A Calvinist pastor of a church I attended many years ago suggested I read Kevin J. Vanhoozer’s First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics[1] (FT). I read it. It did not take long to realize that Vanhoozer is a Calvinist. This pastor was willing to dialogue with me about the problems I had with Calvinism, especially regarding interpretation and hermeneutics. But our discussion soon became unproductive when I pointed out the incoherent and contradictory nature of this pastor’s interpretation of certain texts with other texts in Scripture. At that time, I had not formulated the various details of the critique of Calvinism I provide on this website, but when I stated, “You can’t do that!” his response was “Sure I can.” It was then I began to think through what was going on. I came to realize that the Calvinist’s acceptance of incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction in their hermeneutic was at the center of this controversy. I began to realize that the controversy is at bottom a hermeneutical issue, that is, a question of what interpretive principles are essential to come to understand the author as he intended us to understand him. The Calvinist has a very different answer to those questions than the non-Calvinist who insists that one’s hermeneutic must include coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction. These are necessary conditions for deeming an interpretation valid. They are not sufficient conditions, but they are necessary conditions for validity in interpretation.
It was around the publication of Vanhoozer’s Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship[2] (RT) in 2010 that I also gave a careful reading to that book and began to write down the thoughts in this critique. Those thoughts sat in my computer since then, but I always had in mind to edit and “publish” them. One reason for this is the need to get my thoughts out on paper. It’s cathartic for me. Another reason is so that I can be sure that what I am thinking makes sense! In addition, upon further reflection, I am very concerned about the way Vanhoozer seems to promote his Calvinism, as if a little tweaking here and there by “speech act theory” and a stronger emphasis on God’s actions as “communicative” will relieve his doctrines of their deterministic, monolithic, impersonal, and causal nature. His “God in communicative action” model is overly complicated and a somewhat ‘tricky’ hermeneutic employing the theories of modern philosophy of language, particularly “speech act theory.” This may be convincing to some, but more likely confusing. I hope to show why it should not be convincing to any.
Vanhoozer also states that his “remythologizing” (in contrast to Bultmann’s “denial of God as speech act agent and of Scripture as divine discourse) involves,
“…a hermeneutical and methodological strategy tied to a particular view of God (i.e., as triune communicative agency). As such, it addresses the formal problem of theology by proposing guidelines for biblical interpretation (i.e., how to move from mythos to metaphysics in order to speak of God). Second, and more importantly, remythologizing addresses the material principle at the heart of first theology (i.e., what must God be like if he is actually the speaking and acting agent depicted in the Bible?). It is therefore a concrete proposal for understanding God and God’s relation to the world that follows not the five speculative “ways” of Aquinas (i.e., the five proofs for God’s existence) but the biblical account of the “ways” of God (Ps. 103:7), “ways” that lead not only into the far country but ultimately to the cross of Jesus Christ.” (RT, 23)
Vanhoozer wants to “accord priority to God’s own self-presentation in the theodramatic activity.” (RT, 23) That’s good. That’s the way someone reading the Bible at “face value” would take the plain meaning of much of what is being read. God introduces and presents himself in mind, heart, will, plans, and purposes in Scripture to the human author, the original “audience” or reader, and then to us. Hence, there is nothing new here from Vanhoozer. But for all the good points about hermeneutics that he affirms in these books, he approaches his interpretive concerns from within the framework of Calvinist theology. He simply presupposes the biblical truth of the Calvinist theological and soteriological doctrines. (See FT, p. 98-124) I realize that the defense of these Calvinist doctrines against the critics of Calvinism is why he has written these books. Calvinists realize that their universal divine causal determinism [3]– what Vanhoozer calls “the formal problem of theology” – gives them substantial, and I would say, even after reading Vanhoozer, insurmountable problems. Thus, Vanhoozer runs up against the problems with Calvinism I have elucidated on this website. Even given his application of “speech act theory” to these problems, they still haunt his theology. He too is inconsistent and contradictory at key points when he talks of divine dialogue, the love of God, his compassion and desire for communion with his human creatures. All you have to do is think of unconditional election, irresistible grace, the effectual call and the corollary to these doctrines in the reprobate (i.e., those God does not desire to save nor chose for salvation) to see how the full witness of the Scriptures to God’s nature and his relation to human beings makes Calvinism an untenable theological position.
I am reluctant to say that Calvinism is being foisted on those who read Vanhoozer’s works, but I sure get that feeling regardless of his intent to resolve the criticisms against his form of “classical theology” (i.e., Calvinist doctrines). It is interesting to note that Vanhoozer knows that his Calvinism must be justified against the many substantial criticisms leveled against it over the years. Kudos for him attempting to go the philosophy of language route to find an answer. But he uses language theory to seek confirmation of his a priori Calvinist doctrines, that is, no matter what incoherencies, inconsistencies, or contradictions he runs up against, these problems are never considered in his hermeneutic as indicators of the invalidity of his Calvinist interpretations of Scripture. No matter what rational incoherencies and contradictions along with the moral problems his definition of God’s sovereignty as a theistic determinism cause, he never alters that definition. That just is the essential tenet for being a Calvinist. And this is the most important area of critique of Calvinism. Its universal divine causal determinism (William Lane Craig’s accurate description. See Chapter 4.) renders the whole scheme of theology incoherent and contradictory. For instance, his efforts are somewhat disingenuous in that he presents only one side of his Calvinist doctrines. He says little or nothing about how the non-elect (i.e., the reprobate) raise serious problems for him as he tries to understand God’s love, divine communication, dialogue, compassion, communion, etc. Neither does he grapple with how these serious problems should inform his hermeneutic and subsequent theological conclusions.
Furthermore, his employment of the philosophy of language for the purpose of making his universal divine causal determinism tenable makes his presentation overly complex and obscures the standard Calvinist doctrines in modern linguistic concepts and terminology. This may have the effect of convincing some people to accept Vanhoozer’s presentation. But I hope to demonstrate that underneath it all there is still the standard Calvinist theology, and there is no real relief here for the problems Calvinism generates.
To explain the God/man relationship, that is, how God interacts with human beings and the natural world, Vanhoozer leans heavily on the complexities of “speech act theory.” In this approach he attempts to convince us that concepts like “supervenience,” “locution,” “illocution,” and “perlocution” clarify the way his doctrines of “effectual call” and “irresistible grace” (FT, 85, footnote 55) operate without being causal, instrumental, and impersonal. In addition, when speaking about God’s love, he rejects the “relational view” because “the term relation is not very illuminating.” (FT, 85) He states,
“There are many kinds of relations in the world. Causality, for example, covers a whole family of relations. Impersonal causal relations, however, have nothing to do with loving relations, for the latter are interpersonal.” (FT, 85)
Can Vanhoozer’s Calvinism escape the impersonal causality that has “nothing to do with loving relations” via “speech act theory?” He will try. But I submit to you that it is impossible while he holds to a universal divine causal determinism as the definition of God’s sovereignty.
[1] Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2002).
[2] Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
[3] This term is used by Dr. William Lane Criag in the following lecture in which he critiques Calvinist determinism. William Lane Craig, Defenders 2 Class, Doctrine of Creation: Part 10. Oct. 21, 2012. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-2/s2-doctrine-of-creation/doctrine-of-creation-part-10/ You can read the transcript or listen to the lecture at this link. Last accessed January 15, 2024.
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