprehensive knowledge of God but is suited for in discerning the true meaning of his revelation, especially his written revelation. This is an important distinction to keep in mind for evaluating the Calvinist’s defense of the problematic nature of their proposition that “God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.”[4] Therefore Calvinist sovereignty amounts to an inevitable theological determinism and due to that determinism, the ball of rational incoherence is set rolling. I provide examples of Vanhoozer’s theological incoherence in this Part 2 section.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] Dorothy L. Sayers, The Mind of the Maker, (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1987), 17.
[2] C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, (New York: Macmillian, 1957), 170-171.
[3] Ibid., 17.
[4] G.I Williamson, The Westminster Confession of Faith for Study Classes, (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1978), 31.
The Truth of the Gospel 