Non-Calvinist theologians criticize Calvinists for espousing an unbiblical universal divine causal determinism that maintains that God, by an eternal decree, has ordained “whatsoever comes to pass.” We believe the scope or practical depth of such a theological determinism sets itself in contradiction to the biblical testimony to the non-deterministic nature of God’s relationship to the world and especially human persons. The biblical witness to a non-deterministic reality is simply overwhelming. Theistic determinism is incoherent with the divine “theodrama” as it comes to us in the Bible. Furthermore, in Calvinist thought this comprehensive predetermination of all things – down to the minutest details of human thought and action – is required for God to be sovereign. But this definition of God’s sovereignty is incoherent with the biblical testimony of God’s freedom to create human persons with substantial free will without threat to his sovereignty. Biblical sovereignty is not defined as God having to eternally and comprehensively predetermine “whatsoever comes to pass,” but God’s ability to rule and reign over and within his creation in accord with all his divine attributes to accomplish his key purposes. The Psalmist states it succinctly, “Our God is in heaven and does whatever he pleases.” (Ps. 115:3, CSB, 135:6) This would not mean that God can do whatever we know to be logically and morally impossible. God cannot create square circles and he cannot lie. And neither can God – contra Calvinism – exhaustively determine the actions of all persons and yet state they do them freely. Nor can he predestine a person to hell and then offer him salvation.
In, through and despite the decisions of human beings, God can unfailingly accomplish his plans and purposes. The inevitable theistic determinism of the Calvinist doctrines of a divine eternal decree, predestination, unconditional election and an effectual call are incoherent with the nature of human beings made in God’s image. As such they are personal beings that are, for the most part, the sole authors of their actions with the ability of contrary choice. These are required to coherently explain personal responsibility, moral effort, the performance of duty, and judgment that is just. A deterministic definition of sovereignty is also incoherent with the content of the gospel as “good news” and God’s judgment upon unrepentant sinners. If God really has predetermined all things to occur as he wills, how does one coherently explain the testimony of Scripture that the will of God is not always done? How do acts contrary to the will of God come about?[1]
As a Reformed Calvinist theologian Vanhoozer feels compelled to seek a way to make his definition of God’s sovereignty logically and morally compatible with human freedom. He attempts to hold to the Calvinist doctrine of a sovereign God who has predetermined all things while retaining the freedom and responsibility of human personhood as made in God’s image – that freedom and responsibility we see throughout Scripture. Rather than define God’s sovereignty non-deterministically, which we must assume he believes Scripture will not allow, Vanhoozer prefers to explore how God can be understood as determining the actions of human beings while avoiding the conclusion that he acts inappropriately as a personal God (i.e., “monologically,” causally, etc.) in relation with personal human persons.
Although many of Vanhoozer’s descriptions might lead us to think that for God to be sovereign he need not have predetermined all the thoughts, desires and actions of every person, yet as we read through Vanhoozer we learn that he has embraced the Calvinist doctrine of an “effectual call” which presupposes the absolute salvific determinism of Calvinist soteriology (i.e., the TULIP doctrines). Vanhoozer certainly, by virtue of his doctrine of an effectual call, must believe that God has predetermined the circumstances and internal states pertaining to every person’s eternal destiny. The issue of one’s eternal destiny of course trumps any concerns about whether God has predetermined the day-to-day details of our existence, for our brief temporal life is nothing compared to our eternal existence. But Vanhoozer’s general theological outlook given the doctrine of an “effectual call” and position on petitionary prayer, seem to logically require a comprehensive determinism, that is, a universal divine causal determinism. Moreover, certainly his statements about “dialogical determinism” (RT, 384), “authorial consummation” by which he means “divine determination” (RT, 378), and his claim that “God’s authorial speech both constitutes and consummates human characters…” (RT, 303, footnote 26) lead us to conclude that he maintains that God has predetermined “whatsoever comes to pass.” Also, he clearly contrasts his view against that of William Alston who maintains that God cannot genuinely reply to what humans say or do if what humans say or do is divinely determined. (RT, 492) In contrast to Alston, Vanhoozer then makes his view clear.
“By contrast, the present work has set forth an account of divine dialogical consummation according to which God “determines” human creatures precisely in and through dialogue: the “inner persuasive discourse” of the word and Spirit.” Human creatures are “free” because other created entities do not determine their actions. God, however, is not like other creaturely causes precisely because he works on a different ontological level altogether: his operation is Authorial.” (RT, 492, 493)
“God ‘determines’ human creatures.” God’s “operation” upon human creatures “is Authorial.” “God is not like other creaturely causes…” I think that Vanhoozer’s theistic determinism is clear here. What we will need to discern is whether this divine working “on a different ontological level” is sufficient to relieve this Calvinist determinism of its logical, moral, epistemic, and biblical incoherence. We need to discern whether there is any substantive difference between God determining human creatures “precisely in and through dialogue – by the “inner persuasive discourse” of the word and Spirit” – and God determining human creatures however else he might determine them in this same universal divine causal determinism.
Therefore, it remains for us to examine the plausibility of Vanhoozer’s remedy to his theistic determinism. Does he solve any of his problems that are inherent in his theistic determinism to say that “God ‘determines’ human creatures “precisely in and through dialogue,” that is through “the ‘inner persuasive discourse’ of the word and Spirit.” It seems to me that God is still determining human creatures. Is this language of “communication” and “persuasion” even coherent within his universal divine causal determinism as a determinism? What does it mean to “dialogue” within the context of theistic determinism? What are the implications of the word “persuade?” Is it coherent to maintain that human creatures are “free” because “other created entities do not determine their actions,” but they are still “free” when God determines their actions “because he works on a different ontological level?” How is it that human free will can be defined in one instance because created entities do not determine our actions, while human free will can be defined in another instance where our actions are determined? Are there really two types of “determinisms?” One that removes freedom and one that does not? Why would it be that because God “works on a different ontological level altogether: his operation is Authorial” his actions are any different that the determinism that removes human free will? To me Vanhoozer’s description that is supposed to retain human free will sounds like a stronger and more ominous form of determinism. He admits it is causal, determinative, ontological, and Authorial with a capital “A”!
If God’s operation is “Authorial” aren’t we all simply performing the author’s script? Precisely how do the concepts of literary and speech-act theory relieve the problems of a universal divine causal determinism? Note, in the above quote Vanhoozer is affirming such a determinism. Granted he wants to elaborate on how this causal determinism operates so as not to annihilate human freedom, but is after all a determinism, that is, by definition, causal, and furthermore universal. Also, his doctrine of an “effectual call” confirms a salvific determinism. Therefore, the most profound problem for Vanhoozer’s “communicative” theology is his claim that every person’s eternal destiny has been unconditionally and unalterably predetermined by God from before they ever came into existence. This doctrinal belief is precisely what logically gives rise to the doctrine of an “effectual call.” Both doctrines have insurmountable difficulties of their own. Can Vanhoozer eliminate the problems of these determinism’s, especially those problems that bear upon the gospel message, by proposing that God determines in a manner appropriate to human personhood (i.e., communicatively).
The manner in which God brings about his universal determinism becomes Vanhoozer’s main concern. He wants to soften the harsh implications of his theistic determinism. He feels it is possible to explain that God can act in such a way with people so that what he as predetermined for them will be realized while they retain their human freedom and personhood. God can irresistibly cause (‘effectually call,” RT, 383) persons to “freely and willingly” do his will. (RT, 374) But I think we can see that this is clearly incoherent.
Note that Vanhoozer embarks upon a defense of Calvinist determinism without ever questioning its Scriptural validity. God’s deterministic sovereignty is the monolithic, immoveable doctrine of Reformed Calvinist theology. Vanhoozer embraces this theological given. Therefore, he must work with it in his explanation of the genuine human freedom which he surely admits fills the pages of Scripture. He is convinced he has found a way to reconcile this theistic determinism with human freedom. But can he do more than simply “beat around the deterministic bush” of Calvinist sovereignty? I don’t think so. What he does is craft language and concepts in such a way as to conflate mutually exclusive propositions, playing one side here and the other there, despite the rational incoherence that tenaciously persists given his theistic determinism. As much as I anticipated reading Vanhoozer to see if he has landed on a credible solution to the problems in his Calvinist theology, I must conclude that his employment of “speech-act” theory falls short. In the end it amounts to Reformed Calvinist compatibilism in a new linguistic garb. Reformed Calvinist determinism and compatibilism fail on other grounds than simply whether God is “communicative” in his determinations.
Vanhoozer’s work does challenge us to a new awareness and appreciation that God is at work in this world and in people, but I believe theistic determinism generates insurmountable problems. And as I believe these considerations of rational coherence are indispensable for a sound hermeneutic, they indicate that something is very wrong within Calvinist thought and interpretation. Vanhoozer simply ignores the deeper inconsistencies his theistic determinism raises. He is therefore unconvincing. I have expounded on these inconsistencies and contradiction throughout the chapters and other writings on this website. But here too I will attempt to give some of my reasons for these conclusions in what follows.
Therefore, the crux of the matter is this, if God does determine the eternal destiny of everyone, how can this be coherent with claims of human freedom and a relational soteriology, especially considering the biblical testimony to the content of the gospel message as “good news” and the non-deterministic, relational dynamic of faith? Vanhoozer is correct in that the issue of salvation provides a test case for the nature of God’s personal relation with personal, willing creatures made in his image. But what impact does a doctrine of an “effectual call” have upon the biblical witness to the God/man relation in salvation? We of course should construct our understanding of both God’s love and sovereignty from the testimony of Scripture, whether God’s love and sovereignty includes predeterminations and if so, predeterminations of who, what, when, where, how, and to what extent and for what purpose. We thought Vanhoozer might do this, for he makes this very point – that God’s “speech-acts” recorded for us in Scripture ought to formulate our ideas of God’s nature and ways, avoiding metaphysical and philosophical speculations about what God must be like in order for him to be “God,” thus resisting the temptation to cast him in our own image. But we find that on his biblical journey to understand the nature of the relation between God and man, that Vanhoozer insists on using the doctrine of an “effectual call” which immediately thrusts logical, moral, epistemic, and biblical inconsistencies into our path and especially into the central message of the Bible – the gospel as “good news.” Can we really avoid metaphysical and philosophical “speculations” about what God must be like in order for him to be God?” If we should avoid “speculations,” we certainly cannot avoid legitimate hermeneutical principles in dealing with the source of where we will find our answers to what God is like. But this is the Calvinists fundamental problem. It is a hermeneutical problem in which they refuse to take logical and moral coherence on board in their interpretation of Scripture. What one can glean from the scriptures when they dismiss the hermeneutical principles of coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction is very different than what one gleans from those same scriptures when they are careful to interpret according to the rules of logic and our moral intuition. Therefore, good interpretation does require us to be metaphysically and philosophically responsible. For instance, how does a just and loving God hold those who do not believe his gospel morally responsible for their unbelief when that unbelief has been ordained by God himself? How is it that a gospel message from God that is univocal in its content, issues forth in two diametrically opposed results (i.e., eternal life for some and eternal death for all others) because of what God does or does not do in the hearers? How is it credible to claim that God is love and seeks communion with his human creatures, offering them light, life and hope, and then maintain a theology that states that this same God created a multitude of human persons for the very purpose of assigning them to eternal separation from himself and eternal torment in hell? All this is inherent in Vanhoozer’s theological scheme of an “effectual call” and God’s “authorial action.” All this requires rational, philosophical, and metaphysical thought and reflection.
For instance, my contention is that the distortion of the gospel “as good news” of Calvinism’s “dual call” theology – that there is a “general call” and “effectual call,” which having one content, that of “good news,” which at first includes all sinners but then excludes many as result of the doctrine of unconditional election, is a reliable indication that Calvinism is unbiblical. In so many ways it simply does not “fit” with the biblical text when handled with sound hermeneutical principles. (see RT, xiv, FT, 348, footnote) Unless we are prepared to ignore the crucial role that logical and moral coherence play in biblical interpretation, we cannot embrace the doctrine of an “effectual call.” Those who can dismiss rational coherence by whatever metaphysical and philosophical speculations and thought processes they feel justifies them doing so will be able to embrace the “effectual call.” I contend that it is precisely a theological presupposition arising from faulty deterministic concepts of God’s eternal decree, sovereignty, and election. Once Vanhoozer embraces an “effectual call” he, at a minimum, has embraced the problematic element of Calvinist soteriology – its salvific determinism or the doctrine of unconditional election. From then on out he must suppress the many substantial logical, moral, epistemic, and theological difficulties this determinism generates while searching for a way to make compatible (rationally coherent), two inherently mutually exclusive concepts – salvific determinism and genuine human freedom. It just cannot be done. Logic tells us that two contradictory propositions cannot be reconciled unless one of those propositions is altered. Vanhoozer has severely restricted himself by thinking about the God/man relationship through the determinist grid of Calvinist theology. Therefore, much of what Vanhoozer writes in Remythologizing Theology is a search for a way to understand how God “effectually calls” those he predetermined to come to Christ and yet maintain the proposition that these persons come freely. You cannot determine someone to do something freely. But this endeavor simply presupposes that the Bible teaches the Calvinist doctrine of an “effectual call.” I do not think this is the case. The biblical data and a sound, biblical hermeneutic lead us in a very different theological direction.
Back to “The Vanhoozer Essays”
[1] John Piper attempts to argue God has “two wills” by which he operates. One “will” has determined all things to occur as they do, and another “will” by which God expresses his desire for things to be other than he has determined. For instance, God ordains that someone be murdered, but then he commands us, “Thou shall not murder.” These are what Calvinist’s designate as God’s decretive and prescriptive wills. See John Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” in Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge & Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 107-131. This has implications for whether it can be truthfully and coherently said that God has genuine compassion for the lost that he has predestined to hell. It obviously bears upon God’s veracity and the sincerity of the gospel message. God calls the non-elect to salvation in the gospel (i.e., prescriptive will), yet he has ordained that they not be saved (i.e., decretive will).. In the bibliography I have included the book Why I Am Not A Calvinist by Jerry L. Walls and Joseph R. Dongell in which Piper’s thinking along these lines is examined.
The Truth of the Gospel 