Vanhoozer’s main concern is how God works his will in the world in not so obvious a fashion as the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the ten plagues, the virgin birth, the raising of Lazarus, or Jesus’ own resurrection. His special emphasis is on the compatibility of human decisions and actions with how God effects his decisions and actions regarding our affairs, and for the Calvinist, our eternal destinies.
The problem therefore has at least two sides to it. The first involves how it is that God does what he does. The second are the implications that this divine doing has for the subjects being acted upon. Calvinism can easily be perceived as coercive, causal, and instrumental in that it claims God moves the events of history according to an exhaustive, predetermined divine plan. “Whatsoever comes to pass” has been “ordained” by God in minutest detail beforehand. In that the scope of this determinism is exhaustive, the question arises as to how God enacts his preordination of all things given the obvious nature of human willing and acting? It is not readily apparent how an exhaustive divine predetermination by God’s will alone that causes all things to occur as they do is not in logical and moral contradiction to the obvious capacity for the human person to also will and act of themselves and even contrary to the expressed will of God.
This Reformed Calvinist position, as an exhaustive determinism, presents God as an impersonal sovereign enacting his own will in a world in which we perceive that we as human beings have a similar capacity to will, decide, and act of our own accord. Vanhoozer strives towards a solution to this problem by proposing that God, by engaging human beings through his Word, can “effect” His will in all things while not violating human freedom or personhood through actions or influences that could be construed as instrumental, manipulative, strategic, forceful or coercive.
Note that this is a distinctively Calvinist problem because that theology maintains that there is a divine eternal decree that ordains all things. As a Calvinist question it has two components. ed to point out, generates such profound and pervasive biblical incoherence for the Calvinist that they have no way to surmount the problem, unless Vanhoozer has now discovered it. The second component is the idea that God is an active agent in the affairs of the world and people’s lives. All Christians would agree on this fact. God acts. And it is one thing to act upon impersonal matter and another thing to act upon persons. What we are wrestling with here is how God acts in a world in which we perceive there to be creatures with the capacity of acting of their own wills; creatures of which it seems a biblical and theological requirement that it be said they will and act of their own accord, not as predetermined by God.
Now the divine acts in history seem to fall into at least two categories – those of intervention and those of personal influence. The two certainly overlap and neither requires the conclusion that there must exist either an exhaustive theistic determinism or absolute human freedom. The error would seem to be in thinking about the divine / human interaction from one or the other of these polarities. Thus, I have argued that the Reformed Calvinist position is biblically unsustainable. And a position of absolute human freedom would also not account for all the biblical data on the relation between God and his human creatures. God may act upon the physical elements, through nature, by theophany, the incarnation, etc. But these are special acts and appearances for special purposes that seem to leave the vast majority of human events untouched by his direct intervention.
The Bible also depicts God as speaking as well as acting. This speaking is certainly a direct intervention into human affairs, yet in the Old Testament it was usually to a specially designated individual (i.e., a prophet) that God spoke. This has implications upon the meaning of Heb. 1:1, 2 where we read that “Long ago, at many times and in many ways, God spoke to our forefathers by the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son…” If God has now spoken via “his Son,” then what is the intended message and scope of such a visible and unique speech-act? Could it be that focus of God’s present communication and activity occurs in the dynamic of the divine / human encounter “in Christ?” (Eph. 1) That it is not in some nebulous way that God speaks to us, but there is a content to the present message. What may be difficult to put our finger on is how God works by his Spirit in the world and in the lives of individuals. But we know that the Spirit works in accord with the message of Christ.
God’s will therefore is worked out in a certain context, that is, the gospel message about Jesus and salvation in him through faith. It is his will that Jesus be proclaimed to human beings in need of salvation , but if the Spirit is at work in that message, neither polar extreme needs to be the explanation of what occurs in salvation. It is neither an absolute predestination to salvation, and it certainly is not a matter of human freedom to save oneself. The same holds for the continuation of the work of God in the world or in a life. God can act sovereignly upon his world, and he acts in persons by his Spirit according to the measure of their faith. Each is an aspect of divine sovereignty at work. The Holy Spirit, as God, works through those who believe so they may discern God’s will and walk in it. In this sense we affirm what Vanhoozer is trying to get at. That is, that God does not force, coerce, or manipulate people to do his will. But the dilemma of Calvinist predestination need not enter the picture, for neither does God determine initial belief or continuance in faith, rather he has spoken to us in Christ. If “in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son” then that message has a certain content that needs to be properly understood by coherently incorporating the fullness of the biblical data. I submit that the biblical content of that message is something that Reformed Calvinism cannot coherently incorporate or proclaim. What God does is to bring “good news” of salvation by faith and the promise of his Spirit to those who continue in this faith, trusting God so they “may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect.” (Rom. 12:1, 2) This is how God works his will on earth. It is a spiritual work based in the content of the gospel message of salvation in which God is glorified for his purpose in election, that is, that he eternally planned to be gracious to sinners in sending the “Elect One” in whom we can know the love God has for us, believe, and be saved, thus allowing the Spirit to fill us and transform us into Christ’s image. This message includes the necessity of repentance and faith from the hearer as a response. Does this leave God helpless in the face of unwilling sinners? No. Why? Precisely because God is communicative and he “God has spoken to us by his Son.” That message is for sinners and as sinners they may receive it. As sinners they may also reject it. In order to alleviate any impersonal perception of how God goes about implementing his will, Vanhoozer proposes understanding God’s interaction with man as a “communicative agent.” He is correct. But what is the precise content of what God is communicating? He is communicating that he has wrought salvation for sinners to whom he offers it freely to be received by faith.
What is happening is that the Spirit is at work in the message of the gospel so as to confront people with light, life, and hope. The sovereign work is done and continues in the gospel proclamation but not apart from the sovereign design that this salvation be appropriate on the basis of faith. Sinners have the responsibility to believe in what God is communicating to them of the glorious gospel of their salvation. Without this responsibility of faith, it would not be “communication.” Hence biblical sovereignty as God’s ruling and reigning over the affairs of mankind culminating “in Christ,” not his predestination of certain individuals to salvation, marks the whole affair. Those who believe are regenerated by the Holy Spirit and as they continue in faith they are also kept by that same Spirit. This does justice to all the biblical dynamics. Divine / human communication, the nature of faith, culpability for unbelief, final judgment, etc. all become coherent concepts in a “theodrama” in which, rightly understood, God receives all the glory. What this means is that there are those that will respond both positively and negatively to that message and work of the Spirit. Without the Spirit’s presence none could respond. Given the Spirit’s presence all may respond.
What can we conclude? God does not fundamentally move men about as objects to do as he wills according to an exhaustive predetermined plan for them. We perceive, from Scripture, that God has his own plans and purposes for the world and mankind, and that he always has been “communicative” in working out those determinations. But those determinations are not all-pervasive. God has not ordained, and therefore is the cause, of “whatsoever comes to pass.” Hence, God being sovereign, there is room for real human freedom. Both the content of the gospel and the way it is proclaimed confirm this. Those who object to theological determinism do not object solely on the grounds that it renders God as “non-communicative” – acting upon us “instrumentally,” “manipulatively,” “coercively,” or by “force” – for we think Calvinists as well as non-Calvinists would have difficulty in identifying precisely when such divine modes of deterministic operation are in operation. Rather, non-Calvinists object to theological determinism on the grounds that it cannot coherently account for other clear biblical teachings on the nature of the God/man relation such as moral responsibility, the nature of faith, and especially the content of the gospel message as “good news.” It is in this ultimate theological and ontological sense that adjectives like “instrumental,” “manipulative,” “coercive,” and “force,” characterize the relation between God and man within a theistic determinism. It is the determinism of Calvinism that makes it unbiblical. It is a logically and morally unsustainable position because it has God predetermining “whatsoever comes to pass” by a comprehensive, eternal decree that fixes all events, attitudes, decisions, and actions of all persons at all times, while the biblical data indicates a relational dynamic that is incoherent with such theological determinism. It is incoherent because Scripture testifies to the fact that human beings are the sole author of their actions and that they can do other than what God “communicatively” expresses they should do. This is as we would expect given the claim of “communication” between God and man. Although, the manner by which God accomplishes his will in human affairs and in individuals is a legitimate line of inquiry, the general nature of any effective relationship of God to man, although mysterious, cannot be of the nature of an absolute determinism. The mystery cannot lie in the contradictory proposition that God determines all things yet human freedom remains genuinely real. Rather the mystery lies in the fact that God determines certain human events according to his purposes and can achieve those purposes unfailingly. That is what it means for God to be sovereign. For instance, a sovereign declaration is that those who believe will be saved and those who do not believe will be condemned. Because God is sovereign you can count on it.
The fact that needs to be reckoned with is that the will of God is not always done and it is not a biblical mystery or mystery coherent with Scripture to state contradictory and incoherent propositions regarding two wills in God as a kind of resolution to the problem of theistic determinism. Moral responsibility requires a certain type of freedom of human beings. But the omni-pervasive causality of Reformed Calvinism does not coherently allow for this type of freedom. Omni-pervasive causality is the logical corollary of absolute determinism. It is this omni- pervasive causality that is incoherent with the clear biblical witness to genuine human causality. Human beings cause things to occur that God did not predetermine nor does he will to occur. It is not a matter as to whether or not God can act effectually while not violating human nature and freedom. The non-Calvinist does not claim that human nature is absolutely inviolable by God. Nor is it a matter of whether or not when God acts causally he does so in a “communicative” fashion. That God is “communicative” is fundamentally obvious throughout Scripture. He certainly speaks to men and women to make his plans, purposes, and will known. Nor is it a matter as to whether God will retain his sovereignty if human freedom is granted. The thwarting of God’s sovereignty is an ontological impossibility and a fear generated by the Calvinist’s deterministic thought process that regarding sovereignty. The core of the matter has to do with whether God has left any room for human acts can be considered as genuinely free acts, to what extent, with what purpose, and how “free” is to be coherently defined. Do people have desires, wills, and the capacity to act that God has not instilled in them so as to have them act according to his desires and will for them? The fact that God acts causally is well attested to in Scripture. And there seems to be a spectrum of methods by which he acts to accomplish what he wants to bring about. Certain of God’s actions with men do violate men’s freedom. Sometimes he acts upon persons in forceful and coercive ways (i.e., Jonah, Pharaoh, Saul). We need not avoid confessing that there are many types of “communication” God enters into with men that are not as ”communicative” in the sense that Vanhoozer is seeking to discern here. Sometimes God acts in or through men and women (i.e., Lydia, Stephen, Billy Graham). But even in all these types of action the general rule appears to be that God does not effect his will where the human being is not so inclined for God to work and where the human being is not so inclined we see that God has means by which to incline the will according to his purposes. But this only proves the main contention – that God has not predetermined “whatsoever comes to pass.” For we obviously have instances where God effects his will by forthrightly communicating with the person, which we sense is not a violation of their will but a battle of wills which God always wins. (i.e., Pharaoh) In these instances we have confirmation that the will of man has not been predetermined by God, otherwise the accounts become nonsense. And even when God effects his will without violating human freedom, this does not mean that he has done so absolutely in all things. For he cannot have predetermined “whatsoever comes to pass” lest that make him the author of those evil acts that being the God of all goodness he could never have effected by his will.
The issue is ultimately the claim of the Calvinist that God has predetermined all things absolutely. This is not a plausible interpretation of the whole scope of Scripture. In all of his dealings with all men God is certainly “communicative” in the context of his nature as loving, compassionate, merciful and just. This then eliminates a certain form of theistic determinism and requires certain understandings of human freedom that do not necessarily include the idea of unlimited freedom and the diminishing of God’s sovereignty. For instance, to say God and man are “communicative” by definition demands the capability on man’s part to “communicate” back in various ways and not just in the way God determines. Thus for God to make his “communication,” “communion” and “dialogue” effectual with respect to his predetermined will in all things, especially our eternal destinies, is biblically, morally and epistemologically problematic. To retain a theistic determinism would alter the meaning of “communication” to more of an irresistible “transformation” of the person according to God’s will. “Instrumentality” and “coercion” have crept in. A comprehensive “caused freedom” (RT, 383) that has others irresistibly willing what God has predetermined for them is impossible to reconcile with the biblical testimony to man’s ways with God that are marked by potentiality, possibility, contingency, and conditionality. The “if / then” contingency is everywhere found in Scripture. The God/man relation is marked by the contrasts of obedience and disobedience, acceptance and rejection, faith and unbelief, pride and humility, etc. (Matt. 4:17, 7:24-27, 11:20-24, 13:58, 18:1-6, 21:28-32, 23; Mk. 3:5, 16:15-16; Lu. 7:30, 13:1-5; Jn. 3:16-18, 36, 5:39-40, 8:24, 12:48, 20:30-31; Acts 7:51, et al.) It is a matter of being biblically accurate as to the scope of God’s effectual workings and to whom and how they apply. The Scriptures logically and morally resist the implications of a doctrine that states God applies a predetermined, effectual work with respect to every person’s eternal destiny. The fact that it is God’s prerogative to cause events and actions through men and women is not the issue. The problem is the claim that the Bible teaches that all God’s determinations are predeterminations that are comprehensive in scope and absolute in nature. An eternal decree that ordains “whatsoever comes to pass,” even if it is done “communicatively,” is contrary to the biblical witness to human willing, acting, decision, moral responsibility, the content of the gospel and the nature of faith. The issue becomes especially acute with respect to individual salvation and the presence of evil. We cannot wrest the biblical text to accommodate a cherished theological scheme. That God has predetermined every person’s eternal destiny, even if he accomplishes this “communicatively” is problematic. The problem with an unconditional election and an effectual call translates not into whether God is acting communicatively or non-communicatively but whether he is acting “in character” as moral, compassionate, just and gracious. It is ultimately a question of what God is really like, whether we can know him for what he is really like, and whether we can know our own standing with him. If a theology is leading us into a dark abyss of logical/linguistic, moral and epistemic incoherence in areas where Scripture sheds clear light, the answer is not to declare “mystery” or “incomprehensibility” or suggest the Bible teaches a contradiction that is “only apparent,” but rather we must back out and redirect accordingly. We must reevaluate our hermeneutic. We must allow fundamental laws of reasoning to play their legitimate role in the hermeneutical process. And I contend that Vanhoozer’s application of a literary thought paradigm and “speech-act” theory to the problem of Reformed Calvinist theistic determinism fails to free it of several substantial problems. Indeed, talk of God as a “God-in-communicative-act” affirms an important Scriptural truth but only serves to bolster the case against a Calvinist determinism.
Therefore, the central issue lies in properly interpreting God’s sovereignty in a genuinely meaningful way, that is, with rational coherence, given the biblical texts that testify to the realities of human freedom, moral responsibility and real contingency and conditionality. The historical and personal scope and biblical/theological implications of the claim that God has ordained “whatsoever comes to pass” are problematic at a deeper theological level, not simply in whether God acts “communicatively” as opposed to “instrumentally,” “manipulatively,” “coercively” or by “force.”[1] This is especially important to consider in that Vanhoozer suggests that those who do not embrace his “dialogical variation on a determinist theme” are laboring under a “confusion.” He writes,
“Relational theists and panentheists are not the only theologians to raise eyebrows at the notion of this dialogical variation on a determinist theme. However, their objection – that a personal God cannot cause humans freely to love him back – labors under a confusion between strategic or instrumental and communicative action…Communicative action brings about its effects irresistibly yet non-coercively, through reasoned discourse that, because it is true, good and beautiful, resonates with human minds and hearts (i.e., is internally persuasive). To speak of “dialogical determinism,” then, is to maintain three tenets: (1) the dialogue between God and human creatures is real – interpersonally genuine: (2) the effect is communicative; (3) the outcome is divinely determined.” (RT, 383-4)
This is an astonishing paragraph with contradictory statements. Why does “communicative action” bring about its effects irresistibly? Only because Vanhoozer is a Calvinist! He has to have some form of divine action that works irresistibly upon the person because he cannot forfeit his doctrine of “irresistible grace.” And Vanhoozer is trying to convince us that if God does this via “communicative action” then he can bring about the outcome he determined without a hint of the strategic or instrumental. But I submit to you that God’s “communicative action” or communication does not bring about its effects irresistibly. In fact, if it brings about effects at all, it is by persuading the free will and thinking of the person being communicated to. That is what communication is about.
Vanhoozer is contending that a personal God can cause humans freely to love him if he does it via “communicative action.” He submits that some theologians object to this proposition because they are confusing a communicative type of causal action with a strategic or instrumental type of causal action. With regard to humans loving God, since Vanhoozer maintains “the outcome is divinely determined,” at some point therefore, God determined that certain humans should love him. When God implements this determination he does so communicatively. This preserves the suitability of God’s effective actions for human’s as persons. Implementing this determination in this communicative manner involves “reasoned discourse” that is “internally persuasive.” Vanhoozer argues that such communicative action therefore “brings about its effects irresistibly yet non-coercively.” Hence, Vanhoozer claims that God can cause humans freely to love him in a manner appropriate to human personhood.
Vanhoozer labors under the Reformed presuppositions of a definition of God’s sovereignty that is absolutely deterministic and comprehensive in scope and a definition of total depravity that includes the faith response in the totality of human impossibilities due to sin. But Scripture teaches that God is the cause of any possibility for us to love him, not that he irresistibly causes us to love him back. The love response is first and foremost reduced to a response of faith working through God’s love to us. Note Vanhoozer says, “love him back.” That implies that he first loved us. This was God’s choice. Nothing compelled God to love us. If he chose to do so then this indicates the nature of love. Therefore the Bible teaches that we as sinners choose to do so – “love him back” – because he first loved us. That is what makes it a “dialogical,” “communicative” relation of a uniquely unequal sort. God does not cause us to love him back in the sense of predetermining with irresistible effect that some of us will do so. This simply does not accord with Scripture. His acts of grace, mercy, and redemption are the grounds upon which we should love him in return. They are not the cause of requited love. The cause of reciprocal love is within the beloved made possible by the Lover. The response of unbelieving rejection is left without excuse and therefore can be judged justly in light of the love, mercy and grace of God demonstrated on our behalf in Christ. But there can be a response of rejection to the love and grace of God.
When Vanhoozer adds the word “freely” to his “dialogical determinism” it is incoherent to argue that it is still a “determinism.” It is incoherent to argue that “freely to love him back” essentially means for God “to inevitably cause certain persons to love him back.” “Freely” involves a person’s will as sole author of the response of love with the ability and possibility of contrary choice. “Freely” means to do so or not to do so in light of the impelling reasons why we should “love him back.”
I think that Vanhoozer’s claim that a communicative type of causal action nullifies the strategic and instrumental type of causal action regarding an outcome that is divinely determined is artificial and unsubstantial. I fail to see how the adjective “freely” can coherently be incorporated in Vanhoozer’s description of God’s activity here. The proposition that a communicative action makes outcomes that are divinely determined somehow free with respect to human response and less strategic and instrumental, are simply bald assertions. The contention that humans freely love God when God divinely determined that they should love him is incoherent with the nature of human freedom and divine and human love. It is simply inserted as a bald assertion without convincing logical or moral grounds upon which to stand. If the outcome is divinely determined and the divine effect is therefore irresistible, I fail to comprehend how this is not acting coercively and why one should give intellectual assent to the claim that the person is freely loving God. How does God doing what he does “communicatively” change any of the more fundamental issues of determination and irresistibility? I fail to see how the human response can coherently be described as free simply on the basis that this determined result is performed communicatively. Indeed, a divine communicative action that ultimately determines a human action that is irresistible to the person cannot be coherently characterized as freely loving or “reasoned discourse” or “dialogue that is “real” and “interpersonally genuine.” Neither does it properly represent the meaning of “communicative.”
These statements confirm Vanhoozer’s theistic determinism and raise some important questions. First, as I pointed out, these propositions about divine and human love and human freedom are troubling from a biblical perspective. The very nature of the greatest commandment as a commandment, presupposes libertarian freedom – “You shall love the Lord your God…” (Matt. 22:37) Second, with respect to effecting our salvation, if God were to act upon us “strategically” or “instrumentally” as opposed to “communicatively,” what precisely would that look like? What is the difference between these? Until Vanhoozer can describe the alternative he sets against his “God-in-communicative-act” theology it sounds very much like this communicative causal act theology fits the bill for strategic and instrumental causal action. Assuming that the divine causality displayed in the 10 plagues or raining down fire and brimstone or sending his people into captivity is not quite the nature of the “communicative” word or act we are concerned with here, we just don’t know what a “strategic” or “instrumental” causal action as opposed to a “communicative” causal action would amount to with respect to an individual’s salvation in Christ. I assume the gospel message is a divine communicative act. But that communicative act is not determinative or irresistible because the gospel message is an announcement, offer or invitation to salvation. It takes the form of “repent and believe” which implies the acceptance or rejection by the hearer of the message. It comes as requiring a free response from the hearer. To say it is determined and irresistible is to read Calvinism into the biblical texts on the gospel. Thirdly, what precisely is Vanhoozer talking about when he claims divine “communicative action” brings about its effects “irresistibly yet non-coercively?” This is a distinction without a difference if we don’t know how to identify “coercive” action. “Authority,” “domination” and “control” – all elements in a definition of coercion – are certainly elements in Vanhoozer’s Calvinist effectual call and aspects of his compatibilist view of human freedom. He calls God the “Author” (authority) who determines the outcome (domination) and irresistibly effects people to do his will (control). To claim that “communicative action” is of such a different sort than coercive, strategic or instrumental action when we don’t know what these amount to or look like in action is to set up a “straw man” to give the appearance of plausibility to one’s position. It appears to me that the best practical illustration of these adjectives in action is found precisely in the doctrine of an effectual call, even if it comes about “communicatively.”
In reference to Vanhoozer’s quote above, non-Calvinists are not laboring under a “confusion” when they contend that theistic determinism is inherently coercive, strategic, and instrumental thereby annihilating true human free will. Neither can we identify in practice how God does this in people, but again, it is the determinism that is the problem, not the way God works his will in the elect. And we would also contend that claiming a “communicative” modus operandi to achieve a predetermined outcome with irresistible effect betrays a confusion regarding the word “communicative.” One has to impose the element of the effectual onto the meaning of “communicate.” It is not inherent in the word itself. Indeed, “effectual” and “irresistible” as the result of divine action are the opposite of “communicative.” A “communicative act” is not in and of itself effectual and therefore the idea of it being effectual is brought in from Calvinism and imposed upon the word and its related concepts (i.e., dialogue, communion). Thus Vanhoozer cleverly transforms “communicative action” into something that supports his theistic determinism. But it has also been transformed into something very similar to the strategic and instrumental type of action that Vanhoozer confesses is unacceptable as the way of a personal God with human persons. The word “communicative” takes on these very qualities due to the imposition of Calvinist determinism upon the word. The “main improvement” Vanhoozer seeks to gain from a “retooling” of classical theism through a “shift in thinking about God’s action in terms of a somewhat impersonal causality to a more explicitly personalist paradigm (i.e., communicative agency)” (RT, 297, footnote 3) is never realized. His Calvinist determinism imposes the strategic and instrumental upon the Bible’s witness to the communicative actions of God in Christ and through the Spirit with reference to the gospel message and the call for the hearer to put their faith and trust in Christ for salvation. In contrast, according to Vanhoozer’s Calvinism, everyone’s eternal destiny is fixed and it is God’s “communicative action” that brings to pass what has been predestined for each person. So where is the difference between “communicative action” and the causal, strategic, and instrumental? What is the content of this communicative action?” Vanhoozer has said it is the gospel of Christ – the Word made flesh. But what does this “communicative action” consist of? The very opposite the deterministic doctrines of total inability, unconditional election, and irresistible grace or effectual calling. It proclaims the message of “good news” of salvation to all individuals telling them that they are loved by God and that he has brought about salvation from them if they but believe this and put their faith in Christ so as to appropriate that salvation for themselves. If Vanhoozer is to remain consistent to his Calvinist soteriological doctrines, his “communicative action” cannot be this “good news” message. In light of his Calvinism, therefore, God’s activity is marked by the causal, strategic, instrumental and impersonal. In contrast, the biblical witness to the human response to the communicative action of God’s saving work in Christ is markedly libertarian and not predetermined, causal, or irresistibly effectual. In that the gospel as “good news” comes to us in Scripture as a message to be accepted and yet we find is also rejected, the context tells us that it involves libertarian free will. It is thereby a personal matter between God, the individual, and Jesus. Evangelicals are therefore correct in describing this phenomenon as “personal salvation in Jesus Christ.” They are also being biblical when they talk about salvation as “a decision.”
In addition, note that Vanhoozer’s determinism is supported by his literary analogy. The literary analogy is deterministic. The proposition that “God is to our world…as an author is to the world of his or her text” (RT, 298) simply will not do biblically as a definition of either his sovereignty or description of his “communication.” Yet, these theories are serviceable in supporting Vanhoozer’s Calvinist theistic determinism, not only in that they have commonalities with the nature of how God reveals himself recorded in Scripture (i.e., he certainly does communicate with his human creatures), but because they extend beyond that divine revelation with deterministic affinities. Although Vanhoozer chooses Bakhtin’s dialogical conception of authorship rather than the Tolstoyan type to avoid monologism, in the end Vanhoozer’s Reformed Calvinist God is definitely monological. “Monologism is the aggressive self-assertion of author’s over their characters…giving them a destiny that is not their own but their creator’s will.” (RT, 307) This is Calvinism, pure and simple. This is precisely what Vanhoozer holds to in his Reformed Calvinist soteriological doctrines of unconditional election and an effectual call. “…the author serves as the exclusive or primary cause of what happens.” (RT, 307) His criticism of monological authorship holds true for his Reformed theological position. “…the main problem with this view…is that it fails to account for the dialogical interaction of God and human beings depicted in the Bible or, for that matter, the Bible’ diverse human authorial voices themselves.” (RT, 309) Theistic determinism will always “fail to account for the dialogical interaction of God and human beings depicted in the Bible.” Hence, Vanhoozer’s Calvinism, which just is a universal divine causal determinism, will also always fail to account for the dialogical interaction of God and human beings depicted in the Bible. In short. Calvinism is unbiblical.
Libertarian freedom provides the most coherent logical/linguistic, moral, epistemic, gospel, and biblical resolution to the issues at hand. The only confusion here lies in Vanhoozer’s substitution of the idea of a “communicative” divine causality for deterministic divine causality. The substitution is not a proper one because upon careful scrutiny the claims for “communicative” causality do not hold up. Communicative causality serves up the same logical, moral, epistemic, gospel and biblical difficulties as theistic deterministic causality. The relational theist’s claim is that determinism is inevitably causal, strategic, and instrumental and genuinely “communicative acts” are not. Therefore, genuinely communicative acts cannot be divinely determined acts. That is precisely why they are incompatible. They cannot be presented as if they are compatible. That is to mischaracterize the nature of genuine communication. “Communicative” actions are not deterministic when properly understood according to the definition of “communication.” But Vanhoozer insists upon conflating them to soften his Calvinist theistic determinism. But in doing so he sacrifices rational coherence; something Reformed Calvinist theologians are inclined to do.[2] They therefore should not be joined and manipulated as if one has an explanatory power for the other such that it can be logically argued that because God is “communicative” that both divine determinism and human freedom are compatible. Rather, a closer look reveals that the meaning of “communicative” is distorted to accommodate an overwhelming, all-encompassing determinism. And if the claim of “communicative” action cannot eliminate the determinism, then the use of “communicative” only presents a confusion all its own. It sidetracks us from the main issue as to whether theistic determinism is strategic, instrumental, or most importantly unbiblical.
So Vanhoozer has given us another thing to think about, that is whether his claim about “communicative” action, in the end, is anything different than a theistic determinism in a different linguistic garb. He states that “Communicative action brings about its effects through reasoned discourse,” that is, the type of “reasoned discourse” in which the person being “reasoned with” by God cannot do otherwise because their desires have been irresistibly transformed so that they desire to do what God wants them to do! Is this what you think of when hear the phrase “reasoned discourse?” Surely, the claim that somehow a “communicative,” “reasoned discourse” that produces a predetermined effect that is irresistible falls short on the side of retaining the integrity of human desires, will, and responsive action that is personal and amounts to genuine “communication.” Again, what Vanhoozer means by “communicative” as opposed to strategic or instrumental is essentially a distinction without a difference, for we don’t know what a strategic or instrumental mode of God’s action would be and we perceive that Vanhoozer’s “communicative action” is characterized by the strategic and instrumental. God accomplishes his will through the person. Perhaps the way Vanhoozer redefines “communicative action” in Reformed Calvinist terms is the prime example of coercive, strategic, and instrumental action. Therefore, perhaps the Calvinist claim of effectuality is not characteristic of God’s communicative acts as we find them in Scripture. Effectuality can be the result of God’s coercive, strategic, and instrumental acts, but not his communicative acts as in the gospel message. “Communicative,” and the other forms and variations on the concept, are therefore inappropriate words and phrases to justify the theistic determinism Vanhoozer is intent upon retaining. What Vanhoozer is saying about communication, dialogue, communion, etc. work against his Reformed deterministic theology. He wants to askew the “coercive,” “strategic,” and “instrumental” yet speaks in terms of unconditional election and irresistible divine effect. This is incoherent. Such a theology is inherently “strategic” and “instrumental” and certainly “causal” despite the claim, indeed, in direct conflict with the claim, of a “God-in communicative-act.” The relational theists, when not unbiblical in their extreme, have a better grasp on the mode of relation between God and man. Something of the conditional and contingent abides in the biblical witness. Nothing of this abides in Vanhoozer’s Calvinist soteriological doctrines of unconditional election and irresistible grace or the effectual call. As absolute predeterminations, God’s “communications” that are targeted to certain people with certain irresistible effects, are nothing less than strategic, causal and instrumental in their nature. Casting these predeterminations as “communications” doesn’t change their essential nature. The essential question is whether Calvinist theistic and soteriological determinism is biblical. What Vanhoozer has told us is that theistic determinism works via God’s words to us, but it is still theistic determinism and in that the problem lies. Hence, his use of words like “persuasion” and phrases such a “reasoned discourse” also make Vanhoozer’s attempt at convincing us that “this dialogical version on a determinist theme” is anything other than the Reformed theistic determinism which is logically, morally, and epistemologically incoherent. To commandeer non-deterministic words and phrases like “persuasion,” “reasoned discourse,” “relational,” etc. in an attempt to divert us from recognizing the unbiblical implications of theistic determinism only makes Vanhoozer’s propositions less plausible. To require a “guarantee that God will persuade” is incoherent. (RT, 314) His words and phrases presuppose a non-deterministic divine relationship with human persons. As such, his words and phrases are inconsistent with his theological and soteriological doctrines. “Dialogical determinism” is still determinism and determinism is logically, morally, epistemologically and biblically unsustainable.
So both Vanhoozer and the relational theists are probably referring to a same mode of God’s activity – his communicative actions – yet with a crucial difference. For the relational theists, divine “communicative actions” do not, as a rule, determine human actions, especially people’s eternal destinies. For Vanhoozer, as a Calvinist determinist, they must. And this is where he imposes his theology upon the discussion, rather than letting the biblical text form his theology. “Communicative action” in and of itself is precisely what Vanhoozer is proposing as relief for the incoherence of Calvinist sovereignty and biblical free will. He also views a lack of consideration of God’s “communicative actions” to be the blind spot of “relational theists and panentheists.” If they are blind to the fact that divine communicative actions produce predetermined results, they have their eyes wide open to the scriptures which testify against theistic determinism. The bible testifies that even though God communicates his desires for persons these communicative acts often go unheeded and do not issue forth in the accomplishment of those divine desires. The communication is not effectual according to God’s will. Something other than a predetermined result according to the will of God obtains, even though God acts communicatively. For in a myriad of instances his will for people is revealed and is treated indifferently or disobeyed.
Therefore I am not convinced that with his “communicative” theology Vanhoozer has addressed his essential problem, that is, his theistic determinism. Neither is there a blind spot here for relational theists. They too are speaking about God’s “communicative actions.” Perhaps relational theists see Vanhoozer’s “communicative” theology for what it is. It is ultimately a theistic determinism despite the emphasis on God’s communicative mode of determinism. Vanhoozer has admitted as much in calling his theology a “dialogical determinism” and a “dialogical variation on a determinist theme.” (RT, 383-4) One cannot alter the insurmountable problems inherent in determinism by altering God’s mode of determination. And the way Vanhoozer seeks to alter God’s mode of determinism with “communicative act” creates incoherence between the two. That is why he has chosen this route of “speech-act” theory. It’s vocabulary is non-deterministic by definition and implication. To use it to support a theistic determinism strains the linguistic concepts beyond recognition and only serves to highlight the incoherence inherent in theistic determinism.
Recall this quote by Vanhoozer.
“Relational theists and panentheists are not the only theologians to raise eyebrows at the notion of this dialogical variation on a determinist theme. However, their objection – that a personal God cannot cause humans freely to love him back – labors under a confusion between strategic or instrumental and communicative action…Communicative action brings about its effects irresistibly yet non-coercively, through reasoned discourse that, because it is true, good and beautiful, resonates with human minds and hearts (i.e., is internally persuasive). To speak of “dialogical determinism,” then, is to maintain three tenets: (1) the dialogue between God and human creatures is real – interpersonally genuine: (2) the effect is communicative; (3) the outcome is divinely determined.” (RT, 383-4)
Note again that we just don’t know what “confusion” relational theists labor under when they are not convinced that strategic or instrumental action is no different than Vanhoozer’s “communicative action” for his “communicative action” reduces to the oxymoron of “dialogical determinism.” Vanhoozer is proposing that God acts communicatively, by dialogue, to irresistibly bring about in the hearts and minds of human beings the outcome he has determined. This certainly qualifies as communication that is “strategic,” “instrumental,” and “coercive,” even though Vanhoozer says irresistible is not equal to coercive. So, if there is no essential difference between instrumental action and communicative action because both have the same result of irresistibly determining the human person to do God’s will, then there is really no confusion for the relational theist. He sees Vanhoozer’s form of divine communicative action for what it is – a new brand of theistic determinism.
Vanhoozer labors under a confusion all his own when he speaks of “communicative action,” “dialogical relations,” and “answerability” through which God intends to bring his human creatures into communion with himself, and yet all this ultimately amounts to is God’s “Authorial predestination.” (RT, 334) The statement that “communicative action brings about its effects irresistibly yet non-coercively, through reasoned discourse that, because it is true, good and beautiful, resonates with human minds and hearts (i.e., is internally persuasive)” implies that each human heart with which this “communicative action” “resonates” is able to accept or reject this “reasoned discourse.” “Reasoned discourse” entails human thought that is independent and free. In “reasoned discourse” and “the dialogue between God and human creatures,” the human creatures mind and heart cannot also be subjected to irresistible divine effects that work to unfailing determine the thoughts, desires, and actions of those human creatures. At that point we have a full blown universal divine causal determinism (i.e., Calvinism).
Furthermore, it is obvious that not all of God’s human creatures are “internally persuaded” by God’s communicative action, even though “it is true, good and beautiful.” Many people reject God’s communication. Vanhoozer should then confess that people are the sole authors of their actions, and they have the ability of contrary choice, which, of course, is contrary to his Calvinist doctrines. What this also shows in Vanhoozer’s one-sided view of God’s predestination of some to salvation without mentioning the dreadful corollary. God’s “reasoned discourse” also communicates what is not so good and beautiful, that is, that many, if not most, of God’s human creatures he has irresistibly determined to spend eternity in hell. All this tells us that Vanhoozer’s statements here and his theology “labors under a confusion” all its own.
The problems of predestination remain. For even though “communicative,” Vanhoozer’s theology retains the characteristic of irresistible effect. It is this characteristic that does not properly reflect or fully account for the biblical dynamics of the God/man relationship. Vanhoozer defends the “effectual call” as an instance of a “communicative act” of God whereby he accomplishes his will with regard to an individual by changing their will to conform to his will. But this is confusing. On the other side of things, what would a non-communicative, “strategic” or “instrumental” act that causes us to love God look like? I submit that it also would be a “communicative act.” So Vanhoozer’s “communicative act” reduces to divine determinism at work in a way that conflicts with the biblical data, whereas for the biblical relational theists, a “communicative act” does not have deterministic designs and is therefore better able to incorporate the full range of biblical data. Therefore, it is Vanhoozer’s determinism that the relational theists “raise their eyebrows at.” It is this “notion of a dialogical variation on a deterministic theme” that they do not accept precisely because it is incoherent. Dialogue is irresistible and determinative of a person according to God’s will? How so? Even Vanhoozer admits, it is still a theological determinism.
Certainly there are relational theists that have gone to the extreme, but certainly Vanhoozer’s Reformed Calvinist soteriology remains as the polar opposite with problems of its own that cannot all be solved by claiming that we ought to view God’s eternal decree of predestination as “communicative.”
Again, Vanhoozer states that this failure to see God in “communicative action” is the confusion relational theist’s labor under, but if this is not a matter of whether God is “communicative” or “non-communicative”[3] then Vanhoozer is failing to acknowledge the more fundamental problem relational theists are pointing out in classical Reformed Calvinist theism that also applies to Vanhoozer’s Reformed “communicative” theology – the determinism in the theology. This theological problem transcends its “communicative” aspect. Obviously, according to Vanhoozer, theistic determinism can occur “communicatively.” He clearly states that after all is said and done, (i.e., dialogue, communicative action, reasoned discourse, etc.), that “the outcome is divinely determined.” (RT. 384) So as much as Vanhoozer has tried to alleviate the problem of theistic determinism and human freedom, he has come right back around to his Calvinist determinism. He is whole-heartedly dedicated to Calvinism.
So just to say God is “communicative” in his determinism is still to admit the presence of determinism. For the relational theist the presence of determinism is the problem. Whether God’s determinations occur “communicatively” does not assuage the problematic nature of theistic determinism. Many relational theists understand that Calvinist determinism is not less than “communicative action.” But the essential problem does not lie with it being “communicative” verses “non-communicative” action. It is that Calvinist theology is claiming that God is “communicative” in a way that is incoherent with that claim. It is that the Calvinist’s “being-in-communicative-act” is a deterministic “being-in-communicative-act.” The Bible presents God “being-in-communicative-act” minus the determinism, that is, in the context of human freedom of the will. Relational theists reject Vanhoozer’s “dialogical variation on a determinist theme” because it is a determinist theme. Determinism is antithetical to the biblical witness. Therefore, although God is “being-in-communicative-act,” he is still deterministic and as such may be characterized as “strategic” and “instrumental.”
So let us try to summarize what we have learned thus far from Vanhoozer. Let’s try to express his thesis. I think it would go something like this.
For those God has predetermined to save, he “irresistibly” “causes” them to “freely” “love him back,” and this is not incoherent as long as God does this by way of “communicative action.” Finally, this “communicative action” is the nature and description of the Calvinist doctrine of “the effectual call.”
Question: Can God predetermine that certain persons will “love him back” by “irresistibly” producing in them, that is, causing them to desire to love him and this plausibly be described as these persons “freely” loving God? Vanhoozer says, “Yes.” He seems to be stating that for God it is acceptable to “communicatively” “cause” someone to love him in return. It is unacceptable for God to “instrumentally,” “manipulatively,” coercively,” “strategically” or “forcefully” to “cause” someone to love him in return, but he can do so via “God-in-communicative-act” which Vanhoozer describes as “dialogical determinism.” I think it is really hard to avoid the conclusion that this “communicative” method of God certainly is a causal, strategic, instrumental, and manipulative.
I do not see how Vanhoozer’s God of “communicative action” justifies a theistic determinism or solves the problem of determinism and human freedom. If anything, Vanhoozer’s claims about God as a “communicative” being only adds incoherence to his position. For there is a definition of “communication” that when it occurs between persons is mutually exclusive of determinism. I have tried to indicate how Vanhoozer’s theistic determinism renders incoherent much of the relational and “communicative” aspects of the way he attempts to account for human freedom. We are still left with a theistic determinism that, by definition, is logically, morally, epistemologically, and biblically incompatible with human freedom and personal moral responsibility. Vanhoozer clearly states, “the outcome is divinely determined.” This theistic determinism and an “effectual call” are inherently incoherent with Vanhoozer’s arguments for a dialogue between God and human creatures that is “interpersonally genuine.”
The question before us is whether or not there are logical, moral and theological difficulties in the predetermination of the eternal destiny of human beings no matter how those determinations are realized by God, that is, through “communicative acts” or otherwise. Can God predetermine us to freely love him via a “communicative action” and because it is via a “communicative action” all is well on the logical, moral, and theological fronts? I don’t think so because you have to ignore an awful lot of biblical data to embrace that position. Yous also have to presuppose the truth of an “effectual call.” But the Bible does not support this notion.
Although, as I intimated above, we are not sure what “instrumental” or “strategic” action would amount to in practice with reference to God causing someone to do his will, nevertheless, the concerns run deeper than simply the divine method of divine determinism. Here now we are talking about love. The point is that even if one causes another to love them back via “communicative action,” if it said that the person loves them back freely then it must be that the requited love could just as well have been unrequited. To speak of “irresistibility” on a deterministic basis, that is, the person cannot do otherwise, is to divest the word “freely” of any coherent meaning. To simply claim “communicative act” does not resolve this problem. In other words, requited love that is also free cannot be an unalterably determined and fixed “love” that is caused by the other – in this case God. The problems lie prior to whether God accomplishes his will “communicatively” or not. The problem lies in the suggestion of theistic determinism itself. Therefore, it is a perfectly plausible and a biblically accurate statement to say that God cannot predetermine humans freely to love him. To say that he can is “a confusion” all its own. It is to be confused as to the nature of man, the content of the gospel as “good news,” and God’s love as universal. It is to confuse the responsibility of man with the work of God. Those who accept God’s message of love in Christ are characterized by a type of “soil” (i.e., heart and mind) that is humble, willing and therefore able to receive from God what he “communicates” to them in the gospel. Those who reject God’s message of love in Christ have hearts and minds characterized by “on the path,” “on rocky ground,” or “among thorns.” This parable of the sower and the seed is essentially a parable of the soils. Jesus challenges people to evaluate their hearts and minds and change to “good ground.” (Matt. 13:3-17; Mk. 4:1-20) Through his parables Jesus challenges people to think and evaluate themselves in light of the point of the parable. And he especially confronts them by saying “Let anyone who has ears to hear let him listen.” This means that “hearing” requires not merely physical ears, but a heart and mind that is able to grasp what Jesus is saying. This is not something predetermined by God and given only to special people. The explanations and prophetic quotes Jesus provided clearly indicate that this requires contemplation and action of the part of the hearers. Jesus seeks to persuade persons to be “good soil” that will receive the word. Jesus seeks to cause them to love the word by persuading them to do so. But in that case persuasion would require that he communicate his own love for them individually and universally without distinction, which he does so throughout the gospel and the writers of the epistles also affirm. But this shows up the unbiblical nature of Vanhoozer’s doctrine of an “effectual call,” while also exposing a fatal flaw, that is, that people have the ability of contrary choice. What God does is present the love he has for all individuals that is in Christ (Jn. 3:16; Rom. 5:8). Thus, their love is both won and freely given. This is what is meant in the biblical sense by “cause” to love him back. It must stop at the cause of communication and not go onto the cause of predetermination. The “cause” of communication leaves open the possibility that the communication may be ineffectual. The “cause” of predetermination presupposes the Calvinist ideas of an eternal decree and the Calvinist definition of deterministic divine sovereignty whereby the outcome is fixed. In contrast, the “cause” of communication centers God’s love for us in Christ and allows for us to love him back through faith in Christ. The point is that Vanhoozer’s scheme cannot fully incorporate the full scope of the biblical testimony on the nature of God, his love, the nature of man, and the gospel message. The biblical witness to the expression of God’s love and man’s relation to God always includes the possibility of a person refusing to love God in return by their rejection of Christ. God is not in the business of determining and “communicatively” causing love for himself from others he predetermined prior to creation would be saved. This would force us to understand this “communication” as simply causal and instrumental in the lives of the elect. It has no other purpose in accord with either its scope or content and is incoherent with the biblical data as to its scope and content. Rather, anything God decides to do com-municatively takes the universal scope and precise content of the message and element of communion seriously. Hence, in order for humans to freely love God requires that they are the sole authors of their decisions and actions and have the ability of contrary choice. Without these, Jesus’s parables, the biblical teachings on moral responsibility, God as the pattern of ethical duty, obedience, disobedience, resisting or succumbing to temptation, the nature of faith, etc. are all distorted. Moral responsibility is rendered meaningless, and faith is a redundancy.
The concept of “irresistibility” is incoherent with the word “freely” and the concept of “reasoned discourse.” How can one person cause someone else to irresistibly do something freely? If a person cannot do otherwise (irresistibility, “the outcome is divinely determined,” etc.) they may do so “willingly” in the literal sense of the word because their will has been changed, and, they may be “enabled” to do what they now desire to do in the sense that all impediments are removed, but, they do not do so freely, for freedom of the will involves precisely that – freedom to will according to one’s own self as opposed to another’s self. Therefore, to will freely is by definition to have sole authority over your will and the ability of contrary choice. Freedom of the will is not only to be able to act according to what you desire to do. Freedom of the will involves one’s will, not in the sense of it simply having been somehow altered to do the will of another (in that case you would not be a differentiated being made in God’s image), but must include the act of willing that springs from one’s self. That is what it means for the individual to believe or disbelieve. God’s call is not simply a call that implements an eternal decision of God regarding “whatsoever comes to pass” that swallows up all historical and personal distinctions in God himself.[4] It is the only basis for coherence regarding a personal salvation and moral responsibility.
Also, reasoned discourse does not imply efficacious causality by the influence of another however “communicative,” but the self’s deliberation about what is being communicated by God, and it is that self that produces a willing decision for or against the will of the other. “Come now, let us reason together” does not mean “Come now, and let me efficaciously discourse with you.” It means “Come now, let’s think together about how my overwhelming mercy with regard to your sin leaves you without excuse.” The “Come now…” of Isaiah 1:18 is followed by verse 19, “If you are willing and obedient…but if you refuse and rebel…” Clearly the ability of contrary choice is a biblical presupposition regarding human nature and divine discourse.
Furthermore, it is simply not accurate or plausible to say that “Communicative action brings about its effects irresistibly yet non-coercively, through reasoned discourse that, because it is true, good and beautiful, resonates with human minds and hearts (i.e., is internally persuasive).” First, this idea of “reasoned discourse” that “resonates with human minds and hearts” does not appear to properly reflect the Calvinist concept of total depravity or inability. Reformed Calvinists are quick to point out the utter deadness of the human heart and mind that is “dead in trespasses and sins.” (Eph. 2:1) How does divine “communicative action” resonate with human minds and hearts” because it is “true, good and beautiful?” Doesn’t it “resonate” only with “the minds and hearts” of the elect because they are elect and effectually called by the Spirit? Secondly, the statement is one-sided. That this reasoned discourse resonates with human minds and hearts because it is true, good and beautiful is a bald assertion that blatantly ignores how the discourse is not “true, good and beautiful” for the many God simply has predestined to eternal damnation. Although Vanhoozer intimates a universal application and potential for this “true, good and beautiful” “communicative action” this is simply not the case on his Calvinist theology. This “communicative action” and “reasoned discourse” simply will not “resonate” or be “internally persuasive” or bring about its effects in many who hear it because God has not ordained it. Here we return to the importance of knowing the precise content of Vanhoozer’s gospel message which he has never delineated. What is the content of this communication that is “true, good and beautiful?” I would be interested to know its content with respect to each adjective – its truth, its goodness and its beauty. I would also like to understand whether that communication can be “true, good and beautiful” to all who hear it.
Finally, mote again that we have a clear statement of Vanhoozer’s belief regarding certain divine “communicative action(s),” that is, that “the outcome is divinely determined.” What is the scope of this proposition? As a Calvinist Vanhoozer is applying this statement directly to everyone’s eternal destiny. Vanhoozer’s Calvinist theology and soteriology are a slippery slope to a comprehensive determinism involving “whatsoever comes to pass” and who will and will not be saved. It is a slippery sole from which his “communicative” theology cannot rescue him. If there are people God will “effectually” call, these must have been chosen by God at some point to salvation. Vanhoozer has not led us to believe that God determines to save them upon any condition involving themselves for he even states that faith is granted by God. He writes,
“The Holy Spirit effects our union with Christ by giving us the faith to lay hold of him (so Calvin). To be “in” Christ is thus to be in a process wherein one is both doing and being done-to.”(RT, 290, “giving us the faith” italics mine)
We assume that those who are given the faith to lay hold of Christ are chosen beforehand. When were they chosen? In time? In eternity? Vanhoozer does not make this clear. Regardless, if their salvation has been predetermined by God, then their salvation is unconditional. They will be saved. Hence, there can be no real conditionality or contingency in the life of these “elect” with respect to their salvation. They have “nothing to say” in this regard. They cannot genuinely resist the message or plans of God, neither are they genuinely involved in making these saving plans and purposes of God a reality for them. Their eternal destiny is fixed. As such, it appears that Vanhoozer’s claims about God’s “communicative speech-acts” begin to ring hollow as “communication” and take on the sense of an efficacious, verbal “formula” that irresistibly brings one in line with the will and plans of God. Hence, in that Vanhoozer attempts to argue that God is sovereign in an absolutely deterministic sense and humans are free, his position is one of Reformed compatibilism via “speech act” theory.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] God may act variously at different times and in different circumstances. This is what it means for him to be immutable. If circumstances genuinely do change, then God’s responses will change accordingly precisely because his character does not. This is confirmation that the world is marked by real potentiality, conditionality, contingency and possibility. People really do things that God interacts with and responds to.
[2] See “Chapter 9 – Reason as Problematic for Calvinist Interpretation” and “Chapter 10 – The Calvinist’s Suppression of Logical Reasoning, Moral Intuition and Common Sense”
[3] Again, we don’t know what this would be as a mode of God’s operation. It can only be described as “force,” “coercion,” “manipulation,” “instrumentality,” etc. When Vanhoozer chides relational theists for not viewing theistic determinism as “communicative” he is failing to realize that they have always viewed God as “communicative,” but they never concluded a theistic determinism from divine “communicative act.” Indeed, it is the “communicative” nature of God’s activity that is formative of a non-deterministic theology. I would argue that God’s “communicative acts” as communicative speak against the conclusion that God is a God as depicted in Reformed theistic determinism. It is the theological presuppositions and hermeneutical criteria brought to the text that cause Vanhoozer to arrive at a theistic determinism from God’s “communicative actions.” Communicative actions, as communicative, have nothing of determinism inherent in them. It is only strategic, coercive, instrumental actions that have the characteristic of determination in them. God also involves himself in such when necessary. My contention is that to arrive at a theistic determinism is to employ an erroneous, unbiblical interpretive and hermeneutical paradigm.
[4] See James Daane, The Freedom of God: A Study of Election and Pulpit, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973).
The Truth of the Gospel 