Eric Hankins and Leighton Flowers: Logic Demands We Reject Calvinism

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Reprobation: ‘A Horrible Decree’

According to Calvinism, unconditional election is God’s predetermination of who will be saved.  The logical corollary to this is called the doctrine of reprobation or preterition.  The reprobate are all those who are not unconditionally elected to salvation and therefore will not be saved.  Calvinist R. C. Sproul describes reprobation as God “bypassing” a sinner and “simply letting him go his own way.”  God “does not do anything to them; he simply leaves them alone.”¹  Yet, in what sounds inconsistent with the above, Sproul states that God’s decision to save some is also a “decision not to save others.”  He writes,

“God does not put forth an effort to cause people to sin.  When God chooses to bypass a sinner, He does not work to create unbelief in that person’s heart.  Rather, God simply lets him go his own way.

…Election is an act of God; reprobation is simply the reflex of that action, the fact that God has not elected everybody.

…we have to say that God’s action of deciding to save some is simultaneously a decision not to save others. The decision to save is called election, and the decision not to save is called preterition. Since this is one action, it can be seen as two sides of one coin, and “equally ultimate” in that sense.

But, and this is most important, when God implements election by calling the saints, He saves us apart from anything we have done.  When God implements preterition by reprobating the wicked, He does not do anything to them; He simply leaves them alone.  In this important sense, the work of God in condemning the wicked is not the reverse side of His work in saving sinners.”²

But reprobation or preterition cannot logically be as Sproul describes it because Sproul maintains that God predetermines all things, which would include the sinner’s sin and the unbelief in that person’s heart.  Sproul confirms this when he writes,

“…if we don’t say that God predestines all things, we don’t have a God at all.   If He is not totally sovereign, He is only a “big man” like Zeus or Baal.”³

Therefore, on Calvinist determinism, there is no such thing as “letting him go his own way.”  There is no way that is “his” to go.  God determines everything about the sinner, including the sin and the fact that a certain person will be reprobate.  Therefore, God is just as active in the reprobation of the non-elect as he is in the salvation of the elect.  Hence, “letting him go his own way” is incoherent on Sproul’s determinism.

Speaking about Calvinist Wayne Grudem and his doctrine of reprobation, non-Calvinist Eric Hankins writes,

“Calvinists themselves acknowledge that reprobation is enormously problematic and that the problem is compounded by a lack of biblical support.  Grudem notes, “…the doctrine of reprobation is the most difficult of all the teachings of Scripture for us to think about and accept because it deals with such horrible and eternal consequences for human beings made in the image of God.”⁴ The repugnance of reprobation is why Calvinists like Grudem come up with philosophically incoherent fixes like “single predestination,” God’s “asymmetrical relationship” to election and reprobation, God’s “two wills,” “two loves,” and so on.  Grudem concedes that it seems disingenuous to speak of God’s sorrow over the reprobate if he decrees it.  His answer is that “God can decree something that causes him sorrow yet ultimately will bring him glory.”  But God’s decreeing something sorrowful is not the problem with reprobation.  It is God’s decreeing something evil.  Jerry Wall’s observation at this point it apt:

[T]heological compatibilists [like Grudem] often make claims and engage in rhetoric that naturally lead people to conclude that God loves them and desires their salvation in ways that are surely misleading to all but those trained in the subtleties of Reformed rhetoric…Such language loses all meaning, not to mention all rhetorical force, when we remember that on compatibilist premises God could determine the impenitent to freely repent, but has chosen instead to determine things in such a way that they freely persist in their sins.  God’s refusal to determine the repentance of sinners when it is within his power to do so can be called nothing other than immoral.  Damning certain people by withholding something freely given to others is not glorious.  It is indeed a horrible decree.”⁵

The point is that Hankins and Walls view what God is doing in reprobation as “immoral” and “decreeing something evil.”  But Grudem and other Calvinists do not.  Why not?  The Calvinist’s answer to this will be that they are only stating what the Scriptures teach.  Grudem presumes this when he says, “the doctrine of reprobation is the most difficult of all the teachings of Scripture for us to think about and accept.”

This tells us that the difficulties raised by this doctrine of reprobation that Grudem recognizes and admits have “such horrible and eternal consequences for human beings made in the image of God” do not play any role in his concluding that it is “what the Scriptures teach.”  Even the force of the doctrine that these reprobate human beings are “made in the image of God” provides no check upon Grudem’s conclusion that reprobation is the teaching of Scripture.  But surely being made in the image of God has bearing upon discerning the validity of Grudem’s doctrine of reprobation.  If it doesn’t, what will?  Is God about eternally condemning and punishing those he has made in his own image for no known reasons, except that he has foreordained and caused them to commit the sin he is now condemning and punishing them for, yet this “will ultimately bring him glory”?  This confirms that Calvinists do not allow the full scope of the biblical teaching to inform their exegesis on God’s eternal decree, divine sovereignty, election, and predestination.  Grudem’s hermeneutic does not include the doctrinal, logical, and moral considerations Hankins and Walls raise against Grudem’s compatibilism and doctrine of reprobation. Grudem just ignores these logical and moral critiques of his own Calvinism.⁶

Two Diametrically Opposed Hermeneutics

Therefore, it needs to be carefully observed and acknowledged that there are two diametrically opposed logical and moral sensibilities at work here, which represent two diametrically opposed hermeneutics.  The non-Calvinist hermeneutic incorporates the doctrinal truth of humans being made in the image of God, logical reflections on the Calvinist’s “fixes” which Hankins deems “philosophically incoherent,” and the moral intuitions that indicate that Calvinist compatibilism and the doctrine of reprobation are “repugnant,” “immoral,” and “indeed a horrible decree.” But Calvinists don’t see their attempted “fixes” (e.g., “single predestination,” God’s “asymmetrical relationship” to election and reprobation, God’s “two wills,” “two loves,” and so on”) as “philosophically incoherent.”  Indeed, Jerry Walls views the God of Calvinist compatibilism as “nothing other than immoral,” because as the compatibilist argument goes, God saves the elect without violating their free will.  The elect come to Christ freely.  But Walls then raises the logical and moral questions of why God wouldn’t save everyone if he can do so without violating their free will? Why then wouldn’t he have every sinner come to him freely?  For Walls, reprobation in light of this compatibilism is “not glorious.”  But it is “glorious” for the Calvinist.  The point to note is that for the non-Calvinist, these Calvinist “fixes” as well as Calvinist compatibilism just won’t work because they are “philosophically incoherent.”  But this philosophical incoherence ultimately holds no interpretive weight for the Calvinist.  Incoherence is irrelevant for the Calvinist with respect to determining the validity of his textual interpretations. Hankins writes,

“The burden is on Calvinist theologians to assemble significant and unassailable biblical support for reprobation…” (64)

But when Hankins continues with the following observations, he has already proved that the Calvinist never could “assemble significant and unassailable biblical support for reprobation.”  Hankins states,

“The burden is on Calvinist theologians to assemble significant and unassailable biblical support for reprobation because it runs against the grain of what the Bible clearly teaches about God’s character and purposes, and because it is philosophically impossible both to affirm reprobation and deny that God causes evil.” (64)

Hankins has given two hermeneutical reasons why reprobation cannot be the teaching of Scripture.  The first is that it is inconsistent (i.e., “runs against the grain”) with the clear teaching of the Bible about the character of God and his purposes.  God loves all his human creatures and wants their salvation.  The second hermeneutical reason is that “it is philosophically impossible both to affirm reprobation and deny that God causes evil.”  Now, if we have run up against a philosophical impossibility, that is, if we find ourselves violating the fundamental laws of logic and our moral intuitions (e.g., square circles, married bachelors, red propositions, God reprobates yet God is good and wants to save all people, etc.), then we know for sure that our interpretation is not what the text means to tell us.  We should give the biblical authors and the divine Author more credit than that! To affirm reprobation logically entails that God causes evil, which is another aspect of the character of God that the Bible clearly teaches cannot be the case.

The point here is that once a doctrine can be shown to logically entail something about God that is clearly contrary to what Scripture reveals about Him, then we can conclude that the doctrine is a misinterpretation of the text.  We can say that when reprobation can be shown to be philosophically incoherent, then reprobation cannot be the meaning of the text in Romans 9.  It is enough to show that an exegetical conclusion is incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory to conclude that it is not an accurate exegesis of the text.  So Hankins has already stated two reasons why Calvinist reprobation must be rejected, and both of them involve the incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction inherent in the doctrine.  Philosophy, or the discipline of clear, rational thinking, is essential to exegesis and for evaluating the validity of exegetical claims.

The Hermeneutical Divide

Now we see the hermeneutical divide here.  For the Calvinist, these two reasons, which involve the incoherence and inconsistency of their doctrine with other biblical truths, are not taken to be interpretively significant.  The incoherence and inconsistency of their doctrine of reprobation with other biblical truths mean nothing to the Calvinist in determining the validity of their interpretation of Romans 9 and other relevant passages.  The incoherence, inconsistency, and/or contradiction of their interpretations are pushed aside and deemed inconsequential to evaluating the validity of their exegesis.  Thus, the Calvinist is approving, promoting, and practicing a hermeneutic of incoherence. But this hermeneutic is completely unacceptable for non-Calvinists like Hankins and Walls.  They cannot ignore the incoherence and inconsistency of an interpretive claim.  These are indicators of flawed interpretations.

We can see that given the Calvinist’s disregard for the discipline of philosophy in their hermeneutic that even the Calvinist “fixes” mentioned above ultimately don’t have to work in the defense of Calvinism because as long as logical and moral coherence are viewed as nonessential to one’s hermeneutic, then the laws of logic and our moral intuitions do not serve to determine the validity of the Calvinist’s exegesis or interpretations.  Even the defenses of Calvinism don’t have to be coherent, consistent, or non-contradictory. If interpretive coherence is not essential to their hermeneutics, then it is also not necessary in the defenses they offer to justify their Calvinism.  The Calvinist can feel good about putting forth a valiant effort at trying to make his doctrines logical and morally consistent and coherent by proposing “single predestination,” God’s “asymmetrical relationship” to election and reprobation, God’s “two wills,” “two loves,” and so on”, but when, as Hankins points out, these are shown to be “philosophically incoherent,” this is still irrelevant to the Calvinist.  The Scriptures teach the Calvinist doctrines regardless of the type and magnitude of the difficulties those interpretations raise.  And besides, in the end, the Calvinist can always fall back on “mystery.”

Now, most Calvinists will declare that Scripture cannot contradict itself or be incoherent in its witness, and that God cannot do anything contrary to his nature.  What is interesting here, therefore, is that in defending the coherence and consistency of Scripture, Calvinists are implicitly affirming the proper basicality of the laws of logic and our moral intuitions, and yet, they will not allow these to arbitrate as to the validity of their interpretations.  They affirm them regarding the nature of Scripture, but do not affirm them in their interpretation and understanding of that Scripture.  Here, too, they are inconsistent.

When Calvinism is subject to logical and moral critique, Calvinists must fall back on “mystery,” otherwise they would have to revisit the text in search of coherent interpretations.  But that would ultimately require them to abandon their universal divine causal determinism, which is the source of their incoherence.  The Calvinist does not allow the logical and moral difficulties raised by their exegesis and interpretations to be determinative for evaluating the validity of their exegesis and interpretations. Therefore, they are ultimately forced to resort to ‘mystery.’

Calvinists Schreiner and Ware Argue Why Belief in Calvinism is Unwarranted

Calvinists Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce L. Ware, in their book Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, admit that “the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.”⁷ But then they state, “the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.”⁸  Why should that be the case? Rather than allow logical reasoning and moral intuition to play their legitimate roles in interpretation, they ignore these and flee to ‘mystery.’ Calvinists rightly affirm that the Bible must be free from incoherence and contradiction. But in doing so, they are simultaneously and unwittingly affirming the authority of logical reasoning and its suitability and reliability for evaluating the validity of their exegesis and doctrines. And yet, all the while they refuse to let these guide them toward more valid interpretations. Our logical reasoning and moral intuitions have the authority to arbitrate this controversy.

Schreiner and Ware have also stated that “the fundamental reason people should embrace the Calvinist doctrines of grace is because they believe these doctrines are taught in Scripture.”⁹  But Schreiner and Ware’s statement and position become all the more baffling when they write,

“The theology that should be accepted must provide a plausible explanation of all the scriptural data.”¹⁰

Calvinism is certainly not “a plausible explanation of all the scriptural data.” And shouldn’t Grudem therefore take the scriptural data he himself pointed out about humans being made in the image of God into account when he formulates his soteriological doctrines, especially the doctrine of reprobation? But he doesn’t do this. Why doesn’t he? Especially when Schreiner and Ware also state that,

“Too many biblical scholars today, even among evangelicals, reject any attempt to discern how Scripture fits together theologically.  Such a course is exceedingly dangerous because it is a tacit admission that Scripture does not speak a unified word…”¹¹

Given Schreiner and Ware’s own testimony about the logical problems in their Calvinist theology, which are certainly acute, it does not seem that their doctrines score very high based on their own criteria about why a theology should be accepted.  Does their Calvinism “provide a plausible explanation of all the scriptural data?”  Does their Calvinism “fit together theologically?”  Does Calvinism represent Scripture as speaking “a unified word?”  I think we non-Calvinists have provided overwhelming evidence that it does not.  Schreiner and Ware have just argued why belief in Calvinism is not warranted. But again, they refuse to see this.

Again, these statements presuppose the ability and reliability of reason to discern what is “a plausible explanation” from an implausible one.  They presuppose the ability and reliability of reason to discern a “unified word” or the “fit” of one’s interpretive propositions, which are just other ways of referring to exegetical and interpretive coherence.  They affirm that our reasoning faculties and moral intuitions provide reliable means by which to arbitrate this conflict.  But the Calvinist will not allow them to serve this function in their hermeneutic or their own theology.

Sound, Responsible Interpretive Criteria

The interpretations that should be believed must provide not merely “a plausible explanation” but “the most plausible explanation” of a text.  It must have explanatory power. But Calvinism reaches neither standard. It just lacks plausibility.

In addition, good interpretations should also provide the most plausible explanation of “all the scriptural data.”  That is, they should have explanatory scope and comprehensiveness.  They should also demonstrate “fit” and a “unified word” with their immediate contexts and within the broader context of Scripture.  That is, they need to be coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory. Calvinism fails here also.

Finally, good interpretations should be able to incorporate as many of these criteria in a cumulative case for one’s theological paradigm.

I have been attempting throughout this website to provide the evidence that shows that Calvinism fails in these respects.  Indeed, by their own admission, Schreiner and Ware’s theology certainly has serious problems with the plausibility and hermeneutical principles mentioned above.  Recall they state that,

“It should be granted that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.”¹²

In light of their own criterion of plausibility, “fit” and a “unified word,” that is, explanatory power, explanatory scope, and coherence, we wonder why Schreiner and Ware do not abandon their Calvinism for the alternative interpretations that do fulfill these criteria.  Any objections Calvinists raise against non-Calvinist interpretations seem to pale in number and severity to those raised against Calvinism. But any objections raised by Calvinists against non-Calvinist theologies and soteriologies would have to be exegetical assessments exhibiting rational and moral coherence. But if the Calvinist won’t even apply this standard to his own theology and soteriology, how can he do it against the non-Calvinists exegetical conclusions without committing gross hypocrisy?

Schreiner and Ware reviewed some of the critical logical and moral objections non-Calvinists levy against Calvinism.  They are,

“If God chooses only some, then how can he be loving?  If God’s grace is irresistible, then what happens to human free will?  If God saves those he has chosen, why pray or get involved in missions?  If God is in control of the world, then why do anything at all?  If God is sovereign, then why is there suffering in the world?  If God governs all events, then why is evil our responsibility, not his?”¹³

Schreiner and Ware added their own list of logical and moral problems they face as Calvinists.  They stated,

“God is completely sovereign, and yet human choices and responsibility are not a charade.  God ordains all that comes to pass and is good; and yet evil exists, and it is really evil.  God chooses only some to be saved, and yet there is also a true sense in which he desires the salvation of all.  Those who are elect will never lose their salvation, and yet those who do not persevere to the end will not inherit the kingdom of God.”¹⁴

These are serious conflicts.  But note how the Calvinist refuses to deal with them.  He refuses to entertain the possibility that these conflicts may be the result of their misinterpretation of the text.  In addition, any Calvinist resistance to alternative interpretations offered by non-Calvinists isn’t based on any incoherence, inconsistency, or contradictions in the non-Calvinist interpretations.  Rather, Calvinist criticisms of non-Calvinists seem to reduce to two charges: the failure of non-Calvinists to “understand” Calvinism and non-Calvinists’ refusal to exalt God’s sovereignty and seek the glory of God in all things.

This first charge amounts to the non-Calvinist rightly refusing to acquiesce to the Calvinist’s expectation that we dismiss logical and moral coherence as essential to good interpretation. But if we did acquiesce to the Calvinist expectations, how are we supposed to “understand” Calvinism? We would have forfeited the logical and moral reasoning needed to do so!  We cannot “understand” Calvinism as the Calvinist would like us to, for they require us to put aside our logical and moral bearings to do so. So they are not really asking to be understood. They are asking for permission to remain interpretively incoherent. What they are saying is, “Please ignore the incoherence in our theology for the sake of mutual Christian coexistence.”  But the non-Calvinist will not, and should not, sacrifice philosophical or logical coherence and our moral intuitions in the exegetical task or its conclusions.¹⁵  Too much is at stake here, especially about the definition of the gospel, its content, and the sincerity of its proclamation.

The second charge amounts to rightly refusing to accept Calvinism’s definition of sovereignty as theistic determinism and thus “give God all the glory for salvation,” which again, is question-begging.  Non-Calvinists believe that God is sovereign and that a coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory soteriology and gospel message that is truly “good news” both magnifies and exalts God by giving him all the glory in salvation.

Disengenuous Calvinists

The fact that there are alternative non-Calvinist interpretations of the relevant texts that fulfill the Calvinists’ own standards for interpretation, and yet Calvinists reject the interpretations that follow those standards while embracing their own interpretations that do not reflect their own standards, raises the question as to whether a Calvinist is really a Calvinist because he believes Scripture teaches Calvinism.  Schreiner and Ware confess that the theology to be accepted is that which exhibits explanatory power, explanatory scope, and coherence.  That is the theology that would reflect what Scripture teaches.  Why then do Calvinists remain Calvinists if by their own admission, and non-Calvinist proofs, their theology lacks these qualities and rather exhibits serious logical and moral difficulties?  How can they be what Scripture teaches if these doctrines are logically and morally problematic?  In light of how logic and morality tenaciously assail Calvinism, and in light of other exegetically coherent interpretations, the Calvinist needs to meaningfully reckon with his problems of plausibility, “fit” and coherence, rather than fleeing to “mystery.”

Having just delineated several criteria for determining what the Scripture teaches and the theology that is to be accepted, Schreiner and Ware tell us “that the full and final resolution” of the logical difficulties in their theology is “a mystery.”  This flight to “mystery” communicates that, in the final analysis, the criteria for good interpretation they propose ultimately hold no hermeneutical weight for the Calvinist.  The very criteria Schreiner and Ware affirm are necessary for a good interpretation and theology are ultimately not an essential element in their hermeneutic.

The Calvinist’s Flight to Mystery

Fleeing to “mystery” is not an intellectually responsible move for Calvinists for two reasons.  First, it is simply ad hoc.  “Mystery” is made to be an “explanation” for the problems of Calvinism without further justification as to why these problems should be understood as falling into the category of true biblical mystery.  True biblical mystery is not the same as Calvinist incoherence and contradiction.  Secondly, if the Calvinist claims, “That’s what the Bible teaches.  It’s a mystery!”, then that is just to beg the question.

What I have done so far is demonstrate where the real issue lies in this controversy between the Calvinist and non-Calvinist interpretations and doctrines. We have uncovered the hermeneutical divide. We are also beginning to see that this divide is the terminal issue in this controversy. The fact that non-Calvinists include coherence in their hermeneutic and Calvinists do not causes all productive discussion to cease. We may continue to talk about the issues, but we will find ourselves going around in circles. That is why I call upon the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) to become engaged in this matter at the hermeneutical level in accord with the arguments I have presented, not only in this post, but in other chapters on this website. We all agree that this controversy must be decided at the exegetical level. Its resolution rests upon the proper exegesis of the relevant texts.  But I think we can also see that the proper exegesis of the relevant texts is integrally bound up with the logical and moral coherence of that exegesis.  Indeed, the philosophical coherence or logical implications of one’s exegesis cannot be dismissed by “mystery” precisely because, apart from philosophical coherence, all meaningful thought and speech collapses. Thus, this becomes a matter for the Evangelical Philosophical Society to decisively weigh in on. But will they?

Hankins and Grudem:  Reprobation as a Necessary Implication and Ways of Avoidance

Recall Eric Hankins quoting Wayne Grudem as saying that,

“…the doctrine of reprobation is the most difficult of all the teachings of Scripture for us to think about and accept because it deals with such horrible and eternal consequences for human beings made in the image of God.”¹⁶

Many Calvinists, therefore, don’t want to affirm reprobation.  In a podcast discussion between Leighton Flowers and Eric Hankins on the Calvinist doctrine of reprobation, they point out that a logical implication of the Calvinist doctrine of election is the doctrine of reprobation.  They make the point that the doctrine of unconditional election necessarily implies the doctrine of reprobation.  Watne Grudem, along with other Calvinists like Lorraine Boettner, also recognizes this logical implication.  Boettner states,

“The doctrine of absolute predestination of course logically holds that some are foreordained to death as truly as others are foreordained to life.”¹⁷

Grudem concurs,

“When we understand election as God’s sovereign choice of some persons to be saved, then there is necessarily another aspect of that choice, namely, God’s sovereign decision to pass over others and not to save them.”¹⁸

When Grudem uses the word “necessarily,” he is affirming a function of logic.  He acknowledges that to affirm x may necessarily entail affirming y.  Therefore, those Calvinists who try to avoid affirming the doctrine of reprobation are trying to avoid a logical necessity or logical implication of their doctrine of unconditional election.

The important hermeneutical point here is that you cannot just ignore a logical necessity or the logical implication of something you hold to be biblical and claim to be true.  Neither can you logically work your way out of it.  That is what makes something a necessary implication of other propositions that one holds.  If you ignore the logical or necessary implications of your views, then you are being incoherent.

Hankins: Three Calvnist Strategies to Avoid the Logical Necessity of Reprobation

Eric Hankins states that Calvinists employ three “strategies” to try to avoid reprobation as the necessary implication of unconditional election.  The first strategy is just to deny it and say, “That’s a part of Calvinism I don’t believe.”  Hankins states,

“This is real typical of the poorly informed Calvinist whose adopted it because they have scholars that they like or authors that they like.  They have not thought critically about the system and so – I call it cafeteria Calvinism, you just pick the parts of it that you like, and so – and that flows into this idea of three point Calvinism, two point Calvinism, that sort of stuff, and I would say, just for those who are listening, we really got to stop accepting that…it’s incredibly inconsistent.  But a lot of conversations I had it’s just, ‘Oh well I just don’t accept that part.’  What I’ve tried to demonstrate in my paper is that’s a necessary part of the system. …So that’s strategy one.  Just be internally inconsistent.  ‘I just like that part of Calvinism.’”¹⁹

Hankins contends that Calvinists who deny reprobation are being “incredibly inconsistent” and ignoring “a necessary part of the system.”  Note that ignoring this inconsistency and dismissing the idea of logical necessity is not an intellectual option for the non-Calvinist. Yet it is an option for the Calvinist.  The point is that this certainly has hermeneutical implications.  For the non-Calvinist, a doctrine they might hold that would produce problems on the order of those that reprobation produces for the Calvinist, would cause the non-Calvinist to return to the text in search of a more logically consistent and less morally troubling interpretation.  Not so for the Calvinist.

The second strategy the Calvinist employs to avoid the logical necessity of reprobation is “a series of work-arounds.”  (See Chapter 8 – Calvinist Attempts to Justify Sovereignty as Theistic Determinism) These are,

“God has two loves, God has two wills, God’s desire to elect is asymmetrical in its relationship to God’s desire to reprobate, salvation is all of God and damnation is all of man…one of the ones that I love is equal ultimacy – it’s this high-sounding rhetoric that doesn’t mean anything…that God’s…responsibility for reprobation is somehow different from his responsibility for election.  So, there are those work-arounds that are just…an attempt to give a logical account for reprobation.  But at the end of the day all of those attempts are logically contradictory.”²⁰

Note what these “work-arounds” reveal about the inconsistency in the Calvinists approach to this controversy.  First, Calvinists do have a moral intuition that prompts them to act to defend their doctrines. The fact that Calvinists struggle to relieve the moral problem in their theology through these “work-arounds” is evidence of their logical reasoning and moral intuitions at work.  So the Calvinist certainly seems to be affirming that logical reasoning and moral intuitions play a role in interpretive matters.  Secondly, the Calvinist is employing philosophical thought in concocting these “work-arounds.”  They use philosophy – the same philosophy they reject when it is applied to critiquing their doctrines – to think up these “work-arounds.”  They feel the need to provide rational justification for their interpretative conclusions.  So the Calvinist who ultimately rejects philosophical and moral critiques of their Calvinism is being incoherent by attempting to logically and morally “explain” or defend their Calvinism.

And yet, Hankins mentions a third strategy, which is,

 “…just to accept that their system is logically contradictory…They’ll say things like God does not have to submit to our logic.  Or, they won’t adopt or admit to the term “logically contradictory,” and so they’ll say well it’s a paradox, it’s a mystery, it’s antinomy…Packer, Spurgeon, you know the two parallel paths that cross somewhere in eternity, why should I have to reconcile friends, all that sort of thing.  But that is just a failure to grasp the very clear and simple claim that we are making, that really can’t be denied, that Calvinism at this point is logically contradictory, or, God really is the cause of evil, and that’s where you get to consistent Calvinists or hyper-Calvinists which say ‘Yes, God causes the damnation of the non-elect.”²¹

Once again, the conclusion Hankins arrives at is that the Calvinist system is logically contradictory, and all these Calvinist attempts to avoid that conclusion spring from a failure to admit to the logical and moral incoherence and contradiction in their system.  The point is that the logic of the problem cannot be denied.  Calvinists innately know this.  Recall Schreiner and Ware, who echo Hankins’ observations when they state, “It should be granted that the logical difficulties raised pose legitimate and difficult questions for those who embrace Calvinism.”  But then they also predictably flee to mystery when they write, “All Calvinists we have ever read acknowledge that the full and final resolution of divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.  People do not become Calvinists because Calvinism solves all such logical problems.”²²  What this ultimately means is that the observations and deliverances of philosophy and logic have nothing of consequence to say about the nature of Calvinism or the validity of its interpretations of Scripture.

Hankins points out that hyper-Calvinists are more consistent than their moderate Calvinist brothers and sisters.  Hyper-Calvinists are less inclined to offer the “work-arounds” of the moderate Calvinists.  The hyper-Calvinist will just bite the bullet and say “God predetermined everything that ever happens, both good and evil,” and “Human free will is a myth,” and “God does not love everybody,” and “Jesus didn’t die for all persons,” etc.  But this position solves nothing of the Calvinist’s difficulties and seems to stray further and further away from anything resembling the teaching of Scripture.  Such a view can only survive and thrive when one completely divorces the input of clear philosophical thinking and their moral intuitions from their exegesis.  It is true that when one’s hermeneutics becomes so fragmented and compartmentalized, then one’s technical and traditional exegesis has to stand as an a priori biblical truth, and all else can be ignored.  Hyper-Calvinists are still as inconsistent as their non-hyper fellow Calvinists, only that the focus has just shifted from a logical contradiction to a moral incoherence.  The incoherence is now the moral problem of how to understand God’s loving and gracious character, given the Calvinist doctrines of unconditional election, limited atonement, reprobation, etc.  Reprobation was a logical necessity or logical implication of unconditional election, which is a doctrine that the Calvinist, by definition, cannot deny.  If you deny unconditional election, then you are not a Calvinist.  But when the hyper-Calvinist admits that “God predetermined everything that ever happens, both good and evil,” and “Human free will is a myth,” and “God does not love everybody,” and “Jesus didn’t die for all persons,” etc., he does not extricate himself from his contradictions and incoherence.  He only exacerbates them by implicating God in evil.

What is the bottom line here?  Calvinists are perfectly comfortable dismissing logical and moral coherence, that is, the role of the discipline of philosophy, from their hermeneutic.  Whereas the non-Calvinist cannot.  This is not because the non-Calvinist is seeking to exert his human autonomy over God, but rather wants to interpret Scripture with intellectual responsibility and moral integrity as required because it is the Word of a rational and moral God. 

Flowers, Hankins, and Craig: Logical Contradiction is Proof That a Doctrine is Wrong

Dr. Flowers and Dr. Hankins go on to explicitly state that what can be shown to be logically contradictory is simply wrong.  Dr. Flowers asks,

“…do we need to just call this logically inconsistent because that’s what it is and therefore dismiss it as a blatant contradiction?  If something is contradictory, by the way, in logic if you prove something to be contradictory, you’ve proven it incorrect.  You’ve proven it wrong.  So you can’t say I believe a contradiction and then continue to say that you’re believing truth.  That’s an oxymoron, that’s like I believe a lie, I believe something that’s untrue to say you believe a contradiction.  And true, thinking Christians cannot, I think, give that argument over to the atheistic world.  Just to say, ‘Hey we believe in a blatant contradiction.”²³

Flowers is pointing out the negative implications of the Calvinist holding to a “blatant contradiction.”  He is stressing the fact that if something is contradictory then it is incorrect.  To prove something is a contradiction is to prove that it is just wrong.  He touches upon the fact that the laws of logic are what the Christian apologist employs to counter and disarm the atheist arguments against the existence of God, the supernatural, the spiritual, etc.  For instance, the atheist uses the existence of evil and suffering in the world to doubt or disprove the existence of God.  They say if a good God exists, and he is all-powerful, why is their evil?  If he is good he does not want it and if he is all-powerful he can eradicate it, therefore it does not seem that an all-powerful and/or good God exists.  Note that in making this argument the atheist is affirming the reality of evil.  There are logical and probabilistic forms of this argument that have been convincingly rebutted by William Lane Craig.  But another form of the Christian’s defense and rebuttal against the atheist’s argument here is one that Ravi Zacharias gives which is built upon a series of logical implications.  They are as follows:  If you believe there is such a thing as evil, you must logically believe in good.  If you believe in good, then you must believe in a moral law.  If you believe in a moral law, you must believe in a moral lawgiver.  Who might that be?  The Christian answer is God.  The point is that the atheist is expected to follow the logic of his fundamental complaint and belief as to the reality and presence evil in the world.  If he refuses to follow the logic that his affirmation of the existence of evil entails a transcendent standard of goodness, he can be accused of being logically incoherent, which we all presuppose renders his position invalid.  The same applies to Christian theology and the interpretation of Scripture – or at least it should.  The laws of logic are unavoidable for both the atheist and Christian.  But this is the problem in this Calvinist / non-Calvinist controversy.  The Calvinist is taking it upon himself to dismiss the laws of logic in the preservation of his Calvinist doctrines that he a priori holds to be the truth of Scripture.

So Flowers’ point is an important one.  He is saying that if the atheist world sees that we have accepted a theology and soteriology marked by contradiction and incoherence, then our use of logic in apologetics becomes a farce.  But we have done the same with Calvinism.  Theologically and soteriologically, we have accepted a blatant contradiction, and therefore, as Christians, we lose intellectual credibility.

So the crucial problem facing the Calvinist still remains, that is, whether or not they will adopt a hermeneutic of coherence. Will they acknowledge the role of the laws of logic and moral intuitions as essential elements in a sound hermeneutic that serve to arbitrate the validity of competing interpretations, or ignore the input of philosophical thinking and continue their ad hoc, question-begging flight to mystery?  Will they acknowledge that interpretations that are logically contradictory or morally incoherent cannot be accurate and true interpretations of Scripture, or, against all reason, simply ignore reason and logic, banishing these from their hermeneutic?

Hankins exhorts Christians to carefully think this matter through.

 “…I would really encourage those of you who are listening, you need to spend some time, do a little research, and get very clear on what the difference is between that which is logically contradictory and that which is mysterious or paradoxical.  I’m not saying there aren’t aspects of Christian faith that are mysterious and paradoxical – trinity, hypostatic union – but those are in a different category of thing than what Calvinists are claiming.  Calvinists are claiming that which is actually logically contradictory.  And then you need to get yourself familiar with what are the implications of affirming something which is logically contradictory.  Calvinists will say, ‘Well God just doesn’t have to submit himself to our logic’ – that kind of thing.  If God can do that which is logically contradictory, then all knowledge collapses.  If God can both lie and tell the truth, if something can be both true and false at the same time, then there is nothing to be known about God or God’s world.  It all goes away.  And so that which is logically contradictory is…an impermissible move.  It’s actually wrong, false.  Not to be believed.”²⁴

William Lane Craig sees this as the fundamental problem with Calvinism.  Answering a questioner on the matter of divine determinism and human free will, he states,

“The problem is that I don’t think that the Reformed theologian can give us a coherent interpretation of Scripture…the Reformed divines…typically say that the reconciliation of these texts is just inscrutable.  They can’t put them together; it is a mystery.”²⁵

Flowers, Hankins, and Craig state that in philosophy or apologetics, when an argument or proposition can be shown to be incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory, then it is false.  The same applies to biblical exegesis and interpretation.  Unless the Calvinist wants to justify the irrationality of their position, the inescapable conclusion is that since Calvinism holds to interpretations of Scripture that are incoherent or logically contradictory, it is certainly false and not to be believed.  The various “work-arounds” by which Calvinists seek to justify their doctrinal positions and defend them from irrationality merely beg the question as to whether their exegesis is correct and how we would ultimately know that, or these “work-arounds” simply defer the problem and land us in more incoherence in a different place (e.g., compatibilism).

The Calvinist may assert that “at the end of the day, the argument will stand or fall at the exegetical level,”²⁶but this really has no meaning if at the exegetical level the laws of logic and our moral intuitions do not hold.  An illogical exegesis of the biblical text is no exegesis at all.  No one can claim his interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty or any other doctrine springs from a proper exegesis of the biblical text if that exegesis is incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory to the interpretations of other doctrines that he also claims are derived from an exegesis of the biblical text.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon the exegete not to ignore the logical and moral problems inherent in their interpretations.  They should not seek to retain logically and morally incompatible doctrines, but should rather honestly question the exegetical accuracy of one or the other or both of their doctrinal claims.  To claim that “the argument will stand or fall at the exegetical level” cannot be divorced from its standing or falling at the logical and moral level, for as logical and moral coherence are essential to a good, plausible apologetic argument, they are also essential to a good, plausible interpretation of a text.  If one’s interpretive argument does not demonstrate logical consistency, then the claim that that interpretive argument “stands” at the exegetical level becomes implausible.  Any exegesis that leads us into logically incompatible or morally irreconcilable conclusions is poor exegesis.  It makes the exegetical enterprise meaningless.  One must be willing to question their exegesis if it finds itself implicated in incoherence, inconsistency, or contradiction.  Rather than merely asserting that “at the end of the day, the argument will stand or fall at the exegetical level,” the Calvinist must be willing to ask on what basis they can determine success at the exegetical level.  Is blatant contradiction a sign of exegetical accuracy or a sign of exegetical misinterpretation? Non-Calvinists believe it is the latter. Calvinists do not.

If one holds to a doctrine of divine inspiration that maintains that the Bible is not incoherent, inconsistent or contradictory because the laws of logic and moral principles as we know them are of the very nature of the divine Author, then when the interpreter lands in incoherence and contradiction he must go back to the text and allow it to inform him as to its coherent message.  He should beware of imposing upon the text his own theological predilections in disregard of the incoherence they generate.  Again, although logical coherence is not a sufficient condition for determining exegetical accuracy and the biblical truth of a particular doctrine, it is a necessary condition.  In other words, we know that one’s exegetical propositions and their doctrinal implications are wrongheaded if their logical entailments are incoherent, inconsistent, or contradictory.

In addition, a false definition at one doctrinal point (e.g., sovereignty), even when carried through logically to other doctrinal conclusions, will show itself up in incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions down the theological road.  I submit that this is what is happening with the Calvinist understanding of the biblical doctrines of “the divine decree” and “the sovereignty of God.”  Defined deterministically, these logically produce the TULIP soteriological system.  But the whole system runs afoul of the clear witness in Scripture to a non-deterministic reality and soteriology.  Ultimately, we can certainly discern the incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions of Calvinism, which are reliable indications that it rests upon a flawed exegesis of Scripture.

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Footnotes

1. Given the universal divine causal determinism of Calvinism, we wonder what “simply letting him go his own way” could possibly mean. This will be discussed presently, but recall Sproul believes that “The movement of every molecule, the actions of every planet, the falling of every star, the choices of every volitional creature, all of these are subject to his sovereign will. No maverick molecules run loose in the universe beyond the control of the Creator.  If one such molecule existed, it could be the critical fly in the eternal ointment.” – R. C. Sproul, What is Reformed Theology? (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2016), 172.
   
   Let’s be clear.  By “subject to his sovereign will,” Sproul means “predetermined by God’s will.”  By saying, “simply letting him go his own way,” of course, Sproul is not now changing his position and affirming genuine human free will.  Rather, what we have here is yet another example of inconsistent Calvinism. ↩︎
2. R. C. Sproul, “The Doctrine of Reprobation,” June 10, 1992. https://www.ligonier.org/learn/devotionals/the-doctrine-of-reprobation/ Last accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
3. Ibid. ↩︎
4. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 685. ↩︎
5. Eric Hankins, “Romans 9 and the Calvinist Doctrine of Reprobation,” New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, Spring 2018, JBTM, 15.1 (Spring 2018), pp. 62-75. www.nobts.edu › journals › journals › JBTM_15-1_Spring_2018 Last accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
6. See Chapter 9, the section, “Helm, Calvin and Castellio on Reason and Common Sense,” where Calvin does not think logical and moral coherence are essential to interpretation. ↩︎
7. Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 20. ↩︎
8. Ibid. ↩︎
9. Ibid. 18. ↩︎
10. Ibid. ↩︎
11. Ibid. 19. ↩︎
12. This should not be misunderstood as saying that the non-Calvinist does not acknowledge that there are genuine mysteries in the Bible that are even the result of responsible exegesis.  But it is to say that the non-Calvinist maintains that these genuine mysteries are not logically or morally incoherent or contradictory.  This evaluating of biblical exegesis or interpretations based on logical principles and moral intuitions should not be confused with affirming or embracing rationalism, which is the denial of any supernatural intervention due to one’s naturalistic worldview presuppositions. What is at issue here is the rejection of the role of logic itself in the interpretive task and as evaluative of one’s exegetical conclusions, not that what is recorded in the Bible cannot be counter to what naturalism only deems possible.  The claim is that what is recorded in the Bible, as a written text, cannot be counter to the rules for interpreting a written text. The use of logical reasoning, common sense, and moral intuitions may still end in miracle or mystery, but these results would have included, not excluded, logical reasoning, common sense, and moral intuitions. Simply put, one’s interpretations ought to be consistent, coherent, and non-contradictory. ↩︎
13. Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994), 685.  As found in Eric Hankins, “Romans 9 and the Calvinist Doctrine of Reprobation,” www.nobts.edu › journals › journals › JBTM_15-1_Spring_2018, p. 63. Last accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
14. Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination (1932; Woodstock, Ontario: Devoted, 2017), 47.  From Hankins, Romans 9, footnote 2. ↩︎
15. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 684.  As found in Eric Hankins, Romans 9, footnote 2. ↩︎
16. “Does Romans 9 Teach Calvinistic Reprobation?”  https://youtu.be/HMWUTh9R5cI Time: 7:19 – 8:28. Last accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
17. Ibid. Time: 8:33 – 9:35 ↩︎
18. Ibid. Time: 9:35 – 10:50 ↩︎
19. Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 18, 19. ↩︎
20. “Does Romans 9 Teach Calvinistic Reprobation?” https://youtu.be/HMWUTh9R5cI  Time: 15:12 – 15:53. ↩︎
21. Ibid. Time: 15:58 – 17:06. Last accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
22. Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 18, 19. ↩︎
23. As found in Leighton C. Flowers, The Potter’s Promise: A Biblical Defense of Traditional Soteriology (Trinity Academic Press, 2017, 57.  William Lane Craig’s quote is from the transcript of Defenders 2 class, The Doctrine of Creation, Part 10.  https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-2/s2-doctrine-of-creation/doctrine-of-creation-part-10/ Last accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
24. “Does Romans 9 Teach Calvinistic Reprobation?”  https://youtu.be/HMWUTh9R5cI Lact accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
25. William Lane Craig’s quote is from the transcript of Defenders 2 class, The Doctrine of Creation, Part 10.  https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-2/s2-doctrine-of-creation/doctrine-of-creation-part-10/ Last accessed Nov. 10, 2025. ↩︎
26. Raymond C. Ortlund Jr., “The Sovereignty of God: Case Study in the Old Testament,” in Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), footnote 5, p. 27. ↩︎