The Matter of Western v. Eastern Logic: Thomas Schreiner Affirms and Denies Logic

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Introduction

Calvinist Thomas Schreiner wrote an essay titled, “Does Romans 9 Teach Individual Election unto Salvation?”^[1]  In it, Schreiner demonstrates on the one hand that he affirms the authoritative role of logic in human thought and biblical interpretation, yet denies its role in assessing his own theology. Allow me to explain.

In a section of his article, Schreiner draws the conclusion that,

“Those who defend corporate election are conscious of the fact that it is hard to separate corporate from individual election, for logic would seem to require that the individuals who make up the group cannot be separated from the group itself.”^[2]

He then refers to non-Calvinists William Klein and Clark Pinnock, who hold to a corporate view of election, and accuse Schreiner of imposing “western logic” upon Paul’s thinking in Romans 9 because Schreiner emphasizes the individual in his understanding of election, which is, of course, also unconditional.  Klein and Pinnock maintain that Paul is thinking purely in terms of corporate groups, conforming to a more Eastern understanding, which is not at all about individuals, especially when it comes to explaining why one individual is saved and another is not.  Klein and Pinnock contend that Paul writes from within an Eastern mindset that emphasizes the group or community instead of the individual. According to Klein and Pinnock, the stress Schreiner lays on the individual is more in accord with a Western way of thinking, which constitutes the flaw in Schreiner’s understanding of the text.

Schreiner first reiterates Klein and Pinnock’s critique of Schreiner’s understanding of Paul in Romans,

“Klein responds by saying that this amounts to an imposition of modern Western categories upon biblical writers.^[3]  He goes on to say that it requires a “logic that is foreign to their thinking.”^[4]  Clark H. Pinnock also says that the Arminian view is more attractive because he is “in the process of learning to read the Bible from a new point of view, one that I believe is more truly evangelical and less rationalistic.”^[5]  Those who cannot see how election is corporate without also involving individuals have fallen prey to imposing western logic on the Bible.”^[6]

An Unfortunate Use of the Word ‘Logic’

So Klein and Pinnock have accused Schreiner of “imposing western logic on the Bible.”  It is important to point out that Pinnock should not have used the word “logic” here, not only because we might ask what’s wrong with being logical in our Bible reading, but that the use of this word will become a central issue here.  Schreiner picks up on the word logic and proceeds to turn the tables of “western logic,” so to speak, upon Klein and Pinnock in that they emphasize the corporate view of election to the exclusion of the individual view election. Schreiner will accuse them of imposing their “western logic” on the text in that they do not consider that both corporate and individual election could be true, they emphasize individual choice in salvation and they claim that “the logic of consistent Calvinism makes God the author of evil and casts serious doubt on his goodness.” Schreiner explains,

“This objection [imposing Western categories upon the biblical writers] strikes me as highly ironic.  For example, Klein also says that it makes no sense for God to plead for Israel to be saved (Rom. 10:21) if he has elected only some to be saved.^[7] But this objection surely seems to be based on so-called western logic.  Klein cannot seem to make sense logically of how both of these can be true, and so he concludes that individual election is not credible.  Has he ever considered that he might be forcing western logic upon the text and that both might be true in a way we do not fully comprehend?  Indeed, one could assert that the focus upon individual choice as ultimately determinative in salvation is based on “western” logic inasmuch as it concentrates upon the individual and his or her individual choice.  And on the same page that Pinnock says he is escaping from rationalism, he says he cannot believe “that God determines all things and that creaturely freedom is real” because this view is contradictory and incoherent.  He goes on to say, “The logic of consistent Calvinism makes God the author of evil and casts serious doubt on his goodness.”^[8]  These kinds of statement from Pinnock certainly seem to reflect a dependence on western logic.”^[9]

Unfortunately, Klein and Pinnock have introduced the word “logic” to make their point here.  It seems they wanted to emphasize that Schreiner’s view imposes upon Paul a “western cultural mindset.” To describe this as the use of “western logic” is something very different, and Schreiner is using this “slip-up” against Klein and Pinnock, who critique Schreiner’s Calvinism on the very basis of its logical entailments.  Klein was more accurate when he described Schreiner’s error as “an imposition of modern Western categories upon biblical writers.”  But what Schreiner does is turn Klein and Pinnock’s “logic critique” of Schreiner back on them.  As Schreiner rightly points out, “Indeed, one could assert that the focus upon individual choice as ultimately determinative in salvation is based on “western” logic inasmuch as it concentrates upon the individual and his or her individual choice.”

The Intent of Klein and Pinnock’s Critique of Schriener

The point is that Klein and Pinnock’s critique of Schreiner here is that he fails to view the text through Paul’s mindset, who we all can safely presume thought like a first-century Jew steeped in Eastern ways of thinking, which were more corporate than individual. Their emphasis here is not primarily the problematic logic of Schreiner’s Calvinist interpretation of the text, although they will point out that Schreiner’s “view is contradictory and incoherent.”  Klein and Pinnock’s emphasis here is to be careful not to read “Western categories” or a “western cultural mindset” into the text, and failing to appreciate the Eastern Jewish thought of the biblical writers that should inform and direct our interpretation of the text.  For instance, perhaps we need to read Romans 9-11 as Paul’s theological reflections on the present particular situation in salvation history that Israel as a nation (i.e., group) finds itself in with respect to their rejection of Jesus and God’s plan for the salvation of the Gentiles (i.e., group), and not Paul’s explanation as to why certain individuals are saved and others are not.  Perhaps Romans 9 is not Paul’s dissertation on the unconditional election of individuals to salvation, but rather what God has the right to do with his chosen people, Israel, in light of their stubborn rejection of their Messiah.  Paul may be thinking in terms of groups – Jews and Gentiles – in addressing several profound historical and theological questions and protestations that have arisen about whether God’s word to Israel has failed, what it means for Israel to be God’s elect or “the chosen people of God,” how God is presently dealing with them in judicial hardening and how the Gentiles fit into God’s saving plans and purposes.  And yet, the individual does come into focus when Paul talks about how Jews and the Gentiles are to receive salvation in Christ by faith.  Paul needs to address and answer these larger historical questions and protests, which involve Jews and Gentiles, but he also tells us how Jews and Gentiles, as individuals, receive salvation.

Schriener’s Problem: Theistic Determinism

We should note that in Romans 9-11, Klein and Pinnock do not need to define election solely in corporate terms to the exclusion of the election of individuals.  This may be an overreaction to the fundamental problem of Schreiner’s interpretation of Romans 9.  What makes Schreiner’s position untenable is not the individual aspect of election per se, but the determinism in Schreiner’s definition of election as applied to individuals unconditionally, and how that runs logically and morally roughshod over the immediate context of chapters 10 and 11.  This deterministic unconditional election of individuals is the cause of the logical problems in Schreiner’s position, and this is what Klein and Pinnock are pointing out.  In context, Schreiner’s Calvinistic interpretations are contradictory and incoherent.  Paul may speak of the election of the individual when election is rightly understood as God choosing or predestinating what is to become of those who do believe, viewed either corporately or individually, and not God having predetermined which individuals will believe.  For Paul, election does not refer to God’s unconditional predetermination that certain chosen individuals will believe and be saved to the exclusion of all other individuals who have no possibility of salvation.

Logic is Not Western or Eastern

But in turning the tables of logic on Klein and Pinnock, Schreiner needs to be careful in that he does not distance himself from the utility of logic itself to either affirm the truth of a theological proposition or expose its falsity, which is Klein and Pinnock’s fundamental objection to Schreiner’s Calvinism.  The misstep being made by everyone here is to (mis)use the word “logic” in connection with the intention to warn about reading into the text our own present-day cultural predilections.  So the logic of the matter is not the problem here; it is rather reading into the text one’s own more contemporary cultural mindset.  Note that logic is not subject to cultural mindsets.  The law of noncontradiction is a universally applicable rule of thought at every time and in every culture.  Ultimately, logic is not “western” or “eastern.”  Nor is it the prized possession of any other cultural context.  Klein and Pinnock have caused Schreiner to equivocate on the word “logic” here.  He is confusing it with something like a “western cultural mindset,” which is very different than the concerns of logic itself as applied to the Calvinist doctrines. 

The Purview and Utility of Logic

So if logic is neither “eastern” or “western,” and if according to Schreiner Klein’s view is false or nonsense, he wouldn’t arrive at it by “forcing western logic upon the text,” because according to the essential nature of logic as the means whereby we discern what is true from what is false, the use of logic would only serve to clarify the interpretive problem and suggest its solution.  And that is precisely what Klein and Pinnock are doing in their critique of Schreiner’s Calvinist difficulties.  Klein and Pinnock maintain that it is logic that allows us to discern that “it makes no sense for God to plead for Israel to be saved (Rom. 10:21) if he has elected only some to be saved,” and it is contradictory and incoherent to claim “that God determines all things and that creaturely freedom is real”, and that “…consistent Calvinism makes God the author of evil and casts serious doubt on his goodness.”  These decisions are within the purview of logic.  Pinnock argues that “the logic of consistent Calvinism makes God the author of evil and casts serious doubt on his goodness.”  It is the application of logic that would tell us whether the Calvinist doctrinal propositions are coherent or whether they are nonsense.  This is different than Schreiner suggesting that Klein and Pinnock are basing their critique of Calvinism on the very same “western logic” that they accused Schreiner of falling prey to in interpreting Romans 9. “Logic’ is the wrong word for Klein and Pinnock to us and for Schreiner to latch onto here.  Klein and Pinnock, as much as they also refute Schreiner’s view based on logic, were referring to “western values” or the like in defending a corporate view of Paul’s statements in Romans 9.

The point is that even if Schreiner is imposing “western logic” upon a text that should be interpreted from the social and religious context of Paul as an Eastern Jew, that surely does not negate the validity of applying logical reasoning to assess the truth or falsity of Schreiner’s Calvinist exegesis of Romans 9, or Klein and Pinnock’s view, for that matter.  For Schreiner to justifiably and convincingly critique Klein and Pinnock for the points they made against Calvinism, Schreiner would have to show us why logic and its deliberations don’t apply to the Calvinist doctrines.  For Klein and Pinnock to accuse Schreiner of importing “Western categories” of thought foreign to Paul into Romans 9 is one thing.  They may be right or wrong on that score.  But for Schreiner to latch onto Klein’s use of the word “logic” in Klein’s phrase “logic that is foreign to their thinking” and then associate this with logic itself to defend his Calvinist doctrines by suggesting that Klein and Pinnock’s use of logic is them imposing “Western categories” of thought onto Schreiner’s Calvinism, is to fail to see the vast difference between the two and to distance himself from logic as an ultimate principle of thought by which we can determine the truth or falsity of exegetical conclusions.  Again, logic itself is not a Western category of thought, as if it does not apply to the interpretation of the biblical text.  Klein and Pinnock’s critiques of Calvinism as incoherent and contradictory hold true precisely because their observations are based on logic, even if they may be wrong about Schreiner imposing “Western categories” upon Paul in Romans 9 to arrive at the conclusion that the passage teaches individual unconditional election.^[10]  That is a separate matter.

Logic and Context Working Together

What Klein and Pinnock are doing is attempting to process Schreiner’s position of unconditional election of individuals to salvation with Paul’s other statements in the context that speak of God’s universal salvific intent and will. And they are right in doing this. They are paying attention to context. These statements of Paul, which affirm that God desires all people to be saved, are inconsistent and in contradiction with Schreiner’s view of election.  This acknowledgement of the need for coherence and its role in determining the validity of one’s interpretations is the difference between the Calvinist and non-Calvinist hermeneutic.  In their exegesis and interpretation of Romans 9, Klein and Pinnock cannot abide incoherence and contradiction.  The evidence of incoherence and contradiction that are the deliverances of logic will send them back to the text in search of a more coherent interpretation. Hence, any corporate view they hold will be coherent with Paul’s clear meaning in chapters 10 and 11, where Paul clearly tells us that God has purposed salvation to be by faith, and as such, no one is excluded from being saved on the basis that God has not chosen them for it.  But when Schreiner’s Calvinist views are assessed and exposed as untenable by the use of logic, which goes hand in hand with the hermeneutical principle of context, Schreiner will ultimately dodge the incoherence his doctrine of unconditional election in chapter 9 generates with the universal, well-meant offer of salvation to all to be received by faith we find in chapter 10. And he does this in predictable Calvinist fashion by stating “…that both might be true in a way we do not fully comprehend.”  This is all Schreiner can do when his views are subjected to the canons of reason.  He flees to incomprehensibility and mystery.

So what would Schreiner have Klein and Pinnock do?  Give up using their “western” logic?  That would be convenient for Schreiner as a Calvinist because then Klein and Pinnock could no longer use the logical inconsistencies in Schreiner’s view as reasons for concluding that Calvinism is false.  And yet, in the quotes to come below, Schreiner will admit that the law of noncontradiction is an inviolable law of logic and determiner of what is true from what is false.  But again, as a Calvinist, Schreiner will ultimately have to maintain that the inconsistencies in his theology – “that God determines all things and that creaturely freedom is real” and that “Calvinism makes God the author of evil and casts serious doubt on his goodness,” along with God universally pleading for Israel to be saved even though he has unconditional elected only certain people to salvation, is a “mystery,” that is, “that both might be true in a way we do not fully comprehend.”

Schreiner Affirms and Denies Logic: An Attempt to Free Calvinism From Rational Assessment

Schreiner continues,

“Most Calvinists would affirm that logic should not be jettisoned, but they would also claim that the relationship between divine sovereignty and human responsibility is finally a mystery.  The admission of mystery demonstrates that Calvinists are not dominated by western logic.  In fact, those who insist that human freedom and individual faith must rule out divine determination of all things are those who end up subscribing to western logical categories.”[11]

Schreiner concludes that it is Klein, Pinnock, and all non-Calvinists who “end up subscribing to western logical categories.”  So again, we see Schreiner employing Klein and Pinnock’s unfortunate use of the phrase “western logic” against them. Be that as it may, Schreiner’s position is baffling here.  He agrees that “logic should not be jettisoned,” but then he avoids the deliberations of “western logic” and chooses to hide behind a curtain of mystery.  What could Schreiner mean by “western logic?” Is there a difference between logic and “western logic?”  Of course not.  And in the history of thought, if the principles of logic were initially recognized and formulated and not invented in “the west” (Aristotle), then this distinction is meaningless.  Again, logic is not “western” or “eastern” but stands on its own principles.  There is nothing wrong with “western logic.”  If, as discussed above, logic itself, the kind “that should not be jettisoned” is not “western,” “eastern,” or any other kind, and if Klein and Pinnock did not mean to disparage logic in and of itself but were referring to culturally influenced categories of thought, then logic applies equally to Calvinist and non-Calvinist theologies.  We are all “dominated” by logic. And that is a good thing if we are seeking to remain rational in our interpretations and discourse. When Schreiner admits that the “Calvinist would affirm that logic should not be jettisoned,” then he is also affirming that his Calvinism should be subject to a logical assessment. Hence, for Schreiner to distance himself, along with “most Calvinists,” from “western logic” is inconsistent with his saying “logic should not be jettisoned.” We need to ask Schreiner, which one is it? If “logic should not be jettisoned” and there is no difference between “eastern” and “western” logic, then we should “subscribe to western logical categories,” which just means we should subscribe to using logic in our interpretations. What Schreiner and all Calvinists want is the privilege of employing logic when necessary or jettisoning it when it exposes their interpretations as incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory. What Schreiner is doing is giving himself permission to not be dominated by logic, which is just to say, “I can be irrational if I need to be.” To “not be dominated by western logic” is an impossibility if one is to remain rational. To boast that one is not “dominated by western logic” is to admit that one can be irrational. But this is to be untethered from knowing what is true from what is false. It was Issac Watts (1674-1748), the great English divine and hymn writer, who said,

“It was a saying of the ancients, that ‘truth lies in a well’; and to carry on the metaphor, we may justly say, that logic supplies us with steps whereby we may go down to reach the water.”

What Schreiner is doing here is attempting to free the Calvinists’ exegeses, interpretations, and theology from rational assessment.  To label his Calvinism a mystery doesn’t make it so, especially when the application of logical reasoning to his Calvinism reveals it is incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory. If Schreiner is affirming that there are logical principles “that should not be jettisoned” and that the label “western” does not take away anything from the utility and applicability of those principles to do what they do best – reveal to us what is true and what is false – then he is ultimately saying that “Calvinists need not be logical in their interpretation of Scripture.”  And this is a stunning and troubling admission. In contrast, it is a good thing that non-Calvinists like Klein and Pinnock are dominated by Western logic, for it is the way of reasoning by which we can discern good interpretation from bad interpretation. For Schreiner to state that “the admission of mystery demonstrates that Calvinists are not dominated by western logic” is to use mystery as an excuse for ignoring the logical incoherence of his interpretations and reveal that his hermeneutic is flawed at its very core. Once Calvinists like Schreiner brag about not being dominated by Western logic, they have effectively confessed that their interpretations need not be coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory, but may very well, according to “western logic,” that is, logic itself, be incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory. For Calvinists, that is just fine. For most of the rest of us, it is intellectually and hermeneutically irresponsible.

We can conclude that Schreiner is seeking to avoid the negative judgments logic levels against his Calvinism.  Schreiner commits what in apologetics is called the “taxi-cab” fallacy.  Schreiner affirms and employs logic when it suits his purposes, but then, like a hack, he just gets out when logic threatens his theology.  If most Calvinists would affirm that logic should not be jettisoned, then why do they jettison it by fleeing to mystery when the relationship between their deterministic divine sovereignty is found to be logically incompatible with their affirmation of human responsibility?  Did logic fail us, or is it being conveniently ignored? It’s being conveniently ignored.

It seems that, given Dr. Craig’s five-fold critique of Calvinism that I provided in Chapter 4, logic has not failed us but rather served us quite well.  If Dr. Craig is correct and the Calvinist’s universal divine causal determinism cannot offer a coherent interpretation of Scripture, cannot be rationally affirmed, makes God the author of sin, denies human responsibility, nullifies human agency, and threatens to make reality into a farce, then the Calvinist, who affirms that logic should not be jettisoned, must either provide logically sound arguments that address these problems, or, accept alternative non-Calvinist interpretations of the text that are exegetically responsible yet do not generate these philosophical, moral, and doctrinal incoherencies.  To keep insisting that one’s exegesis requires believing contradictory propositions re-designated as “mystery” is to beg the question.  To relabel these problems a “mystery” is not an intellectually or interpretively responsible option.  As long as there are alternative interpretations of the text that are exegetically sound, that is, they apply to the text the historical-grammatical interpretive methodology, attention to literary genre, coherence in the immediate and broader literary and canonical context, and authorial intent by the demonstration of explanatory power, explanatory scope, consistency, coherence, etc., then these alternative interpretations should be preferred as closer to the true meaning of the texts.  While such interpretations exist, the Calvinist’s assertion of “mystery” remains merely ad hoc and continues to beg the question.

So here we have more evidence of the hermeneutical divide.  Schreiner clearly reveals the interpretive thought process of the Calvinist, which is very different from that of the non-Calvinist.  Again, Schreiner states that “logic should not be jettisoned,” and yet he also states that “the admission of mystery demonstrates that Calvinists are not dominated by western logic.”  This is astonishing.  Is this freedom from “western logic” something laudable?  Is his boast that the Calvinist is not “dominated” by logic a spiritual or interpretive virtue?  Is the rejection of logic at some point in one’s interpretive process or conclusions the inevitable result of correct exegesis on the relevant texts on sovereignty and human responsibility?  Is it a sign of theological courage to ignore the logical implications of one’s interpretations?  If Schreiner affirms logic, then why does he also spurn it?  Because it is “western logic?”  But again, logic itself is neither “western” nor “eastern” nor anything else.  What type of “logic” does Schreiner endorse?  No kind of logic?  Can Schreiner remain logic-free?  What does it mean, and what would the implications be of not being “dominated” by “western logic?” Does he affirm Eastern logic as a corporate interpretation of Romans 9-11? If he can pick and choose when to use or reject “western logic,” how would he avoid interpretive relativism?  Does he not affirm the universal applicability of the basic cannons of reason?  If not, then what kind of logic does he employ in his exegetical and interpretive process?  Is Schreiner’s “logic” something different than the logic Dr. Craig applies in assessing Calvinism?  How would Schreiner respond to Dr. Craig’s critique?  Can Schreiner justify jettisoning logic on the basis that his exegesis of certain biblical texts demands it?  How then could we know the truth or falsity of that exegesis?  How would this not be merely question-begging?

Schreiner anticipates these questions and realizes he needs to clarify his statements.  He writes,

“My own view of the role of logic needs to be clarified so that what I have just said will not be misunderstood.  The law of noncontradiction was not invented by Aristotle.  It was articulated and defended by him and is characteristic of all meaningful human thought and speech.  That which is contradictory cannot be true.  Thus it is legitimate to ask if a particular theological position is contradictory or illogical.  The law of noncontradiction cannot be dismissed as western, for all people intuitively sense that what is contradictory cannot be true.”^[12]

So Schreiner affirms what I have stated above about the utility, universality, and abiding nature of logic.  But recall Schreiner’s previous statements that “…those who insist that human freedom and individual faith must rule out divine determination of all things are those who end up subscribing to western logical categories” and that “the admission of mystery demonstrates that Calvinists are not being dominated by western logic.”  And yet here he states, “The law of noncontradiction cannot be dismissed as western.” Furthermore, he affirms that “all people intuitively sense that what is contradictory cannot be true.”  The inconsistency here is simply astonishing! And this is precisely why non-Calvinists reject Calvinism, because it violates the law of noncontradiction and everybody knows it!  So this is not an issue of subscribing “to western logical categories,” rather it is just applying to Schreiner’s theological beliefs the type of logic Schreiner himself affirms.  So Schreiner is inconsistent here, but from what he has said, he cannot dismiss “those who insist that human freedom and individual faith must rule out divine determination of all things” as “those who end up subscribing to western logical categories.”

‘What is Contradictory Cannot Be True’: Schreiner Defeats His Calvinism

So, I agree with Schreiner that because “That which is contradictory cannot be true,” it is “legitimate to ask if a particular theological position is contradictory or illogical.”  And if it is legitimate to ask this, then it must be the case that we can discern whether or not a “particular theological position is contradictory or illogical.”  And if it is the case that we can discern a contradiction when we see one, then the ones that are obvious in Calvinism are not beyond our human comprehension, as the Calvinist would like us to believe. Furthermore, Schreiner affirms that “all people intuitively sense that what is contradictory cannot be true.”  Note that this implies that common folk can discern a contradiction when they see one.  But why then the Calvinists’ flight to mystery when their exegesis and theology most certainly seem to be presenting a contradiction?  Schreiner will insist that, based on his exegesis, we end up at mystery.  But why isn’t it the case that we can say with conviction that Schreiner and his Calvinism end up in a contradiction?  Why doesn’t the law of non-contradiction apply to his exegesis? 

All this is incoherent with what Schreiner stated previously when he says that “The admission of mystery demonstrates that Calvinists are not dominated by western logic.”  But this “western logic” is not any different than the law of noncontradiction that Aristotle articulated and defended, which Schreiner himself recognizes is “characteristic of all meaningful thought and speech.”  This again raises the question of whether the Calvinist is “dominated” by any logic at all or whether Schreiner is conveniently dismissing logic when it indicts his theology. What all this actually proves is that Calvinists are dominated by an interpretation of Scripture that violates the laws of logic. And these are the very laws of logic Schreiner has affirmed for meaningful thought and speech. In short, Calvinists and their Calvinism are incoherent.

The Calvinist will respond that he is dominated by Scripture and its authority.  But this, again, not only begs the question and presents the false dichotomy between logic and exegesis.  One does not have to choose between incoherence, contradiction, and inconsistency or “the mystery” of the Calvinist interpretation of Scripture.  There are alternative exegeses that uphold Scripture’s authority, but do not require us to embrace interpretations that are incoherent or contradictory.  In fact, these alternatives uphold Scripture’s inspiration and rational integrity while Calvinism does not. And this, in turn, is to either affirm or deny certain things about the nature of God. The Calvinist God is a very different type of being than the God the non-Calvinist finds on the pages of Scripture. Scripture does not contradict itself, because God does not contradict himself.  God and his Word – written or “made flesh”- is not incoherent or inconsistent.  What Schreiner is revealing to us is that for the Calvinist, logic can be jettisoned in the preservation of the Calvinist doctrines, and the whole logical and moral problem can be reassigned to the category of “a mystery.”  The Reformed Calvinist tradition holds absolute sway even when it is found to be logically and morally incoherent and contradictory.  This, I submit, is just poor interpretation and an unacceptable hermeneutic.

Exegesis Must Make Sense

Schreiner’s statements reveal that his Calvinism cannot escape the death-grip of the canons of reason.  He, of course, wants to avoid the charge of irrationality.  Yet, as much as Schreiner affirms the universal nature and crucial role of logic for discerning truth and that what is contradictory cannot be true, he does not acknowledge the fact that contradiction and incoherence characterize his Calvinist theological and soteriological doctrines, which he claims are derived from textual exegesis.  He is blind to his own conclusions when it comes to his theology. But if Schreiner did not flee to mystery and would acknowledge the implications of his own conclusions for his position, he would have to provide a substantive defense of his doctrinal beliefs on logical and moral grounds to convince us that they are not incoherent and contradictory.  This, of course, is asking for something more than merely providing a Calvinist exegesis of the various relevant texts.  It requires something more from one’s exegesis.  It requires that one’s exegesis make sense.  Simply providing an exegesis of a text does not definitively confirm the accuracy of that exegesis.  Interpretive validity is not merely a matter of producing an exegesis of various texts, as necessary as that is, but requires that they be coherent and non-contradictory.  If Schreiner is going to claim that his doctrines are the biblical teaching, then, in light of his statement that “that which is contradictory cannot be true,” he must show us how it is that his doctrines are not contradictory.  Therefore, in addition to providing an exegesis of the texts, he would have to provide a substantive argument as to why his exegesis and his theological conclusions based on that exegesis are not contradictory when our logical reasoning faculties are telling us that they are.  This he affirmed when he stated, “all people intuitively sense that what is contradictory cannot be true.” Hence, since “most Calvinists would affirm that logic should not be jettisoned” and Schreiner affirms that “it is legitimate to ask if a particular theological position is contradictory or illogical,” we therefore do so.  We are asking whether Calvinism is contradictory or illogical. It certainly seems to be! In that Schreiner also affirms that “The law of noncontradiction cannot be dismissed as western, for all people intuitively sense that what is contradictory cannot be true,” we therefore trust our logical reasoning and common sense and require from the Calvinists a logical explanation of their exegesis, interpretations, and theology.  Schreiner would have to tell us why what “all people intuitively sense” about his Calvinism – that it is logically and morally untenable – is mistaken.

Moreover, if we cannot discern whether or not the Calvinist doctrines are contradictory then of what value is it to say that “the law of noncontradiction is characteristic of all meaningful human thought and speech?”  What is meant or gained by affirming that “it is legitimate to ask if a particular theological position is contradictory or illogical” if our rational faculties cannot sufficiently detect whether a particular theological position is contradictory?  Given the truths about logic that Schreiner has affirmed above, his flight to mystery smacks of evading the real issues here.

Schreiner’s Inevitable Conclusion: Calvinism is Irrational

To provide a logical explanation of his exegetical conclusions would be to defend his exegesis against those who, based on the law of noncontradiction, “insist that human freedom and individual faith must rule out divine determination of all things.”  But what would Schreiner say to convince us otherwise?  If there is a real contradiction here, which it seems evident that there is, there is nothing for the Calvinist to say, and there is no defense of his theology.  Since we know a real contradiction when we see one, we should then all agree that there is a real contradiction here.  It is not merely an “apparent” contradiction.  I submit that the Calvinist has no response or defense of their theological propositions on the grounds of reason, logic, and moral intuition.  Calvinism is inconsistent and contradictory and therefore can confidently be deemed irrational. Schreiner himself has led us to this conclusion.

It is inconsistent for Schreiner to affirm that the law of non-contradiction (and I assume the other laws of logic), and accept that “That which is contradictory cannot be true” yet state, along with Calvinist Bruce Ware that,

“…we are convinced that the central reason that the doctrines of grace are questioned is not because of scriptural exegesis, although we grant that those who disagree with us would interpret many Scriptures differently.  But their fundamental objections are certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology we affirm.  It should be granted that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.  The objections go something like this: If God chooses only some, then how can he be loving?  If God’s grace is irresistible, then what happens to human free will?  If God saves those he has chosen, why pray or get involved in missions?  If God is in control of the world, then why do anything at all?  If God is sovereign, then why is there suffering in the world?  If God governs all events, then why is evil our responsibility, not his?

…We suggest that the answers to the preceding questions are often complex because the reality of life as portrayed by the Scriptures is complex.  God is completely sovereign, and yet human choices and responsibility are not a charade.  God ordains all that comes to pass and is good; and yet evil exists, and it is really evil.  God chooses only some to be saved, and yet there is also a true sense in which he desires the salvation of all.  Those who are elect will never lose their salvation, and yet those who do not persevere to the end will not inherit the kingdom of God.  All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.  People do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems.  Rather, the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.  Our attempt to solve the problems posed by our theology, then, is an example of “faith seeking understanding.” ^[13]

In light of Schreiner’s affirmation of the indispensability of laws of logic to think or speak meaningfully, this objection no longer stands. The thinking and language here evade the central problem with Schreiner and Ware’s interpretive methodology and hermeneutic. They refuse to face the negative implications of the laws of logic for their exegesis and theology. They refuse to face the fact that those very laws of logic that they affirm establish that their interpretations of certain texts are mistaken. They will not allow logical and moral reasoning to determine the validity or invalidity of their interpretations and theology. They insist on separating philosophical and moral reflection from exegesis and interpretation. But philosophical objections are substantial objections that need to be addressed.  Given Schreiner’s own support of the law of non-contradiction, such objections are enough to invalidate Schreiner’s exegesis. Schreiner and Ware tell us that “people do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems.” Well, I would say that people ought not to become Calvinists unless “all such logical problems” are solved precisely because they are logical problems.  Logic either holds in biblical interpretation or it does not.  One cannot pick and choose when and how logical and moral reasoning apply and when they do not.  Schreiner and Ware state, “…the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”  But how will we determine if that claim is true? How will we determine whether or not “these doctrines are taught in Scripture?” I have argued that any exegesis that claims to be biblically faithful also needs to be logically consistent and non-contradictory; otherwise, it is safe to say it is not taught in Scripture.  We have shown, and Schreiner admits, that “that which is contradictory cannot be true.”  Therefore, as contradictory, the Calvinist doctrines cannot be true.  Hence, regardless of Schriener and Ware’s claims to the contrary, these doctrines are not taught in Scripture. People ought not to “believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”  There is no rational warrant for us to “believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”  An exegesis that leads to logical and moral incoherence and contradiction is a misinterpretation of the text.   People ought not to become Calvinists because Calvinism has not, and I contend, cannot solve its logical and moral problems and therefore is not what the Scripture teaches.  Schreiner and Ware are simply making a bold assertion when they claim their doctrines are taught in Scripture. They may honestly believe that these doctrines are taught in Scripture, but the only way they can do so is to ignore their logical and moral reasoning in the process. The Calvinist cannot solve “all such logical problems” because they are real contradictions inherent in their exegetical conclusions. All this should give pause to the Christian who is considering embracing Calvinism. It should send him back to Scripture to reconsider the exegetical alternatives that make better sense of the relevant texts.  The only way you can solve a contradiction is to back off from it to an interpretive alternative that produces textual and theological consistency and coherence.  But that takes a bit of humility, and the Calvinist would have to give up his Calvinist determinism.  That he will never do.  He would rather flee to mystery. But this is not an intellectually responsible option, and as such, it is an irresponsible exegetical methodology. In light of all that has been said, Schreiner and Ware’s assessment of their problem merely shows itself up as ignoring logic’s condemnation of their position.  

Logic Identifies Contradiction in Calvinist Exegesis

With all that he has said above, Schreiner attempts to offer further explanations in defense of his position.  He continues,

“Nevertheless, to subscribe to the law of noncontradiction does not mean that logic can resolve every problem in theology.  There are times when Scripture strongly affirms two realities that cannot finally be resolved logically by us.  For example, the doctrines of the Trinity and of the two natures in Christ are theological constructs that are rightly derived from the Bible, and yet we cannot ultimately explain how there can be three persons and yet one God.  This does not mean that the doctrine of the Trinity is irrational.  It means only that it is above our present rational capacities.  Such mysteries should be adopted only if that is where the biblical evidence leads.  I believe the biblical evidence compels us to see such a mystery in the case of divine election and human responsibility.  A mystery is not required, however, in the case of corporate election, and so there is no need to postulate a discontinuity between corporate and individual election.  In fact individual election cannot be dismissed, since it is taught in too many texts (John 6:37, 44-45, 64-65; Acts 13:48; 16:14; etc.)

Biblical exegesis requires us, then to see a mystery in the case of divine election and human responsibility.  Romans 9 teaches that God does elect individuals and groups unto salvation, and he determines who will exercise faith.  Nevertheless, Romans 9:30-10:21 teaches us that those who do not exercise faith are responsible and should have done so.  How can both of these be logically true?  We cannot fully grasp the answer to this question, for as with other mysteries in Scripture we affirm that our human minds cannot adequately grasp the full import of divine revelation.”^[14]

Several observations should be made at this point.  First, affirming the Calvinist’s stress on exegesis, this is not primarily a matter of logic resolving this problem in Calvinist theology.  Rather, it is more fundamentally a matter of logic identifying a problem in Calvinist exegesis.  The resolution, as Schreiner, Ware, and most Calvinists are careful to point out, will ultimately be at the exegetical level.  But what does “resolving” or “identifying” a problem at the exegetical level mean?  What does this entail except that we employ the canons of reason to do so?  We might agree when Schreiner states, “…the law of noncontradiction does not mean that logic can resolve every problem in theology,” but we would, in stark disagreement with Schreiner, affirm that our reason can identify a violation of the law of noncontradiction in Calvinist theology and therefore establish that theology as mistaken in its interpretations.  The law of noncontradiction would indicate that there is a problem that needs to be resolved. Furthermore, logic can serve to continually assess the validity of the suggested resolutions.  Just because we are dealing with “the study of God” (theology) and divinely inspired Scripture does not negate the canons of reason being applied to determine the validity of one’s textual exegesis.  Therefore, I disagree that “Biblical exegesis requires us, then to see a mystery in the case of divine election and human responsibility” precisely because “our rational capacities” which work with the law of noncontradiction require us to reject that particular exegesis. When Schreiner states, “Romans 9 teaches that God does elect individuals and groups unto salvation, and he determines who will exercise faith,” he is simply wrong because these statements contradict Paul’s teachings in Romans 10 and 11. Romans 9 does not teach what Schreiner says it teaches because “our rational capacities” message that this conjunction of thoughts is of the nature of logical contradiction. Therefore, they are not a true biblical mystery. Our “rational capacities” do apply to those problems in theology that are truly contradictory.  Logic certainly can resolve this type of problem in theology because logic is perfectly suited to identify these and point us in the right exegetical and interpretive direction.

Schreiner again states, “I believe the biblical evidence compels us to see such a mystery in the case of divine election and human responsibility.”  It certainly does not.  There are non-Calvinist interpretations of the same texts that do not lead to contradictions.  Rather, I believe that when we keep clear thinking before us, that is, we keep our logical and moral faculties engaged, the biblical evidence compels us to see a contradiction between human responsibility and the Calvinist definition of sovereignty as deterministic and divine election as unconditional.

Determinism and Free Will: A Contradiction, Not a Mystery

Schreiner suggests that deterministic election and human responsibility are akin to the doctrine of the Trinity, which he states is a mystery.  But is the relationship between Calvinist determinism and human freedom and responsibility a mystery like the Trinity or a real contradiction? Can the “mystery” of the Trinity be made analogous to the relation between deterministic sovereignty and unconditional election and human freedom and responsibility? I agree with Schreiner that we can determine that the doctrine of the Trinity is not irrational.  But how can we determine it is not irrational?  Only by the use of our logical faculties.  So, if those faculties can discern when something is not irrational or illogical, then they can also discern when something is irrational or illogical.  With our reasoning faculties in play, we can conclude that deterministic sovereignty and unconditional election are logically incompatible with human freedom and responsibility. So these Calvinist doctrines do not create a genuine biblical mystery; they create a genuine unbiblical contradiction. That is not the case with the Trinity. Is the Trinity even a mystery as Schreiner claims?  Why should we believe Schreiner when he says that “we cannot ultimately explain how there can be three persons and yet one God?”  Dr. Craig observes,

“The doctrine of the Trinity is often obscured by Christians in mystery. Sometimes they will say that the doctrine of the Trinity is logically inconsistent or it is an affront to reason and something that can be held only by faith.  It is a mystery.  But I think this really does the doctrine a disservice.  The doctrine of the Trinity is not even apparently logically contradictory.  The doctrine of the Trinity is not the self-contradictory doctrine that three gods are somehow one God, or that three persons are somehow one person.  Rather, the doctrine states that there are three persons in the one God.  Another way to put it: God is tri-personal.”^[15]

But even if the Trinity has an element of mystery to it, the question is whether these two theological issues – determinism and free will – are even close to being the same as any mystery in the Trinity.  Are they both “mystery” in the same sense that they are merely “above our present rational capacities?”  Is this just a matter of not being able to “ultimately explain,” that is, fully comprehend, some theological point, or is this a matter of seeing clearly enough that a certain theological proposition is in contradiction or incoherent with another theological proposition?  Even if the Trinity has an element of mystery to it, how is it that deterministic unconditional election and human responsibility fall into that category of “mystery” in the same way?  Again, our “present rational capacities” tell us they do not. The claims of Calvinism are contradictory.

When Schreiner claims the Trinity is a “mystery,” he confirms the distinction I have been making, that there are things that are “above our present rational capacities” and these need to be distinguished from things that can be known to run against our “present rational capacities” or laws of thought.  It is the difference between things that are beyond our reason to fully comprehend (genuine biblical mystery) and things that are against reason when sufficiently comprehended (genuine exegetical contradiction or incoherence).  That is the difference at issue here.  I believe Calvinism falls into the latter category, and, as Dr. Craig points out, it does the doctrine of the Trinity a disservice to deem it logically inconsistent and contradictory, and therefore shouldn’t be employed as analogous support for the contradiction between Calvinism’s universal divine causal determinism and human freedom and responsibility. Dr. Craig does not conclude about the Trinity what he is compelled to conclude about Calvinism.

For instance, Schreiner’s textual exegesis maintains that God unconditionally elects certain individuals to faith.  Only the elect will believe and be saved.  Yet, Schreiner’s textual exegesis also maintains that those who are not elect should have believed and will be held responsible by God for their unbelief.  In addition, Schreiner’s textual exegesis maintains that God meticulously predetermined all that occurs, including the thoughts and choices of all individuals.  Yet, Schreiner’s textual exegesis also maintains that human beings make their own choices, including evil ones, and are responsible for those choices, while God is not implicated in the evil they do and that occurs throughout the world.  For Schreiner, these doctrines either are not or cannot be contradictory or incoherent; otherwise, according to his own words, they would not be true.  Recall that Schreiner states, “The law of noncontradiction…is characteristic of all meaningful human thought and speech.  That which is contradictory cannot be true.  Thus, it is legitimate to ask if a particular theological position is “contradictory or illogical.” So, we have asked and investigated whether the Calvinist theological position is contradictory or illogical.  I am compelled to conclude on the amount and weight of the evidence I have presented above, and in the many other chapters on this site, that the Calvinist position is contradictory and illogical.  I have found no way to avoid this conclusion.  And the Calvinist has not provided any evidence or argument to avoid this conclusion.  As far as I can tell, these Calvinist doctrines are contradictory.

The Calvinist might claim that his position cannot be contradictory because then these doctrines would implicate Scripture in a contradiction or incoherence.  But that again is to beg the question and reiterate that the Calvinist has a real problem on their hands. We have to make a judgment on the validity of an interpretation based on the coherence of the propositions.  We cannot assume they are the correct interpretation of the text and then reason that, since the Bible cannot contradict itself, the propositions are not really contradictory, that they are just apparently contradictory. That’s the ad hoc way to avoid the contradiction. I assume that Schreiner’s doctrine of biblical inspiration will not allow for there to be a contradiction in Scripture. Therefore, when he arrives at contradictory interpretations, something is wrong in his exegesis.  But note that for him to reason thus would be to confirm that he trusts his rational capacities enough to be able to identify contradiction and incoherence, and that would indict his interpretations as invalid.

So if Schreiner would conclude that the Scripture would be implicated and impugned if it contained contradictory and incoherent teachings, why doesn’t he apply the same logic to implicating and impugning God in evil, given his universal divine causal determinism?  Why does he ignore this? Schreiner would have to give an answer here.  But this is difficult for him once he adopts a kind of “selective reasoning” where reason is affirmed when it helps one’s position and distanced by “mystery” when it imposes upon and begins to unravel his theology.  Recall that he stated, “The admission of mystery demonstrates that Calvinists are not dominated by western logic.  In fact, those who insist that human freedom and individual faith must rule out divine determination of all things are those who end up subscribing to western logical categories.”  In this, Schreiner is incoherent, for he has also affirmed that “The law of noncontradiction…is characteristic of all meaningful human thought and speech.  That which is contradictory cannot be true.”  Calvinists admit to “certain logical problems that are provoked by the Augustinian-Calvinist theology we affirm” but then simply choose to ignore their hermeneutical implications.

So, do Schreiner’s Calvinist doctrines really fit the category of “mystery” or can they be discerned to be logically contradictory and incoherent?  Our inability to “adequately grasp the full import of divine revelation” is different than our ability to adequately grasp a logical incoherence or contradiction.  The latter should not be confused with the former, and if the latter is the case, it should not be labeled a “mystery.”  Schreiner’s exegesis of the biblical texts leads him to conclude that “God determines who will exercise faith” and yet “all individuals are responsible to exercise faith and should have done so.”  He obviously recognizes that there is a logical contradiction here because he goes on to ask, “How can both of these be logically true?”  His answer is that “Biblical exegesis requires us…to see a mystery in the case of divine election and human responsibility.” Again, he flees to ‘mystery.’ 

But of course, another answer can be given to Schreiner’s question, “How can both of these be logically true?”  And that answer is that, “They can’t, at least as Schreiner has defined ‘divine election’ as deterministic and unconditional.  A moment’s logical reflection tells us they are contradictory.  Therefore, Schreiner has misinterpreted the text regarding divine election to mean divine determinism.  It seems to me, and to all non-Calvinists, that we certainly can fully grasp the problem here and the necessary solution.  The problem is that we have a contradiction on our hands.  This is because, as Schreiner states, “the law of noncontradiction was not invented.”  It is something inherent to the warp and woof of human thought as thought.  As Christians, we would claim that the principles of logic are a fundamental part of God’s cognitive life, a basic element of his rational nature.  As made in the image of God, we too are rational beings that function according to God’s principles of logic.  We discover these and employ them as reliable for discerning what is true from what is false.  Recall that Sir William Hamilton stated a metaphysical truth when he said,

“Logic is the science of thought as thought, that is, the necessary conditions to which thought, in itself considered is subject.”^[16]

And Schreiner along with all Calvinists must take the advice of I. A. Richards who said

“We cannot have it both ways, and no sneers at the limitations of logic…amend the dilemma.”^[17]

All this implies that we can know and are governed by the canons of reason and that we can also discern contradictions or incoherencies when they are present.  We know when human thought and speech are meaningful and when they become nonsense.

Calvinism: A Flawed Exegesis

Therefore, I submit that we can certainly identify the problem here to be one of logical contradiction and incoherence.^[18]  This is not hard to grasp.  We can confidently say that the Calvinists’ exegetical conclusions are logically incompatible, and therefore, we know, as Schreiner himself admits, the position cannot be true.  It is false at some point or another.  Therefore, the problem is not inherent in the text but in the exegete’s handling of the text.  The exegesis is flawed. So it becomes the problem of every Calvinist. The solution is to go back to the text and do a better job at all that good exegesis requires.  For instance, as to the exegesis of Romans 9, this chapter needs to be coherently interpreted within the broader context of Paul’s thought in Romans 10 and 11.   It is incumbent upon Schreiner and Calvinists to do so.

These problems speak to the accuracy of one’s exegesis and interpretation of the biblical text.  The logical implications of one’s exegesis and theological system, given the full scope of related issues that need to be considered, cannot be ignored, and Calvinism’s theistic determinism is at the root of most, if not all, of the Calvinist’s logical and moral difficulties.  If, and only if, we take logical and moral coherence on board in our hermeneutic, are we able to see that the Calvinist’s deterministic definition of sovereignty is not a valid interpretation of Scripture.  That is why the Calvinist must hide behind the curtain of mystery.  It allows them to avoid the negative logical and moral ramifications of their theology.  If they were to integrate logical and moral considerations into their hermeneutics as definitive contributors for discerning valid interpretations, then they would have to abandon or radically revise their theology.  What the Calvinists are doing by ignoring the problematic logical and moral implications of their interpretations and declaring them a mystery is to justify any and all interpretations, no matter how severe their incoherence.  Therefore, the question has to be asked and answered.  “Are logical and moral coherence essential to a sound biblical hermeneutic?  If not, why not?”  I submit that these problems ought to be deemed hermeneutically significant to the degree that they should cause the interpreter to reconsider whether their interpretations are actually what the Bible teaches.

Recall that Schreiner and Ware state, “It should be granted that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.”^[19]  So they acknowledge that the logical problems inherent in Calvinism are legitimate.  Yet they say “All Calvinists …acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.”  But if these difficulties involve logical reasoning and moral principles well known to us and by which we discern truth from error in all other matters, why not here?  If they are properly discerned to be of the nature of logical and moral difficulties, is it therefore inappropriate and disingenuous to label them a ‘mystery.’  Such labeling becomes a mere assertion based on presupposing Calvinism to be biblical truth.  Thus, the “reasoning” is circular.  It is not made clear why or how this is a true biblical mystery.  What is legitimate for logic to discern is declared “a mystery” on the basis that “they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”  This is not only question-begging, but it is to say the Scriptures present to us doctrines we can identify as logically incoherent, but are at the same time told to believe they are not; rather, they are a “mystery.”  Mystery is not a synonym for incoherence. In the mind of the Calvinist, they can be at one and the same time incoherent or contradictory and a “mystery.”  But I have shown by the Calvinists’ own statements that this is not the case.  Why declare what can be identified as a logical problem a ‘mystery?’

At this point, we suspect eisegesis to be going on instead of exegesis.  One seems to be allowing their traditional reading of the text to stand despite the radical logical and moral ramifications of that traditional reading in relation to all other truths that need to be considered.  Are all biblical interpretations marked by incoherence or contradiction to be considered mysteries?  Can these questions even be asked?

I am pressing the point here because what is a contradiction must be acknowledged to be a contradiction and not to be unjustifiably asserted to be a ‘mystery.’  ‘Mystery’ does not provide a satisfactory explanation of one’s exegetical conclusions while those conclusions exhibit contradiction and incoherence.  Consistent, coherent, and non-contradictory exegetical conclusions are necessary for declaring them to be valid.  Exegetical procedures must prove themselves sound by being marked by coherence and non-contradiction.  Rational coherence must be a hallmark of our exegesis, interpretations, and hermeneutics.  The importance one assigns to rational coherence in their exegetical interpretive process and theological conclusions is the central difference between Calvinists and non-Calvinists.  Rational coherence is dispensable for the Calvinist.  It is indispensable for the non-Calvinist.  This hermeneutical divide is at the heart of this controversy.  As long as the Calvinist can resort to excusing interpretive incoherence or contradiction by claiming ‘mystery,’ no resolution will be found between the Calvinist and non-Calvinist positions.  The Calvinist must state a position on this matter that is neither ad hoc nor question-begging.  The words of I. A. Richards are worth repeating: “We cannot have it both ways, and no sneers at the limitations of logic…amend the dilemma.”^[20]

The Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) to the Rescue

We should not overlook the most important ramification of this Calvinist / non-Calvinist controversy.  These two mutually exclusive theologies result in two mutually exclusive soteriologies, which in turn place the gospel message as “good news” in jeopardy. That is, given Calvinism, the gospel as “good news” is eroded.  In fact, it completely disappears. So, given the arguments presented in this chapter and the many others on this site and in the annotated bibliography, who can assist the church in resolving this confusion over the gospel?  In that I have pointed out that the Calvinist, practically speaking, rejects philosophical reflection in his hermeneutic, perhaps the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) is suited to the task.  The ultimate end of the EPS is to bring glory to the Triune God and spread the Kingdom of God.^[21]  One would expect, therefore, that the EPS has a vested interest in defining and defending the biblical gospel and promoting its proclamation as “good news.” The first “value” in the profile for an Evangelical Philosophical Society Executive Committee Member reads,

“First, an Executive Committee Member should value excellence in philosophy.  He or she should exhibit a life of philosophical growth, a commitment to the discipline, and a desire to serve the field of philosophy both because it is intrinsically good to do so and for the honor of Jesus Christ.”^[22]

This statement affirms the intrinsic goodness of serving the field of philosophy, implying the importance of its reflections, thoughts, and principles for sound thinking in all areas of life, including biblical interpretation.  Philosophy is not something that can be brushed aside when one’s theological position runs afoul of sound philosophical thinking.  Indeed, such thinking is “for the honor of Jesus Christ.”

The second “value” for an Executive Committee Member is that they,

 “…exhibit a real sense of faithfulness to the teachings of the inerrant Word of God, along with an eagerness to identify with the Evangelical community.”^[23]

Faithfulness to the teachings of Scripture requires bringing philosophical reflection to bear upon one’s interpretations of Scripture to determine their faithfulness to the text.  And to identify with the community as “Evangelical” is to identify with a community that holds to the scriptural definition of the term “evangelical,” which means “good news.”

This second “value” continues to stress an important caveat that I think is applicable to this controversy.  It states,

“The EPS is an Evangelical society and it should manifest a desire to be loyal to and defend views of that community unless, of course, that loyalty or those views are suspect for some reason or another.”^[24]

What will determine whether a view is “suspect?”  What constitutes “for some reason or another” in determining whether a view is faithful to the teachings of the inerrant Word of God?  Surely it must involve the application of philosophical reasoning, which I have argued for throughout this chapter and was clearly set out in the first “value.”  Calvinists forfeit sound philosophical and moral reasoning to hold to their interpretations of Scripture. Surely the EPS has a crucial role in deciphering and resolving this hermeneutical divide.

The fourth “value” states that an,

“Executive Committee Member should be strongly committed to being an activist for the cause of Christ…to promote a Christian world view in the world and the church, strengthen the faith of believers, and help to fulfill the Great Commission.”

All these involve one’s understanding of soteriology and the implications of that soteriology for the gospel as “good news.”  What is “a Christian worldview?” What is it to be “an activist for the cause of Christ” and “to fulfill the Great Commission?” What is “the cause of Christ?” I submit that all these questions and commitments are answered in drastically different ways depending upon whether one is a Calvinist (that is, one who speaks consistently with his Calvinism) or a non-Calvinist. These commitments certainly involve knowing the content of the gospel message.  So what is the content of the gospel message as truly “good news?” Calvinists and non-Calvinists have mutually exclusive understandings of soteriological doctrines, and this bears upon the gospel they have to bring to the world. In that they are mutually exclusive understandings, this controversy is appropriate for the EPS. They should take up these questions in a forum, council, or conference to discern truth from error. That is an important role of philosophy. So I present this challenge to the EPS because the gospel is at stake here. If we continue to deny this fact, we will never come to grips with what constitutes the truth of the gospel, and we will prove to be violating not only the fourth value but also the first two values and our commitment to the philosophical endeavor itself. Responsible evangelical Christian philosophers cannot continue to ignore this issue. The “Vision Statement” of the EPS reads,

“The Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) is a professional society of Christian philosophers who are committed to a high view of biblical authority and who believe that the gospel of Jesus Christ is true…”^[25]

But what gospel are they talking about? Which “gospel of Jesus Christ” is the true gospel?  Does it matter to the EPS that there are two mutually exclusive soteriologies, each with its correspondingly different “gospel” message? If not, why not? Can either soteriology produce a message the content of which is truly “good news?”  Where is the “good news” in the TULIP doctrines? Can these two incompatible soteriologies both be the teaching of Scripture? Does the Calvinist’s theological and soteriological determinism produce a message of “good news” for sinners?  We must cease using the word “gospel” without showing a proper concern for discerning its meaning and content. We must reject a mindless acceptance of two mutually exclusive views on soteriology and what constitutes “the gospel.”  This theological relativism is not befitting the responsible evangelical philosopher. If we hold to the first two values for Executive Committee Members, and the EPS Vision Statement, that is, that we have a commitment to doing good philosophy, that the philosophical discipline has intrinsic worth, that philosophy is essential to honoring Jesus Christ, and that philosophy serves to identify views in the Evangelical community that are “suspect for some reason or another,” then we cannot allow two mutually exclusive soteriologies and “gospels” to stand.  Calvinism is suspect because it is not evangelical. It has forfeited the message of “good news.” The EPS needs to make this matter a high priority, not only because it directly involves the purposes of the discipline of Christian philosophy, but also because it bears directly upon the intellectual integrity and credibility of the EPS, especially as an evangelical society.  This issue has crucial ramifications for both the church and the EPS as “evangelicals, ”that is, as a church and group whose central message is “the good news.”  The EPS “Mission Statement” emphasizes this point. It reads,

“The mission of the Evangelical Philosophical Society is to glorify God through the faithful practice of philosophy, fostering a deeper understanding of God and the world he created while both encouraging and enabling Christian philosophers to engage philosophical and spiritual issues in the academy, church, and culture.”^[26]

Therefore, I put the following questions and challenges to the EPS.  Do evangelical Christian philosophers actually believe that their discipline has little or nothing to contribute to discerning the validity of certain interpretations of Scripture?  Do the functions and purposes of philosophy – its ability to discern the relevant information and issues, logically reflect on them, assess them in relation to other information and issues and draw true conclusions – have no bearing upon the interpretation of biblical texts or the discipline of biblical hermeneutics?  Can we say that the philosophical assessment of Calvinism does not and cannot lead to any reliably true conclusions as to its biblical validity or invalidity?  For instance, does William Lane Craig’s philosophical assessment given in Chapter 4 have no relevance for discerning the interpretive validity of the Calvinist doctrines and teachings? Can philosophy provide any decisive conclusions in this regard?  Can philosophy tell us anything true about the nature and plausibility of determinisms, including theistic determinisms? In addition, and more pointedly, does the EPS have a concern for the truth in this matter, especially if the gospel is at stake? I think it should. 

This is nothing less than a controversy about the definition and content of the gospel. The faithful practice of philosophy needs to be brought to bear on this gospel controversy because the perpetuation of the controversy, and therefore its resolution, is essentially a matter of whether one believes philosophical reflection and moral intuition are indispensable elements in a sound hermeneutic or whether one believes that exegesis exists in a dichotomous relation to philosophical reflection and moral intuition.  What does the EPS believe in this regard?  Does the EPS take the stance that two mutually exclusive theologies, soteriologies, and gospel messages can both be biblical truth?  Are they just indifferent to the matter? Have they abandoned the truth of the gospel for a pretentious ‘evangelical’ eccelesial unity? Has the EPS been influenced by the interpretive and soteriological relativism so pervasive in the evangelical church today?

As an Evangelical Philosophical Society, the EPS is suited to play a key role in discerning and affirming the biblical gospel in our day.  The EPS is suited to do so because the controversy concerns whether a sound hermeneutic requires us to view rational and moral coherence as essential to determining the validity of biblical exegesis.  We are in desperate need of Christian philosophers to weigh in on this particular question.  They have in the past, but I challenge evangelical philosophers and the EPS to rise to this occasion in the present.

This controversy highlights the need to apply philosophical principles to biblical interpretations bearing on the definition and content of the gospel as “good news.”  We need a deeper understanding of God and the world he created as it relates to the gospel, defined as “good news.”  As it stands now, the evangelical church, with its neglect of the life of the mind and interpretive relativism, is discouraging Christian philosophy.  As this happens, we lose the ability to do good interpretation, and Scripture loses its authority and interest.  Good, sound thinking is being banished from our churches as the present status of this controversy demonstrates. There is a rise of Calvinism in many churches that identify as ‘evangelical.’ The perpetual nature of this controversy results from our failure to come to grips with whether we adopt a hermeneutic of coherence or continue in the present state of intellectual denial that allows two incompatible soteriologies and gospels to exist by asserting that “the Bible teaches both.”  Surely such a state of affairs is intellectually unacceptable for the EPS, as it should be for any Christian and church that claims to be “evangelical.”

The probative force of sound reasoning and moral intuition is truly problematic for Calvinist interpretation. Clear thinking needs to be restored and the hermeneutical divide addressed. Will the EPS rise to the occasion, if for no other reason than the restoration and preservation of the truth of the gospel as the “good news” that it is?  By doing so, it will be affirming that truth matters and that defining and defending the true gospel is at the heart of its mission and the ultimate purpose of its existence.  Recall the “Vision Statement” above, which I quote in full here.  It reads,

“The Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) is a professional society of Christian philosophers who are committed to a high view of biblical authority and who believe that the gospel of Jesus Christ is true, intellectually persuasive, and rationally defensible in the marketplace of ideas.”

So if the “gospel of Jesus Christ is true” and there are two mutually exclusive gospels in the church today, which one is true? How is this not the most important issue that should occupy the hearts and minds of the members of the EPS?  How is it that the true gospel of Jesus Christ cannot be definitively identified?  Is the Calvinist or non-Calvinist gospel message the true gospel?  If “the gospel of Jesus Christ is intellectually persuasive and rationally defensible,” how is it that Calvinism remains an acceptable Christian theology when it shows itself to be intellectually incoherent, inconsistent, contradictory, and therefore not rationally defensible?  We need to revive not only the issue of truth in a relativistic age, but we need to revive the issue of the truth of the gospel in a relativistic evangelical church to proclaim the message that the Holy Spirit can use in power to bring conviction of sin and impress upon each and every sinner their need to believe and be saved. This is a matter concerning the expression of the mind and heart of God’s love for each individual proclaimed in the truth of the gospel.

The involvement of the EPS is even more essential because things get even worse within Calvinism.  I have demonstrated on this site that Calvinists reject the deliberations and deliverances of human reason and moral intuitions, which, along with the non-Calvinists’ textual exegeses, provide substantive, weighty critiques of their biblical interpretations and deterministic theological system.  To avoid these defeaters, which show up Calvinism’s core doctrines as unbiblical, we find Calvinists taking a troubling step to perpetuate their theology. That is, the Calvinist must suppress our logical reasoning and moral intuitions to diminish the force these have in revealing Calvinism as untenable. In Chapter 10, I provide the evidence of this suppression by Calvinists and give further examples of their rejection of logical and moral coherence in interpretation.  

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