Vanhoozer writes,
“Prayer is the practical resolution of the theoretical problem of how to balance divine determination (i.e., authorial consummation) and human freedom (i.e., heroic consent).” (RT, 378)
“To put it in remythologized terms: prayer is an asymmetrical dialogical interaction whereby God effects in us, through word and Spirit, a freedom of consent.” (RT, 382-3)
Note the following about the first quote. How do you “balance” human freedom within a universal divine causal determinism? As I have shown over and over, and in many different ways, you cannot “balance” human freedom with Calvinist theistic determinism. The Calvinist will attempt to redefine human freedom as “doing what you want” with your “wants” determined by God. But that is just playing with words. The result is the same. In contrast, under an honest, common sense definition of human freedom or freedom of the will as we all experience it, such freedom gets pulled into the vortex of theistic determinism from which it cannot escape.
Vanhoozer insists that the practice of prayer balances determinism and human freedom. How so? How is a universal divine causal determinism “balanced” with anything? How is prayer “the practical resolution” to the “theoretical problem of how to balance divine determination…and human freedom?” Note first that Vanhoozer cannot avoid the fact of the existence of human freedom of the type that stands in conflict with divine determinism. He admits the problem created by his determinism. But note also what he will not admit. He will not admit that his universal divine causal determinism cannot be “balanced” with human freedom because these two are mutually exclusive or contradictory concepts. So, his problem really is one of hermeneutics and deciding what principles must be included in a sound hermeneutic. Vanhoozer’s hermeneutic fails to include moral and logical coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. If it did, he would have to face the prospect that his Calvinist deterministic doctrines are not the teaching of Scripture. Here, as in so many other instances and like all Calvinists, rather than admit to a contradiction in his interpretation of the scriptures and go back to the text with sound hermeneutical principles in hand to exegete the key passages accordingly, he attempts to substitute what is clearly a contradiction in his interpretation with the concept of “balance.” This is typical of Calvinism’s refusal to admit the entailments of their theistic determinism. Even when faced with the inconsistencies, incoherencies, and contradictions that are entailed in their universal divine causal determinism, they seek ways to intellectually defend their determinism (e.g., compatibilism) or excuse the moral and logical inconsistencies, incoherencies, and contradictions (e.g., “mystery,” “tension,” “antinomy,” “incomprehensibility,” etc.) their theology creates.
But getting back to the issue of prayer. Within Calvinism’s universal divine causal determinism, the desire to pray, the act of praying, and the content of one’s prayers are all predetermined by God. And for that matter, the lack of a desire to pray and prayerlessness are also predetermined by God. God has ordained and causes “whatsoever comes to pass.” And here we have another instance of Calvinist incoherence. That is, how is it that the prayer which is determined by God is “the practical resolution” of the problem “of how to balance divine determinism…and human freedom?” What about this situation can honestly be identified as “human freedom?” What about this situation can honestly be identified as “balanced?”
When Vanhoozer described prayer as a “human freedom” one might think he is acknowledging that prayer is an act of a person’s free will. That is, that we take it upon ourselves to pray and that God answers according to his will, plans, purposes, etc. But we know that is not the case on Calvinism. Prayer is also encompassed within the dictates of a sovereign divine determination. On Calvinism God predetermined our prayers and the “answers” to those prayers. So how does prayer resolve the problem of how to “balance” divine determination and human freedom? For a non-Calvinist there is no need to “balance” anything here. Divine sovereignty does not create the need to explain or “balance” prayer because sovereignty is not equated with determinism. For the non-Calvinist, prayer changes things because God is in a dynamic, not static, relationship with his human creatures and vice versa. Hence, no prayer, no change (unless God takes his prerogative to act despite our lack of prayer).
What Vanhoozer cannot mean by “balance” is that a person must take the initiative to pray and given that “human freedom” God uses it as the means by which he shapes the person according to his predetermined plan for them. We know Vanhoozer believes that when God determinatively forms a person’s desires, will, and actions, only then are the truly “free.” But with respect to a person taking the initiative to pray, that is not Calvinism, for Calvinist’s tell us we cannot initiate any spiritual discipline, and that would include prayer. We cannot even believe unless God “effects” faith in us. Given “total inability” we have no ability to initiate praying. Whether you pray or not, and the content of your prayers, are all the result of the predetermined will of God.
So, how is prayer “dialogical?” And what could an “asymmetrical dialogical interaction” possibly mean given Vanhoozer’s theistic determinism? What would this “interaction” consist of? It would have to reduce to God causing the person to pray and the person praying. I guess this can be called “inter-action,” but it is merely instrumental action on the part of the person as they are moved or effected by God. The desire to pray must be effected by God. To describe this as “dialogical” or “interaction” seems to me to be more Calvinist double-speak. Therefore, what is the purpose of prayer if it amounts to an act of God upon certain people so that they speak to God what he has predetermined that they say to him so he can effect in them “a freedom of consent” to do his will.
Note the phrases “heroic consent” and “freedom of consent.” First, this idea of “consent” is incoherent given universal divine causal determinism. “Consent” implies some degree of human freedom by which the person of themselves, that is, of their own will, freely prays to God and does his will. I think Vanhoozer knows this but is intent on finding this “balance” to preserve his Calvinism. This seems like a way to wedge something like “human freedom” into this deterministic situation. But once “consent” is involved – however God does this within the individual praying – it becomes incoherent to hold to universal divine causal determinism, i.e., Calvinism.
So, this cannot be a real “freedom of consent.” Real “consent” would require God to somehow, at some point, bestow freedom of the will on the person praying. Now, if the person can “consent” to God’s will, this would imply that they can also “dissent” now that they are the sole author of their desires and actions with the capability of doing otherwise than God might want. If you find this confusing, you are not alone! It is confusing because Vanhoozer is using words that only make sense given the worldview of libertarian freedom. His use of these words makes it sound as if his theological determinism is compatible with human freedom, but of course it is not. For instance, Vanhoozer writes that,
“Prayer is a human response to the divine summons to participate in the economy of triune communication.” (RT, 381)
Whereas on his Calvinism this should read,
“Prayer is a divinely predetermined action caused by God by which the human being exhibits the economy of triune communication.”
Vanhoozer continues,
“In Calvin’s words: prayer is “the chief exercise of faith…by which we daily receive God’s benefits.” It is also the chief means by which God acts in us to “insinuate [his] end in our deliberations” and hence the prime exhibit of the providential concursus of divine sovereignty and human freedom.” (RT, 381)
Whereas on his Calvinism this should read,
“In Calvin’s words: prayer is “the chief exercise of God-given faith…by which we daily receive God’s benefits.” It is also the chief means by which God acts in us to “bring about [his] end” and hence the prime exhibit of his divine sovereignty.”
Finally, Vanhoozer writes,
“Praying as Jesus prayed is the God-ordained means of aligning human minds, wills, and hearts with God’s, and thus a demonstration of God’s communicative power. It is chiefly through prayer that the Author dialogically determines and refines his human hero.” (RT, 381)
Whereas on his Calvinism this should read,
“Praying as Jesus prayed is the God-ordained activity that God causes to take place by which God aligns human minds, wills, and hearts with his own mind, will, and heart, and is thus a demonstration of God’s sovereign power. It is chiefly through prayer that the Author determines his human hero as to both what he prays and what he is to become.” (RT, 381)
According to Vanhoozer, prayer is “the prime exhibit of the providential concursus of divine sovereignty and human freedom.” So where does “human freedom” come in? It doesn’t. It can’t. Vanhoozer simply asserts it as if to say we initiate prayer or that prayer is our responsibility, etc. At bottom, what Vanhoozer still ends up with is a God that completely controls all persons in all respects – even their prayers. Therefore, these statements have elements of disingenuousness in them.
Let’s return again to the original quotes in this section. Note that we have here a clear definition of “authorial consummation.” It is simply the “divine determination” of “classical theism.” If at times we may have wondered whether Vanhoozer was embracing a coherent expression of human freedom, we learn that he certainly tips his deterministic hand here in discussing petitionary prayer. Here is compatibilism at its best. The attempt to “balance” “divine determinism” and “human freedom.” Prayer is supposed to the practical exhibition of this “balance.” But if “divine determinism” is true, how can there be a balance? Logically there is no “balance” possible given theistic determinism. By definition determinisms do not allow for non-deterministic worldviews or their elements like “human freedom,” “consent,” “dialogue,” “persuasion,” “permission,” etc. Determinisms, whether reductive metaphysical naturalism or universal divine causal determinism, encompass everything. But the Calvinist does not take logic on board in his hermeneutic and therefore his theological constructions need not make sense. He merely asserts that what is happening when we pray is the working of theistic determinism and human freedom in “balance.”
Regarding the second quote. Human freedom is defined as humans simply being effected by God to desire “a freedom of consent.” This is a good example, not only of a Calvinist’s attempt at compatibilism, but also his inconsistency. Again, here too Vanhoozer presupposes, contrary to his determinism, that we ought to pray. It seems he presupposes that it is up to us to pray. Now, when we do pray, it allows God to effect in us a “freedom of consent.” That is to say “a freedom of consent” to do God’s will. So Vanhoozer is saying that our prayers allow God to effect in us “a freedom of consent” to do his will. But are these really prayers that come from us as genuinely free creatures? Not according to Calvinism. All prayer or lack thereof, and all desire to do God’s will or lack thereof, and everything else that occurs, is determined by God. So, this makes little sense. God determines that we pray and praying causes God to effect in us a “freedom of consent.” It seems that Vanhoozer is saying that at some point God frees us from his determinism, which would be in direct conflict with Calvinism. Rather, he is saying that God makes us desire to will to do his will, which we have already critiqued as being the same thing as universal divine causal determinism. I submit to you that God cannot exercise his determinative will, even if “communicatively,” so as to effectually and irresistibly cause people to do what they do and then claim that they do so freely. This is just contradictory nonsense.
Also, note that traditionally prayer is considered to be a spiritual discipline. But “discipline” is also a word that does not fit well within theistic determinism, if at all. So, what is the dynamic of spiritual discipline of prayer? Is it an activity that is the result of divine determinism, or is there at least a degree of human freedom and responsibility in it? Scripture indicates that prayer and praying are inconsistent with a world in which everything is predetermined and caused by God. There is no indication that God causes people to pray. There is also no indication that the answer is predetermined. Causality and predetermination must be read into the text. They are not gleaned from a plain reading of the text. Here are some verses involving prayer.
“And Isaac prayed to the Lord for his wife, because she was barren. And the Lord granted his prayer…” (Gen. 25:21, ESV)
“But I [Jesus] say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you,..” (Mt. 5:44, ESV)
“Lord, teach us to pray, as John taught his disciples.” And he said to them, “When you pray, say:..” (Lk. 11:1,2, ESV)
The parable of the persistent widow was spoken by Jesus,
“…to the effect that they ought always to pray and not lose heart.” (Lk. 18:1, ESV)
In Acts 8:22 Paul tells Simon the Magician,
“Repent, therefore, of this wickedness of yours, and pray to the Lord that, if possible, the intent of your heart may be forgiven you.” (ESV)
“Rejoice in hope, be patient in tribulation, be constant in prayer.” (Rom. 12:12, ESV)
“Continue steadfastly in prayer, being watchful in it with thanksgiving.” (Col. 4:2, ESV)
“First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all people,..” (1 Tim. 2:1, ESV)
Husbands should treat their wives with understanding and honor,
“…so that your prayers may not be hindered.” (1 Pet. 3:7, ESV)
“For the eyes of the Lord are on the righteous, and his ears are open to their prayer.” (1 Pet. 3:12, ESV)
In the above quotes we read about prayer that is “granted” by the Lord, that prayer is commanded for our enemies, Jesus responding to the disciple’s request to teach them how to pray, Jesus encouraging persistence in prayer, Paul admonishing Simon to pray, believers to “continue steadfast” (Rom. 12:2, ASV) or be persistent” (CSB) in prayer, Paul urging prayer for all people, Peter says prayers can be hindered and that prayers come from the person praying not as determined by God. And in Revelation 5:8 and 8:3-4 we read that the prayers are “the prayers of the saints.”
All these instances are incoherent with Calvinist theistic determinism. Throughout Scripture people pray that things would be a certain way according to need, their natural and righteous desires, direction, strength, support, etc. Certainly, our prayers are subject to God’s plans and purposes, but that doesn’t mean that our prayers are predetermined and caused by God as unalterable parts of those plans and purposes. God doesn’t pray to himself through us. Prayers are spoken of a responsibility of the one praying and the content of the prayers are from within us. In prayer we speak to God in genuine dialogical interaction, for God’s ears are open to our prayers and they may be granted or denied by God for reasons other than him having predetermined all things. Even within what he has predestined to occur (e.g., Jesus’ crucifixion), he also loves all sinners and treats his believing children as a good Father would, supplying them good things as they seek his will (Mt. 7:7-11; Lk. 11:5-13).
Recall Vanhoozer states,
“To put it in remythologized terms: prayer is an asymmetrical dialogical interaction whereby God effects in us, through word and Spirit, a freedom of consent.” (RT, 382-3)
Is Vanhoozer saying that we will and act according to the desires God implants in us? If so, Vanhoozer then, in typical Reformed Calvinist double-speak, calls this “freedom of consent.” This “freedom of consent” originates in God having predetermined what we will do and effectually altering our desires so that we irresistibly do what he has predetermined. This process culminates in what Vanhoozer calls “heroic consent” or “freedom of consent.” This is hardly a convincing or coherent explanation of “freedom” or “consent.” “Freedom of consent” implies voluntary approval, agreement or permission and is only coherent in the context of libertarian freedom. You cannot irresistibly cause someone to “consent.” That is to coerce no matter what degree of “dialogical interaction” takes place. The “dialogical interaction” is still “asymmetrical.” To say that God does all this communicatively holds no weight in the matter for this is simply a different way of talking about coercion because the person being acted upon is not the author of their action and they have been deprived of the ability of contrary choice. I am not here defending the idea that human freedom is absolute, that is, inviolable by God. I have already said that there is no such thing as absolute human freedom. But human freedom does not have to be absolute, that is, inviolable, to be genuine human freedom or human free will that makes sense of human responsibility, along with both divine and human judgment and justice. What we are trying to discern here is whether there is such a thing as genuine human freedom, to whatever degree, and if so, what is the nature of that human freedom that does justice to the biblical witness to the relationship between God and man. I submit that the nature of that freedom is to be left to voluntarily submit to God, which is antithetical to the Calvinist deterministic doctrines. It is as Eugene Peterson pointed out when he stated,
“The Christian is a person who recognizes that our real problem is not in achieving freedom but in learning service under a better master.”[1]
We already have been granted substantial freedom by God as made in his image. We need to use that freedom to place ourselves under the rule of God so that his “voice-idea” for our life may be “consummated” as he “solicits the obedience of faith.” If Vanhoozer is affirming that our existence is made complete and is fulfilled only within the will of God, we of course agree. But as much a God may fill our lives with his presence, this is dependent upon our humble willingness to let it be as he wills. The “obedience of faith” is still obedience. And to “solicit” the “obedience of faith” implies no guarantee that this faith will be given. The Bible affirms this human freedom on almost every page. It does not affirm Vanhoozer’s theistic determinism. This humility which issues in willing service, this self-authoring and the ability to choose contrary to the will of the one with whom one is in “dialogical relation,” has been nullified by Vanhoozer’s divine “communicative” theistic determinism. Although “communicative” these have still been taken away, but they are the essence of the meaning of the words “freedom” and “consent.” The line between linguistic coherence and incoherence has been crossed with the use of the words and concepts of “freedom” and “consent” in the Calvinist context of “divine determinism” and “God effects.” There is nothing for the sinner to “recognize” about “learning service under a better master” within the doctrinal context of Calvinist determinism. So here again we have Vanhoozer helping himself to language and terms that are incoherent with his fundamental deterministic doctrines. And he simply refuses to consider the hermeneutical implications of this incoherence. This is especially ironic in that his book First Theology is subtitled God, Scripture & Hermeneutics.
We only need to reiterate here that Vanhoozer’s definition of God’s sovereignty as a comprehensive and unconditional determinism remains the insurmountable problem in this theology. Despite Vanhoozer’s claim that prayer is the practical resolution balancing divine determinism and human freedom, we know that according to his theology no one prays except that God as determined that they pray and that both the prayer and “the outcome is determined.” (RT, 384) No one “consents” except that God determined that they “consent.” All such talk of “freedom” and “consent” is rendered meaningless from within the confines of an all-pervasive theistic determinism. God’s will alone has predetermined what will be done in all things. “Human freedom” and “heroic consent,” and “freedom of consent” are illusory. Vanhoozer quotes Farmer,
“Petitionary prayer is part of the soul’s response to God’s challenge and invitation to it to become through cooperation with Him a personality more and more fitted for cooperation with Him.” (RT, 381)
“If we take our bearings from Jesus’ prayer and, indeed, from the shape of his whole life, we can only conclude that obedience…is a bona fide form of interpersonal relationship.” (RT, 381)
“Praying with Jesus, we come to understand the Father’s love and so discover perfect freedom in our willing consent to God’s will.” (RT, 381)
A non-Calvinist would agree with these three quotes. God initiates a “challenge” and “invitation” to “cooperate” with him. In our “willing consent” we “discover perfect freedom.” It is troubling how Vanhoozer has coopted concepts that clearly are only coherent only within the context of libertarian freedom and wrested them for his deterministic purposes. Farmer is presenting nothing predestinarian or deterministic here. There is nothing here of Calvinism. Rather, a person either accepts that challenge and invitation or rejects it. Those who are “obedient” are “more and more fitted for cooperation with Him.” They learn more of what God wills to be done “on earth as it is in heaven.” And they understand more of “the Father’s love” and thereby give “willing consent to God’s will.” This is what praying does for us. But this entails that contrary choices are also possible. A person may neglect praying, reject God’s challenges and invitations, especially that of the gospel, disobey God, refuse to “pray with Jesus” and know of God’s love, and not consent to do his will. Human freedom entails the ability to do otherwise. The point to note is that Vanhoozer is affirming concepts that are in contradiction to his Calvinist theology. This makes us ask, “Dr. Vanhoozer, what is it that you truly believe? Do you affirm Calvinism, or do you affirm libertarian freedom? Which is it, for it cannot be both!”
The above quotes only make sense within the worldview of libertarian freedom. That worldview allows for linguistic and conceptual harmony and theological coherence. And because the non-Calvinist takes rational and moral coherence on board in his hermeneutic, he is compelled to conclude that these statements are inconsistent with Calvinist theistic determinism. They create linguistic and conceptual disharmony and theological incoherence, thus demonstrating the incoherence inherent in Calvinism’s theological determinism. Logic cannot grasp the language here that is stretched beyond comprehension for one who believes that the sole will of God unconditionally effects the God/man relationship (i.e., “authorial consummation”). Vanhoozer affirms that God “challenges” and “invites.” There is talk of “cooperation” with God which is anathema for the consistent Calvinist. There is the mention of “obedience” and “our willing consent to God’s will.”
So, what is being required of us as we read Vanhoozer? He is of course assuming the truth of Calvinism, but in doing so and also using words and concepts that only make sense in the context of libertarian freedom he in essence is requiring that we suppress our faculty of logical thinking. In order to embrace Vanhoozer’s thesis and the ideas he is presenting we would have to suppress the fact that he is speaking in contradiction with his Calvinist determinism. Granted an “interaction” can be “dialogical” and “asymmetrical,” but because it is “dialogical” it can on be “asymmetrical” to a degree. It cannot be wholly determined or one-sided as is the teaching of Calvinism. For if what is meant by “asymmetrical” is that the relationship is irresistibly predetermined by one of the parties involved then what would be the purpose and meaning of calling it “dialogical?” It becomes a monologue. Vanhoozer would answer that it is to “effect” a “freedom of consent?” But we are back to the same problem. The words “freedom” and “consent” imply the ability at some point sole authorship of one’s actions and the ability of contrary choice which are incoherent with Vanhoozer’s claims about there being an “effectual” action of God upon the person. One does not “consent” to an irresistible “effect.” They don’t even surrender to it. They just are the product of the irresistible effect – which in this case is God. “Consent” implies a sufficient degree of freedom such that “dissent” from the “challenge” and “invitation” to “cooperate” with God is also a possibility. “Consent” implies the retention of a “will” as understood as the person being sole author of their actions along with the real possibility of contrary choice. Only then do the words “willingly consent to God’s will” make sense. Also, only in the context of libertarian freedom does the word “communicative” makes sense. We respond willingly to what is communicated. The communication itself does not irresistibly effect what is being communicated for that would make the words “willingly to consent to God’s will” incoherent. What is it to “willingly consent to God’s will” if God determined that you will “consent” to his will (compatibilism)? Moreover, “obedience” has no meaning except within the context of the possibility of “disobedience” which logically implies being the sole author of one’s action and having the ability of contrary choice.
Hence, the biblical teaching is less convoluted, clearer, and more coherent than Vanhoozer’s attempt at reconciling his universal divine causal determinism with the human freedom he is forced to acknowledge because it is all around him and in him. We willingly consent or willingly refuse to consent to what God has communicated to us. But he does not communicate to us what is logically contradictory or the reverse of moral intuitions. The Calvinist, exercising his free will, refuses to consent to this hermeneutic of coherence. The Calvinist willingly refuses this biblical view due to the fact that they must retain a deterministic definition of God’s sovereignty no matter what the moral or intellectual price tag. They believe their understanding of a deterministic sovereignty that requires a pervasive unconditionality to be the biblical view of reality despite the logical/linguistic, moral, epistemic, and biblical/theological contradictions, inconsistencies, and incoherencies it creates. I contend therefore, that in the true sense of the word, it is accurate to describe Reformed Calvinist thought as a–rational.
The point to note is that the language becomes distorted and cannot bear Vanhoozer’s required deterministic worldview. The conflation of meanings boggles the mind. This is especially worrisome in light of Vanhoozer’s own statements regarding proper interpretation.
“Right interpretation depends not only on having the right procedures but on having the right habits of perception as well as a desire to understand the whole. We often need to be trained in order to perceive things correctly…To stake a theological truth claim ultimately demands practical reasoning…Staking theological truth claims is a product neither of instrumental nor of speculative reason but of practical reason: a type of reasoning about moral action and a type of reasoning for which one may be held morally responsible. Indeed, according to some recent virtue epistemologists, rationality just is a form of being moral – of ethics applied to the intellect…” (FT, 348)
The non-Calvinist heartily agrees with what Vanhoozer says here, but it is not how the Calvinist approached the interpretive task. It appears that Vanhoozer simply does not reason or process words and theological concepts as he describes above – the “right procedures,” the “right habits of perception,” a desire to understand the whole,” “practical reasoning.” “moral action,” etc. All this can be summarized in the phrase hermeneutic of coherence. But I have shown that the Calvinist does not adopt a hermeneutic of coherence. Interpretive conclusions that are obviously incoherent or contradictory are viable options for the Calvinist. A very thorny problem indeed!
The more fundamental issue therefore involves examining this phenomenon in evangelicalism to see if there is a real, objective “right” and “wrong” biblical hermeneutic that we should desire to know and must adhere to. We know that there is, but it is simply dismissed by the Calvinist when their interpretations are threatened by that hermeneutic. I suggest that in addition to textual exegesis, the grammatical-historical method and the very helpful insights that Vanhoozer provides about letting God’s revelation play the leading role in the formation of our thoughts about God and his ways, we must add the criteria of rational coherence. Whatever is gleaned from these traditional interpretive methodologies should exhibit logical, moral, epistemological and biblical consistency. This is where Vanhoozer and all Calvinist fall woefully short.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] Eugene H. Peterson, A Long Obedience in the Same Direction: Discipleship in an Instant Society, (Downers Grove, InterVarsity Press, 1980), 61.
The Truth of the Gospel 