Helm, Calvin, and Castellio: The Battle for Reason and Common Sense in Interpretation

Here is a clickable outline of the sections in this post.

Introduction

Calvinists employ certain rationalizations to justify or explain their incoherent theological and soteriological doctrines. Examples of these are: mystery, tension, antinomy, the Bible teaches both, etc. Below, I examine two others from the introduction of Paul Helm’s book The Secret Providence of God. They are incomprehensibility and two wills in God.

Calvinist Paul Helm documents the “explanatory” approach Calvin himself took in his work Concerning the Secret Providence of God (1558). When pressed on the logical and moral difficulties in his theology by a French theologian, Sebastian Castellio (1515–1563), Calvin ultimately resorts to incomprehensibility. Helm follows the exchange between Calvin and Castellio in his book The Secret Providence of God. Helm, as the editor, writes the introduction in which he describes Calvin’s views on providence and predestination as follows.

“Such providence/predestination was “absolute”; that is, it was not conditioned by any human merit or by God’s foreknowledge of any other such preconditions, nor is providence to be regarded as a mere general superintendence of the creation. Rather it reaches down to every detail, including the intricacies of human action. Thus Calvin’s belief about predestination/providence also embrace the fall and the propagation of original sin, as well as those predestined to life according to God’s foreknowledge and election were only a minority of the human race and the predestination of the elect has it counterpart in the perdition of the reprobate.”^[1]

Calvin on ‘Two Wills in God’ and Castellio’s Response

One way Calvin sought to reconcile his understanding of an “absolute” providence and predestination with human responsibility was to claim there are two senses in which God wills things. This was expressed as a “bare” permission and “willing” permission, that is, there is God’s decretive or secret will by which God determines and causes whatever comes to pass – all desires, beliefs, attitudes, actions and eternal destinies (“bare” permission), and yet there is also God’s revealed or preceptive^[2] will, commanding or prohibiting certain desires, beliefs, attitudes and actions, and to which he holds men responsible for their disobedience and for their rejection of Christ and salvation (“willing” permission).

One of the problems Castellio had with Calvin’s view is that if God decrees all things, then this idea of a second will, that is, the revealed or preceptive will, is logically incoherent with that decretive or secret will that determines all things. Since God, by his decretive or secret will, predetermined all things “down to every detail,” God’s revealed or preceptive will has no meaning. It is just a distinction without a difference. It is “nominal,” or in name only. The incoherence was obvious to Castellio.

Castellio also critiqued Calvin for claiming that God causes men to do or not do by his decretive or secret will that which is contrary to what he otherwise commands or prohibits in his revealed or preceptive will. People violate God’s revealed will, precepts, or commands every day. According to Calvin, God secretly decreed that they do so. This presents a duplicitous and conflicted view of God.

Moreover, Castellio points out that if God has decreed all things, then a logical corollary of this is that God decreed all evil and is therefore responsible for it. Indeed, God is himself evil. The alternative would be to argue that because God is just and good, the actions he decreed are not really evil at all. Helm recounts Castellio’s objections and gives us Calvin’s ultimate response.

“Castellio’s general line is that the distinction between God’s willing permission and God’s decree is merely nominal, so that, in effect, if by decree God wills all that comes to pass then he wills evil in precisely the same fashion as he wills good, and he is responsible for evil in precisely the same sense that he responsible for good. This not only compromises God’s character but also calls into question another of Calvin’s nuances: his distinction between “two wills” in God – “will” in the sense of what God decrees and “will” in the sense of what God commands. Castellio’s preference for understanding divine providence as “bare” providence and divine foreknowledge as “mere” foreknowledge and his rejection of the stronger senses of these terms lead him to ridicule what in fact are Calvin’s central and controlling distinctions in this debate.

Castellio argues that if, as Calvin claims, God controls whatever comes to pass, then how can he sincerely command what is at odds with what he decrees shall come to pass? Surely, if God wills an action to occur, and if so, then how can he sincerely forbid it and how can that action be evil? Castellio has some fun at Calvin’s expense in claiming that Calvin’s doctrine obliterates moral distinctions, making it difficult to distinguish between God and the Devil! (Article 3). So he represents Calvin’s views as “all the crimes that have been accomplished by any man are the good and just works of God” (Article 4) and “the will of God is the supreme cause of the hardness of men’s hearts” (Article 9).”^[3]

What Do You Think of Calvin’s ‘Two Wills in God’ Explanation?

We should stop here and ask whether Calvin’s “two wills” is the teaching of Scripture or just contrived to accommodate the logical and moral problems within Calvin’s interpretation of Scripture. By presenting responsible alternative interpretations of the relevant texts that don’t run afoul of logic and our moral intuitions, we can be confident that Calvin’s “two wills” response is not the teaching of Scripture and amounts to a contrived attempt to solve these problems caused by his determinism. And of course, many non-Calvinist scholars have provided such responsible alternative interpretations. So this really is not a matter of the Calvinist position being biblical and all others not, as Calvinists claim.

Therefore, more pertinent to our hermeneutical inquiry, we must ask the Calvinist why Castellio’s conclusions are wrong. Why are they not the logical and moral entailments of Calvin’s determinism and, therefore, legitimate criticisms, that is, legitimate criticisms from a hermeneutical point of view that certainly do render Calvin’s interpretations invalid? We should press the Calvinists as to whether logical and moral considerations are indispensable to proper interpretation and whether they are reliable indicators of the validity or invalidity of their own or anyone else’s interpretations. For the Calvinist to respond that their doctrines are the teaching of Scripture would be mere question-begging. To admit that logical and moral considerations are indispensable to proper interpretation would be to shipwreck the Calvinist position on the rocks of logic and moral intuition as part of a sound hermeneutic. It would indict their own interpretations as seriously flawed. On the other hand, to respond that logical and moral considerations are dispensable or not essential to proper exegesis and interpretation, the Calvinist would be adopting a hermeneutic of incoherence, which disallows all rational assessment of Scripture. Even the prospect of rational dialogue over the meaning of certain texts is made impossible by such a hermeneutic of incoherence. But this is precisely the hermeneutic the Calvinist has adopted. That is why Calvinists must flee to “mystery,” for it sounds like the most “convincing” option in light of the formidable critiques that biblical exegesis, philosophical reflection, and moral intuition level against Calvinist thought and doctrine. But this attempt to find refuge in mystery is ad hoc and still begs the question.

So let us proceed to “the central issue” at hand – Calvin’s exclusion of reason and common sense from his hermeneutic. Helm continues,

“Castellio’s fire is directed at Calvin’s inability to demonstrate how what is not commanded by God can also be willed by God in a significant sense, and this opens up what for Calvin turns out to be the central issue. This is Castellio’s fondness for preferring his own reason to what for Calvin is the clear teaching of the Word of God about the Lord’s decreeing evil and his use of that evil to further his own purposes. Castellio believes that by reason, common sense, and the use of certain apt analogies, he can clear up or rather avoid what Calvin regards as divine mysteries, the fact that these matters are beyond our full understanding, being “ineffable.” Calvin freely recognizes that we cannot altogether see how what God commands and what he decrees are part of his one single will, and we cannot presently fathom the reasons that God has for electing some and bypassing others. Nevertheless, for Calvin it is sufficient that Scripture repeatedly affirms such things (along with claiming that God is not himself sinful, not “the author of sin”). We cannot fully comprehend how it is that these things – God’s universal, absolute decree and man’s culpability for evil – can be consistent, not even with the help of the distinction between primary and secondary causation, or of the doctrine of the two wills, or of God’s willing permission.”^[4]

Calvin Bans Reason, Moral Intuition, and Common Sense From His Hermeneutic

Question. Is the use of “reason, common sense, and apt analogies” in interpreting the Word of God merely a “fondness” as Helm characterizes Castellio’s argument, especially concerning reason and common sense? Philosophers, many theologians, and I think most laymen would disagree with Helm’s description. There is plenty to comprehend here via our reason and common sense. Plenty to chew on and digest. So, Castellio is correct to critique Calvin based on the deliverances of reason and common sense. And when Castellio does so, this leads to conclusions that repudiate Calvin’s interpretations and affirm Castellio’s critique of Calvin. And I submit that such conclusions are reliable interpretations of Scripture precisely because they incorporate reason and common sense. It is not that we do not have enough information about the issues at hand so that we must admit to mystery, but rather that the Bible has provided more than sufficient revelatory information on the relevant subjects, and therefore the flight to “mystery” is premature and smacks of the desire to preserve a preferred traditional interpretation rather than be involved in an objective, reasoned assessment of the text. The problem is not the lack of information. The problem is that the Calvinist is attempting to evade the information we do have.

Calvin’s approach is not very promising because it is self-refuting. “We cannot fully comprehend how it is that these things – God’s universal, absolute decree and man’s culpability for evil – can be consistent…” This implies that Calvin, because he can identify that his doctrines are inconsistent, affirms his own use of reason and its utility. But this is just to affirm reason’s usefulness in one instance – that “God’s universal, absolute decree and man’s culpability for evil” are seen as inconsistent, but to deny reason’s usefulness in another instance – for discerning the validity of Calvin’s interpretation. As far as reason’s utility in the exegetical and interpretive task is concerned, Calvin rejects it. Yet we are told that Calvin’s exegesis is correct, and therefore, we must believe in the ‘doctrines of grace’ that are the conclusions of his exegesis and live with the results as something we cannot fully comprehend. Calvin asserts that we cannot comprehend the inconsistency here, although we can discern the inconsistency here. The claim that we cannot comprehend the inconsistency is a red herring. The presence of inconsistency is the problem. The interpretive inconsistency, which is readily discerned and affirmed, is the issue here. The inconsistency between the interpretations means that the exegesis is flawed.

Calvin is employing reason arbitrarily. It is to use reason to discern the inconsistency in his interpretations on this matter, only to turn around and claim the deficiency of reason on this matter. Reason tells him there is an inconsistency in his theological propositions, but with respect to determining the validity of his interpretation of Scripture, reason doesn’t apply. According to Calvin, his interpretation is inconsistent, yet correct, yet also incomprehensible. It is by such confusion that Calvinists recruit people into Calvinism and keep themselves and others in the fold.

Note what is going on here. First, we are told that the Calvinist difficulties do not conform to reason or common sense, which is only to acknowledge that our reason and common sense are functioning reliably because we can discern these difficulties. But then, in an ad hoc fashion, we are told that this same reason and common sense do not function reliably when it comes to assessing the validity of Calvin’s “teaching of Scripture.” This seems to be Calvin’s way to avoid a substantive critique of his interpretation of Scripture. It is very effective because he is putting out of court the very thing that we need to discern the validity of his interpretation – the deliberations of reason, our moral intuitions, and common sense. I submit that Calvin is leaving himself open to the charge of irrationality. But that does not matter to Calvin. So when Calvin bans reason and moral common sense from his hermeneutic, his doctrines can remain intact on other grounds, like claims of mystery or incomprehensibility. But also, along with Calvin’s rejection of reason and moral common sense from his hermeneutic, all hope of resolving this problem ceases.

Now, two different hermeneutics are in play, and they are mutually incompatible with respect to the role of logical and moral reasoning in the interpretive enterprise. Calvin has assured us that any dialogue about the meaning of the biblical text could never be productive. Also, his interpretations can never be challenged by the Castellios of the world because Calvin has insulated himself from their “fondness for preferring their own reason to what, for Calvin, is the clear teaching of the Word of God.” If Calvin has his way, the Castellios of the world would be left with nothing by which to discern the truth or falsity of Calvin’s proposed interpretations. The canons of reason, moral intuition, and common sense, which are necessary to discern interpretive validity, have been banished by Calvin. But discerning interpretive validity is the purview of reason, moral intuition, and common sense.

Hence, as you have probably already observed, Calvin’s position is merely question-begging. Despite the incoherencies Castellio has pointed out in Calvin’s interpretations and that Calvin himself recognizes, “Nevertheless, for Calvin it is sufficient that Scripture repeatedly affirms such things,” and Calvin insists that they are “the clear teaching of the Word of God.” Now, why is that? Simply because Calvin presupposes the truth of his interpretations based on a hermeneutic of incoherence. Calvin is begging the question. Calvin’s interpretations are certainly not biblically accurate if we take rational and moral reasoning on board in our hermeneutic, as Castellio argues needs to be done. But Calvin doesn’t think so. Hence, the hermeneutical divide.

Furthermore, if Castellio is prevented from objecting to Calvin’s views based on reason and common sense, he would be more likely to acquiesce to Calvin’s interpretations. After all, why wouldn’t Calvin’s interpretations be just as legitimate as Castellio’s? This is what Calvin would prefer. It is what Calvinists hope for. It is what Calvinists press for to this very day with their rationalizations. We can see that, given Calvin’s stance, which rejects reason’s critique of his doctrinal propositions, Calvinism requires this suppression of reason for persons to give assent to Calvinist theology and remain Calvinists.

An important hermeneutical question is being highlighted in this exchange between Calvin and Castellio. Are Castellio’s metaphysical observations sufficient to defeat Calvin’s doctrinal and interpretive claims? I think so, for the same reasons that we don’t accept square circles, married bachelors, and talk about justice being green. These things just don’t make sense. Therefore, for the same reasons, that is, that laws of logic apply even to talk about God, and especially to the interpretation of His divinely inspired written texts, we know Calvin has erred here. This philosophical critique is enough to show Calvin is wrong.

Calvinism is Exegetically and Philosophically Flawed

But along with this logical and moral critique of Calvin, Castellio would need to present alternative exegetically sound interpretations of the relevant texts that do not entail the philosophical incoherence and contradictions that Calvin’s interpretations do. Once that is done, Calvin’s “central issue” would no longer hold weight doctrinally because it would be shown to be both interpretively and philosophically flawed. Calvin (and Helm) wouldn’t be able to cavalierly conclude that Castellio prefers his own reason and common sense over what, for Calvin, is the “clear teaching” of Scripture because Castellio would have offered alternative, exegetically responsible, coherent interpretations. Calvin would also have to deal with those alternative interpretations on the basis that they accomplish both a responsible exegesis and a coherent exegetical result. And if Calvin were to disagree with those alternative interpretations, he would have to show, without using principles of logical reasoning, moral intuitions, or common sense, how they are not the teaching of Scripture. Having already rejected them in his interpretive methodology, these faculties and their deliverances are no longer available to him. Calvin would have to show us how we know a “clear teaching of the Word of God” when the criteria of logical reasoning, moral intuitions, and common sense are put out of court in the exegetical process. How could Calvin ever show us that?! How would we ever know the “clear teaching of Word of God” apart from properly reasoning about what we are reading and applying our logic, moral intuition, and common sense to the proposed conclusions of that reading?

Now, these exegetically responsible alternative interpretations are available. Non-Calvinists are providing “clear teaching of the Word of God” on the relevant texts. See my bibliography and other pertinent chapters on this site for responsible, exegetical non-Calvinist treatments of the passages Calvinists claim teach their Calvinism. The point is that the non-Calvinist’s exegesis of the relevant passages will conflict with the Calvinist’s interpretations because the non-Calvinist requires their interpretations to be logically and morally coherent, whereas the Calvinist does not. So here again we have the hermeneutical divide.

Hence, if Calvinists have jettisoned rational and moral considerations from their hermeneutic, why would they then accept rational and moral critiques as evidence against the validity of their exegeses and interpretive conclusions? This is precisely what Calvin is doing here with Castellio. In addition, why should the Calvinist give attention to logical and moral considerations held out as evidence for the accuracy of the non-Calvinist’s exegesis and interpretations? The Calvinist can simply reject any interpretations other than their own and never have to provide reasons for doing so. But, of course, this is irresponsible.

Indeed, I submit this is one reason why Calvinists feel no responsibility to respond to the critiques leveled against Calvinism. Calvinists know that these critiques are the death knell for their theology; therefore, they do not feel obligated, or rather, they must do their best to avoid responding to the logical and moral criticisms of their teachings and doctrines. After all, “for Calvin it is sufficient that Scripture repeatedly affirms such things,” and “we cannot fully comprehend how it is that these things…can be consistent, not even with the help of the distinction between primary and secondary causation, or of the doctrine of the two wills, or of God’s willing permission.” They may even subsume all disagreement under the predetermined will of God and, therefore, be inclined to conclude that attempts to persuade their critics to embrace their doctrines are a futile effort. If God has not determined to do an effective work in them, then no change is possible. That being the case, there is not much the Calvinist can or is motivated to do, if anything. Their critics must be left to God to work the needed change of mind and heart.

Calvin: ‘Particular Providence’ and More On The ‘Two Wills in God’

Helm continues,

“God’s revealed law establishes moral standards and obligations which, as is known from experience, are widely flouted, for men and women frequently act immorally. But given God’s providential government of his creation and also his predestination of the saints, such immoralities are also willed by God, for they are part of his “particular” providence, the character of which is equitable and just. To use two examples cited by Calvin, God prohibits incest, and yet he willed that Absalom should commit incest. He forbids deceit and yet willed that Jesus should be betrayed, and so on. What is hidden from us, the factor that leads to Calvin’s habitual reference to “secret” providence, are God’s purposes or reasons for willingly permitting the particular occasions of evil that occur and for denying salvation to many.”^[5]

Here we have an attempt to introduce conditionality or contingency into Calvinist theistic determinism. But it fails, as expected, because of the contradictory and confusing terminology of “willingly permitting,” in which “willingly” is supposed to refer to God having preordained whatsoever comes to pass, while “permitting” is supposed to refer to people choosing to do what they do and being culpable for it. Calvin is equivocating on the word “willing.” Helm acknowledges this when he writes,

“Calvin notes that in phrases such as “God’s secret will” and “God’s revealed will” the word will is used equivocally. These are not only two different senses of will, but insofar as the revealed will is flouted, God’s will in this sense is at odds with his divine decree. But Calvin hardly helps his own cause when he occasionally uses expressions such as “God wills what he does not will.” For if God wills what he does not will, there is a contradiction at the very heart of what, according to Calvin, God wills. But he vehemently denies this, so the two wills need to be carefully distinguished.”

So there is “a contradiction at the very heart of what, for Calvin, God wills.” And of course, Calvin and contemporary Calvinists would vehemently deny this. But his “two wills in God” explanation does nothing to relieve the contradiction. Neither does his bold assertion that there is no contradiction here. Now, we need to observe and acknowledge this and come to grips with its interpretive implications. We need to decide whether the presence of contradiction indicates a misinterpretation of the text in some respect or whether such incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction can simply be ignored in the exegetical and interpretive task.

Helm has written, “…if God wills what he does not will, there is a contradiction at the very heart of what, according to Calvin, God wills.” There is a contradiction here because Calvin teaches that God wills, as in determines, all things to occur as they do, and that God also wills, as in desires, that those things he determined should not happen as they do. This is to state nothing more than that God is confused. Helm tells us that even Calvin knew his theology was confused, although he refused to see any interpretive significance in it.

“One has the impression, from The Secret Providence of God and from other writings such as the Institutes, that deploying this distinction is not Calvin’s preferred option just because of the confusion between “willing permission” and “bare permission” that it engenders.”

What drives all this confusion? The monolithic Calvinist doctrine of the eternal divine decree, or, theistic determinism.

“…God is in the occurrence of every evil in virtue of his decreeing it.”^[6]

Calvin’s “two wills” theory makes no sense. For Calvin to simply assert that his theory of “two wills” in God does not lead to a contradiction does not make it so. His “two wills” theory, which is not the teaching of Scripture and was concocted to soften his determinism, leads to an inevitable contradiction. And the fallacy of equivocation is certainly no help here. We should not attempt to repair a failed theology by proposing fallacies. Who wants their position to be based on fallacies? Furthermore, this fallacy should not be described as “carefully distinguished” meanings of the word “will.” When we “carefully distinguish” the word “will” in the summary statement of Calvin’s position, that “God wills what he does not will,” this can only mean “God decrees to occur what he does not want to occur.” And that is schizophrenic nonsense. And we ought not to let ourselves become so confused as to think it credible under the guise of exalting God’s sovereignty or his grace. Hold onto your common sense. Don’t let it go.

Certainly, “permission” involves “willing” to allow something to happen. This “willing” is not problematic, but neither is it the type of “willing” that is at issue here. What is a problem is the use of the word “willing” as decreeing or predetermining, defined as a universal divine causal determinism. The word “willing” as meaning God decrees all things, coupled with the words “permitting” or permission” produces an incoherence because it implies the wills of two different moral agents in action, but this is excluded by the Calvinist’s universal divine causal determinism. To insert “willingly” before “permits” in an attempt to make determinism coherent with the concept of permission. We should see it for what it is – linguistic legerdemain. It is to speak nonsense and therefore just doesn’t work. No one has an issue with the fact that God “willingly permits,” that is, allows evil things to happen, but that is just the point. It is enough to say that God permits evil things to happen. That is the more accurate reflection of the testimony of Scripture. The word “willingly” is not necessary, as such, it is contrived for a purpose it could never achieve, that is, to support and preserve the Calvinist doctrine of theistic determinism. Of course, with respect to God, when he permits or allows someone to do an evil act, God is doing so “willingly.” But he is not willing the act to occur in the sense of having predetermined it and causing it to come to pass.

Equivocating on the word “willingly” is an example of the linguistic gymnastics Calvinists are so famous for. We obviously all agree that God permits certain evils to occur, but that God “willingly permits” with the meaning of this phrase being that he predetermined them by his own will to unfailingly come to pass and is therefore the cause of that evil, is incoherent with the concept of permission. We have no problem with the word ‘willingly’ to refer to God permitting evil acts to occur. We have a problem with him causing them to happen by his own will, according to his eternal decree, which predetermined “whatsoever comes to pass,” and then trying to convince us this is somehow coherent with permission.^[7] It is true that,

“Bare permission fits snugly in the theological thinking of someone whose God is not all-decreeing.”^[8]

And permission, “bare,” “willing” or otherwise, does not fit at all into the theological thinking of someone whose God is all-determining. So permission has to be jammed into such a theology regardless of the logical and moral wreckage left in its wake.

Helm and Calvin v. Castellio

Recall that Paul Helm is also a Calvinist. This is why, at times, he seems to be a spokesperson in defense of Calvin. Helm has previously told us that “God’s universal, absolute decree and man’s culpability for evil” can never be comprehended as consistent, “not even with the help of the distinction between primary and secondary causation, or of the doctrine of the two wills, or of God’s willing permission.”^[9] Helm explains,

“For Calvin, God has the right to discriminate and choose, even though his reasons for choosing are inscrutable to us. He is our Father in the sense that he is our creator and sustainer, but he has the rights of a creator, and this must never be forgotten. Castellio’s fondness for analogies that fly in the face of what Calvin regards as the clear teaching of Scripture touches upon what he sees as Castellio’s second epistemological deficiency; his intolerance of and impatience over any attribution of mystery or unaccountability to God’s ways. Calvin is ready to emphasize human limitations in understanding or explaining God’s ways. Castellio is not.”^[10]

Just what the full characteristics and nature of this “Father” God are needs further explanation. For instance, how does the love, grace, and compassion of the God of the Bible fit into Calvin’s “Father” who exercises “the rights of a creator” that are so egregious to our moral sensibilities and also inscrutable to us, such that true knowledge of this “Father’s” character is placed beyond our grasp? How does “he is our creator and sustainer, but he has the rights of a creator, and this must never be forgotten” help in sorting out the kind of “creator and sustainer” Calvin has painted for us – one who predestines people to hell before he creates them and is the cause of all evil? Resorting to “he has the rights of a creator” does nothing to explain or relieve the logical and moral problems in Calvin’s theology. All this highlights once again what the main issue is in this controversy. Again, the main issue is not that “his [God’s] reasons for choosing are inscrutable to us.” That is question-begging because it presupposes the Bible teaches Calvinist “choosing” (i.e., unconditional election). Rather, the issue is that “his choosing” causes incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction within the Bible itself, which tells us that Calvin has got things wrong. God does not “discriminate and choose” as Calvin defines these in his doctrines of unconditional election or predestination. These are Calvin’s misinterpretations of Scripture. We therefore know that talk of these doctrines as included in the “rights of a creator” is merely an unfounded assertion because the Creator that we find in Scripture has not written a text that contains incoherence, inconsistency, and contradiction. Calvin and Helm’s problem is their refusal to adopt a hermeneutic of coherence.

Another Calvinist tactic, insulating their theology from critique while attempting to preserve it, is revealed here. That is, the assertion that non-Calvinists are intolerant of and impatient with “any attribution of mystery or unaccountability to God’s ways.” In response, first, what we are impatient with, and rightly so, is not mystery but interpretive incoherence. When Helm states that “Calvin is ready to emphasize human limitations in understanding or explaining God’s ways,” what he is really confessing is that Calvin is ready to ignore what human reason exposes about the incoherence of his interpretations and doctrines. Calvin resorts to “God’s ways” being beyond our ways as an excuse to ignore the insurmountable problems that logical and moral reasoning reveal in his doctrines. Calvinists have a vested interest in non-Calvinists being “patient” with their “mystery,” which is only to say, “Don’t challenge my theology on logical or moral grounds lest you expose it as incoherent.” Secondly, the assertion that non-Calvinists refuse to be accountable to “God’s ways” is just another instance of question-begging. The Calvinist is here merely presupposing the truth of their exegeses and doctrines. In addition, Calvinists will also charge non-Calvinists with not appreciating the “nuances” of Calvinism and being “impatient” with them. Helm writes,

“Castellio’s strategy is to ignore Calvin’s nuances and to straightforwardly charge Calvin’s God with being the author of evil. Dialectically, Calvin is at something of a disadvantage at such points because he has to answer the charge that God is the author of sin by deploying his distinctions, as well as by appealing to divine inscrutability, and this procedure is made to seem contrived and self-serving to someone as impatient as Castellio.”^[11]

It is “contrived and self-serving” because Calvin is stuck with his ‘God’ being the author of evil. I have examined Calvin’s “distinctions” in Chapter 8 and have shown that they are as incoherent and contradictory as the deterministic doctrines they attempt to justify and protect. And none of Calvin’s “nuances” can ward off the straightforward charge that Calvin’s God is the author of evil. There are no “nuances” here. There are just incoherent interpretations of Scripture. There are no “nuances” that can alter the common-sense, logical, and moral reasoning that leads most people to the conclusion that something is very wrong with Calvinism. They can clearly see that its determinism is untenable. Calvin certainly is at “a disadvantage at such points” because Calvin’s “distinctions” do not succeed in extricating Calvinism from its logical and moral difficulties. You can attempt to divert attention away from these difficulties by claiming that there are “nuances” and “distinctions” that need to be considered. But when all of these are considered, the charges that logical reflection and moral intuition level against the Calvinist doctrines and their theistic determinism hold fast. That is why Calvin must ultimately appeal to “divine inscrutability.” But this is no help either. It certainly is “contrived and self-serving,” but not because Castellio is “impatient” with Calvin, but because Calvin, and Calvinists to this day, just will not face the fact that their interpretations and the theological doctrines derived from them are incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory. This accusation of “impatience” is really a way of saying “Don’t push too hard or too fast in identifying the obvious logical and moral inconsistencies, incoherencies, and contradictions in our theology. Please accept our ‘distinctions’ and ‘nuances’ as sufficient ‘reasonings’ in support of our doctrinal positions. We know these cannot address the objections raised against our theology, but at least allow us to continue to justify our position to ourselves.” But we cannot allow this to happen because essential biblical truths are at stake.

A Serious Matter: Two Different Conceptions of God

Helm recognizes the seriousness of these matters. He writes,

“These differences are symptomatic of two different conceptions of God.”^[12]

This is certainly true and reveals the profound importance of this controversy. Does the Bible present two different conceptions of God?! Of course not. If not, then one conception (or both) is the result of a serious misinterpretation of Scripture. I submit that the substantial evidence reveals that Calvin’s god is not the God of the Bible. This is the case because all that Calvin and Calvinists can do, when everything is said and done, is flee to mystery and incomprehensibility. Helm continues,

“In his theology Calvin never resorts to paradox or logical incoherence to address theological problems, even though he readily recognizes God’s inaccessibility. But how can his account of God possibly be consistent? How can he have two wills and not generally permit evil but willingly permit this evil and that evil? How can he proclaim the freeness of his grace and at the same time elect and predestinate only a small minority of the human race to salvation? Calvin’s response to such questions is threefold: to affirm the meaning and truth of the Scriptural data that call forth these distinctions, to resolutely refuse to apply analogies to God that are not themselves warranted by Scripture, and to affirm (also on scriptural precedent) that God’s ways are mysterious and unfathomable.”^[13]

And this precisely identifies the problem in Calvinism. Calvin himself refused to embrace a hermeneutic of coherence. Notice Calvin’s assertion about the Scripture data “that call forth these distinctions.” He is convinced he has correctly interpreted and understood the scriptures. But we know he has not, because of the incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions in his results. This is Calvin refusing to acknowledge a hermeneutic of coherence. Coherence, consistency, and non-contradiction simply do not matter to Calvin. He will never admit to the incoherence of his interpretations, and therefore, he must flee to “God’s inaccessibility” and “that God’s ways are mysterious and unfathomable.” The things that Calvin claims are hidden from us are the products of his own misinterpretations of Scripture. Given alternative interpretations, many, if not all, of the problems raised here do not arise. On non-deterministic interpretations of divine sovereignty, these “logical difficulties” are not even raised.

Furthermore, why Castellio’s critique of Calvin’s theology should even trouble Calvin confirms how inconsistent Calvin and Calvinists are in their thinking and practice in comparison with their theology. If we grant Calvin’s theistic determinism for a moment, since Castellio was predetermined to believe what he believed and say what he said, what was Calvin to do? Why should it even matter to Calvin? It is hard to understand why Calvin would even bother responding to Castellio, for it was God himself who caused Castellio to think, desire, believe, and speak as he did. So that means that Calvin was arguing with God himself!

What I have attempted to show above is that Paul Helm’s account documents the logical incoherence and contradiction in Calvin’s theology, and not only that, but also Calvin’s failed attempts to deal with the incoherence in his theology with his ideas of “incomprehensibility,” “two wills in God,” and that God ‘willingly permits” evil. These attempts only breed more incoherence. Calvin’s explanations did not free him from his problem of logical and moral incoherence. Therefore, why Calvinists make any attempt at presenting their theistic determinism as consistent, coherent, or non-contradictory with human responsibility and man’s culpability for evil is where the true mystery lies.

We can thank Paul Helm for his assessment of Calvin’s reasoning in contrast to Castellio’s. It probably won’t convert any Calvinists if it didn’t convert Helm himself! Although for a Calvinist to follow Castellio and become a non-Calvinist would require that the Calvinist be predetermined by God to change their position. I can’t say that they would have to be persuaded that the logical and moral objections raised are enough to determine the invalidity of Calvin’s interpretations. That would require the Calvinist to accept the non-Calvinist’s worldview in which free will is a reality. But the Calvinist will never be persuaded of this because, as I have attempted to show, a Calvinist is, by definition, one who simply does not take logical and moral coherence on board in their interpretive processes and for determining the validity of their interpretations. These are necessary for persuasion to take place. The Calvinist doctrines of the divine eternal decree and the sovereignty of God, defined deterministically, which generate the logical and moral incoherence in their theology, are a priori biblical truths and therefore are incontrovertible doctrines. As such, this closes the door to these “logical difficulties” playing a role in determining the validity of their interpretations.

Concluding Thoughts

I think Castellio was right, not only because his critiques of Calvin’s theology made sense, but also because he exposed the nonsense in Calvin’s theology. We saw how Calvin didn’t make sense in his theology, but tried to rationalize his way through his incoherence. Therefore, I hope this account of the differences between Calvin and Castellio on the role of logical reflection and moral intuition in the interpretive enterprise will convince you that they are critical for doing good interpretation, while also giving pause to you who are being pressured by Calvinists to suppress your logical and moral faculties so that you would embrace Calvinism. Stand firm on your God-given rational faculties and moral intuitions. Stand firm on God’s word rightly expounded. And especially stand firm on the truth of the Gospel, which is always truly “good news!”

Footnotes

[1] John Calvin, The Secret Providence of God, ed. Paul Helm, (Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 21.

[2] This may also be called his ‘prescriptive will’ in the sense that God prescribes what we are to do and not do. The term ‘preceptive will’ means the same thing. It refers to God’s precepts or commands regarding what we are to do or not do.

[3] Ibid. 23-24.

[4] Ibid. 24-25.

[5] Ibid. 26.

[6] Ibid. 27.

[7] Other matters of concern can be brought up here. For instance, the fact that God permits evils, that is, that he has not predetermined, decreed, and caused those evils, does not entail that evil acts have no reason or purpose. That God has to decree and be the cause of evil for it to have a reason or purpose is a non-sequitur and impugns the character of God. God can redeem evil that he has not decreed; that is, make purposeful, have reasons for, and finally judge the evil he allows to occur. The free will defense would argue that a reason God has for allowing evil is that God wanted to create morally free agents – creatures with freedom of choice. This introduced the possibility that they may go wrong and do evil. He does not stop all evil, and the reason or purpose that an evil doer does evil lies within them. The act remains an evil act done by them for which God will hold them responsible. But God’s reasons for creating creatures that can do evil are that they may also love him freely.

Also, given the moral contradictions above, what is the Calvinist’s claim that God is equitable and just based on? Certainly not on our sense of equity and justice! And if God’s equity and justice are in no sense like ours, or rather, if our moral intuitions of equity and justice, although incomplete, are in no sense true reflections of God’s, then God is, we know not what. We have no true knowledge of God. God may truly be a moral monster.

[8] John Calvin, The Secret Providence of God, ed. Paul Helm, (Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 27.

[9] Ibid. 25.

[10] Ibid. 28-29.

[11] Ibid. 29.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.